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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
There is nothing in which people more betray their character  
than in what they find to laugh at. 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Elective Affinitites1 
 
 
This dissertation attempts to examine the Greek terminology for 
laughter, analyze its use in Ancient Greek drama of the classical period as well 
as interpret the understandings of laughter in the surviving plays and 
fragments2 of Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides. As indicated in the subtitle 
of the thesis, the primary subject of the study is the phenomenon of laughter in 
the tragedies and satyr plays of the three major Greek playwrights. In this 
disseration, I treat the following questions: 
1) What is laughter? 
2) What is the terminology for laughter in the Ancient Greek language? 
3) What are the understandings of laughter reflected in the Ancient 
Greek language? 
4) What is the general perception of laughter in Greek drama?3 
5) What are the similarities and differences in the treatment of the motif 
of laughter between the three major dramatists? 
This study therefore is set to elucidate the fact that laughter is not only 
connected with humour and that the dramatists of the fifth-century BC 
recognized this fact and, in their works, evoked other aspects of the 
                                               
1 Goethe (1854) 140. 
2 Hereon, I use the word ‘fragment(s)’ as a technical term to denote the pieces of dramatic plays 
by Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides which were not transmitted to our times in complete 
form. 
3 Hereon, I apply the expression ‘Greek drama’ in reference to the defined corpus of texts by 
Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides. 
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phenomenon of laughter. With this study, I hope to provide a thorough 
explanation of the phenomenon itself, present a classification of laughter and 
apply it in my analysis of the Greek texts. 
In order to carry out a detailed examination of laughter in Greek drama, 
the material for study has been limited to the works of Aeschylus, Sophocles 
and Euripides. In this thesis, I omit the works and fragments of Aristophanes, 
due to fact of a very large number of references to laughter found in the 
preserved plays and fragments of the comic playwright (91).4 Its addition to the 
110 references found in the defined material of the three dramatists would 
exceed the limits of this thesis. Furthermore, in my study I am concerned with 
those passages containing the terminology for laughter which explicitly refers 
to the phenomenon and does not imply it. Next, it is not my focus of interest to 
analyze the potential reaction of laughter in the audience nor is my study 
devoted to the examination of comic elements in the tragedies and satyr plays.5 
Finally, my lexical-semantic analysis excludes interjections, for there are no 
explicit references in the discussed texts to a Greek ‘ha-ha-ha’. However, at 
times, I include into my discussion the possibility of an actor emitting laughter 
onstage, should the text provide any clues on the matter with the used 
terminology for laughter. 
I have distributed the study into two main parts: the first deals with the 
phenomenon of laughter (subdivided into two chapters), whereas the second 
examines the understandings of laughter in the works and fragments of the 
                                               
4 For a list of laughter-words in Aristophanean drama, see the beginning of Part II. 
5 For comic elements in Greek tragedy, the most exhaustive study remains that of Bernd 
Seidensticker (1982), Palintonos Harmonia: Studien zu komischen Elementen in der griechischen 
Tragödie, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Worth mentioning are the articles by Jacques 
Jouanna (1998), ‘Le sourire des Tragiques grecs’, and Simon Goldhill (2006), ‘The Thrill of 
Misplaced Laughter’. For humour in the works of Euripides, see the article of Justina Gregory 
(1999-2000), ‘Comic elements in Euripides’, in Cropp, M. J., Lee, K. H., and Sansone D., eds. 
(1999-2000), Euripides and Tragic Theatre in the Late Fifth Century, Champaign, Ill. (Illinois 
Classical Studies 24-25) 59-74. For comicality in the Bacchae, see Bernd Seidensticker (1978), 
‘Comic elements in Euripides‘ Bacchae‘, AJP 99: 303-320. 
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three major Greek playwrights (subdivided into three chapters). Chapter I 
discusses the subject of laughter in general, starting out with its universal 
definition provided by the Oxford English Dictionary, then it analyzes the three 
traditional theories of laughter as well as the modern explanations for the 
phenomenon. Chapter II examines the Greek terminology of laughter and 
distinguishes the its understandings in the Ancient Greek language. The 
following three chapters present the lexical-interpretative analysis of the 
references to laughter found in the studied texts of Aeschylus (chapter III), 
Sophocles (chapter IV), and Euripides (chapter V). In these three chapters, I will 
apply the same methodological criteria, which I intend to distinguish in the first 
part of this study, for the analysis of the Greek vocabulary of laughter and its 
interpretations in the dramatic texts of the three authors, should the texts allow 
to do so. 
In this study, I have adopted the Harvard Referencing system. 
Accordingly, references to the texts of ancient authors are presented under the 
names of the editors. As the primary text source for the surviving dramas of the 
three playwrights, I use the Oxford Classical Texts editions: Page (1972) for 
Aeschylus; Lloyd-Jones and Wilson (1990) for Sophocles; and Diggle (1981, 
1984, 1994) for Euripides, unless stated otherwise. All references to the three 
dramatists are given by the standard line-numbering, which is used by the 
editors above and by most translators. The fragments are cited from Tragicorum 
Graecorum Fragmenta (TrGF) and their references follow the numbering from 
this edition. Since translators differ in their choice of rendering the studied 
Greek laughter-words, different translations of the plays and fragments are of 
use; this is every time clearly indicated. When I cite passages of analyzed texts, 
I emphasize the Greek terms for laughter in bold (should they occur) as well as 
their equivalents in the quoted English translations. Also, I aptly note those 
cases in which I have made my own translation of a passage, should its 
available translations not retain the original reference to laughter. 
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Proper names of authors, gods and characters are in Latinised form (e.g. 
Aeschylus, Dionysus, Polynices). Although the abbreviations of the Greek 
authors and their works come from the Latin versions (e.g. Tr. for Troades), I 
usually apply the English names of the Greek plays in the text of my thesis (e.g. 
Trojan Women). 
Laughter may seem, at first, easy to identify. Its common association is 
that of a person’s loud, audible reaction to the comic, i.e. to those things 
(people, items, situations) that possess such a quality in them that stimulate 
laughter. In relation to literature, this connection has a long tradition dating 
back to antiquity and is best represented by one of the two universal symbols of 
theatre, i.e. the laughing mask. Comedy, therefore, is a literary genre associated 
with laughter the most, since it is aimed at making its audience laugh. In 
classical scholarship, this association of laughter with comic drama, but also 
with other humorous literary genres prevails, as many studies which pose 
‘laughter’ in the title, in fact, deal with the subjects of ‘humour’, ‘comicality’ or 
the genre of ‘comedy’ itself.6 In similar vein studies regarding other dramatic 
genres, particularly tragedy, apply the term ‘laughter’ in the title, when the 
subject of comic elements in Greek tragedy is in the author’s focus of interest.7 
In other words, when studies in drama are concerned, it is generally assumed 
that laughter has to do with that which is recognized to be funny.  
                                               
6 This trend is discernible in studies in both Greek and Latin literature e.g. Erich Segal (1968), 
Roman Laughter: The Comedy of Plautus, Cambridge: Harvard University Press; Umberto Albini 
(1997), Riso alla Greca. Aristofane o la fabbrica del comico, Milano: Garzanti; Anthony Corbeill 
(1996), Controlling Laughter. Political Humor in the Late Roman Republic, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press; Stuart Douglas Olson (2007), Broken Laughter. Select Fragments of Greek Comedy, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press; John R. Clarke (2008) Looking at Laughter. Humor, Power, and 
Transgression in Roman Visual Culture, 100 B.C. – A.D. 250, Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
7 E.g. the 2006 article by Goldhill entitled ‘The Thrill of Misplaced Laughter’ analyzes those 
dramatic passages, which may evoke a humorous response in the audience. Similarly Jouanna 
in his 1998 article entitled ‘Le sourire des Tragiques grecs’, although here with reference to the 
term ‘smile’, nevertheless in the understanding of ‘the comic’. 
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However, as many studies in the last century have shown, the 
phenomenon of laughter is not limited only to the association with the comic, 
but appears to be a far more complex set of behaviours taking place on many 
levels of human activity. At the turn of the twentieth century, new aspects of 
laughter were scientifically acknowledged. In his 1900 study entitled simply 
Laughter (Le Rire), the French philosopher Henri Bergson pointed out the social 
functions of the phenomenon. A few years later, Sigmund Freud, in his 1905 
study Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious, argued for laughter’s role in 
releasing psychic tension. The first monograph dedicated to the many 
psychological functions of the phenomenon was written by Boris Sidis in 1913, 
entitled The Psychology of Laughter. Although these three works devoted to 
laughter examined it still in connection with the comic, nevertheless they 
elucidated other aspects of the phenomenon: psychological and social. 
Throughout the twentieth century most studies included both laughter and the 
comic in their focus of interest, until, in 1972, Jan van Hoof presented his 
findings on the origins of the acts of laughing and smiling, which he presented 
in his influential article A comparative approach to the phylogeny of laughter and 
smile. The Dutch ethologist not only provided significant evidence for the 
phylogenetic origins of these two behaviours, but also indicated them as two 
separate phenomena. What is particularly interesting is the fact that his 
research was based on non-comic data and has set off the discourse on laughter 
without the need of relating it to humour. Since then, many studies have 
examined the phenomenon of laughter in its different aspects, of which 
noteworthy are the works of John Morreall (1983), Taking Laugher Seriously; 
Frank Buckley (2003), The Morality of Laughter; Wallace Chafe (2007), The 
Importance of Not Being Earnest. The Feeling Behind Laughter and Humor; and 
Alexander Kozintsev (2012), The Mirror of Laughter. The fullest treatment of the 
phenomenon of laughter in its various aspects has been provided by the 
American neurobiologist Robert Provine in his 2000 monograph entitled 
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Laughter: A Scientific Study, in which he argues for the complex socio-
psychological nature of the phenomenon. Noticeably, these works from the last 
thirty years have provided evidence that laughter is more than only a reaction 
to the comic. In other words, laughter is not only about funniness. 
In regard of research on laughter in ancient literature, in the last decades 
scholars have changed the narrow understanding of laughter from a distinct 
connection with the comic to that of a multi-faceted phenomenon. This trend 
has become noticeable from the 1990s, from which the first general studies on 
the phenomenon of laughter in ancient Greek drama come from;8 these are: the 
articles of Matthew Dillon (1991), ‘Tragic laughter’, and Stephen Halliwell 
(1991), ‘The Uses of Greek Laughter in Greek Culture’; the second chapter in 
Ingvild Gilhus (1997: 28-42), Laughing Gods, Weeping Virgins: Laughter in the 
History of Religion; and the first chapter in George Minois (2000: 15-38), Histoire 
du rire et de la derision; a set of studies on laughter in ancient Greece edited by 
Marie-Laurence Desclos (2000), Le rire des Grecs; the 1994 volume one of the 
series Laughter down the Centuries edited by Siegfrid Jäkel and Asko Timonen; 
and two monographs fully dedicated to the subject: Dominique Arnould (1990), 
Le rire et les larmes dans la littérature grecque d’Homère à Platon, and the most 
recent study by Stephen Halliwell (2008), Greek Laughter. A Study of Cultural 
Psychology from Homer to Early Christianity. To these works, which treat the 
subject of laughter in Greek drama in a general manner, there are also some 
articles, which deal with references to laughter in particular literary works. For 
                                               
8 In relation to the studies on laughter in  fifth century comedy, especially the works of 
Aristophanes, worth mentioning are: Dominique Arnould (1997), ‘Le rire selon Aristophane: 
vocabulaire et images’, in Thiercy, P., and Menu M. eds. (1997), Aristophane: la langue, la scène, la 
cité. Actes du colloque de Toulouse 9-19 mars 1994, Bari: Levante Editore: 97-106; Alan H. 
Sommerstein (2000), ‘Parlez du rire chez Aristophane’, in Desclos (2000) 65-75 (reprinted in the 
English language as ‘Talking about laughter in Aristphanes’, in Alan Sommerstein (2009), 
Talking about Laughter and Other Studies in Creek Comedy, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 104-
115; and on laughter in comedy in general, Stephen Kidd (2011), ‘Laughter interjections in 
Greek comedy’, CQ 61 (2) 445-459. Also, the general works on laughter in ancient Greece by 
Arnould (1990), Minois (2000), Halliwell (1991), (2008) discuss the subject on the examples of 
Aristophanic comedy.  
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instance, Gustav Grossmann’s 1968 article, Das Lachen des Aias, discusses the 
mad laughter of the title character in Sophocles’ Ajax; a few articles examine 
different references to laughter in Euripides’ Bacchae, e.g. Matt Neuburg (1987), 
‘Whose laughter does Pentheus fear? (Eur. Ba. 842)’, and similarly P.T. Stevens 
in his 1988 article as a response to Neuburg (entitled in the same way); as well 
as Giuseppina Basta Donzelli (2006), ‘Il riso amaro di Dioniso. Euripide, 
Baccanti’, 170-369’. As it is clear from the titles, these articles only include 
particular passages on laughter from chosen dramas. 
The most influential works on the discourse of laughter in Greek drama 
are the mentioned above studies of Arnould (1990) and Halliwell (2008), but 
also the article by Dillon (1991). Although these works deal with many aspects 
of the phenomenon, nevertheless, they fail to avoid certain shortcomings in 
their treatment of laughter in Greek drama. For instance, Arnould (1990) pays 
attention to those references to laughter in the dramas which denote the social 
aspect of hostility between a laugher and his laughed at target.9 Although she 
does acknowledge references to laughter in its other aspects passim throughout 
the study, however she only mentions them briefly and provides no fuller 
treatment of them. In short, Arnould’s discussion on laughter in the works of 
the three dramatists is general, since the French scholar does not include the 
differences in narration, style and messages conveyed in the dramas of the 
particular playwrights. Similarly the 1991 article of Dillon, who also makes 
general observations in regard of all three poets without including the specifics 
of their style. Although Dillon points out the main features of laughter in Greek 
drama, attempting to distinguish a separate type of ‘tragic laughter’, however, 
he omits the stylistic and narrative differences between the dramas of 
Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides. In other words, the scholar bases his 
analysis on generalization. The last of the three main studies on laughter is 
                                               
9 As suggested already in the title of the chapter ‘ΓΕΛΩΣΙ Δ’ΕΧΘΡΟΙ DANS LA TRAGÉDIE’. 
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Halliwell’s 2008 monumental monograph. In this excellent and exhaustive 
study, the British scholar extends his first observations on the general nature of 
Greek laughter presented in his 1991 article.10 Without any doubt, Halliwell is 
fully aware of the complexity of laughter reflected in Greek literature and 
examines the many references in all of the aspects of the phenomenon. 
However, in regard of the works of Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides, he 
limits the discussion only to a few paragraphs in the Introduction to his study 
and presents his findings in a brief as well as generalizing manner. Only in a 
section of chapter III does the scholar pay more attention to the connection of 
laughter with the symposium in three Euripidean dramas: Cyclops, Alcestis and 
Bacchae.11 Halliwell, thus, presents in brief the general characteristics of laughter 
in the works of Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides without any further 
discussion.  
In general, these three studies have contributed greatly to the discussion 
on laughter in Greek drama, however, reveal certain deficiencies. Firstly, the 
authors do not present a clearly defined classification of the phenomenon of 
laughter. Arnould (1990) omits presenting any categories, similarly Dillon 
(1991), whereas Halliwell (2008), although he makes many references to 
modern findings on the phenomenon, nevertheless he does this in the form of 
copious footnotes. This fact does not facilitate the process of comparing and 
distinguishing the differences as well as the similarities between the ancient 
                                               
10 Apart from distinguishing the different psychological and social aspects of laughter, Halliwell 
(1991: 283) draws a distinction between two types of laughter in ancient Greece: 1) playful, 
which includes ‘lightness of tone; autonomous enjoyment; psychological relaxation; and a 
shared acceptance of the self-sufficient presuppositions or conventions of such laughter by all 
who participate in it’, and 2) consequential, which is directed ‘towards some definite result 
other than autonomous pleasure (e.g. causing embarrassment or shame, signaling hostility, 
damaging a reputation, contributing to the defeat of an opponent, delivering public 
chastisement’, by ‘its deployment of an appropriate range of ridiculing tones, from mild 
derision to the vitriolic or outrageously offensive’ as well as by ‘its arousal of feelings which 
may not be shared or enoed by all concerned, and which typically involve some degree or 
anatagonism’. Curiously, although acknowledged in his 2008 study, Halliwell does not base his 
discussion on these two types. 
11 Halliwell (2008) 127-139. 
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understandings of laughter and its modern perceptions. Lastly, I have not 
found a study that would distinguish, classify and interpret the Greek 
vocabulary for laughter in a clear manner. Halliwell avoids a separate 
introduction devoted only to the terminology for laughter. Although he 
discusses many of these terms, nevertheless he leaves his reader to search for 
the laughter-words throughout his 552 page-wide study.12 Despite these 
discernible shortcomings in the the three main works on laughter in Greek 
drama, they are of great importance to my study and form the basis of my 
discourse on laughter in Greek drama 
 Having said this, it becomes clear that my study continues the 
discussion on ancient Greek laughter which has received more interest in the 
last three decades. With this thesis, I hope to extend the generalizations on the 
nature of laughter in the works of the three playwrights, pay more attention to 
the subject in classical tragedy and sayr play than it has received as well as 
elucidate the fact that already in antiquity laughter was recognized to be a far 
more complex set of behaviours than it is usually perceived today. Finally, 
since man’s nature is itself complex, I will attempt to examine whether the 
distinctly human phenomenon of laughter reflects this complexity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
12 Halliwell ends his study with an ‘Index of selected Greek terms’ on page 608-9, but without 
the meanings of the terms, hence, has the reader search throughout the book. Also, in Appendix 
I entitled ‘The Greek (body) language of laughter and smiles’ (pages 520-29), the scholar 
provides an elucidating analysis of a few chosen laughter-words. 
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Part I 
 
Laughter 
 
 
 
Better to write about laughter than tears,  
for laughter is the property of man. 
 
 François Rabelais, Gargantua13 
 
 
In this part of the thesis, I will define the modern understanding of 
laughter in order to compare it to that of the ancient Greek-speaking world. For 
this purpose, the discussion has been divided into two chapters: in the first, I 
analyse the general theories, historical explanations and modern concepts of 
laughter; in the second, I examine the ancient Greek terminology regarding the 
phenomenon in order to extract and define the general understandings of 
laughter in antiquity. The chief purpose of this part of the thesis is to 
distinguish universal as well as distinctly Greek categories of laughter, which 
will become the theoretical framework for my analysis of Greek drama in the 
second part of the thesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
13 Rabelais (1995) 43 (my translation). 
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Chapter I 
 
Laughter 
Definition, Theories, and Sociality 
 
 
Perhaps I know best why man alone laughs: 
he alone suffers so deeply that he had to 
invent laughter. 
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power 14 
 
 
In this introductory chapter, I would like to explore the research 
traditions and interpretations of laughter. The chapter consists of three sections. 
In the first part, I present the definition of the act of laughing, in order to 
indicate its characteristic features. The second section focuses on the prominent 
theories of laughter as to see if any comprises all aspects of the phenomenon. 
The third part deals with the sociality of laughter in detail. I conclude this 
chapter with presenting a categorization of laughter, which will become the 
main discursive line for our analysis of the Greek material in the following 
chapters. 
1.1. Definition of laughter 
Laughter is the action of laughing.15 The Oxford English Dictionary defines 
the verb ‘to laugh’ as follows: ‘to manifest the combination of bodily 
phenomena (spasmodic utterance of inarticulate sounds, facial distortion, 
shaking of the sides, etc.) which forms the instinctive expression of mirth or of 
sense of something ludicrous, and which can also be occasioned by certain 
physical sensations, esp. that produced by tickling.’ The first entry concludes 
                                               
14 Nietzsche (1968) 56. 
15 OED s.v. ‘laughter’, n.¹, 1. a. 
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with: ‘to have the emotion (of mirth, amusement, scorn) which is expressed by 
laughing’.16  
What becomes apparent from this definition is that the word ‘laughter’ 
may refer to three separate actions: 1) a physical reaction which combines 
visual and auditory components, 2) a behavioural expression of the sense of 
funniness, and 3) the bodily manifestation of a certain state of mind. Therefore, 
according to the entry in the OED, the term ‘laughter’ does not describe one 
specific action but semantically encompasses a set of reactions: physiological 
(bodily actions), intellectual (perception of humour) and psychological 
(expression of an emotional attitude). In order to distinguish precisely each 
meaning behind the term ‘laughter’, let us analyze the three main components 
of its definition. 
1.1.1. Physiology of laughter 
First and foremost, the term ‘laughter’ pertains to a set of bodily 
reactions. From the physical description of the act of laughing we may 
distinguish three basic components: 1) muscular contractions of the face, 2) 
respiratory interruptions with an articulation of sounds, and 3) bodily actions.17 
Facial muscles are primary in the production of laughter. In particular, 
spasmodic contractions of the cheek muscles (zygomaticus major) cause the 
mouth to widen and draw the lip corners upward. Often, the mouth opens and 
exposes bared teeth, whereas the muscles surrounding the eyes (obicularis oculi) 
pull the skin at the outsides of the eyes. This movement produces the 
distinctive laughing effect of ‘crow’s feet’. Together these actions form a specific 
facial display, which accompanies laughter and has been distinguished as the 
                                               
16 OED s.v. ‘laugh’, v., 1. a. 
17 An early physiological description is found in Descartes (1989) V art. 124; Darwin (1998) 199. 
For a contemporary extensive description of laughter, see Ruch and Ekman (2001) 426-443. 
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‘Duchenne display’.18 Since facial actions occur as most observable, laughter is 
primarily identified with the human face.19 
The act of laughing involves also other parts of the body – the so-called 
vocal organs, as a laugh is produced during the depletion of air from the lungs. 
The described above motions of the face are accompanied by spasms of the 
diaphragm, the larynx and the glottis. These organs regulate the breathing 
process while laughing and create its characteristic respiratory pattern which 
consists of a sequence of repeated expirations. It is with these emissions of air 
and the accompany of sound that the characteristic “ha-ha” of laughter is 
produced.20 In point of the fact that the glottis opens and closes rhythmically 
when portions of air are expelled, the phonation occurs in staccato fashion. 
Finally, the emitted sounds vibrate through the vocal tract as the expired air 
escapes through the nostrils and mouth.21 As Provine notices: ‘laughing is, in 
essence, a movement that produces a sound.’22 
The English transcription of the distinctive sound of laughter is “ha-ha”, 
also “hee-hee” and “ho-ho”.23 Its acoustic quality depends on the constitution of 
the vocal tract, the disposition of it’s components (larynx, tongue, jaw) and the 
                                               
18 This display is typical for spontaneous, i.e. genuine laughter (alternatively termed ‘Duchenne 
smile’). For the differences between involuntary and voluntary, i.e. feigned laugh, see Ekman, 
Davidson, and Friesen (1990). Although a smile may be observable while laughing, it occurs 
independently as well, see Provine (2000) 49-53. On the distinct evolutionary origin of the two 
phenomena, cf. van Hooff (1972). In general, a smile requires less engagement of the face and 
body than laughing. Holland (1982) states that ‘laughter differs from smiling simply in that the 
smile does not interrupt breathing.’ Cited in Berger (1997) 45. For a psychological-cultural 
study of the smile, see Szarota (2006).  
19 Cf. Parvulescu (2010) 28 regarding the face as ‘the throne of laughter’. 
20 Martin (2007) 159. 
21 For a broader discussion on the physical properties of laughing, see Chafe (2009) 17-23. 
22 Provine (2000) 5. The English language has a rich vocabulary to denote various types of 
audible laughter e.g. ‘cackle’, ‘chuckle’, ‘chortle’, ‘crow’, ‘giggle’, ‘guffaw’, ‘roar’. 
23 On the acoustics of laughter, see Bachorowski, Smoski, and Owren (2001). The word ‘laugh’ is 
of onomatopoeic etymology: Old English hlæhhan, from Proto-Germanic *klakhjanan, from 
Proto-Indo-European *klak-, (cf. Lat. cachinare ‘to laugh aloud’, Gr. καχάζειν ‘to cackle’). In 
Polish, the word for laughter śmiech comes from the Proto-Slavic směxъ composed of the prefix 
χъ from the verb *smъjati sę, and contrary to the English ‘laughter’, it derives from the Indo-
European root *smei-/smeid-; similarly Eng. smile, Gr. μειδιάω ‘to smile’. Cf. Pokorny (1959) 967; 
Chantraine (1974) s.v. μειδιάω. 
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intensity of the muscular contractions occurring while laughing. Moreover, the 
age of an individual, his sex as well as the differences in the way people breath 
while laughing and articulate sound influence the acoustic properties of their 
laughter.24 In short, every person laughs in his or her own, characteristic 
manner. 
In addition, other physiological symptoms may occur while laughing, 
such as increased heart rate, skin blushing, back-and-forward movements of 
the head and torso, even lacrimation.25 Intensive laughter may also result in the 
trembling of the whole body, which, in extreme cases, may even convert into 
convulsion.26 
What becomes apparent from these observations is the fact that such 
compulsiveness of these physical components suggest a certain involuntary 
nature of laughter. Aristotle was first to describe this distinction in his work On 
the Parts of Animals. Laughter is provoked by the stimulation of the diaphragm 
(φρένες), which, according to the philosopher, shares responsibility in the 
process of thinking. Hence, its sensation ‘disturbs the mental action as to 
occasion movements [i.e. laughter] that are independent of the will’.27 Today 
neurobiologists ascribe the production of genuine laughter to the brain, 
although they differ in distinguishing its proper parts responsible for such 
reflex action.28 In the view of Provine, people possess little conscious control 
                                               
24 Cf. Glenn (2003) 10-13. 
25 Keith-Spiegel (1972) 16-17. 
26 Berlyne (1972) 51.  
27 Arist. Part. an. 3.10, 673a 5-6: ‘ποιεῖν ὅμως ἐπίδηλον καὶ κινεῖν τὴν διάνοιαν παρὰ τὴν 
προαίρεσιν.’ (my emphasis, and likewise in all Greek passages hereon). English translation in 
Ogle (1957) 673a. For a broader analysis of this Aristotelian passage, see Labarrière (2000); cf. 
Halliwell (2008) 315-316. 
28 Defined parts of the brain in Berger (1997) 45, Damásio (2004) 74-79, Kozintsev (2012) 75-79, 
however Martin (2007) 171-73, argues for the need of further evidence; likewise Chafe (2009) 56-
57. Curiously, already Hippocrates recognized the role of the brain in producing laughter, cf. 
Hipp. Morb. Sacr. XVII 1-3: Εἰδέναι δὲ χρὴ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ὅτι ἔξ οὐδενὸς ἡμῖν αἱ ἡδοναὶ 
γίνονται καὶ εὐφροσύναι καὶ γέλωτες καὶ παιδιαὶ ἢ ἐντεῦθεν. English translation in Jones 
(1962) 175: ‘Men ought to know that from the brain only, arise our pleasures, joys, laughter and 
jests’. 
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over spontaneous laughter, since its involuntary nature reveals ‘an instinctive 
behavior programmed by our genes.’29 Such complexity of the physiological 
process of laughing indicates a certain automatic character of the phenomenon. 
Indeed, when concerning the body, genuine laughter seems to occur as a sort of 
reflex activity.30  
1.1.2. Reaction to humour 
Reflex is an action which occurs in response to a stimulus. If this should 
apply to the phenomenon of laughter, its reflexive character would require a 
stimulus which would provoke the physiological process in the body. Since 
antiquity many distinguish thinkers have attempted to explain the various 
causes for laughter, amongst which the widest attention have received those 
basically referred to as ‘humorous’. 
This group of laughter-stimuli is characterized by a common feature, 
namely ‘humour’31, defined twofold in the OED as ‘the quality of action, 
speech, or writing, which excites amusement; oddity, jocularity, facetiousness, 
comicality, fun’ as well as ‘the faculty of perceiving what is ludicrous or 
amusing, or of expressing it in speech, writing, or other composition; jocose 
imagination or treatment of a subject.’32 According to this definition, for a 
                                               
29 Provine (2000) 1, esp. 49-52. 
30 Cf. Koestler (1964) 28-30.  
31 The term ‘humour’ (in American English ‘humor’) stems from the Latin (h)umor-em nom. 
humor meaning ‘fluid’, ‘moisture’, which in the medical doctrine of Hippocrates (De humore) 
referred to one of the four ‘cardinal humours’, i.e. bodily fluids; cf. ODEE 452. Introduced into 
the English language through the Old French humeur, the term maintained its physio-
pathological meaning until the seventeenth century, when it began to encompass oddity and 
abnormal behaviours, hence entered the semantic sphere of the comic. At first a neutral term, in 
time ‘humour’ accepted positive connotations. For the term’s lexicological evolution, see Ruch 
(1998) 5-11, esp. 8; Ermida (2008) 4-5. In Polish, the equivalent of the English term is komizm, cf. 
Ostromęcka-Frączak (2008) 11. On the meaning of humor in Polish, see Gołaszewska (1987) 21; 
Garczyński (1989) 11-15; Dziemidok (2005) 13-19.; on the semantic differences between the 
terms humor (‘humour’), dowcip (‘the wit’) and komizm (‘the comic’, ‘the ridiculous’), see 
Bogołębska (2000). 
32 OED s.v. ‘humour’, n., II 7. a. and 7. b. Though, in general, contemporary theorists agree that 
humour remains ‘a universal human trait’ (Raskin 1985: 2), however their interpretations of the 
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situation or item to be ‘humorous’, it must contain such quality, which evokes 
people’s laughter, hence must be ‘laughable’, ‘amusing’, ‘comical’, ‘funny’ or 
‘ludicrous’. On the other hand, in order to recognize such a stimulus one must 
have the skill to perceive what is laughable, or experience what modern 
humour scholarship terms as ‘humour response’.33  
Humour accepts many forms. In The Psychology of Humor, Martin (2007) 
divides the humorous stimuli into three types: 1) jokes, 2) conversational 
humour, and 3) unintentional humour.34 A joke is a piece of text, narrative in 
form, which presents a short story ending with a ‘punchline’. The humour is 
realized through the punchline as it shifts the meaning of the story in an 
unexpected way.35 Conversational humour operates on a similar basis, creating 
the humorous effect by surprising shifts in meaning, however with differences 
in the intention or use of the humour. Eleven categories of such have been 
recognized: 1) irony, 2) satire, 3) sarcasm, 4) overstatement or understatement, 
5) self-deprecation, 6) teasing, 7) replies to rhetorical questions, 8) clever replies 
to serious statements, 9) double entendres, 10) transformations of frozen 
expressions, 11) puns.36 Finally, unintentional humour occurs on two plains: 
linguistic and spatial. The first refers to errors in spelling and pronunciation 
(e.g. spoonerism, malapropisms, Freudian slips) whereas the second concerns 
                                                                                                                                         
term vary as well as its categorization, cf. Goldstein and McGhee (1972) xxi: ‘there is no single 
definition of humor acceptable to all investigators in the area’; similarly Attardo (1994) 3. Ruch 
(1998) 6, emphasizes the coexistence of two terminological systems for the term ‘humour’ which 
1) refers to one of the elements of the comic along with wit, nonsense, irony, ridicule, sarcasm 
and satire; cf. Freud (1905), (1928); and 2) ‘humour’ is employed as a neutral umbrella-term for 
all related phenomena, especially in current Anglo-American research, cf. Gajda (2000) 9. Same 
distinction in Dziemidok (2005) 13-14. 
33 Cf. Ruch (1998) 411. 
34 Martin (2007) 11.  
35 On the punchline, see Oring (1989). On joke competence, see Carrell (2000). A general study 
on jokes in Wilson (1979); see also Oring (1992). 
36 I follow the list of Long and Graesser (1988) reprinted in Martin (2007) 13. For alternative 
classifications, see Raskin (1985) 29-30. For an analysis of many of these categories (inter al. 
wordplay, phraseplay, teasing, irony, sarcasm), see Partington (2006) 110-224, who regards 
them as forms of ‘laughter-talk’, i.e. ‘the talk preceding and provoking, intentionally or 
otherwise, a bout of laughter’, ibid.1. 
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various forms of physical accidents perceived as humorous (e.g. slapstick acts 
like slipping on a banana peal).  
The examples above clearly demonstrate that laughter may be evoked by 
the perception of a specific quality of words and action. In Taking Laughter 
Seriously, Morreall (1983) observes that humour ‘is based on a conceptual shift, 
a jolt to our picture of the way things are supposed to be.’37 Humorous stimuli, 
therefore, require a complex mental process during which the collected 
information (e.g. a joke, a situation) is analyzed in meaning and in the end 
recognized as a kind of to provoke laughter, i.e. ‘laughable’. Many philosophers 
in the past as well as contemporary humour researches have termed differently 
what they find to be the laughable element: ‘violation of expectations’, 
‘surprise’, ‘opposition of ideas’, ‘contrast’, ‘contradiction’, and especially 
‘incongruity’.38 Furthermore, although theorists have coined various terms for 
describing this cognitive-perceptual process39, correspondingly they regard 
itself as a highly complex reason for laughter. In the words of Koestler (1964) 
humour is ‘the only domain of creative activity where a stimulus on a high 
level of complexity produces a massive and sharply defined response on the 
level of physiological reflexes.’40 In sum, humour appears to be a cognitive 
experience which may be expressed by laughter. 
As we can see, laughter generally occurs as the product of mental 
activity. Humour with its various forms only provokes a cognitive-perceptual 
process, which, once conducted successfully,41 may result in laughter. In this 
                                               
37 Morreall (1983) 60. 
38 For an account of these terms and their supporters, see section 1.2.2. below. 
39 ‘Synergy’ in Apter (1989) 129-141, esp. 133, ‘bisociation’ in Koestler (1964) 35-36 , ‘script 
opposition’ in Raskin (1985) 99-100. For a discussion on the latter two, see Partington (2006) 25-
39. 
40 Koestler (1964) 31. 
41 The act of recognizing a situation as ‘humorous’, ‘funny’, hence ‘laughable’ has various 
determinants, of which personal dispositions and cultural background dominate. Early notion 
of the historical and social relativity in Ritter (1974) 79. An anthropological account in Apte 
(1985) 261, who denotes: ‘humor is a culturally shaped individual cognitive experience, 
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case, it is the act of perceiving an ‘external’ stimulus which causes laughter. 
Thus, external stimuli function on an internal ground, for laughter comes as the 
result of what occurs in one’s mind. 
1.1.3. Expression of emotions 
The word ‘emotion’ derives from the French émouvoir which comes from 
the Latin verb emovere (the prefix e (ex) ‘out of something’, and the verb movere, 
‘to move’), hence its primary meaning ‘moving out’, ‘agitation’ and 
‘perturbation’. In reference to the mind the term is used twofold, as it indicates: 
1) a particular ‘emotion’, i.e. a mental ‘feeling’ or ‘affection’ which may be 
temporary, 2) an ‘emotional state’, i.e. a durable mental agitation or disturbance 
of the mind. 
Since antiquity the interest in the sphere of human emotions has 
generated many theoretical premises.42 In particular, an early cognitive 
explanation may be found in Aristotle’s Rhetoric.43 According to the Greek 
philosopher, an emotional response occurs to the experienced impressions of an 
item or situation. While processing information about a perceived object a 
person also judges its importance and constructs a thought (or belief) about it. 
As a result, this generated judgement, which is accompanied by the sensations 
of pleasure and pain, affects the mind, i.e. creates an emotional response.44 
Aristotle’s observations gave ground to the tradition of connecting emotions 
with cognition, which remains prominent till today. A continuation, albeit in an 
extended form, may be found in the works of the American psychologist 
Lazarus on the so-called ‘appraisal theory of emotions’. Accordingly, during 
                                                                                                                                         
culturally determined because sociocultural factors are the primary trigger mechanism leading 
to its occurrence.’ For a sociological view, cf. Zijderveld (1983) 7. 
42 For a survey on the history of emotions in philosophy, see Solomon (1993). 
43 Cf. Fortenbaugh (1975) 9-22, esp. 16-18. 
44 Arist. Rhet. 1378a 20-23: ἔστι δὲ τὰ πάθη δι’ ὅσα μεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς 
κρίσεις οἷς ἕπεται λύπη καὶ ἡδονή. cf. Cooper (1999) 406-23, esp. 415-16. In modern 
psychology a similar distinction between pleasure vs. displeasure expresses Barrett (2006). 
 29 
 
the cognitive-perceptual process of a situation (e.g. a chance meeting with a 
friend) one simultaneously conducts its appraisal. It is this internal evaluation 
that causes an emotional response.45 In the view of Lazarus a person may carry 
out an appraisal in two ways: 1) recognizing a personal benefit in the perceived 
object, or 2) considering it to bring harm to oneself. In the first case, one 
acknowledges the aroused emotions as beneficial, i.e. positive, whereas in the 
second, as harmful, i.e. negative. In this view, emotions origin from individual 
evaluations,46 and hence may become manifested in behavioural manner. 
Accepting such an explanation for the origins of emotions in our analysis of 
laughter, we may consider the phenomenon to be an expression of one’s 
emotional response to an external factor. 
1.1.3.1. Humorous stimuli 
Humorous stimuli are considered to evoke an emotion of pleasant 
nature.47 The affinity of laughter and pleasure has a long tradition, as it begins 
with Plato, who in his dialogue Philebus identifies the two phenomena.48 The 
English philosopher Hobbes explains the cause for laughing by a sudden act 
which pleases a person,49 similarly Spencer regards ‘acute pleasure’ as a main 
stimulus.50 A continuation of these ideas is traceable in the twentieth century in 
inter al. Bergson, Freud51 and especially in modern humour studies. 
Contemporary humour theorists attempt to denote this pleasant feeling with 
various terms, such as ‘arousal’ (Berlyne 1972), ‘amusement’ (Clark 1970), 
                                               
45 Lazarus (1991) 127-70. 
46 For a broader account on emotion, see Ze’ev (2000) 13-78. For other theories of emotions, see 
Rolls (1999) 59-74. 
47 Cf. Berlyne (1972) 44: ‘It is, however, hard to imagine anybody finding something humorous 
and not enjoying it.’ 
48 Plat. Philb. 50a 5-8: ἡμᾶς ... φησὶν ὁ λόγος ... ὡμολογῆσθαι ... τὸ δὲ γελᾶν ἡδονήν. For a 
discussion on Plato’s remarks about laughter, see section 1.2.3.1. below. 
49 Hobbes (1991) 43. 
50 Spencer (1966) 304. 
51 Bergson (2005) 102, reiterates Plato’s observation ‘laughter is always pleasure’, 
correspondingly Freud (2002) 145. 
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‘exhilaration’ (Ruch 1993), ‘mirth’ (Martin 2007), or recently, in a more 
descriptive fashion, ‘the feeling of nonseriousness’ (Chafe 2009). Despite the 
variety of terms, they all recognize the pleasant nature of the predominant 
emotion associated with laughter.52 
In point of fact that the feeling of pleasure most often accompanies the 
humorous experience, there exists a tendency, as Glenn (2003) points out ‘to 
treat laughter simplistically as response to humor and thus to imply a causal, 
stimulus-response relationship from humorous event to perception of humor to 
laughter.’53 As a result, the phenomenon of laughter has been mainly associated 
with humour, referred to by some researchers as ‘the language of humour’54 or 
even identified with it. As a consequence of this, the terms ‘humour’ and 
‘laughter’ have been used in synonymous fashion,55 whereas the traditional 
‘theories of laughter’ have been discussed by scholars and philosophers 
permutably as the ‘theories of humour’.56 Yet, despite the obvious link, 
‘humour’ and ‘laughter’ remain two separate phenomena which may occur 
independently. Attardo emphasizes this distinction in his famous work 
Linguistic Theories of Humor, in which he considers humour to be ‘a mental 
phenomenon’, whereas laughter its possible ‘complex neuro-physiological 
manifestation’.57 Furthermore, laughter may accompany the humorous 
experience, however not necessarily,58 and, as we shall see below, laughter may 
manifest an emotional response to a stimulus which lacks humorous quality. 
                                               
52 For a broader discussion on humour research, see section 1.2.2.2. below. 
53 Glenn (2003) 24. 
54 Zijderveld (1983) 26. 
55 E.g. Bergson (2005), Hertzler (1970). 
56 Awareness of the distinction in Chapman and Foot (1976) 4, Zijderveld (1983) 26, Apte (1985) 
14. Nevertheless, theoretical approaches to laughter in association with humour dominate e.g. 
Koestler (1964), Morreall (1987), Berger (1997); exceptionally Clark (1970) who emphasizes his 
focus on humour. 
57 Attardo (1994) 10.  
58 Cf. Douglas (1975) 148.  
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Therefore, despite a close relation the two phenomena do not always occur 
simultaneously nor are the words ‘humour’ and ‘laughter’ coterminous. 
1.1.3.2. Non-humorous stimuli 
An emotional response occurs in reference to many non-humorous 
stimuli. In his research on humour, the American philosopher Morreall (1983) 
enlists such ‘unfunny’ causes as: 1) tickling, 2) nitrous oxide, 3) seeing a magic 
trick, 4) regaining safety after being in danger, 5) solving a puzzle or problem, 
6) winning a game, 7) meeting and old friend on the street, 8) discovering one 
has won the lottery, 9) anticipation of joyous events, 10) playing with a baby.59  
Firstly, laughter may be elicited by external factors, such as a physical 
sensation (no. 1) while being touched in certain parts of the body: the armpits, 
soles of the feet, the neck etc.60 It may also be the result of a chemical reaction 
(no. 2) after inhaling ‘laughing gas’.61 Secondly, an emotional response may 
occur in the case of situations perceived as positive which lack humorous 
quality. Laughter then becomes the expression of: one’s feeling of success or 
triumph (no. 5, 6, 8), one’s feeling of surprise (no. 3), one’s feeling of relief after 
restrain (no. 4), one’s joy (no. 7, 9), as well as one’s attitude of play (no. 10). 
Many prominent thinkers incorporate the link of these emotions with laughter 
in their attempts in engendering a theoretical premise of the phenomenon. As I 
will analyze these views in more detail in section 2.1. here it will suffice only to 
connect these non-humorous feelings with a precise theory of laughter. Hence, 
1) the ‘superiority theory’ will explain laughter as the manifestation of a feeling 
of self-content, success or triumph; 2) the ‘incongruity theory’ will consider the 
                                               
59 Morreall (1983) 1-2. For an alternative list of non-humorous causes, see Monro (1951) 20-34; 
Chafe (2009) 73-87. 
60 Arist. Part. an. 3.10, 673a 8-10: ‘Ὁ δὲ γαργαλισμὸς γέλως ἐστὶ διὰ κινήσεως τοιαύτης τοῦ 
μορίου τοῦ περὶ τὴν μασχάλην.’ English translation in Ogle (1957) 673a: ‘For to be tickled is to 
be set in laughter, the laughter being produced by such a motion as mentioned of the region of 
the armpit.’ On the characteristics of tickling, see Harris (1999) 344-351.  
61 In opposition Ruch (1993) 611, who enlists nitrous oxide among his elicitors of ‘exhilaration’, 
i.e. a stimulant of a positive emotion. 
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pleasant effect of the ‘unexpected element’ or ‘surprise’; and finally 3) the ‘relief 
theory’ will associate the liberating force of laughter with pleasure. Next, the 
connection of laughter with the feeling of joy has a long tradition dating back to 
the humanist writers of the sixteenth and seventeenth century, inter al. 
Castiglione, Joubert and Descartes.62 In the nineteenth century, this idea 
received support in the observations on primates of Darwin presented in his 
famous Expression of the Emotions and Man and Animals.63 Today, although 
laughter is still seen as a natural and universal expression of experienced or 
anticipated joy, contemporary ethologists give evidence to an evolutionary 
development of laughter, which in a social setting appears to be a signal of a 
playful state of mind.64 As we may see, all these non-humorous explanations 
find the source for laughter in a common cause – the experience of a pleasant 
emotion, albeit without humorous quality. 
In the context in which it is evident that various emotions may be 
expressed in vocal-behavioural manner, laughter may manifest other states of 
mind than only amused or pleased, but also non-pleasant such as embarrassed, 
scornful, angry or even dysfunctional.  
Firstly, in his famous study Laughing and Crying: A Study of the Limits of 
Human Behaviour, Plessner enlists among others embarrassment as an 
unpleasant cause for genuine laughter. Once a person recognizes to be tacitly 
observed and judged by others (e.g. children or young people amongst a group 
of adults) he/she considers his/her social situation as inferior. Laughter, then, 
may occur as an expression of a notion of social disruption.65 Secondly, 
laughter’s potential to express negative emotions, such as derision, anger or 
contempt, is observable in the act of laughing conducted with the deliberate 
                                               
62 The famous works concerning laughter as a sign of joy are: Castiglione (1528), Libro del 
cortegiano; Joubert (1579), Traité du Ris; Descartes (1649), Les passions de l'âme. For a survey of 
early-modern theorists of laughter, see Skinner (2004) 142-144, esp. 144.  
63 Darwin (1998) 80; 195-196. 
64 Van Hooff (1972). On laughter and play, see section 1.3.5.1. below. 
65 Plessner (2004) 113-16. 
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intention to ridicule another person. As I will discuss the matter of derision in 
more detail,66 here, it suffices to mention that, in general, the laugher’s 
intentions are to experience himself/herself (optionally evoke in the third party) 
feelings of contemptuous pleasure, which are then expressed in laughter. 
According to Koestler (1964) such laughter becomes ‘the puffing away of 
emotion discarded by thought.’67 Thus, laughter allows a free expression of 
such emotions as ‘malice’, ‘contempt’, ‘disrespect’ or simply shows a negative 
disposition towards the laughed at person. Finally, uncontrolled and excessive 
laughter has been recognized as a symptom of mental abnormalities ever since 
antiquity.68 Modern scientists acknowledge pathological laughter as a clinical 
manifestation of various psychiatric illnesses such as schizophrenia, pervasive 
developmental disorders (PDD) and mania. Also, it has been observed that 
other diseases resulting in brain disorders, i.e. Parkinson’s disease, sclerosis 
may also manifest in abnormal laughter.69 In this case, laughter becomes a 
symptom for an illness. 
Given that emotions come as a result of an individual’s appraisal of a 
situation (pleasant or beneficial, hence positive; non-pleasant or harmful, thus 
negative), their physical expression may signal to others that one is 
experiencing certain feelings or is in a certain state of mind. This manifestation 
may be genuine or pathological, but obviously maintains an informative 
function. In the words of Grotjahn, laughter ‘can be used to express an 
unending variety of emotions.’70 
 
The detailed analysis of the OED definition of the verb ‘to laugh’ gives 
evidence that the term ‘laughter’ itself refers to an action of manifold nature. As 
                                               
66 See section 1.3.5.4. below. 
67 Koestler (1964) 56.  
68 Cf. Halliwell (2008) 17-18. 
69 For the characteristics of pathological laughter, see Duchowny (1983).  
70 Grotjahn (1957) ix. 
34 
 
we have seen, the act of laughing may occur on three plains: physical, 
intellectual and psychological. In general, we may observe that the physical 
reaction of laughter requires prior an internal activity: cognitive and/or 
emotional. In the light of the discussion above, we may come to the conclusion 
that laughter is a vocal-behavioural expression of emotions with 
communicative functions.  
At this point it becomes apparent that the analyzed definition regards 
the act of laughing as an individual experience. Although the phenomenon’s 
informative role is acknowledged, we find no explanations for the possible 
impact of such information on others. Hence, the classic definition of laughter 
omits a social context.71 In this case, two main questions appear. Firstly, may we 
find a universal theoretical explanation for laughter which would comprise all 
of the three analysed aspects? And secondly, does any of these theories include 
a social aspect within the discussed phenomenon? In order to provide answers 
to these questions, let us turn our attention to the so-called ‘theories of 
laughter’. 
1.2. Theories of laughter 
Laughter per se remains a complex phenomenon. Since the act of 
laughing contains many components: physical, intellectual and psychological, a 
monolithic explanation for laughter would require references to all three of 
these aspects. Over the centuries philosophers, scholars and scientists have 
tried to produce a comprehensive set of principles for laughter, nevertheless 
their attempts were never fully satisfactory.72 As a result, many theories have 
been constructed of which three remain prominent till today: 1) the relief 
                                               
71 An omission noticed also by Glenn (2003) 8-9. Interestingly, the origins of the OED date back 
to the nineteenth century and despite two editions (1st edn. 1933, 2nd edn. 1989) in the twentieth 
century the first entry of ‘to laugh’ has not been modified. 
72 For a survey of the traditional and contemporary theories of laughter/humour with a critical 
analysis, see Dziemidok (2011) 9-64. 
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theory, 2) the incongruity theory, 3) the superiority theory.73 These are 
traditionally known as the ‘theories of laughter’, which I will examine in more 
detail.74  
1.2.1. The relief vel release theory 
The first discussed theory focuses on the mechanism of laughter from an 
internal (physiological or psychological) point of view. Relief theorists conduct 
research on the phenomenon’s bodily mechanism and the functions it plays in 
the laughing individual. In view of this theory, laughter occurs as a discharge 
of excess energy in the human body or psyche which originated from psychical 
excitation. Nervous excitement is basically gathered in the muscles, which is 
next dissipated through the muscular actions whilst laughing. The main role of 
laughter is liberation from tension. 
1.2.1.1. The physiological explanation 
In his essay The Physiology of Laughter, Spencer made the first attempt to 
describe the relief mechanism of the phenomenon, which occurs during the 
release of nervous energy in the human body. Spencer observes that the 
perception of an external stimulus (e.g. watching a theatrical play) may arouse 
in a person a set of psychical expectations. Once produced, this excitation is 
then accumulated in the body in the form of energy that puts the nervous 
system into a state of tension. Whilst a sudden change in the stimulus occurs 
                                               
73 I follow the traditional tripartite division in Morreall (1983) 4-37. Studies on humour chiefly 
refer to these three theories although under different terms e.g. 
‘cognitive’/’psychological’/‘social’ in Attardo (1994) 47. For alternative divisions of 
laughter/humour theories, see Monro (1951) 83-231; Keith-Spiegel (1972) 5-12; Martin (2007) 33-
82; Dziemidok (2011) 12-13. 
74 In order to dispel any misapprehension, it is necessary to note what is understood under the 
term ‘theory’. Here, I follow the lead of Morreall (2009) 6-7, who uses the term to describe a 
whole group of theoretical explanations which share a common feature (the relief effect, the 
incongruous element, the expression of superiority). Hence, under the headings ‘relief theory’, 
‘incongruity theory’ and ‘superiority theory’ we discuss a set of theories which share a main 
idea, however, may differ in other respects. 
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(e.g. an unexpected turn in the action of the play) the original expend of 
nervous energy is interrupted and seeks to be released in different manner. As 
Spencer explains ‘the excess must therefore discharge itself in some other 
direction; and in the way already explained, there results an efflux through the 
motor nerves to various classes of the muscles, producing the half-convulsive 
actions we term laughter’.75 This ‘efflux’ of nervous excitement brings physical 
relief to the body. In this view, laughter enables the relaxation of tension. This 
mechanical theory is considered to be one of the first philosophical 
acknowledgments of a liberating element within the act of laughing.76 
1.2.1.2. The psychological approach  
Spencer’s link of laughter with the ‘efflux of psychic energy’ has 
subsequently influenced Freud in his psychoanalytical investigations. In The 
Joke and Its Relation to the Unconscious (1905) the famous psychologist considers 
laughter as a form of discharging redundant psychic energy in the individual. 
This discharge, which leads to the release of energy may be occasioned by three 
laughter-related phenomena: 1) ‘joking’ or ‘wit’ (‘der Witz’), 2) the ‘comic’ (‘das 
Komische’), and 3) ‘humour’ (‘der Humor’).77 According to Freudian theory, 
internal inhibitions and external circumstances (social restrictions, taboos) 
restrain sexual and aggressive impulses in the human unconscious. A high 
quantity of inhibitory energy is used to repress these libidinal drives. 
                                               
75 Spencer (1911) 305 (my emphasis). 
76 An early notion of laughter’s liberating force from constraints is traceable in the observation 
by the third Earl of Shaftesbury: ‘The natural free spirits of ingenious men, if imprisoned or 
controlled, will find out other ways of motion to relieve themselves in their constraint; and 
whether it be in burlesque, mimicry, or buffoonery, they will be glad at any rate to vent 
themselves, and be revenged upon their constrainers’ (my emphasis). Earl of Schaftesbury, 
Sensus Communis. An Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour (1711), cited by Morreall (2009) 16.  
77 On the problematic English translation of the German term der Witz, see the ‘Translator’s 
Preface’ in Freud (2002) XXXii-XXXiii. On the ‘comic’ category, see Ibid. 177-234. The ‘humour’ 
category received additional attention in a separate paper, cf. Freud (1928). For a detailed 
discussion on the differences between the three Freudian types of laughter-related phenomena, 
see Morreall (2009) 17-23. 
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Interestingly, this repression may be interrupted by e.g. the perception of a joke 
which contains an element described by Freud as ‘tendentious’ (‘tendenziös’), 
i.e. ‘purposive’.78 Such jokes fulfil a psychological function. Given that the joke 
‘will get around restrictions and open up sources of pleasure that have become 
inaccessible’79, the previously restrained impulses have a chance of being briefly 
experienced. Consequently, a surplus charge of inhibitory energy appears, 
which is then released in the form of laughter. A tendentious joke enables a 
temporary pleasant experience of unrestrained sexual and aggressive impulses, 
whereas laughter becomes its expression. For a moment, then, the act of 
laughing enables man’s liberation from social inhibitions or taboos. 
 
The discussed release theories have originated in the nineteenth century 
at a time when human biology and psyche were the main focus of interest. As a 
consequence of this, the relief theory of laughter lays emphasis on the internal 
activities of a person, since it attempts to explain the phenomenon’s origins 
(discharge of surplus psychic energy) and its biological or psychological 
function (liberation from tension). For the relief effect to occur, both Spencer 
and Freud acknowledge the prior presence of a cognitive stimulus, which they 
consider of incongruous quality.80 Therefore, their theoretical premises are not 
confined only to the release factor. Furthermore, little attention receives the 
emotional aspect of the phenomenon, for, although both discussed theorists 
                                               
78 Freud recognizes also another category of jokes he refers to as ‘innocent’ (‘harmlos’). There 
role is to bring merely pleasure from the ‘joke-work’, i.e. the cognitive process stimulated by 
humorous discourse. However, Freud himself failed to provide any examples of such jokes. 
Modern humour theorists claim that this is because all jokes are purposive, cf. Gruner (1997) 
147-78. 
79 Freud (2002) 100. On the cognitive aspect in jokes, see section 1.2.2. below. 
80 Spencer (1911) 307: ‘laughter naturally results only when consciousness is unawares 
transferred from great things to small – only when there is what we call a descending incongruity’ 
(my emphasis). According to Freud, the liberating effect of laughter is achieved by a cognitive 
distraction, which causes an interruption in repressing the libidinal impulses. The mechanism 
may occur only due to the ‘joke-work’ (‘Witzarbeit’) technique i.e. the preoccupation of one’s 
conscious (superego) with the distracting intellectual element of a joke. 
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recognize an association of laughter with feelings, they link it basically to 
pleasure. As main emphasis is laid on the laughing individual, the social aspect 
of laughter is neglected. 
1.2.2. The incongruity theory 
The second discussed theory focuses on the intellectual mechanisms 
within the individual which lead to the evocation of laughter. Main emphasis is 
laid on two fields: 1) the devices (stimuli) capable of provoking a laugh due to 
an incongruous element, 2) the intellectual process responsible for perceiving 
these devices as ‘incongruous’, hence ‘laughable’. In this case, laughter is 
considered to be a reaction to the perception of an ‘incongruity’.  
1.2.2.1. Incongruity per se 
The word ‘incongruity’ derives from the Latin verb congruere ‘to come 
together’, ‘to coincide’, ‘to agree with something’ preceded with the Latin prefix 
in- meaning ‘not’, ‘lacking’, ‘without’.81 Hence, an item identified as 
‘incongruous’ is perceived as ‘not coming together’, ‘not agreeing with 
something’, ‘not fitting in a certain way’. In reference to laughter, the term 
‘incongruity’82 was first used by the Scottish philosopher Beattie (1778) in his 
essay On Laughter and Ludicrous Composition.83 However, it ought to be stressed 
that first suggestions of a ‘non fitting’ element in eliciting laughter date back to 
antiquity. In the Rhetoric, Aristotle mentions the use of a specific technique in 
order to make the listeners laugh – to set up an expectation in the listeners and 
                                               
81 OLD s.v. ‘congruere’; Ibid. s.v. ‘in-‘. 
82 The term itself is of quite modern origin, since, according to the OED (s.v. ‘incongruity, 3.) it 
appears the earliest in the sixteenth century. 
83 Beattie (1778) 347, states that ‘laughter arises from the view of two or more inconsistent, 
unsuitable, or incongruous parts or circumstances, considered as united in one complex object or 
assemblage, as acquiring a assort of mutual relation from the peculiar manner in which the 
mind takes notice of them’ (my emphasis). 
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then violate it.84 A reiteration of the subject appears in Cicero’s On the Orator, as 
the rhetorician states that the most common jokes are ‘exemplified when we are 
expecting to hear a particular phrase, and something different is uttered (my itals.). In 
this case our own mistake even makes us laugh ourselves.’85 Although these are 
merely minor accounts on the subject, we may nevertheless distinguish an idea 
that laughter can be occasioned by a thing escaping the expectation. 
The beginnings of a modern incongruity theory are found in the 
observations of Hutcheson. In Reflections upon Laughter (1750) he introduces 
‘contrast’ as the reason for a laugh. Its mechanism depends on ‘the bringing 
together of images which have contrary additional ideas, as well as some 
resemblance in the principal idea’.86 Laughter, then is evoked by the subjective 
perception of an opposition of ideas. In addition to ‘contrast’, in his Critique of 
Judgement (1790), Kant stresses the importance of the role of ‘unexpectedness’ or 
‘surprise’ to the laughing experience87, and following his lead Schopenhauer 
(1819) in the World as Will and Representation explains the source of the 
phenomenon in the discrepancy between the sensual impression of an item and 
its general concept.88 Finally, in a similar vein, although on a different 
                                               
84 Arist. Rhet. III 1412a 27-8: ‘Jibes involving change of a letter [i.e. puns] also have this effect, for 
they are deceptive’, (ὅπερ δύναται καὶ τὰ παρὰ γράμμα σκώμματα· ἐξαπατᾷ γαρ). The 
philosopher also mentions a kind of surprise element, for example in jokes with unexpected 
twists in meaning of words, cf. Ibid. 31-32: ‘Changes of letter [as in a pun] make the 
speakermean not what he says but what the word plays on’, (τὰ δὲ παρὰ γράμμα ποιεῖ οὐχ’ ὃ 
λέγει λέγειν, ἀλλ’ ὃ μεταστρέφει ὄνομα). English translations in Kennedy (1991) 250. 
85 Cic. De orat. 2.63: ‘Sed scitis esse notissimum ridiculi genus, cum aliud exspectamus, aliud 
dicitur. Hic nobismet ipsis noster error risum movet’(my italics). English translation in Sutton 
and Rackham (1948) 389. 
86 Hutcheson (1750) 19, explains the contrast occurring ‘between ideas of grandeur, dignity, 
sanctity, perfection, and ideas of meanness, baseness, profanity’. 
87 Kant (2007) 159: ‘Laughter is an affect arising from a strained expectation being suddenly 
reduced to nothing’ (‘aus der plötzlichen Verwandlung einer gespannten Erwartung in nichts’).  
88 Schopenhauer (2010) 84: ‘In every case, laughter arises from nothing other than the sudden 
perception of an incongruity between a concept and the real objects (‘aus der plötzlichen 
wahrgenommenen Inkongruenz zwischen einem Begriff und den realen Objekten’) that are, in 
some respect, thought through the concept; in fact laughter itself is simply the expression of this 
incongruity (‘nur der Ausdruck dieser Inkongruenz’).  
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philosophical premise, Kierkegaard (1846) distinguishes ‘contradiction’ as the 
sufficient criterion for laughter.89  
Interesting is the fact, that these historical figures base these conclusions 
on the example of jokes they find appropriate to support their views. Therefore, 
their analysis of laughter is lead chiefly in the association with humour. It is 
also important to stress, that these philosophers only made minor accounts on 
the subject of laughter, however, never have engendered a complete doctrine 
nor (with the exception of Beattie) did they devote a separate study. Such full 
treatments of the subject have appeared with the expansion of research on the 
laughable, which today has become a separate scientific field known as 
‘humour studies’. Among various premises on humour and laughter, the 
incongruity theory remains predominant. 
1.2.2.2. Laughter in humour scholarship 
Contemporary incongruity theorists subscribe to the general formula 
outlined by the above-mentioned philosophers, albeit with more extensiveness 
and diversity in interpretation.90 In general, modern researchers lay emphasis 
on the internal activities of an individual and attempt to answer the questions: 
what does one perceive to be laughable, and how does one conduct the process 
of this perception. As I have already discussed above the cognitive-perceptive 
process (section 1.1.2.) as well as the modern ideas of humorous stimuli (section 
1.1.3.1.) these explanations need not be repeated here. From the innumerable 
contributors,91 who correspondingly employ this theory in their research on 
‘humour’, ‘the comic’ or ‘the comical’, one of the most prominent has been 
                                               
89 Kierkegaard (1846) Concluding Unscientific Postscript, reprinted in Morreall (1987) 83: ‘The 
comical is present in every stage of life (only that the relative positions are different), for 
wherever there is life, there is contradiction, and wherever there is contradiction, the comical is 
present’. For an account on Kierkegaard’s views on humour, see Lippitt (2000). 
90 A condensed survey of the different approaches is presented in Baumli (1976) 16-29. 
91 Cf. Monro (1951); Collins-Swabey (1961); Koestler (1964); Clark (1970); Raskin (1985); Ruch 
(1998); Morreall (1983), (1987), (1989), (2009). 
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established by Morreall. In his article ‘Enjoying incongruity’ (1989) the 
American philosopher discerns ‘amusement’ as one of three possible reactions 
to incongruity,92 and stresses its significance in appreciating humour. Since 
‘amusement is the enjoyment of something which clashes with our mental 
pattern and expectations’ humour functions as the ‘enjoyment of incongruity’.93 
In this view, the perception of incongruity itself becomes a source of pleasure. 
Again, as in the case of the relief doctrine, the incongruity theory does 
not comprise all aspects of laughter we have distinguished in its definition. As 
main emphasis is laid on the cognitive process and laughter-provoking devices, 
investigations on laughter itself become secondary. Hence, the term ‘laughter’ 
is mainly used in association with ‘humour’, ‘the comic’ and ‘humorous 
devices’. Other non-humorous occasions for laughter are usually omitted by 
incongruity theorists. Although an emotional response of pleasant nature to 
this intellectual action is acknowledged, it is nevertheless recognized as a 
neutral state of pleasure, which becomes then physically manifested. What is of 
significance to this study, incongruity theories basically neglect a social aspect 
of the discussed phenomenon. 
1.2.3. The superiority theory 
The third analyzed theory explains the cause for laughter through the 
arousal of an emotion in the laugher defined mainly as a ‘feeling of superiority’. 
The term ‘superiority’ is of Latin origin. It is a noun constructed from the word 
superior, a comparative form from the adjective superus which basically means 
‘situated above’ and ‘upper’.94 In fact, the semantic sphere of the term ‘superior’ 
which originally refers to someone or something ‘higher in local position; 
situated above or further up than something else’, extends into such as 1) 
                                               
92 The other two are ‘negative emotion’ and ‘puzzlement’, Morreall (1989) 6-10.  
93 Ibid. 1. 
94 OLD s.v. 
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‘higher in rank or dignity; more exalted in social or official status’, 2) ‘higher in 
degree, amount, quality, importance, or other respect; of greater value or 
consideration’, and lastly 3) ‘higher in status or quality than; hence, greater or 
better than’.95 Since the OED defines the word ‘superiority’ as ‘the quality or 
condition of being superior’96, therefore, we may notice that the circumstances 
of being or feeling superior may occur in reference to 1) social status, 2) 
interpersonal value or 3) personal quality.  
1.2.3.1. Ancient notions 
Early notions of a certain feeling of superiority are traceable in some 
extant writings of ancient authors. In his dialogue Philebus Plato recognizes the 
‘laughable’ (τὸ γελοῖον) in human vice (πονηρία), especially in people’s 
mistaken perception of themselves in regard to their finances, physical 
appearances, moral conduct and intelligence.97 Laughing at others’ self-
ignorance brings pleasure,98 which, in the view of Plato, occurs simultaneously 
in the company of malice (ὁ φθόνος). Since this feeling is considered negatively 
as ‘the pain in the soul’ (λύπη ψυχῆς), laughter, then, manifests an ambiguous 
emotion, described by the philosopher as the ‘mixture of pleasure and pain’, 
what becomes most noticeable in the case of experiencing delight at the 
misfortunes of friends.99 Plato concludes his discussion on the laughable 
                                               
95 OED s.v. ‘superior’, adj., A. 1.; A. 3; A. 5. 
96 OED s.v. ‘superiority’. 
97 Plat. Philb. 48c-e. The often-quoted Platonian ‘theory of laughter’ (cf. de Vries (1985) 379) is 
presented by the character of Socrates, according to whom such self-ignorant people do not 
follow the famous inscription in Delphi, namely ‘Know thyself’ (γνῶθι σαυτόν). This self-
ignorance (ἡ ἄγνοια) is considered to be a misfortune (τὸ κακόν), which in the Republic Plato 
regards to be the truly ‘laughable thing’, Plat. Res. 452d 7-9: ‘the man who thinks that anything 
other than baseness is ridiculous is a fool’ (μάταιος ὃς γελοῖον ἄλλο τι ἡγεῖται ἢ τὸ κακόν). 
English translation in  Emlyn-Jones and Preddy (2013a) 459. 
98 Plat. Philb. 49e 9: ‘we enjoy… when we laugh at it’ (χαίρομεν δὲ ... ὅταν ἐπ’ αὐτῇ γελῶμεν). 
Mytranslation. 
99 Plat. Philb. 50a 5-9: ‘in our laughing at the absurdities of our friends, in blending pleasure 
with envy, we are blending together pleasure with pain; for we had agreed some time ago that 
envy was a pain of soul, but laughing was a pleasure, and the pair of them occurred 
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recognizing the same malicious pleasure when laughing at the characters in 
comedy.100 In the case of Aristotle, who discusses comedy in a set of passages in 
the Poetics, the ‘laughable’ is considered to be ‘one category of the shameful’ for 
it ‘comprises any fault or mark of shame which involves no pain or 
destruction’.101 On the basis of the references in which comedy is said to 
represent people ‘inferior’ (χείρονες, Poet. 1448a 17) and ‘base’ (φαῦλοι, Poet. 
1448b 26), however, ‘not completely evil’ (οὐ μέντοι κατὰ πᾶσαν κακίαν, Poet. 
1449a 32), we may observe a certain attitude of superiority the spectators adopt 
towards the comic characters.  
Similar ideas are noticeable in the transmitted works on oratory of 
Cicero and Quintilian. Following Aristotle’s observations, Cicero indicates the 
laughable in human defects of moral and physical nature,102 since the source of 
laughter always lies in things which are deformed or offensive.103 Quintilian 
comes closest to discerning a certain superior attitude of an orator towards his 
                                                                                                                                         
simultaneously in these times (γελῶντας ἄρα ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν φίλων γελοίοις φησὶν ὁ 
λόγος, κεραννύντας ἡδονὴν αὖ φθόνῳ, λύπῃ τὴν ἡδονὴν συγκεραννύναι· τὸν γὰρ 
φθόνον ὡμολογῆσθαι λύπην ψυχῆς ἡμῖν πάλαι, τὸ δὲ γελᾶν ἡδονήν, ἅμα γίγνεσθαι δὲ 
τούτω ἐν τούτοις τοῖς χρόνοις). English translation in Benardete (1993) 60. 
100 In Laws (Leg. VII 816d) Plato defines comedy as ‘the actions of ugly bodies and ugly ideas 
and of the men engaged in ludicrous comic-acting’ (τὰ δὲ τῶν αἰσχρῶν σωμάτων καὶ 
διανοημάτων καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τὰ τοῦ γέλωτος κωμῳδήματα τετραμμένων). English translation 
in Bury (1952b) 97. 
101 Arist. Poet. 1449a 33-35: τοῦ αἰσχροῦ ἐστι τὸ γελοῖον μόριον. τὸ γὰρ γελοῖόν ἐστιν 
ἁμάρτημά τι καὶ αἶσχος ἀνώδυνον καὶ οὐ φθαρτικόν. English translation in Halliwell (2005) 
45. 
102 Cic. De orat. 2.59. 238: ‘all laughing-matters are found among those blemishes noticeable in 
the conduct of people who are neither objects of general esteem nor yet full of misery’ (materies 
omnis ridiculorum est in eis vitiis, quae sunt in vita hominum neque carorum neque 
calamitosorum); Ibid. 2.59. 239: ‘In ugliness too and in physical blemishes there is good enough 
matter for jesting’ (Est etiam deformitatis et corporis vitiorum satis bella materies ad 
iocandum). English translation in Sutton and Rackham (1948) 375. 
103 Cic. De orat. 2.58. 236: ‘Then the field or province, so to speak, of the laughable (this being our 
next problem), is restricted to that which may be described as unseemly or ugly’ (Locus autem 
et regio quasi ridiculi - nam id proxime quaeritur - turpitudine et deformitate - quadam 
continetur). English translation in Sutton and Rackham (1948) 373. For a broader discussion on 
the laughable in Cicero, see Grant (1924) 73-6; on the joke in Ciceronian rhetoric, see Szostek 
(2004). 
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opponent. Once he concurs with Cicero on the nature of the laughable,104 he 
observes that ‘laughter is never far from derision’105, whereas to speak 
derisively of someone is ‘the most ambitious way of glorying oneself’.106 From 
these indirect references we may notice the connection of laughter with the 
feeling of pleasure at others’ mistakes, infirmities and weaknesses, a feeling 
defined today as Schadenfreude.107 It is, however, apparent that in the extant 
texts the discussion is lead mainly in respect to the laughter-evoking object, i.e. 
the laughable.108 
1.2.3.2. A feeling of superiority 
The emotional aspect of laughter receives more attention in early 
modern times, as philosophers turn their interest from the laughable object 
onto the laughing subject. Laughter’s relation to feelings has been 
acknowledged by many thinkers, however, the first to explicitly state an 
emotion of superiority was the English philosopher Hobbes, who presented his 
famous definition on laughter in The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic.109 
Accordingly, the phenomenon appears as ‘nothyng else but a suddaine Glory 
arising from suddaine Conception of some Eminency in our selves by 
                                               
104 Quintilian quotes Cicero’s observation in Inst. Orat. VI 3.8: ‘Habet enim [i.e. risus], ut Cicero 
dicit, sedem in deformitate aliqua et turpitudine’. 
105 Quint. Inst. Orat. VI 3.7: ‘a derisu non procul abest risus.’ English translation in Selby Watson 
(1875). 
106 Quint. Inst. Orat. XI 1.22: ‘Ambitiosissimum gloriandi genus est etiam deridere.’ For an 
account on laughter in Quintilian, see Desbordes (1998). 
107 The loanword deriving from the German language is composed of Schaden ‘harm’ and Freude 
‘joy’. For a discussion on the meanings of the term in the English language, see Portmann (2000) 
3-6. Although there exists the Greek equivalent ἐπιχαιρεκακία which Aristotle uses to define 
the feeling of pleasure at others misfortunes (Nic. Eth. II 7, 1108b 1-6), the term does not appear 
in the association with laughter. 
108 For a broader discussion on the laughable in ancient rhetoric, see Grant (1924).  
109 Many humour theorists e.g. Ludovici (1932) 65, Morreall (1987) 19, Berger (1997) 22, Provine 
(2000) 14, Martin (2007) 44, entitle this work as Human Nature. Such modification results from 
the writing’s illegal edition in 1650, when the original text of The Elements of Law was divided 
into two separate, having one part published under the title Human Nature, or the Fundamental 
Elements of Policie. This gave the tradition to the different title. In this study I follow the lead of 
Hobbesian specialists, who quote the original 1640 source, cf. Ewin (2001), Skinner (2004). 
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Comparison with the Infirmityes of others’.110 It is the recognition of one’s 
‘eminency’, i.e. ‘greatness’, ‘importance’, or ‘prominence’ that provokes the 
feeling of ‘glory’, used by Hobbes in the sense of ‘vain-glory’, i.e. ‘self-
esteem’.111 As we may notice, a feeling of superiority evinces itself in joyous 
contempt, for its source lies in an unexpected, yet pleasant recognition of one’s 
superiority (which elicits joy) and at the same time the discovery of another’s 
inferiority (which evokes contempt) by comparing his imperfections and 
defects. In other words, laughter manifests a state of mind, namely a 
pleasurable and self-congratulatory feeling evoked by the awareness of being 
superior. 
The Hobbesian view on the subjective aspect of laughter has found many 
supporters112 and continuators, who describe laughter’s feeling of superiority 
with different terms. For instance, Bain (1865) refers to it as ‘the emotion of 
power’ or ‘the consciousness of superior power, energy or might’;113 Ludovici 
(1932) regards it as ‘superior adaptation’;114 many have described this feeling as 
‘triumph’;115 and more recently Gruner (1997) uses the expression ‘thrill of 
                                               
110 Hobbes (1969) 42 (original spelling). For a broader philosophical discussion of Hobbesian 
laughter, see Ewin (2001). 
111 Hobbes (1991) 42: ‘GLORYING: which if grounded upon the experience of his own former 
actions, is the same with Confidence: but if grounded on the flattery of others; or onely supposed 
by himself, for delight in the consequences of it, is called VAINE-GLORY: which name is 
properly given; because a well grounded Confidence begetteth Attempt; whereas the supposing 
of power does not, and is therefore rightly called Vaine’ (original spelling). 
112 Inter al. French writers: Stendhal (1907) devotes a full chapter (ch. II), basically in reference to 
comedy, cf. Bishop (1975); and Baudelaire (1956) who regards human superiority in a 
theological context, cf. Geier (2007) 135-136. Critically Hutcheson (1750) 6-15; Nietzsche (1955) 
753, reputed Hobbes for trying to create a ‘bad reputation’ [eine üble Nachrede] for laughter; 
similar criticism in Eastman (1921) 33- 37, esp. 37, where he speaks of ‘Hobbes’s erroneous 
theory’. 
113 Bain (1865) 118. 
114 Ludovici (1932) 62: ‘We laugh when we feel that our adaptation to life is superior. It may be a 
purely subjective state unprovoked by any external object, (Hobbes's self-glory covers this, too), 
or it may be a state of mind excited by a comparison, as when we laugh at a schoolboy howler’ 
(my italics). 
115 On the association of laughter with triumph, see section 1.3.5.3. below. 
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winning’.116 Despite the diversity, all these terms refer to the idea that laughter 
expresses a pleasant emotional experience, namely a joyful feeling of high self-
esteem caused by a favourable comparison to others. Thus, it is apparent that 
the superiority theory basically regards human emotionality as it attempts to 
explain the psychological reactions within the laughing subject. 
As we have seen, the superiority theory considers other emotions than 
just simple pleasure, and, in this regard, the term ‘laughter’ may refer to the 
evocation and experience of such sentiments as ‘a feeling of superiority’, 
‘glory’, ‘high self-esteem’ or ‘Schadenfreude’. However, as in the cases of the 
previously discussed two theories, the superiority doctrine fails to comprise all 
aspects of the definition of laughter we have distinguished earlier. Though 
emphasis is laid on the psychological reasons for laughing, little attention is 
paid to the cognitive process. Again, superiority theorists focus their research 
on the laughing individual, whereas, express little or no interest in the 
phenomenon’s social dimension.117 
 
The detailed analysis of the three prominent ‘theories of laughter’ has 
shown that none of the doctrines encompass all of the discussed aspects of 
laughter. In general, these theories attempt to give a single explanation for its 
evocation. Thus, a bout of laughter is explained in terms of human: 1) 
physiology (the relief theory), 2) cognition (the incongruity theory), and 3) 
psychology (the superiority theory). What is of significance to our 
investigation, the classical theories chiefly explain the laughter process within 
the individual, however, tend to omit, or make minor observations on the 
                                               
116 Gruner (1997) 8: ‘laughing equals winning. (…) I use “winning” here in its broadest sense: 
Getting what you want. For it is “getting what we want” that makes us happy, isn’t it? We say 
that we enjoy getting what we want’ (original emphasis). Gruner designates his proposition as 
the ‘laugh/win theory’, cf. ibid. 12. 
117 Cf. Baudelaire (1956) 140: ‘The comic and the capacity for laughter are situated in the laugher 
and by no means in the object of his mirth.’  
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phenomenon’s social effects. It is a curious fact, that such a trend dominated 
laughter/humour scholarship until the end of the nineteenth century. Only then 
does the subject of laughter become of interest to scientists of other fields of 
studies, such as ethology, anthropology, ethnology, as well as sociology. Since 
these studies examine human behaviours in a social setting, they have included 
a social dimension to the phenomenon of laughter. This way, in the twentieth 
century, studies on laughter have become more interdisciplinary. We shall, 
therefore, move to the next section, in which I will investigate the arguments 
for the sociality of laughter. 
1.3. Social dimension of laughter 
In this section we I examine laughter as a social act. Curiously, this 
‘sociality’ became explicitly acknowledged only a century ago in the famous 
work of Bergson entitled Laughter (1900). It was the French philosopher who 
pointed at society as the phenomenon’s ‘natural environment’ (milieu naturel), 
arguing that ‘you would hardly appreciate the comic if you felt yourself 
isolated from others. Laughter appears to stand in need of an echo… Our 
laughter is always the laughter of a group.’118 Till today, Bergson’s observations 
are recognized as groundbreaking in studies on laughter, which by accepting 
the social dimension have limited an essentially individualistic approach to the 
phenomenon. 
Laughter requires a social context. It may occur between individuals or 
among groups. Recent experiments held on groups of people provide 
considerable supportive material to the collective nature of the phenomenon. In 
Laughter - A Scientific Investigation (2000), Provine adduces evidence on the 
social setting for laughter from an experiment held on 72 students, who were to 
note down every instance of their laughter and its social circumstances. He 
                                               
118 Bergson (2005) 5-6. 
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claims: ‘the sociality of laughing was striking… My logbook keepers laughed 
about 30 times more when they were around others than when they were alone 
– laughter almost disappeared among solitary subjects not exposed to media 
stimulation.’119 The main conclusion of this experiment is that laughter hardly 
ever occurs in solitude.  
Man’s constitution determines the social character of laughter. In The 
Morality of Laughter (2003), Buckley enlists such arguments for the 
phenomenon’s sociality: 1) its human origin, 2) the human object, 3) 
transmission of information, and 4) formation of bonds.120 Let us briefly analyze 
these social aspects. 
1.3.1. Human laughter 
To laugh is human. Already Aristotle makes the distinction between 
animals and human beings on the basis of the latter’s capacity to laugh, as he 
finds man to be ‘the only animal that laughs.’121 Furthermore, laughter’s 
sociality becomes explicit since its subject, i.e. man – the laughing animal 
(animal ridens), happens to be at the same time an animal sociale. Aristotle 
mentions man’s social nature in Nicomachean Ethics (‘For man is a social being 
and by nature designed to live with others’, Nic. Eth. IX 1169b) and makes a 
                                               
119 Provine (2000) 44-45 (original emphasis). On the sociality of humorous laughter, see 
Chapman (1976), (1983). 
120 Buckley (2003) 17-19. 
121 Arist. Part. An. III. 10, 673a 8: ‘τὸ μόνον γελᾶν τῶν ζῴων ἄνθρωπον.’As is evident on the 
example of the Rabelaisian motto to this chapter, the thought has been reiterated through the 
centuries by many philosophers and writers, e.g. Whitehead (1754) 37: ‘Twas said of old, deny 
it who can / the only laughing animal is man’; Beattie (1778) 323: ‘Risibility… one of the 
characters that distinguish man from the inferior animal.’ For the idea’s evolution from 
antiquity till the Renaissance, see Screech (1997) 1-5. Similarly in Polish literature, e.g. Jan 
Kochanowski Pieśń świętojańska o Sobótce: ‘Sam ze wszystkiego stworzenia / Człowiek ma 
śmiech z przyrodzenia / Inszy wszelki źwierz niemy / Nie śmieje się, jako chcemy’, cf. Pelc 
(2003); Wacław Potocki, Moralia III 168: ‘śmiech i płacz imo wszystkie zwierzęta i ptaki/ Ma 
człek…’. Despite contemporary evidence for types of animal ‘laughs’ (see note 123 below) the 
idea of laughter being quintessentially human remains prominent, cf. Hertzler (1970) 27: ‘True 
laughter, like true language, exists only among human beings’; Buckley (2003) 15: ‘Thinking 
and risibility are both human attributes and limited to conscious beings’; Similarly in Polish 
thought, cf. Kołakowski (2003) 1. 
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fuller account in Politics, in which expresses the famous statement of man being 
‘by nature a political animal.’122 Although the philosopher did not mention the 
social nature of laughter expressis verbis, the connection, nevertheless, appears 
clear, since he defines laughter’s subject, i.e. man as a social specie. In short, we 
may paraphrase in Aristotelian manner that man by nature is a social animal, 
the only one which laughs.123 
1.3.2. Human object of laughter 
Secondly, the laughable should contain something manlike. According to 
Bergson, what evokes a laugh is the perception of a human feature in an object, 
‘for if any other animal, or some lifeless object, produces the same effect, it is 
always because of some resemblance to man, of the stamp he gives it or the use he 
puts it to.’124 In case of items or animals, these have to resemble man in a certain 
way (means of appearance e.g. a carrot root resembling human form, or 
behaviour e.g. a bear dancing in the circus). It comes as no surprise, then, since 
Bergson acknowledges the laugh-provoking object as ‘strictly human’ 
(proprement humain), that man himself often becomes the most suitable object 
for laughter. Hence, not only does the human being appear to be the ‘laughing 
animal’, but also the proper ‘animal laughed at’.125  
                                               
122 Arist. Pol. I 1253a 2: ‘πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῷον.’ Here, the word πολιτικόν resembles 
more the English word ‘social’, than ‘political’ what becomes more apparent in the Latin 
version homo est animal sociale. Cf. the explanation in Kitto (2009) 11: ‘Man is an animal whose 
characteristic it is to live in a city-state.’ 
123 The uniqueness of human laughter has been questioned by Darwin (1998) 131-3, who gives 
examples of chimpanzee laughter; similarly Leacock (1937) 21: ‘Aristotle is scarcely correct 
when he says that man is the only laughing animal. There is good ground for saying that the 
primates all laugh’ (original emphasis). Modern research on animals provides examples of 
laughter-like sounds emitted inter al. by primates, cf. Provine (2000) 75-97, dogs, cf. Simonet, 
Versteeg and Storie (2005), and even rats, cf. Panksepp and Burgdorf (2003). 
124 Bergson (2005) 4 (my emphasis). For an opposite view, cf. Morreall (1983) 64: ‘If I find a 
bowling ball in my refrigerator, I may find this incongruous situation funny, even though I do 
not see the ball as a person.’ 
125 Bergson (2005) 3-4. Early observation already in Montaigne (1958) 221: ‘our own peculiar 
human condition is that we are as fit to be laughed at as able to laugh [Nostre propre condition est 
autant ridicule, que risible]’. 
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1.3.3. Laughter’s communicative role 
Laughter stands a form of communication. The British anthropologist 
Douglas (1975) notices in her research on body symbolism that ‘the body’s 
main scope is to express the relation of the individual to the group’.126 In this 
regard, the physical manifestation of laughter becomes a ‘unique bodily 
eruption which is always to be taken a communication.’127 Laughter, therefore, 
is a psychosomatic form of behaviour which plays a social role in transmitting 
information about the position of the laughing subject relative to others, 
whether individual or group. This way, one’s laughter not only expresses but 
also signals one’s feelings.  
1.3.4. Social effects of laughter 
Laughter appears to be a phenomenon ambivalent in its social outcomes. 
Interestingly, the English language recognizes this ambiguity in the popular 
juxtaposition of the expressions to ‘laugh with’ and ‘laugh at’.128 For instance, in 
his remarks on laughter, Pope makes the distinction that ‘those are my friends I 
laugh with, and those that are not I laugh at.’129 On the basis of this example it 
becomes clear that the English poet points at two different intentional acts of 
his laughter: with the first expression he refers to the pleasant co-experience of 
group laughter shared with people he considers to be friends; whereas with the 
second, he describes an action intended to communicate the lack of such 
amicable relations with people he does not regard as friends. In short, ‘laughing 
                                               
126 Douglas (1975) 167 
127 Ibid. 167-68. 
128 ‘To laugh with’ is a simple construction of a verb and preposition phrase which refers to the 
action of sharing the experience of laughing, e.g. ‘to laugh with a friend, classmates, neighbours 
etc.’; however, ‘to laugh at’ is idiomatic with the figurative meaning ‘to deride’, ‘to ridicule’, ‘to 
mock’ and ‘to make fun of’. The OED s.v. ‘laugh’, v., 4.b. attributes the first instances of this 
idiom to Chaucer (c. 1374): ‘He laughethe at my peyne’. For a linguistic analysis of the verb ‘to 
laugh’, see Hiltunen (1994), esp. 218-219.  
129 Pope (1956) 111. 
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with’ refers to positive personal interactions, whereas ‘laughing at’ expresses 
the negative.  
1.3.4.1. Group cohesion  
The act of ‘laughing with’ has a cohesive effect. According to Buckley 
shared laughter is as a form of ‘a community-building device’.130 Be it between 
individuals or within a group, laughter has the power to manifest or create 
affiliation. Provine stresses that: ‘you can define “friends” and “group 
members” as those with whom you laugh’, since laughter may express shared 
values or show the laughers’ like-mindedness.131 It has the ability to unite its 
participants, even if they are total strangers,132 create social bonds and reinforce 
existing relationships. Modern scientific investigations in social interactions 
provide supportive material to the social facilitation and bonding function of 
group laughter.133 Laughing with others often becomes a shared experience of 
pleasant nature and contributes to positive affective reactions in its participants: 
mutual understanding and closeness.134 In short, laughter is a social act which, 
generally, brings its members together. 
1.3.4.2. Social exclusion 
Curiously, a single act of laughter which promotes in-group solidarity, at 
the same time, may have an opposite social effect. In an early twentieth century 
article ‘Le problème sociologique du rire’ (1928), Dupréel argues that the whole 
                                               
130 Buckley (2003) 184 
131 Provine (2000) 47. 
132 Zijderveld (1983) 47: ‘Joking and laughter unite people. They can even bring into association 
people who were previously unknown to each other, or otherwise have little to say to each 
other.’  
133 Researchers in various fields concur: ethology: Lorenz (2002) 173; Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1989) 138; 
anthropology: Carty and Musharbash (2008) 209-14; sociology: Hertzler (1970) 93-98, Zijderveld 
(1983) 47-52; psychology: Chapman (1976), (1983). 
134 Glenn (2008) 29. Cf. Bakhtin (1986) 135: ‘laughter makes things close and familiar’. 
52 
 
problem of laughter is a sociological one,135 for it is group dynamics that 
constitute the nature of the phenomenon. In particular, the French sociologist 
distinguishes two types of social laughter: 1) ‘laughter of welcome’ (‘le rire 
d’accueil’), the pleasant group experience of shared laughter, which unites 
people and creates bonds; and 2) ‘laughter of exclusion’ (‘le rire d’exclusion’), 
the social rejection of a chosen individual or group. This distinction has been 
confirmed in the studies of Australian anthropologists Carty and Musharbash, 
who concurrently claim that: ‘[l]aughter is a boundary thrown up around those 
laughing, those sharing the joke. Its role is demarcating difference, of 
collectively identifying against an Other, is as bound to processes of social 
exclusion as to inclusion.’136 As it appears, laughter may simultaneously elicit 
two different social reactions in its participants: cohesive within the laughing 
group and exclusive for an individual or group at whom the laughter is 
directed at. Usually, the ‘Other’ refers to people who differ or stand in 
opposition to the laughers, such as outsiders, foreigners, antagonists and 
enemies.  
 
As we have seen, Buckley’s fourth argument for the sociality of laughter 
regards one of the phenomenon’s social effects. As it will emerge, these depend 
on the type of message the laugher conveys to the participants with his/her 
laughter. Let us, then, pay our attention to the laugher’s disposition. 
1.3.5. The laugher’s disposition 
Laughter may reveal one’s attitude to another. In his research on the 
social aspects of humour, Zillmann distinguishes two categories of 
interpersonal dispositions: 1) positive, considering such emotions as affection, 
admiration and love, as well as 2) negative, regarding e.g. resentment, 
                                               
135 Dupréel (1928) 213: ‘Le problème sociologique du rire, c’est tout le problème du rire’. 
136 Carty and Musharbash (2008) 214. 
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condemnation or even hate.137 The main idea of Zillmann’s ‘disposition theory’ 
is based on the premise that people are disposed to laugh with friends at 
common antagonists and not the contrary.138 Accordingly, a positive disposition 
is revealed among those who share the experience of laughing with each other, 
which, as we have seen, results in the promotion of group affiliation. However, 
laughing with a negative disposition depends on demonstrating one’s 
superiority, a non-friendly attitude, disdain or even hostility towards the target 
of laughter. The social effects are the contrary of those of the positive 
disposition. Not surprisingly, then, the laugher’s attitude determines the type 
of social outcome. 
1.3.5.1. Playfulness 
A positive disposition is often connected with playful laughter. This 
matter has received more attention in a subset of research on ‘play’. 139 From the 
three main definitions of the word ‘play’, the most suitable for our discussion 
on laughter describes the phenomenon as ‘an exercise or action for amusement 
or diversion’ and, next, opposes the additional meaning of ‘jest, fun, sport’ to 
the term ‘earnest’.140 Therefore, ‘play’ defines an activity considered to be non-
serious and which is conducted with a social-psychological purpose, i.e. to 
rouse amusement in its participants. 
The connection of laughter and play has received scientific attention 
from primatologists, who give evidence to a phylogenetic development of 
laughter on the bases of comparative animal research. In his influential article 
‘A comparative approach to the phylogeny of laughter and smiling’ (1972), van 
                                               
137 Zillmann (1983) 90. 
138 Zillmann and Cantor (1976) 101: ‘Appreciation [of humour] should be maximal when our 
friends humiliate our enemies, and minimal when our enemies manage to get the upper hand 
over our friends.’ Similarly on the laugher’s affective disposition in Provine (2000) 20: ‘we laugh 
more when bad things happen to obnoxious than to pleasant people.’ 
139 Some scientists consider these studies as a separate ‘theory of play’, however I follow the 
approach accepted by Baumli (1976) 26.  
140 OED s.v. ‘play’, n., II. 7. a.  
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Hooff observes in primates two specific facial displays, which appear only in 
non-hostile social activities, such as the context of play. The analysis of data 
suggests that the display denoted as ‘relaxed open-mouth’ originally served 
animals as a non-agonistic signal, which evolved from presenting an attitude of 
submission to reflecting a state of playfulness.141 In reference to human 
behaviour, the comparative evidence strongly favours the evolutionary origin 
of laughter from the analyzed ‘relaxed open-mouth’ display. Thus, in the words 
of van Hooff, human laughter stands ‘a metacommunicative signal’ which 
designates its association with play.142 
What becomes apparent from these investigations is that the origins and 
functions of laughter are of social nature. In the context of play, the discussed 
phenomenon appears to be a non-verbal behaviour which conveys to other 
participants of the non-serious activity expressive signals of friendliness, non-
hostility or simply of being in a playful state of mind.143 In this case, laughter 
                                               
141 The other display defined as the ‘silent bared-teeth’ is to give origin to smiling, cf. van Hoof 
(1972) 225-231. On the smile, see note 18 above. 
142 van Hoof (1972) 235. 
143 It is interesting to note, that in humour studies only recently has the semantic sphere of the 
term ‘laughter’ fully encompassed the connection of humour with the presence of a playful 
attitude. The link between humour and play has been generally omitted by theorists until the 
twentieth century. An early recognition of laughter’s connection with play is expressed by 
Sully, who lists play as one of the occasions for laughter, even discerns the presence of a play-
mood, however only in regard of children, see Sully (1902) 76, esp. 145-50. The first to stress the 
essentially playful nature of humour was Eastman in his work The Enjoyment of Laughter, who 
completely identifies humour with play and criticizes the serious treatment of the phenomenon 
by early researchers (2009) 15: ‘Humor is play. Humor is being in fun. It has no general value 
except the values possessed by play… Therefore no definition of humor, no theory of wit, no 
explanation of comic laughter, will ever stand up, which is not based upon the distinction 
between playful and serious’ (original emphasis). Since then the subject of play has attracted a 
great deal of professional attention and scholarly interest. Worth recalling is the famous work 
on the homo ludens by Huizinga (1955), as well as influential studies on the connection of 
humour and play by Fry (1963) and Berlyne (1969). A comprehensive theory of playful humour 
has been introduced by Apter, according to whom ‘play’ should be understood as a state of 
mind, i.e. (1991: 31): ‘a way of seeing and being, a special mental ‘set’ towards the world and 
one’s actions in it.’ Such a non-serious mindset is recognized as paratelic, in the opposition of 
that of a telic (i.e. goal-oriented), serious mode. Hence, play enables an individual to engage in 
any activity in a purposeless way, lacking goal-orientation, and only for the sheer pleasure of it. 
In the view of Apter, humour can only be experienced through this playful state of mind, 
which, then, becomes manifested in laughter. 
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accepts positive interpersonal functions and, thus, may enhance group 
cohesion. 
1.3.5.2. Hostility 
Some researchers associated a laugher’s negative disposition with 
aggression. An early example is the opinion of the Canadian writer Leacock 
(1935) who claims that ‘the savage who cracked his enemy over the head with a 
tomahawk and shouted, “Ha! Ha!” was the first humorist.’144 Today, on the 
basis of an evolutionary development, some specialists regard laughter as a 
primitive signal of hatred and hostility. For instance, the biologist Ludovici 
(1932) argues for laughter’s origins from the ‘showing of teeth’, which ‘are 
visible to the attacking or merely threatening foe’ and belong to ‘the animals’ 
arsenal of weapons, its equipment for war and for survival in the struggle for 
existence.’145 Lorenz (1966), who defines aggression to be ‘the fighting instinct 
in beast and man which is directed against members of the same species,’146 
views laughter as a ‘ritualization of a redirected threatening moment.’147 And 
similarly, the Austrian behaviourist Eibl-Eibesfeldt derives it from ‘an ancient 
form of mobbing’, and agrees on the affiliating effect between aggressive 
laughers for ‘[c]ommon laughter thus becomes a bonding signal between those 
who are common aggressors.’148 Here, laughter is identified with non-friendly 
social behaviours, since threats are forms of attack posed to intimidate, whereas 
mobbing victimizes it target by emotional abuse. Accepting such agonistic 
origins for the phenomenon leads to the conclusion that of Albert Rapp’s, who 
                                               
144 Leacock (1935) 9.  
145 Ludovici (1932) 70.  
146 Lorenz (2002) IX. 
147 Ibid. 284. 
148 Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1989) 138: ‘The loud utterance of laughter is derived from an old pattern 
behaviour of mobbing, in which several group members threaten a common enemy. Thus it is a 
special case of aggressive behaviour and this component retains its original significance. If we 
laugh aloud at someone, this is an aggressive act, bonding those who join in the laughter’ (my 
emphasis). 
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in his Wit and Origins of Humor (1951) reckons human laughter ‘a gesture born 
out of hatred and aggressiveness’ for ‘hostility is innate to mankind’.149  
Today, this evolutionary explanation of laughter’s hostile origins has 
been widely criticized.150 However, the presented ideas may be of hand for our 
discussion, for they elucidate the observable hostile aspect of laughter. In these 
views, we may recognize in the aggressor a hostile intention to belittle the 
victim by sending signals of one’s power. Likewise in laughter, since it is a 
mean of communication, we may observe that the laugher transmits the 
message about his power or superiority over the laughed at target. As we will 
see, such signal of hostile might is most noticeable in the case of triumphant 
laughter, to which we draw our attention next. 
1.3.5.3. Triumph 
An old English proverb claims that ‘he laughs that wins’.151 It is, 
however, a universal truth that laughter becomes the victor. Ancient sources of 
the Western world contain this belief, and especially the preserved texts of epic 
poetry provide numerous examples of triumphant laughter, i.e. the laugh of the 
victor over a vanquished foe.152 Though in the original Latin language the word 
triumphus regards a civil Roman celebration of military success, today the term 
‘triumph’ pertains to such forms of behaviour as exultation of victory in 
                                               
149 Rapp (1951) 13. Accordingly, this innate predisposition is a determinant for laughter. 
Contrary Dolf Zillmann, who in the work Hostility and Aggression (1979: 361) argues that ‘[m]an 
is hostile and aggressive… not because he follows inborn impulses, but because these behaviors 
have utility.’ 
150 Criticism: on Leacock, already in Eastman (2009) 130-131; and Kozintsev (2012) 177; on 
Ludovici, in Eastman ibid. 33 in footnote: ‘The simple truth is that Mr. Ludovici’s alleged 
“biology” is myth, and has about as much to do with the real attributes of man and animals as 
Mother Goose’; on Eibl-Eibesfeldt, in Kozintsev (2012) 184, 194, n. 21: ‘The probable reason for 
Eibl-Eibesfeldt’s mistake is that… he speculatively projected human behavior onto that of 
nonhuman primates, with which he was poorly acquainted.’ Cf. Garczyński (1989) 145. 
151 First instances of the proverb date back to 1546, cf. Manser (2006) 325. It was very popular 
and often quoted in early English drama, see L93 in Dent (1984) 462; in Shakespeare, e.g. 
Othello, IV 1: ‘they laugh that wins’, cf. Shakespeare (2006) 332. 
152 Basically in the Iliad and Odyssey: For few Homeric examples of ‘laughter of victory’ in Jäkel 
(1994) 25; a fuller account on ‘le rire du triomphe’, in Arnould (1990) 31-36. 
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combat, joy of successful conquest, elation at an opponent’s defeat or simply a 
rapturous delight at one’s achievements.153  
A theoretical approach to this matter emerges only in early modern 
times. Hobbes’s observations on laughter apply to his idea of bellum omnium 
contra omnes, i.e. man’s constant struggle for power in which one’s failure 
becomes the other’s success.154 Accordingly, laughter’s expression of superiority 
turns into a victor’s triumphant elation over the laughed at target, for ‘we 
triumph when we laugh’, hence, ‘it is no wonder therefore that men take it 
heinously to be laughed at or derided, that is triumphed over’.155 In this view, 
laughter aims at communicating to its target the message of his inferiority, and, 
in Hobbesian terms, his ‘vanquish’. 
 In twentieth century research the connection of laughter with triumph 
has still received considerable attention. Similarly to Hobbes, though from a 
psychological stance, Sidis (1913) discerns laughter as an innate expression of 
triumph, described as the feeling of success after overcoming a difficulty.156 
Here, triumphant laughter forms the basis for the laughable. 
Since laughter usually accompanies the successful defeat of one’s 
opponent, some theorists attempted an evolutionary explanation for it as a 
developed primitive cry of triumph. In particular, Rapp (1951) derives the 
phenomenon from ‘the roar of triumph in an ancient jungle duel’;157 and, 
correspondingly, Gruner (1978) sees the beginnings of his ‘laugh/win theory’ in 
‘the many generations of men who responded to their sudden victories in 
violent encounters with roars of triumph, over hundred of thousands of years, 
                                               
153 OED s.v. ‘triumph’, v., 4. 
154 On the world as a place of constant struggle, see Hobbes, De Cive (1642). 
155 Hobbes (1969) 41-2. 
156 Sidis (1913) 14: ‘When we triumph over some difficulty after a period of long hard work, we 
laugh. (…) The politician, the statesman has his grim smile after a successful campaign, and the 
general has his grin after a triumphant battle. This is the laughter of triumph.’ 
157 Rapp (1951) 21. 
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wore a groove, a riverbed, into the collective human unconscious’.158 In these 
views, contemporary humour and wit developed from a primitive agonistic 
behaviour which in an aggressive form expressed hostility. According to Rapp, 
traces of the original ‘roar of triumph’ remain in derision, which, ‘still shows its 
teeth and its claws’ through which ‘the savage still lurks’.159 
As we have seen, the ancient association of laughter with one’s victory 
exists till today. In our investigations on the sociality of laughter, the 
triumphant aspect provides an explanation to the negative interpersonal 
relation between the laugher and his laughed at target, for a laugh of triumph 
indicates the victor and victim, simultaneously demarcating the winner from 
the looser. Thus, no social bonds are created, for, in the words of Lorenz, 
laughter draws a line.160 A similar effect will be found in the succeeding section, 
which occurs not only after one winning in military combat, but also by other 
forms of conduct within a competitive milieu. What is more, such laughter-
evoking behaviour may even be of humorous quality. Thus, we turn our 
attention to the matter of derision. 
1.3.5.4. Ridicule 
‘Derision’, ‘ridicule’ or ‘mockery’ are used permutably to describe an 
action which generally is based on a disdainful treating of another person. Or in 
other words, it is the act of laughing to scorn.161 For the mechanism of ridicule 
to occur, the sociologist Hertzler indicates three main elements: 1) the subject, 
i.e. the laugher, 2) the object, i.e. the person laughed at, the target or the butt of 
joke, and optionally 3) a third party (e.g. an audience) – an observer of the act.162 
                                               
158 Gruner (1978) 52.  
159 Rapp (1951) 13. 
160 Lorenz (2002) 284.  
161 Cf. OED s.v. ‘ mock‘, v., 1. a; ‘ridicule’, n.¹, 3; ‘scorn’, v. , 3. 
162 Herztler (1970) 29. 
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Or, following Buckley, it requires simply ‘the wit, the listener, and the butt.’163 
Accordingly, derisive laughter occurs at the expense of the target who becomes 
the source of amusement to the subject, and, optionally, to an audience. In 
order to practice mockery, the laugher uses means of contemptuous speech and 
behaviour, often of humorous quality,164 sometimes even of vulgar or obscene 
nature.165 Significantly, the subject’s intentionality forms the basis for ridicule, 
as his main intentions are to express (in humorous or non-humorous form) 
negative sentiments (anger, contempt, disdain) towards the butt of laughter 
and, through this, experience feelings generally recognized as positive, such as 
‘playfulness’ and ‘mirth’.166  
Since we have stated in section 1.3.1. above that laughter stands a form 
of communication, it is clear that derisive acts may convey an unfavorable 
message to the target. In the Psychology of Laughter (1913), one of the first studies 
devoted exclusively to the phenomenon of laughter, Sidis provides a socio-
psychological explanation for derision’s impact on the target as follows: ‘[m]an 
craves for the homage, for the respect of his fellow beings. Man hungers for 
praise, for fame. …men, and especially women, fear the disapprobation of their 
fellow-beings; they fear disapprobation all the more when it is given to them in 
the form of disrespect as expressed by ridicule. For ridicule means disapprobation, 
humiliation; it means inferiority, degradation. Ridicule means the placing of the 
person below the level of the class to which he belongs by birth, connection, 
occupation, education and training.’167 Thus, to be laughed at means to be 
socially degraded.  
                                               
163 Buckley (2003) xiii. Cf. Freud (2002) 97. 
164 For the humorous devices, see section 1.1.2. above. 
165 A famous example of extreme obscenity is Old Comedy, see Henderson (1977), Robson 
(2006).  
166 This intentionality is well encompassed in the English idiom ‘to make fun of somebody’ or 
‘to poke fun at somebody’. 
167 Sidis (1913) 50-1 (my emphasis). 
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Some scholars go further and completely associate laughter with 
degradation. Stern (1954) introduces an axiological interpretation of the 
phenomenon, therefore, including its potential social outcomes. Accordingly, 
laughter occurs as ‘an instinctive, negative value judgment concerning a 
degradation of values.’168 Such evaluation has a negative social effect on the 
target, because he recognizes in the laughter a message about his inferiority. 
This, then, rouses unpleasant emotions in the person laughed at, hence makes 
him feel hurt and offended. Stern adds: ‘and he is right to be offended, for 
instinctively he recognizes in this laughter an attempt to degrade his value or 
that of his work in the eyes of other people’.169 Similarly, the English 
philosopher Scruton states: ‘if people dislike being laughed at it is surely 
because laughter de-values its object in the subject’s eyes’ and concludes ‘it is 
painful to be the object of laughter.’170 In these views, interactional degradation 
is based on provoking the awareness of one’s inferiority. Hence, laughter 
becomes a certain wordless form of judgement, which stresses the hierarchic 
structure of reality, as Wieczorek (2000) claims: ‘the superiority of one thing 
over another, the “betterness” of one thing in comparison to another.’171 Thus, it 
is no wonder that derision, just as hostile laughter, often inflicts a negative 
response in the derided target. 
Since common approval and acceptance is important to members of 
society, any forms of public depreciation, even in humorous form, threaten the 
                                               
168 Stern (1954) 17. A similar observation though not elaborated is expressed by Montaigne 
(1958) 221: ‘the things we laugh at we consider worthless’ (‘les choses dequoy on se moque, on 
les estime sans pris’). 
169 Stern (1954) 16. 
170 Scruton (1983) 163. However, the philosopher shows no interest in the social aspect of 
laughter as he considers it to be an aesthetic experience. Thus, in his opinion, the term ‘de-
valuing’ (Ibid.) ‘seems to be neither a precondition of amusement nor the result of it. It is rather 
the amusement itself… Amusement may thus be described as a kind of attentive demolition’ 
(original emphasis). Scruton also rejects the superiority explanation, as he states ibid. 164: ‘[t]o 
lower the object is not necessarily to raise the subject; it might be to lower both together. It is by 
the universal lowering that one may come to feel ‘kinship’ with the thing at which one laughs’. 
For a criticism of Scruton’s approach, see Dziemidok (2011) 20. 
171 Wieczorek (2000) 18, (my translation). 
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image of the laughed at person. Not surprisingly, the target usually 
acknowledges such conduct as painful, offensive and insulting. As a result, 
negative emotions appear, namely ‘embarrassment’, ‘shame’, and ‘feeling of 
inferiority’.172 Also, the object of ridicule may experience other negative 
sentiments, such as anger and hatred which in extreme cases may even evoke 
the need for compensation or revenge.173 Non-friendly laughter, then, may 
evoke a negative reaction in its object, as it remains an experience of un-
pleasant nature. Also as in the case of hostile or triumphant laughter, derision 
does not favour the formation of bonds between the laugher and its target. 
With the power to belittle its victim in a funny way, ridicule is used 
against an antagonist in competition. Already ancient rhetoricians 
recommended ‘laughter’ as a weapon to baffle an opponent. For instance, 
Aristotle (Rhet. III 18, 7 1419b) follows the advice of Gorgias: ‘one should spoil 
the opponents' seriousness with laughter and their laughter with 
seriousness’;174 and similarly Cicero, who advises an orator to raise a laugh 
‘because it overthrows the adversary, or hampers him, or makes light of him, or 
discourages, or refutes him.’175 Furthermore, derisive laughter may be also used 
for corrective purposes. Many literary modes of speech and genres, such as 
irony, jokes, parody, farce, or comedy employ ridicule in a disciplinary manner. 
Most noticeable remains satire, which ‘always has a victim, always criticizes’.176 
                                               
172 Buckley (2003) 155: ‘Laughter can be modeled as a three-party game in which the parties 
bargain for inclusion in a two-party coalition (wit and listener) that excludes the third (the 
butt).’ 
173 Bakhtin (1986) 135: ‘Indignation, anger, and dissatisfaction are always unilateral: they 
exclude the one toward whom they are directed, and so forth; they evoke reciprocal anger.’ 
174 Aristot. Rhet. III 18, 7 1419b: δεῖν ἔφη Γοργίας τὴν μὲν σπουδὴν διαφθείρειν τῶν ἐναντίων 
γέλωτι τὸν δὲ γέλωτα σπουδῇ. English translation in Kennedy (1991) 280. 
175 Cic. de Orat. 2.58. 236: ‘vel quod frangit adversarium, quod impedit, quod elevat, quod 
deterret, quod refutat’. English translation in Jelby Watson (1875) 150. Concurrently Erasmus in 
his Praise of Folly (1986): ‘what can’t be refuted by argument often can be parried by laughter’. 
Today, this rhetorical device (slanter) is known as a ‘horse laugh’, cf. Moore and Parker (2004) 
141. On the destructive force of laughter in rhetorical discourse, see Davis (2000). 
176 Pollard (1970) 73.  
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Following the motto castigare ridendo mores, satire aims at enforcing behavioural 
norms through the derision of human vices and follies.177  
Concerning the social aspect, famous remains the observation of Bergson 
who reckons laughter a social corrective.178 ‘In laughter we always find the 
unavowed intention to humiliate and consequently to correct our neighbour.’179 
Accordingly, people dread ridicule for they are aware of its humiliating effects. 
It is through this fear of humiliation that derisive laughter ‘pursues a utilitarian 
aim of general improvement.’180 A more recent work with the same 
functionalist approach to the phenomenon is Billig’s Laughter and Ridicule 
(2005), who claims that ‘ridicule lies at the heart of social life.’181 Here, social 
control is based on the employment of derision and the elicitation of 
embarrassment understood in the sociological terms of Goffman.182 In 
particular, Billig distinguishes two sorts of humour (considered to be a form of 
ridicule): 1) disciplinary, and 2) rebellious.183 The first type is employed against 
transgressors of social convention, and its basic role is to maintain current 
social order. The second type, however, is used against the existing rules of 
society, as it challenges authority and the restraints of social norms and 
customs. Interestingly, Billig argues that rebellious humour may also serve 
                                               
177 The satirist remains fully aware of this purpose e.g. English poet John Dryden in the 
foreword to Absalom and Achitophel (1886) 90 states: ‘[t]he true end of satire is the amendment of 
vices by correction. And he who writes honestly is no more an enemy to the offender, than the 
physician to the patient, when he prescribes harsh remedies to an inveterate disease.’ In Polish 
literature, the same notion is expressed by Ignacy Krasicki (1778) in the poem Monachomachia: ‘I 
śmiech niekiedy może być nauką/ Kiedy się z przywar, nie osób natrząsa.’ However, some 
theorists claim that satire enables an author’s negative disposition to the attacked person, cf. 
Connery and Combe (1995) 2: ‘satire is a literary Trojan horse for which polite (or politic) 
artfulness produces a dissembling form, serving first to contain and conceal, and then to 
unleash the primitive passions of the satirist.’ For a recent general study on satire in Western 
literature, see Quintero (2007). 
178 Bergson (2005) 135. Noteworthy is the fact that Bergson ascribes only one function to 
laughter, namely the social one [‘la fonction utile, qui est fonction sociale’]. 
179 Ibid. 136. 
180 Ibid. 20. 
181 Billig (2005) 8. 
182 Cf. the essay ‘Embarrassment and social organization’ in Goffman (2005) 97- 112. 
183 Billig (2005) 202. 
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disciplinary functions for mocking those at power does not equate rebellion 
against them, because as authority is laughed at, so is its power exposed and 
reaffirmed.184 In both cases, the role of derision is a social one. 
It is clear that the laugher’s derisive acts convey an unfavorable message 
to the target. In the words of Chafe (2009) such laughter ‘places the butt of the 
ridicule, outside the serious world by treating him or her as someone who, 
quite simply, is not to be taken seriously.’185 Derision, therefore, is a purposeful 
act with the deliberate intention to disparage the object of laughter, i.e. to 
dishonour, discredit or lower the target’s status, dignity or significance in 
society. Again, as in the case of hostile laughter, ridicule does not favour the 
formation of bonds between the laugher and its target.  
At this point it becomes apparent that the laugher’s disposition effects 
the quality of the relations between him/her and other participants of laughter. 
A positive attitude contributes to the creation of bonds, whereas a negative 
does not. There are, however, circumstances in which one’s laughter does not 
apply to the actual emotional experience. This brings our attention to the matter 
of feigned laughter. 
1.3.5.5. Feigned laughter 
Laughter may be used in a conscious manner. Such behaviour occurs 
when a person wishes to feign positive emotions and mask his/her original 
feelings, not necessarily of pleasant nature. Already Darwin recognizes the 
employment of feigned laughter in the presence of shameful emotions,186 and 
sociologist Goffman concurs enlisting ‘a nervous hallow laugh’ among ‘signs of 
                                               
184 Billig (2005) 213. 
185 Chafe (2009) 95. Likewise, Kozintsev (2012) 44: ‘The primary source of comedy lies not in the 
object, but in the fact that the subject ceases to take the object seriously’ (my emphasis). 
186 Darwin (1998) 212: ‘Laughter is frequently employed in a forced manner to conceal or mask 
some other state of mind, even anger. We often see persons laughing in order to conceal their 
shame of shyness’. Ludovici (1932) 62, terms it a ‘bluff laugh’ with which one pretends to 
express a ‘superior adaptation’ while actually feeling socially inferior. On the distinction of 
spontaneous and voluntary laughter see Ekman, Davidson, and Friesen (1990). 
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attempting to conceal embarrassment.’187 Moreover, laughter may be employed 
to mask one’s true emotions, like sadness.188 In a humorous context, however, 
an individual may laugh although he/she did not ‘get the joke’, i.e. uses 
laughter to mask his/her failure in appreciating a humour-related device. In 
these cases, such a voluntary act of laughing serves an important social role to 
an individual who, for various reasons, does not react in the same manner as a 
group of people he/she is amongst, and attempts to conceal his/her non-fitting 
reaction.189 In the words of Hertzler: ‘he laughs to be in.’190 Feigned laughter, 
then, is employed voluntarily for social purposes, to create or maintain bonds 
with others. 
 
In this section we have discussed the arguments for the sociality of 
laughter. The analysis has been based on ethological, anthropological, and 
especially sociological data, which has allowed us to expand our examination 
of the phenomenon beyond the traditional philosophical-psychological 
discourse. Three important observations have, thus, emerged. First of all, 
laughter is a fundamentally human behaviour. Man is the main laughing 
subject as well as becomes himself the most preferred object of laughter. 
Secondly, laughter reveals a rhetorical character, rather than biological, for its 
primary purpose is communication. A person’s bout of laughter becomes a 
mean of transmitting information of that person’s disposition towards another. 
Depending on the quality of this message, laughter effects the relationship 
between the laugher and his/her object in a positive or negative way. This 
brings us to the third observation, which is the fact that laughter plays an 
important role in human interactions, since it has the power to form, maintain 
                                               
187 Goffman (2005) 121 enlists also: 1) a fixed smile; 2) busy hands; 3) downward glance to hide 
the expression of the eyes. 
188 Ekman and Friesen (1975) 126, express it as ‘laughing on the outside, crying on the inside.’ 
189 Foot and McCreaddie (2006) 309. 
190 Hertzler (1970) 70 (original emphasis). 
 65 
 
or disrupt interpersonal relations. We may hence concur with the words of 
Provine that ‘laughter is about relationships’.191  
1.4. Evaluations of laughter 
Laughter has been judged throughout the ages. Although it hasn’t been 
thoroughly analyzed until the early modern times, nevertheless it has received 
a considerable amount of opinionated attention. Curiously, as we will see, main 
criticism towards laughter considers it a social behaviour. 
1.4.1. The negative tradition 
Laughter has the power to inflict pain in its object. In his investigations 
on the historical views of laughter, Morreall enlists eight primary objections to 
what we may define as ‘negative laughter’, which throughout the ages has been 
accused of 1) insincerity; 2) idleness; 3) irresponsibility; 4) hedonism; 5) 
diminish of self-control; 6) hostility; 7) promotion of anarchy; and 8) 
foolishness.192 As we may notice, these charges are basically of moral nature. 
Already Greek philosophers expressed objections to the use of laughter, 
which may do harm. In particular, Chilon claimed wisely ‘do not laugh at the 
unfortunate person’ (Stob. 3.1.172) and Democritus was attributed the saying 
‘Being human beings, it is proper for us not to laugh at human misfortunes, but 
to pity them’ (Democr. fr. 107a).193 Plato, too, was aware of this, and in the Laws 
designated such dangerous act as laughing ‘with passion’ (μετὰ θυμοῦ, Leg. 
935 d-e). Consequently, he argued that in an ideal state, for the sake of proper 
education of the young, ridicule ought to be strictly forbidden, especially that in 
the form of comedy, iambic and lyric poetry, with the exception of some forms 
                                               
191 Provine (2000) 44. 
192 Morreall (2009) 9. 
193 Stob. 3. 1. 172: Τῷ δυστυχοῦντι μὴ ἐπιγέλα. Democr. fr. 107a: ἄξιον ἀνθρώπους ὄντας ἐπ’ 
ἀνθρώπων συμφοραῖς μὴ γελᾶν, ἀλλ’ ὀλοφύρεσθαι. Both English quotations from Stewart 
(1994) 35. 
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of playful laughter and only conducted under official control.194 Aristotle 
concurred, as he forbade the young to watch certain types of comicality,195 and 
proposed only institutionalized forms and occasions for derisive laughter to 
occur.196 Consequently, in Nicomachean Ethics the Greek philosopher argued that 
many funny sources for laughter, such as the joke (τὸ σκῶμμα) or wit (ἡ 
εὐτραπελία) are recognized as ‘a form of abuse’ (λοιδόρημά τι ἐστίν, Eth. Nic. 
1128a 31) and ‘educated insolence’ (ὕβρις ἐστίν, Rhet. 1389b 12), although used 
by witty people (εὐτράπελοι) they bring pleasure (περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἣ μὲν ἐν 
ταῖς παιδιαῖς, Eth. Nic. 1128b). Verbal abuse for raising a laugh at the expense 
of another may be painful and in the Rhetorics Aristotle warns about this danger 
(Rhet. 1379a): ‘people…become angry at those who laugh at them and scoff and 
mock; for these wantonly insult them’ (ὀργίζονται δὲ τοῖς τε καταγελῶσι καὶ 
χλευάζουσι καὶ σκώπτουσιν· ὑβρίζουσι γάρ).’197 As we can see, Greek thinkers 
were highly aware of laughter’s injurious quality, hence, in order not to hurt 
the laughed at target recommended its control and avoiding negative emotional 
engagement in it. 
 Similar concerns have been expressed throughout the ages. The Church 
fathers condemned laughter for being a behaviour excessive in its nature, 
                                               
194 Pl. Leg. XI 936a: ‘Those to whom permission has been given, as we previously said, to write 
songs about one another shall be allowed to ridicule others in jest and without passion (ἄνευ 
θυμοῦ μὲν μετὰ παιδιᾶς ἐξέστω); but they shall not be allowed to do so with passion and in earnest 
(σπουδῇ δὲ ἅμα καὶ θυμουμένοισιν μὴ ἐξέστω)’ (my emphasis). English translation by in 
Bury (1952b) 465. Such permission is given to poets recognized to be ‘personally good and 
honored in the State as performers of noble deeds’ (Leg. VIII 829d). English translation in Bury 
(1952b) 129. 
195 Arist. Pol. VII 1336b: ‘But it should not be granted to younger people to witness iambus or 
comedy (οὔτ᾽ ἰάμβων οὔτε κωμῳδίας θεατὰς ἐατέον) until they have reached the age at 
which it is appropriate for them to participate in sitting at the table and drinking, at which time 
their education will make them entirely unaffected by the harm that comes from such things’. 
English translation by Kraut (1997) 33-4. 
196 In antiquity derision and ridicule were allowed at certain occasions like, festivals, 
symposiums, religious rites; cf. chapters 3, 4 and 5 in Halliwell (2008). 
197 English translation in Kennedy (1991) 128.  
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irrational and idle.198 Not only was it apprehended as a hedonistic diversion, 
but could have even brought danger to the salvation of a proper Christian.199 As 
a result, in the Middle Ages laughter was excluded from the official sphere of 
life (ideology, religious cult, state ceremonies, etiquette). The only exceptional 
permission for its presence, especially in the form of ridicule and mockery, was 
granted at times of feasts and festivities.200 With the change of perception in 
early modern times, when a general appreciation of laughter emerged201, 
several moral objections still remained. Some philosophers associated derisive 
laughter with hostility. In particular, Descartes discerned it’s source in the 
mixture of joy and hatred which rises from perceiving the misfortunes of those 
who deserve it.202 Curiously, even the so-called ‘founder’ of the superiority 
theory, Hobbes, shared a critical approach to the phenomenon, for, in his 
opinion, laughter generally signalled cowardness, for ‘much Laughter at the 
defects of others, is a signe of Pusillanimity. For of great minds, one of the 
proper workes is, to help and free others from scorn’.203 
In a similar vein, etiquette directives from the seventeenth until the 
nineteenth centuries dictated an economy in laughter.204 Many manuals on 
                                               
198 In the Encyclopedia of Christianity Bowden (2005) 219, marks: ‘Christianity is not generally 
associated with laughter. The New Testament never says that Jesus laughed.’ Screech (1999) 6-7, 
explains that despite pertaining to be ‘a religion of joy’, Christianity is actually a ‘religion of 
woe’. For the development of Christian discourse on laughter, see Gilhus (1997) 64-82. 
199 Cf. John Chrysostom, Concerning the Statues, Homily XV: ‘to laugh, to speak jocosely, does not 
seem an acknowledged sin, but it leads to acknowledged sin. Thus laughter often gives birth to 
foul discourse, and foul discourse to action still more foul. Often from words and laughter 
proceed railing and insult, and from railing and insult, blows and wounds, and from blows and 
wounds slaughter and murder.’ Quoted in Gilhus (1997) 67. 
200 Bakhtin (1984) 73. 
201 Ibid. 66. 
202 Descartes (1989) V art. 178: ‘Derision or Mockery is a species of Joy mingled with Hatred (‘une 
espèce de joie mêlée de haine’) which arises from perceiving some small misfortune in a person 
we think to be deserving of it. We have Hatred for this misfortune, and Joy in seeing it in 
someone who deserves it’ (my emphasis). 
203 Hobbes (1991) 43 (original spelling). 
204 Moderation in laughter was especially required from young ladies, cf. George Savile, 
Marquess of Halifax (1688) The Lady’s New Year’s Gift; or, Advice to a Daughter; such ideas were 
also expressed in novels of the time, cf. F. Burney (1788) Evelina, or the History of a Young Lady’s 
Entrance into the World; and periodical literature, cf. The Lady’s Magazine: or Entertaining 
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proper manners had been written, which advised the young becoming of age to 
exercise caution while laughing, for its scornful form was reckoned ungraceful 
behaviour. In particular, noticeable remain the remarks of Lord Chesterfield in 
Letters to His Son (1774), who perceived the phenomenon so undignified to the 
well-bred, that he summoned its complete rejection in life.205 
From the eighteenth century, the subject of humour received more 
attention. Although the common appreciation of humorous laughter increased, 
nevertheless its negative aspect was not completely forgotten by philosophers 
and theorists. In particular, Baudelaire claimed laughter to be satanic,206 
whereas Ludovici defined it as ‘something sinister’207. What is more, with the 
evolution of the phenomenon’s positive evaluation, many thinkers and 
researchers started to juxtapose it with the negative. For instance, Leacock 
metaphorically distinguished both varieties as two streams coming from one 
source: ‘In one direction flowed, clear and undefiled, the humour of human 
kindliness. In the other, the polluted waters of mockery and sarcasm, the 
“humor” that turned the cruel sports of rough ages, the infliction of pain as a 
perverted source of pleasure’.208  
On the basis of the examples above we may notice that these ideas 
contributed to the over two thousand year old tradition of the negative 
evaluation of laughter. What is of significance to our inquiry is the fact that the 
phenomenon’s non favourable evaluation originates in antiquity. Since then, 
                                                                                                                                         
Companion for the Fair Sex (1791) vol. 22, 67: ‘The most unpleasant of all sorts of laughter is the 
sneer, so very unpleasant, indeed, that I do not know whether it ought not to be excluded from 
the degrees of laughter, and reckoned an expression of malignity or revenge peculiar to certain 
dispositions and tempers. It is very ungraceful and unmannerly, and even where used to 
express contempt of vice, ought to be used with caution.’  
205 Chesterfield (1889) 68-69: ‘Having mentioned laughing, I must particularly warn you against it: 
and I could heartily wish, that you may often be seen to smile, but never heard to laugh, while 
you live. Frequent and loud laughter is the characteristic of folly and ill manners: it is the manner in 
which the mob express their silly joy, at silly things; and they call it being merry. In my mind 
there is nothing so illiberal, and so ill-bred, as audible laughter’ (my emphasis). 
206 Baudelaire (1956) 140: ‘le rire est satanique’. 
207 Ludovici (1932) 17. 
208 Leacock (1937) 30. 
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main objections rise to the use of derision and ridicule, considered to be 
immoral for the potential harm inflicted on others.  
1.4.2. The positive approach 
In the twenty first century a positive view of laughter predominates. One 
of the reasons for this may be the fact that contemporary theorists, even 
supporters of the superiority theory, conduct their research mainly in the 
association with humour, jokes, pleasure and play.209 Today, little attention is 
paid to the phenomenon’s harmful powers and the potential infliction of pain 
on others.210 Instead, laughter is generally recognized to be beneficial to man’s 
health, both mental and physical.211 There even exists a separate field of science, 
namely ‘gelotology’,212 which investigates the physiological effects of laughter 
on the human body.213 Finally, the predominant modern connection of laughter 
with playfulness leads some theorists to the complete rejection of the 
phenomenon’s negative aspect. This is, for example, the case of the Russian 
anthropologist Kozintsev, who in his recent study The Mirror of Laughter (2012) 
rebuffs the dichotomy of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ laughter. In his opinion, the 
phenomenon’s traditional connection with evil and violence is a serious 
‘misunderstanding’, for the recognition of ‘hostile’, ‘aggressive’, hence 
‘negative’ laughter had evolved as a cultural phenomenon. With the 
                                               
209 Cf. Gruner (1997); Buckley (2003).  
210 For few contemporary ethical issues in humour/laughter, see Morreall (2009) 98-110. 
211 Cf. Martin (2007) chapter 9 and 10. Worth mentioning is the book of Norman Cousins (1979) 
Anatomy of an Illness as Perceived by the Patient: Reflections on Healing, through which the ideas of 
laughter’s medicinal values became popular, e.g. ‘laughter is inner jogging’.  
212 The term composed from the Greek word γέλως (‘laughter’) is of modern origin, as it was 
coined by Fry’s assistant Edith Trager in 1964, cf. Fry and Allen (1975) 9.  
213 Scientific investigations on laughter were pioneered by a group of American researchers in 
the Mental Research Institute in Palo Alto. Known as the ‘Palo-Alto-Group’ scientists of 
psychology, psychiatry and social studies lead their transdisciplinary research on the 
phenomenon under the lead of anthropologist Gregory Bateson. However, the foundation of a 
separate science of laughter, i.e. ‘gelotology’ is attributed to one of its members, the psychiatrist 
William F. Fry. For an account of scientific evidence for the phenomenon’s impact on physical 
health, see Martin (2007) 309-33. Criticism in Provine (2000) 190.  
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development of culture laughter ceased to reflect its original nature, namely 
‘the blissful ancient joy of disorderly play’.214 Kozintsev explains : ‘The tragedy 
is that most people do not understand this and use their evolutionary legacy 
not simply in a wrong way but utterly in spite of its nature. This is why “even 
he who no longer fears anything else in the world fears ridicule.” Misuse of 
laughter is a fundamental error on the part of culture. Laughter itself is not 
culpable; it bears no hereditary guilt. The evil, which is mixed in with it, is 
unrelated to its nature. Although it, too, is partly rooted in our biology, the 
blame for the attempt to unite the ununitable – laughter and aggression – must 
be laid at culture’s door’.215  
Certainly, we may agree with a critical approach to the 
hostile/aggressive evolutionary explanation and lay emphasis on the 
phenomenon’s playful origins, which, as we have discussed before, 
contemporary research favours. However, difficulty arises in accepting 
Kozintsev’s vehement negation of laughter’s negative aspect. To disdain 
culture’s influence on laughter and regarding it as a ‘fundamental error’ is a 
misapprehension, for what becomes evident from our investigation is that 
human laughter is a fundamentally cultural phenomenon. As we have seen in 
the course of this chapter, alike fashion, the interpretation and functions of 
laughter depend on current socio-cultural factors, mainly contemporary 
ideology and morality. In other words, ‘evil’ or ‘negative’ laughter is not, as 
Kozintsev’s argues, one of the phenomenon’s ‘fake meanings’, only one of its 
current interpretations. The negative tradition of laughter is not a mistaken 
perception, but only a reflection of people’s mentality of a certain time and 
place. Thus, one should consider the socio-cultural background whilst 
                                               
214 This is the joyful experience of a non-serious violation of norms. Laughter’s original context 
is the one of friendly play, which enables the experience of only one particular feeling, namely 
‘the blissful ancient joy of disorderly play.’ Cf. Kozintsev (2012) 183-4. Interestingly, Bakhtin 
(1984) 71, sees the evolution of the negative tradition beginning from the Renaissance period. 
215 Kozintsev (2012) 188. 
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discussing laughter, for as Propp already stated ‘we do not laugh now as 
people once laughed.’216  
1.5. Conclusion 
In the course of this chapter I have examined concisely the modern 
definition of laughter and outlined various explanations for the phenomenon. 
The discussion has been based on a set of data on the subject from a span of 
over 2000 years, beginning with the earliest remarks by ancient Greek 
philosophers until modern research on laughter lead in various fields of study 
(physiology, neurosciences, linguistics, psychology, ethology, anthropology, 
sociology, sociolinguistics, Humor Studies). The first and chief purpose of this 
chapter has been, therefore, explanatory, in order to provide answers to the 
following questions: what exactly is laughter? What are the causes for 
laughing? What are the functions of a bout of laughter? Three important 
observations have emerged from this theoretical analysis. Firstly, the analysis 
has provided supported material to emphasize the fallacy of equating humour 
with laughter, as other non-humorous stimuli have been indicated and 
explored. Thus, my discussion on laughter in Greek drama in the second part of 
this study will not focus on the subject only in relation with humour. Secondly, 
despite the large number of theories and interpretations, there is no 
homogeneous explanation for the phenomenon. The traditional three theories 
of laughter which have developed only in modern times fail to give a full 
explanation. They will, therefore, be of no use in the following chapters of this 
study. Lastly, it has become evident that laughter is a fundamentally human, 
however, multifaceted physico-psychic-social activity.217 As it has emerged 
from my investigation in this chapter, the English language predominantly uses 
but a single lexeme ‘laughter’ to describe a set of behaviours occurring on 
                                               
216 Propp (1984) 127. 
217 Hertzler (1970) 11. 
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different levels of human activity: physiological, intellectual, psychological and 
social.218  
First of all, the word ‘laughter’ may denote spontaneous and complex 
bodily actions, particularly 1) a distinct sound, 2) a facial display, or even 3) 
compulsive movements of the body. Next, the term’s meaning may be confined 
to internal activities: cognitive and psychological. Regarding cognition, the 
‘laughter’ may regard 4) humour, 5) certain humorous devices (categories of 
humour as well as literary genres which evoke laughter), 6) the feeling of 
amusement elicited by these devices, or even 7) incongruity itself. Considering 
the sphere of emotions, the word may designate a manifestation of one’s 
attitude, emotions or mental state. On the one hand, it may regard the 
expression of positive feelings, such as 8) pleasure or delight, 9) joy, 10) feeling 
of success, 11) relief, 12) playfulness and 13) friendliness, however, on the other 
hand, it may relate to the manifestation of negative sentiments such as 14) 
Schadenfreude, 15) superiority, 16) hostility, 17) feeling of triumph over an 
adversary or 18) derisive contempt. In extreme cases ‘laughter’ may even 
regard 19) a symptom for mental illness. Furthermore, the semantic sphere of 
the term may explicitly refer to the social dimension of laughter. Here, the 
word may mean 20) a group bonding element, 21) a form of social exclusion or 
22) an act of laughing on purpose in order to communicate to others the feigned 
experience of positive sentiments. Lastly, depending on the emotions felt by the 
participants of laughter (pleasant or non-pleasant) as well as the general 
evaluation of the phenomenon, the term ‘laughter’ may refer to 23) a positive 
experience (individual or collective), as well as 24) a negative social behaviour. 
In result, the English term ‘laughter’ itself appears to be misleading. Not only 
does it comprise various ideas on the subject, but it may also regard different 
                                               
218 English synonyms do not show same semantic complexity. Apart from the basic reference to 
the audible aspect of laughter, they may regard a certain aspect of the phenomenon (derision, 
amusement etc.), depending on the context of their use, e.g. ‘cachinnation’, ‘cackle’, ‘chuckle’, 
chuckling’, ‘giggle’, ‘giggling’, ‘guffaw’, ‘snicker’, ‘snigger’, ‘snort’, ‘titter’ etc. 
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concepts simultaneously. 219 Thus, when discussing laughter it is, necessary to 
specify which understanding of the term one applies. 
This leads to the second purpose of this introductory chapter which has 
been to distinguish universal concepts of the phenomenon we may use as a 
backdrop in the following analysis of the Greek vocabulary of laughter. For this 
reason, the ideas of laughter enumerated above will serve as a heuristic 
explanatory tool in our examination of the Greek interpretations of the 
phenomenon in the next chapter. We must, however, bear in mind Hertzler’s 
observation that ‘languages have some non-parallel lexical, syntactical, and 
semantic elements that greatly retard or confuse direct translation.’220 Therefore, 
the Greek language may reflect some of these universal ideas, omit others, or 
even introduce concepts unique to its linguistic structure. Let us, then, turn to 
the next chapter which deals with the Greek vocabulary for laughter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
219 Cf. Scruton (1983) 153.  
220 Hertzler (1970) 63. 
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Chapter II 
 
Greek Laughter 
Terminology and Interpretations 
 
 
Every language is a vast pattern-system, different from others, in which are culturally 
ordained the forms and categories by which the personality not only communicates, but 
also analyses nature, notices or neglects types of relationship and phenomena, channels his 
reasoning, and builds the house of his consciousness. 
Benjamin Lee Whorf, Language, Mind and Reality221 
 
 
This chapter is a general introduction to Greek laughter. My inquiry is 
based on presenting the vocabulary connected with laughter in the Greek 
language and providing its lexical-semantic analysis. The main purpose for this 
is to distinguish the general ideas and ways of understanding the phenomenon 
of laughter in the ancient Greek language. Final conclusions will be used to 
supplement my discoursive line established in chapter I. 
2.1. Terminology 
Ancient Greek language produced a vast amount of terminology used in 
reference to laughter and its related phenomena. In my research, I have counted 
133 words which refer to the discussed phenomenon either explicitly or 
indirectly.222 These so-called laughter words belong to different lexical 
categories as well as stem from various roots. In general, we may distinguish 
three main roots from which majority of the words derive: 1) γελ-, 2) καχ-, and 
3) χασκ-. 
                                               
221 Whorf (1956) 252. 
222 For this purpose, I have searched the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae (TLG) database available 
online (http://www.tlg.uci.edu/). This virtual database contains all Greek writings from Homer 
to early Medieval period. 
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2.1.1. Word-group with γελ- root 
The first word-family is centred on the root γελ-. In terms of word-
formation, three lexemes form the basis of the whole word-group, namely: 1) 
the verb γελάω ‘laugh’223, 2) the noun γέλως ‘laughter’, and 3) the adjective 
γέλοιος ‘laughable’.224 These terms along with their main derivatives are listed 
in table 1. 
Lexeme  Meaning 
†γελαιώς  n. ‘laughter’225 
γελασείω v. ‘to be ready to laugh’ 
γελάσιμος adj. ‘laughable’ 
γελασίνη n. ‘female laugher’ 
γελασῖνος n. ‘laugher’ 
γέλασις n. ‘laughter’ 
γελάσκω v. ‘laugh convulsively’ 
γέλασμα n. ‘laugh’226,‘smile’, ‘cause of laughter’ 
γελαστέον gerund ‘must be laughed at’ 
γελαστής n. ‘laugher’, ‘sneerer’ 
γελαστικός adj. ‘able to laugh’ 
γελαστός adj. ‘laughable’ 
γελάστρια n. ‘female laugher’ 
γελαστύς n. ‘laughter’ 
γελάω v. ‘laugh’, ‘smile’227 
γελοιάζω v. ‘jest’, ‘laugh’,’ joke’228 
γελοίασμα n. ‘joke’229 
γελοιασμός n. ‘jesting’ 
γελοιαστής n. ‘jester’, ‘buffoon’ 
γελοιαστικός adj. ‘mirth-provoking’ 
                                               
223 I adduce the basic forms of Greek verbs in the manner of modern lexicographers, i.e. in the 
first person singular of the present tense. In all tables in this chapter, unless stated otherwise, 
the meanings of Greek lexemes are provided according to the ninth revised edition of the LSJ. 
224 Originally, γέλοιος is a denominative adjective formed from γέλως; the latter, however, is a 
direct derivative of γελάω. Cf. Frisk (1960-70), Chantraine (1968-80), Beekes (2010), all s.v. 
γελάω. 
225 My translation. Cf. LSJ s.v. γελαιώς: ὁ γέλως. 
226 LSJ (1897) 303, s.v. γέλασμα. 
227 LSJ Suppl. s.v. γελάω. 
228 LSJ s.v. γελοιάζω: ‘jest’; Abramowiczówna (1958-65) s.v. γελοιάζω: ‘żartować, śmiać się, 
dowcipkować’. 
229 DGE s.v. γελοίασμα: ‘broma, chanza’. Cf. LSJ Suppl. s.v. γελοίασμα.  
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*γελοιάστρια n. ‘female joker’230 
γελοιάω v. ‘laugh’ 
γέλοιος adj. ‘mirth-provoking’,‘amusing’  
γελοιότης n. ‘absurdity’ 
γελοιώδης adj. ‘laughable’ 
γέλως n. ‘laughter’  
γελωτῖνος adj. ‘ridiculous’ 
γελωτός adj. ‘ridiculous’ 
 Table 1. List of basic cognates centred on γελάω. † denotes a corrupted lexeme. 
Notably, the verb γελάω has many cognates. With the extended stem 
γελασ-, it forms 1) nouns: γέλασμα ‘laugh, smile’, γέλασις ‘laughing’ and 
γελαστύς meaning ‘laughter’, as well as agent nouns: γελασῖνος, ‘laugher’, 
γελαστής ‘laugher, sneerer’, and the forms γελασίνη as well as γελάστρια, 
both meaning ‘female laugher’; 2) adjectives γελάσιμος ‘laughable’, 
γελαστικός ‘able to laugh’, and γελαστός ‘laughable, ridiculous’; 3) verbs: 
γελάσκω ‘laugh convulsively’, γελασείω ‘to be ready to laugh’; and also 4) the 
gerund γελαστέον ‘must be laughed at’.  
In word-formation, the root γελωτ- from γέλως ‘laughter’ is used to 
create other adjectives such as γελωτῖνος and γελωτός, both meaning 
‘ridiculous’. Furthermore, the adjective γέλοιος creates other denominatives: 1) 
the nouns: γελοίασμα ‘joke’, γελοιασμός ‘jesting’, γελοιότης ‘absurdity, 
ridiculousness’, γελοιαστής ‘jester, buffoon’ and γελοιάστρια ‘cheerful 
woman, female joker’; 2) the verb γελοιάζω ‘jest, laugh, joke’; and 3) the 
adjectives: γελοιώδης ‘laughable, ridiculous’, γελοιαστικός ‘mith-provoking, 
comical, funny’. 
Modern lexica of the Greek language give a separate entry to the verb 
γελοιάω ‘laugh’, although it is a rare Epic form of the standard γελάω.231 The 
                                               
230 DGE s.v. γελοιάστρια: ‘mujer alegre, bromista’. * indicates hereon words not listed in the 
LSJ. 
231 E.g. the LSJ and DGE s.v. γελοιάω. 
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noun γελαιώς, however, is a corrupted hapax legomenon occurring without a 
context.232 For this reason, it will not be of our further interest. 
Due to the fact that three main terms, i.e. γελάω, γέλως, and γέλοιος 
play such a significant role in the formation of other γελ- rooted lexemes, I will, 
thus, begin my discussion from their lexical-semantic analysis. However, since 
it is the stem γελ- which carries the primary semantic content of the whole 
word-family, it will be useful to first pay attention to the origins this root. 
2.1.1.1. Etymology 
Etymology supplies us with interesting data on the γελ- rooted word-
group. On the basis of comparative material, linguists derive this root from the 
Indo European etymon *gel-. In his dictionary Indogermanisches Etymologisches 
Wörterbuch (1959), Pokorny argues that the Indo European lemma *gel- seems to 
share at the same time several meanings such as ‘light’ (‘hell’), ‘to shine’ (‘heiter 
glänzen’), ‘to be bright (‘heiter sein’), ‘to smile’ (‘lächeln’), and finally ‘to laugh’ 
(‘lachen’).233 Accordingly, the Austrian linguist attests the concept of laughter 
within *gel- through the comparison with other lexemes in Indo European 
languages.234 Furthermore, he notices the root’s connection with the idea of 
brightness and shinning on the example of other Greek words which, in his 
opinion, are likely to share the same root with γελάω; these are γαληνός 
‘bright, calm’ (‘heiter’, ‘ruhig’), γαλήνη ‘stillness, calm of the sea’ (‘Heiterkeit’, 
‘Meeresstille’), γλῆνος, ‘trinket’ (‘Prachstück’), and γλήνη ‘pupil of the eye, 
eyeball’ (‘Augenstern’). Finally, although Pokorny includes the concept of 
‘smile’ within the semantics of the root, he does not give any supportive 
material for this. In fact, the linguist provides significant comparative evidence 
                                               
232 Hsch. s.v. †γελαιώς· ὁ γέλως. 
233 Pokorny (1959) 366. 
234 Armenian całr, gen. cał-u ‘laughter’, ci-całim ‘laugh’; Cf. Clackson (1994) 126-132. 
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for the attachment of the meaning ‘smile’ to another root (s)mei-.235 Nonetheless, 
it is commonly accepted that already the Indo European root *gel- showed 
semantic complexity.  
Studies on Indo European roots have greatly influenced the research of 
etymologists of the ancient Greek language. Regarding the origins of γελάω, 
Pokorny’s hypothesis on the connection of the concept of laughter and 
brightness remains prominent till today. Etymologists of the Greek language, 
such as Frisk (1960-70), Chantraine (1968-80) and Beekes (2010) reflect 
Pokorny’s view on an etymological connection of γελάω ‘laugh’ between the 
words γαλήνη ‘calm, stillness of the sea’, γλήνη ‘eyeball’ and γλῆνος 
‘playthings, trinkets’,236 as well as with γελανής ‘cheerful’, γελανόω ‘cheer up’ 
and the Laconian γελαρής ‘calm of the wind’.237 Moreover, Frisk and 
Chantraine238 also see a possible etymological connection with other lexemes 
such as Γελέων239 (an epithet of Zeus meaning ‘illustious, splendid’ as well as 
the name of Ion’s son) and Γελέοντες240 (i.e. ‘the illustrious, the brilliant’). 
Another argument in support of this etymological connection is provided by 
the γελ-rooted word γελεῖν, a unique form found only in Hesychius.241 In his 
lexicon, the Byzantine scholar explains this gloss to be synonymous with 
λάμπειν ‘shine’ and ἀνθεῖν ‘bloom, flourish, be brilliant’. 
                                               
235 Pokorny (1959) 967.  
236 It is likely that all three lexemes share the Indo European root *gelHu̯3-/ *gl ̥Hu̯3- as γελάω. 
γαλήνη is formed from *γαλασ-νᾱ, which probably derives from the s-stem *γελασ-, found 
also in γέλως, γελασ-τός, cf. Beekes (2010) s.v. γαλήνη. The word γλήνη and its derivative 
γλῆνος may derive from γλη-, γλᾱ- or γλασ-, cf. Chantraine (1968-80) s.v. γλήνη. It remains 
probable that the original meaning of these three words is ‘shine, bright’, cf. Hsch. s.v. γλῆνος 
explained as φάος ‘light’. 
237 It is probable that the theme γελασ- forms the lexemes γελανής (*γελασ-νής) and γελαρής 
(*γελασ-ρής), Frisk (1960-70) s.v. γελάω. Cf. Hsch. s.v. γελαρής· γαληνή. The verb γελανόω is 
denominative from γελανής. 
238 Frisk (1960-70), Chantraine (1968-80), both s.v. Γελέοντες. 
239 IG 22.1072.6: Διὸς Γελέοντος, ‘of Illustrious Zeus’. Inscription dated c. II d.C. 
240 Castoriadis (2007) 24. These are the children of Ion’s son Geleon, who were one of the 
original four Ionian tribes  
241 To my knowledge, only the DGE distinguishes separately γελέω ‘smile’ (‘sonreir’), 
considering it to be a late form of γελάω. It supports this meaning with a single example found 
in Proteu. 36: τὸ πρόσωπόν σου βλέπω ... γελοῦντα, ‘I see your face smiling’.  
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It is, therefore, likely that the Greek root γελ-, just as its Indo European 
predecessor, contained both the idea of laughter as well as the concept of 
radiance and shining. This hypothesis is today regarded as plausible.242 
2.1.1.2. γελάω  
The basic lexeme composed with the root γελ- is γελάω. Other forms of 
this verb include the epic γελόω243 found in the works of Homer, γελοιάω244 in 
Homeric Hymns, as well as the Aeolic γέλαιμι245 employed by some authors, 
such as Sappho and Theocritus. Modern lexical entries concur upon the verb’s 
basic signification ‘laugh’. However, besides this they also list other meanings, 
such as ‘smile’, ‘be cheerful’, ‘be merry’, rejoice’, ‘laugh at’, ‘deride’, ‘mock’ and 
even ‘shine’ or ‘glitter’.246 Let us briefly look through these meanings, one by 
one. 
2.1.1.2.1. The meaning of ‘laugh’ 
First and foremost, γελάω designates the vocalisation of laughter. Often, 
this aspect is emphasized by adverbial modifiers which distinguish certain 
types of the phenomenon’s audibility.247 We may divide these types into two 
groups regarding 1) a soft sound, and 2) a loud outburst. In Greek texts, soft 
                                               
242 Cf. Arnould (1990) 138-139; Lopez Eire (2000) 14; Halliwell (2008) 13. 
243 E.g. Hom. Od. 20. 390: γελώωντες; Od. 21. 105: γελόω. This is an instance of ‘epic diectasis’ 
or ‘distension’, i.e. the re-opening of a contracted verb with the alteration of its original stem 
vowel. In epic poetry, this is particularly common among -άω verbs. See, Chantraine (1958) 77-
80.  
244 Hom. Hymn. 5. 49: ἡδὺ γελοιήσασα φιλομμειδὴς Ἀφροδίτη, ‘the smile-loving Aphrodite 
laughed sweetly’, (my translation). Hereon the translations of Greek passages are mine, unless 
stated otherwise. 
245 Sapph. fr. 31. 5: γελαίσας. Theocr. 1.36: γέλαισα. On the inflection of γελάω, see van de 
Laar (2000) 99. 
246 Cf. s.v. γελάω: LSJ: I. ‘laugh’; II. ‘laugh at’; II. 2. ‘deride’; ‘passive voice – to be derided’. DGE 
I. 1. ‘sonreir’, ‘reir’; 2. ‘reirse de’; 3. ‘ser objeto de risa’; 4. ‘reir’, fig. ‘resplandecer’, ‘exultar’. 
Abramowiczówna (1958-65): 1. ‘smiać się’; 2. ‘promienieć’, ‘rozbłyskać’; 3. ‘śmiać się z czegoś’; 
‘wyśmiać’; pass. ‘być wyśmianym’; Ewing (1827) 307: ‘I laugh, smile, am merry, rejoice; laugh at, 
mock; also shine, glitter, flourish’ (original italics).  
247 Arnould (1990) 164-68; Halliwell (2008) 523 n. 17. 
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laughter is indicated by the adverbs ἁβρὰ248, ἁπαλόν249, ἠρέμα250, and ἡσυχῇ251 
all meaning ‘softly, gently’. In opposition stand the modifiers stressing the high 
volume and intensity of a laugh, such as ἁδρόν252 ‘loud’, καπυρόν253 ‘crackly 
loud’, πάνυ254 and μέγα255 both meaning ‘greatly’ and πλατὺ256 ‘widely, 
extensively’. Without any doubt, the basic Greek understanding of γελάω is the 
sound of laughter. 
2.1.1.2.2. The meaning of ‘smile’ 
Ancient Greek makes a lexical distinction between laughing and smiling. 
Τhe former is signified by γελάω, whereas the latter is denoted by the lexeme 
μειδάω (vel μειδιάω). Basically, the difference between these two phenomena 
lies in the fact that laughter includes vocalisation, whereas smiling does not. 
Therefore, the verb μειδάω, as well as the whole word-group centred on its 
                                               
248 AP 12. 125 .1: ἐνύπνιον ἁβρὰ γελῶντος ὀκτωκαιδεκέτους παιδὸς, ‘a dream of an eighteen 
year old, gently-laughing boy’. 
249 In Hom. Od. 14. 465, Odysseus mentions the power of wine to make people sing and laugh 
soflty (ἁπαλὸν γελάσαι), cf. Athen. 5. 8. 8; Greek gods laugh softly, as well: Apollo in Hom. 
Hymn. 4. 281: ‘laughed gently’ (ἁπαλὸν γελάσας); Aphrodite in AP 16. 174: ‘laughed softly’ 
(ἁπαλὸν γελάσασα), cf. AP 9. 320; Eros in Long. 2. 4. 4. 2: ‘laughed very softly’ (ἐγέλα πάνυ 
ἁπαλὸν).  
250 In the dialogues of Plato, gentle laughter occurs just before an interlocutor is about to have 
his say, e.g. Phd. 84d: ὃς ἀκούσας ἐγέλασέν τε ἠρέμα καί φησιν, ‘on hearing this, he [i.e. 
Socrates] laughed gently and said…’. 
251 Pl. Phd. 115c 5: Γελάσας δὲ ἅμα ἡσυχῇ καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀποβλέψας εἶπεν, ‘He [i.e. Socrates] 
laughed gently, looked at us and said…’. 
252 Laughing out loud (ἁδρὸν γελάσαι) is listed among the business of a professional Flatterer 
in Antiph. fr. 142. 9 Kock. 
253 Long. 2. 5. 1.1: Eros ‘laughed out very loud’ (πάνυ καπυρὸν γελάσας). Instead of a prayer, 
the epitaph of Rhinthon, a Syracusian composer of tragic burlesques (Phlyakes), asks the 
passerbys to laugh out loud, cf. AP 7. 414 (Nossis): Καὶ καπυρὸν γελάσας παραμείβεο καὶ 
φίλον εἰπὼν ῥῆμ' ἐπ' ἐμοί, ‘Laugh frankly as thou passest by and speak a kind word over me’; 
translation in Paton (1919) 225.  
254 Pl. Euthd. 276d 1-2: πάνυ ἐγέλασάν… οἱ ἐρασταὶ τοῖν ἀνδροῖν, ‘The pair’s admirers 
laughed heartily’. 
255 Plut. Nic. 7. 6. 2: τοῖς δ' Ἀθηναίοις ἐπῆλθε γελάσαι μέγα, ‘the Athenians were prompted to 
laugh out loud’. 
256 Philostratus (VA 7. 39) depicts some authors laughing out loud at the art of wizardry (οἳ 
ἐγέλασαν πλατὺ ἐς τὴν τέχνην). 
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root μειδ-,257 semantically regards a facial expression involving the movement 
of the lips which exposes the teeth.  
The differentiation between γελάω and μειδάω is noticeable in line 204 
from the Homeric Hymn to Demeter. In reaction to the joking of the maid Iambe, 
the grief-stricken goddess is said ‘to smile, to laugh and keep a gracious 
heart’.258 In this line, we observe Demeter’s gradual change of mood as her 
spirits are being lifted. We may also recognize the communicative role of the 
facial expression denoted by μειδάω, signifying the subtle beginning of 
Demeter’s shift of mood and, then, the outward manifestation of this emotional 
process expressed by the γελάω term. On the basis of this example, it is evident 
that the words μειδάω and γελάω semantically differ from each other. 
Despite this distinction, in modern times, it has been a common practice 
to render the verb γελάω not only ‘laugh’, but also ‘smile’. This is especially 
noticeable in the 18th and 19th century English translations of classical texts.259 In 
fact, a conceptual association of the two phenomena is observable today within 
the two most autoritative Greek lexica: the Liddell-Scott Greek English Lexicon as 
well as the Diccionario Griego-Español, since both include ‘smile’ as one of the 
                                               
257 Derivates: nouns: μειδάμων ‘smiling’ (Pi. Is. I 47), μείδημα ‘smile’ (Hes. Th. 205), μειδίαμα 
‘smiling’ (Poll. 6. 199), μειδίασις ‘smile’ (Poll. 6. 199), μειδίασμα ‘smile’ (Hsch. s.v.), 
μειδιασμός ‘smile’ (Poll. 6. 199); τὸ μειδιαστικόν ‘hilarity’ (Sch. Ar. Pl. 27.). Other formations 
are composed with prefixes δια-, ἐπι, and ὑπο-. Famous is the compound epithet of Aphrodite 
φιλομ(μ)ειδής ‘with a friendly smile’ (Hom. Il. 5. 375). This word-family is formed from the 
Indo European root *smei-, see Pokorny (1959) 967; cf. Chantraine (1968-80), Beekes (2010), both 
s.v. μειδάω. Interestingly, this stem forms the English ‘smile’ and Polish ‘śmiać się’ (meaning 
laugh). 
258 Hom. Hymn. 2. 204: μειδῆσαι γελάσαι τε καὶ ἵλαον σχεῖν θυμόν. Translation in Foley (1994) 
12. 
259 The trend is not in doubt within the translations of Greek tragedy of the time; for Aeschylus, 
see the translations of Potter (1833) 240: ‘The gods… smile (γελᾷ), as they view him rack’d with 
pain’ (The Furies); Paley (1855) 484 n. 725: ‘To her domestics indeed she concealed a smile 
(γέλων) under (within) a sorrowful eye trying to hid it (i.e. her delight)’ (The Choephorae); for 
Sophocles, see Potter (1808) 274-5: ‘[Telamon] never, e’en in prosperous fortune wore a pleasing 
smile (γελᾶν),’ (Ajax); Francklin (1832) 94: ‘when we have done the deed, joy shall appear, and 
we will smile (γελᾶν) in safety’, (Electra); for Euripides, see Potter (1823) 417: ‘then with a 
horrid smile (γέλωτι) he cried’, (Hercules); Buckley (1865) 53: ‘How pleasantly dost thou smile 
(γελᾷς) upon the sorrows of thine own’, (The Troades). 
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primary meanings of γελάω.260 Same connection is observable in the few 
English-Greek lexica, in which γελάω is one of the Greek equivalents for the 
verb ‘smile’.261 Furthermore, an intricate connection between laughing and 
smiling remains quiet common amongst modern classicists. For instance, in his 
article ‘On the semantics of ancient Greek smiles’, Clarke generally claims that 
‘γελάω is, of course, the standard word for smiling and laughter of various 
kinds’.262 In a similar vein, though in relation to Attic Greek, Arnould states that 
in the classical period γελάω is used in both meanings, ‘laugh’ and ‘smile’.263 
And finally, some scholars have even considered ‘smile’ to be the semantic 
prototype, i.e. the original sense of γελάω. This is the case of the famous British 
classicist Jebb, who states ‘the primary sense of γελᾶν was ‘smiling’ not 
‘laughing’ – as appears in the figurative uses’.264 It is, thus, apparent that a 
significant group of scholars, lexicographers and translators have concurred on 
attributing γελάω with the meaning ‘smile’. 
The question, however, arises whether the Greek γελάω semantically 
encompasses both concepts of laughing and smiling. As mentioned above in 
section 2.1.1.1., etymological data provides no evidence for such, therefore, 
Jebb’s doctrinaire view lacks supportive material.265 Also, the assumption of 
Clarke and Arnould gives rise to difficulties. In particular, Clarke presents no 
arguments for his translation of γελάω as ‘smile’ in the passages he 
investigates, as well as for treating the verb as synonymous with μειδάω 
‘smile’.266 In regard of Arnould’s hypothesis, the French scholar makes her 
                                               
260 LSJ Suppl.: ‘after ‘laugh’ insert ‘smile’’; DGE I 1: ‘sonreir’, ‘reir’; both s.v. γελάω. 
261 Cf. Yonge (1849), Woodhouse (1910), both s.v. ‘smile’. 
262 Clarke (2005) 39. 
263 Arnould (1990) 141: ‘γελᾶν note alors, à l’époque classique, à la fois le rire et le sourire, dans 
leur multiple valeurs.’  
264 Jebb (1905) 279. 
265 The British scholar provides but a single and disputable example from the Greek corpus, 
Aes. Pr. 89-90: κυμάτων/ἀνήριθμον γέλασμα, which we discuss in detail in chapter III, section 
3.2.7. 
266 Cf. Clarke’s translations (2005: 40-41): Hom. Hymn. 2. 14 ‘all the earth gleamed/smiled 
(ἐγελάσσε) and the salty swell of the sea’; Hes. Th. 40: ‘and the house of loud-thundering father 
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claim on the basis of the scarce occurrences of μειδάω in classical Attic.267 It is a 
fact, that in classical texts, the usage of this verb is significantly rare, in 
comparison to the number of occurrances in archaic poetry.268 Scantity, 
however, of one word is not a decisive sign for a change within the semantics of 
another.269 In these two cases, the inclusion of ‘smile’ within the semantics of 
γελάω again remains undefended. Moreover, the lexica mentioned above fail 
to provide accurate references to support the association of the two 
phenomena, for they adduce no convincing examples for ‘smile’ as a primary 
sense of γελάω.270 And lastly, the noticeable tendency to render γελάω with 
‘smile’ in early translations of Greek texts may origin from the general aversion 
to laughter in the 18th and 19th centuries, a distinctive socio-cultural feature we 
have discussed already in section 1.4.1.271 In this respect, relevant becomes the 
observation of Kott, who states that translation is an interpretative process.272 
The reason which gives rise to such difficulties in modern translation is 
the fact that the idea of laughter denoted by γελάω consists not only of an 
audible element but also of a visual one. Lopez Eire, particularly, speaks of this 
                                                                                                                                         
Zeus shines/smiles with the lilied voice of the goddesses’(my italics). Similar criticism in Halliwell 
(2008) 521 n. 7. 
267 Similarly Sommerstein (2009) 104-5: ‘the only verb that can take its [i.e. μειδάω] place is 
γελάω’.  
268 Arnould (1990) 141 n. 3, encounts 22 instances of μειδάω and cognates employed by Homer.  
269 Though rare in classical authors, μειδάω appears in e.g. Ar. Th. 513; Pl. Phd. 86d 6; Xen. Cyr. 
2.2.16; Theophr. Char. 8.2 etc. Cf. Halliwell (2008) 522 n. 11. 
270 The LSJ Supplement only adds the laconic information on inserting the meaning ‘smile’, but 
adduces no new references nor does it indicate which examples in the original entry should 
regard this meaning. As for the Spanish lexicon, the DGE cites only one example, albeit 
questionable, with the meaning ‘smile’, cf. DGE s.v. γελάω I 1 μηδὲν ἥδιον γελᾶν ‘no dirigir 
una sonrisa más dulce’in Soph. Ai. 1011; I will discuss this example in detail in chapter IV. 
271 Here, it suffices to mention that such reserve is observable also amongst classical scholars of 
the time. For instance, in his translation of Aeschylean drama, John Stuart Blackie (1850) is fully 
aware of the contemporary cultural preference for the smile over laughter, cf. Blackie (1850) 
298: ‘I at once admit that γελάω is often used in Greek, where, accordingly to our usage (my 
emphasis), smile (orig. italics) would be the word’. Similarly, James Boise (1869) 186 argues for 
the translation of φιλομμειδής as ‘sweetly smiling’ on the basis that ‘this seems more suited to 
the idea of Aphrodite than the somewhat coarse epithet laughter-loving’ (my emphasis). 
272 Kott (1999) 7: ‘A translation, especially of a text written over two and a half millenia ago, is 
always a type of interpretation’(my translation). 
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in his 2000 article, ‘Les mots pour exprimere l’idée de <<rire>> en grec ancien’. 
Accordingly, the concepts behind γελάω as well as μειδάω are predominantly 
visual, for both lexemes denote expressive movements of the face.273 As Lopez 
Eire claims, the verb γελάω signifies a behaviour by which ‘certain facial 
muscles contract in a fashion that stretch the lips, reveal the teeth and give the 
eyes a particular shine’.274 Indeed, in the extant Greek corpus, there are instance 
of γελάω in which the concept of sound appears secondary to the idea of facial 
expression.275 It is due to this fact, as well as the similarities of the facial 
movements denoted by both μειδάω and γελάω, that the latter has been 
commonly rendered ‘smile’. Similarity, however is not identity, as Halliwell 
advocates in his study Greek Laughter: A Study of Cultural Psychology from Homer 
to Early Christianity, in which he argues that just because γελάω may, at times, 
semantically encompass a facial expression overlaping a smile, it can never be 
perceived as fully devoid of its audible component.276 In this case, the semantics 
of γελάω appear complex, since the primacy of one of its concepts does not 
exclude the simultaneous invocation of another. In short, there is more to a 
Greek face described as laughing, than as smiling. 
2.1.1.2.3. The meanings of ‘rejoice’, ‘take delight in’, ‘be cheerful’ 
A fundamental role of the emission of sounds as well as of facial 
expression is to manifest outwardly emotional processes within an individual. 
                                               
273 Lopez Eire (2000) 23: ‘ il y a, dans les verbes γελᾶν et μειδιᾶν, prédominance des sensations 
visuelles par rapport aux sensations acoustiques.’  
274 Lopez Eire (2000) 14: ‘ contractant certains muscles du visage qui étirent les lèvres, 
découvrant les dents, et conférant aux yeux un brilliant particulier, est en grec ancient γελᾶν’, 
(my translation). 
275 E.g. Eur. Ba. 1021: ἴθ', ὦ Βάκχε, θὴρ … προσώπωι γελῶντι, ‘Go, o Bachus, beast, with 
laughing face’, translation in Seaford (1996) 123. Cf. Protoevangelium Jacobi XVII 2: τί ἐστίν σοι 
τοῦτο, ὅτι τὸ πρόσωπόν σου βλέπω ποτὲ μὲν γελοῦντα ποτὲ δὲ στυγνάζον, ‘what’s wrong 
with you, that I see your face at one time laughing and at another time sad?’. 
276 Halliwell (2008) 522-24.  
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According to Lopez Eire, γελάω denotes the manifestation of emotions, such as 
joy, pleasure, merriment, and frivolity.277  
In the Greek corpus, γελάω apparently regards the expression of joyful 
delight in those cases in which the verb occurs along with other lexemes 
denoting the experience of positive feelings: χαίρω278 ‘rejoice at’, γηθέω279 
‘rejoice’, τέρπομαι280 ‘enjoy, take delight in’, and ἥδομαι281 ‘enjoy oneself’. 
Moreover, in those instances in which γελάω appears without another verb 
indicating the experience of pleasant emotions, the sentimental aspect may be 
stressed by adjectives, e.g. φαιδρός282 in its figurative meaning ‘beaming with 
joy, cheerful’, or by adverbial modifiers e.g. ἡδύ283 ‘pleasantly, merrily’ and 
χλαρόν284 ‘gaily’. Also, the connection with joyful sentiments is evident in those 
passages in which laughter is located in the seats of emotions, for instance, the 
ἦτορ ‘heart’.285 Such examples are particularly interesting, in light of the 
hypothesis that the original semantics of γελάω, besides the idea of brightness, 
may have also encapsulated the idea of experiencing positive emotions. As we 
have mentioned in section 2.1.1.1 above, linguists trace a possible etymological 
connection between γελάω and the words γελανής286 ‘cheerful’ and 
                                               
277 Lopez Eire (2000) 14, 26. 
278 Antipho Soph. fr. 44b II 33- III 3: γελῶμεν χαίροντες καὶ δακρύομεν λυπούμενοι, ‘we laugh 
when we are happy and cry when we are sad’, translation in Pendrick (2002) 183. 
279 Hom. Hymn. 2. 420-21: γέλασσε δὲ Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων γηθήσας, ‘Phoebus Apollo laughed 
happily’. 
280 Hom. Od. 21. 105: γελόω καὶ τέρπομαι ἄφρονι θυμῷ, ‘I laugh in delight with a mindless 
heart’. 
281 Ar. Pax 335: Ἥδομαι γὰρ καὶ γέγηθα καὶ πέπορδα καὶ γελῶ, ‘Oh I’m glad, I’m happy, I fart 
and I laugh’, translation in Henderson (1998) 471. 
282 Long. 4.22.4: ἴασι φαιδροὶ καὶ γελῶντες, ‘here they come, laughing and beaming with joy’. 
283 In Hom. Il. 23. 784, the Greeks laughed merrily (ἡδὺ γέλασσαν) at Ajax’s stumble and fall 
into dung. 
284 Pi. Pyth. 9. 38: χλαρὸν χλοαρὸν γελάσσαις, ‘laughing indulgently with gentle gaze’, 
translation in Francis (1972) 291. 
285 Hom. Il. 21. 389-90: ἐγέλασσε δέ οἱ φίλον ἦτορ γηθοσύνῃ, ὅθ' ὁρᾶτο θεοὺς ἔριδι 
ξυνιόντας, ‘[Zeus] laughed deep in his own heart, delighted to see the gods engage in all-out 
conflict’, translation in Fagles and Knox (1998) 532.  
286 In Olympian ode 5, Pindar mentions Boreas, king of the winds, as sending his sons in succor 
to the Argonauts ‘willingly and with cheerful heart’ (ἑκὼν καρδίᾳ γελανεῖ, Olym. 5. 2.); also in 
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γελανόω287 ‘cheer up, brighten up’.288 Although these two lexemes appear 
seldom in the extant Greek corpus (γελανής: twice, γελανόω: once), it is an 
interesting fact that all three of their occurrences explicitly regard a traditional 
seat of emotions.289 Here, laughter lies literally in the heart. 
Merriment and frivolity, or in other words amusement and playfulness, 
are other types of pleasant feelings signified by γελάω. Merry laughter usually 
occurs in a playful context which ‘involves a self-conscious suspension of the 
normal consequentiality of ‘taking things seriously’’.290 In the Greek language, 
popular indicators of such non-serious contexts are words centred on the verb 
παίζω ‘play’.291 A look into the extant texts shows that παίζω often 
accompanies γελάω in reference to special events suitable for playful laughter 
to occur, such as civic festivals, revels (komoi), and drinking parties (symposia)292. 
On the other hand, the Greek texts also give us examples of frivolous or non-
serious laughter taking place in less former situations.293 Whether during a 
                                                                                                                                         
Pythian ode 4, the poet prays to the sea nymph, Camarina, to accept ‘with a happy heart’ 
(θυμῷ γελανεῖ, Pyth. 4. 181) the gifts of victorious Psaumis. 
287 Bacchylides describes the soul of Meleager asking the hero Heracles to ‘cheer up his heart’ 
(γελανώσας τε θυμόν, Epinic. 5. 80). 
288 For the possible etymological connection (γελᾱνής < *γελασ-νης?), see Frisk (1960-70), 
Chantraine (1968-80) and Beekes (2010), all s.v. γελάω.  
289 The heart (denoted by καρδία in Pi. Olym. 5.2., and by θυμός in Pi. Pyth. 4. 181 and Bacch. 
Epinic. 5. 80 ) is described as being in a cheerful state (γελανής) or accepting a favorable 
attitude (γελανόω). However, any connection with the concept of laughter may be only 
metaphorical, cf. Halliwell (2008) 91 n. 95. For the role of θυμός in Pindar and Bacchylides, see 
Sullivan (1993); for καρδία, cf. Sullivan (1995).  
290 Halliwell (2008) 20. 
291 E.g. παιδιά ‘childish play, amusement’, παίγνια ‘play, jests’. The etymology of this word 
group is based on παῖς ‘child’, cf. Beekes (2010) s.v. παῖς.  
292 Eleg. adesp., fr. 27 West: ‘Hail fellow drinkers… we ought to laugh and joke (γελᾶν παίζειν 
χρησαμένους), behaving properly, take pleasure in being together, engage in silly talk with one 
another, and utter jests as to arouse laughter (σκώπτειν τοιαῦθ’ οἷα γέλωτα φέρειν)’, 
translation in Hunter (2004) 13. Ar. Nu. 623 ‘you pour libations and laugh’ (σπένδεθ' ὑμεῖς καὶ 
γελᾶτ'). Curiously, symposiastic laughter is even found outer space, cf. Luc. VH 2.16: ’They all 
drink from each of these when the revels begin, and thenceforth enjoy themselves (ἡδόμενοι) 
and laugh (γελῶντες) all the while’, translation in Harmon (1913) 319. 
293 E.g. at war: Hannibal’s laughing and joking (ἐπιέναι γελᾶν οὕτω καὶ παίζειν τῷ στρατηγῷ) 
uplifts the spirts of the Carthaginians, in Plut. Fab. 15. 4; at a household: the image of a playful 
and laughing wife (παίζουσα καὶ γελῶσα) is juxtaposed with that of her serious husband, in 
Plut. Con. Praec. 139f. 13; at the market: a joking and laughing fish seller (παίζειν καὶ γελᾶν) 
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culturally ordained occasion (holiday) or a quotidian circumstance (market, 
court, household), playful, i.e. non-serious conduct enables the experience of 
merriment and the free manifestation of this emotion through laughter. 
Therefore, another recognizable Greek understanding of γελάω is the 
experience of pleasant sentiments. 
2.1.1.2.4. The meaning of ‘laugh at something’ 
Modern lexica point to the cause of one’s burst of laughter as they denote 
γελάω with the non idiomatic meaning ‘laugh at’. In particular, this meaning 
first and foremost relates to the aspect of humour. In this regard, various 
humorous devices are recognized to elicit laughter in others. A thorough 
examination of Greek humour-related stimuli appearing in connection with 
γελάω would exceed the limits of this chapter. We may, however, divide them 
into two general groups: 1) visual humour, based on the perception of actions 
regarded to be laughable, e.g. appearances294, behaviours295, events296 etc.; as 
well as 2) verbal humour, based on the perpception of words, expressions and 
language considered to be laughter-provoking, e.g. jokes297, funny sayings298 etc. 
                                                                                                                                         
tries to sell stale fish, in Antiph. fr. 218 Kock; at court: the Athenians are described as jesting 
and laughing during a trial (παίζοντας καὶ γελῶντας ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ), in Pl. Euthphr. 3e 1.  
294 Heracles is overcome by laughter after seeing the effeminate Dionysus dressed up like 
himself, cf. Ar. Ra. 43-6: ‘By Demeter, I just can’t stop laughing (Οὔ… δύναμαι μὴ γελᾶν)! Even 
though I’m biting my lip, I can’t help laughing (ἀλλ' ὅμως γελῶ) … It’s the sight of that 
lionskin atop a yellow gown’, translation in Henderson (2002) 21-3. Similar reaction of 
Peisetaerus on seeing Euelpides in bird attire, cf. his answer to the question ‘what are you 
laughing at’ in Ar. Av. 803-5: ‘Those wing feathers of yours. Know what you look just like in 
those wings? A painted goose, done cheaply!’, translation in Henderson (2000) 129  
295 In Ar. Pl. 723, Asclepiades laughs at Neoclides’ violent reaction (jumping, screaming and 
shouting) to the god’s medicinal remedies. 
296 Dionysus speaks of some comical sport events, in Ar. Ra. 1089-93: ‘I about died laughing at 
the Panathenaea (ὥστε γ' ἀφαυάνθην Παναθηναίοισι γελῶν) when some laggard was 
running, all pale-faced, stooped over, and fat, falling behind and struggling badly’, translation 
in Henderson (2002) 175. 
297 Xanthias asks his master if he can make a joke, one that usually makes the audience crack up, 
in Ar. Ra. 1-2: Εἴπω τι τῶν εἰωθότων… ἐφ' οἷς ἀεὶ γελῶσιν οἱ θεώμενοι, ‘shall I say anything 
of the usual stuff which makes the audience laugh?’; cf. Ar. V. 567-8: ‘Others crack jokes to 
make me laugh (οἱ δὲ σκώπτουσ', ἵν' ἐγὼ γελάσω) and put away my anger’, translation in 
Henderson (1998) 293.  
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It comes as no surprise that humorous laughter constitutes the basis of certain 
Greek literary genres such as iambic poetry, satyr play, and comedy, all aimed 
at providing amusement and laughter in their audiences. In short, the idea of 
humorous laughter as a pleasant experience stimulated by the perception of the 
comic is also found amoung the Greek understandings of γελάω.  
2.1.1.2.5. The meanings of ‘deride’, ‘mock’, ‘ridicule’ 
A salient feature in ancient Greek culture is to take pleasure in 
perceiving the misfortunes of others and manifest it through laughter. In her 
1990 study entitled Le rire et les larmes dans la littérature grecque d’Homère a 
Platon, Arnould explains that the laughter expressed in ἡδὺ γελάω chiefly lies 
in the experience of pleasure, delight or the feeling of satisfaction over a 
positive turn of events.299 She also adds that often these sentiments are far from 
being benevolent. The ‘sweetness’ of such laughter lies in the outward 
expression of sentiments such as superiority300 and triumph301, which are 
pleasant to the subject, albeit malignant towards others. Concurrently, Zuntz 
(1960) regards this feeling of malicious pleasure in one’s laugh as explicit 
Schadenfreude.302  
The verb γελάω, then, reflects the idea of experiencing emotions that are 
quite dark hearted in their core. This is most evident in the cases in which 
laughter accompanies acts of derision. Mockery is denoted by different 
                                                                                                                                         
298 In Ar. Pax 1066, Trygaeus laughs out loud at the expressions of the oracle monger Hierocles 
saying ‘I enjoyed that one about the flashing-eyed monkeys’ (Ἥσθην χαροποῖσι πιθήκοις). 
299 Arnould (1990) 164.  
300 In Hom. Od. 20. 358, the suitors laugh with disdain (ἡδὺ γέλασσαν) at the seer 
Theoclymenos. 
301 Paris laughs triumphantly after wounding Diomedes, in Hom. Il. 11. 378-80: ‘loosing a heady 
laugh of triumph (μάλα ἡδὺ γελάσσας) Paris leapt from his hiding-place and shouted out in 
glory, “Now you’re hit – no wasted shot, my winging arrow!”’, translation in Fagles (1998) 309. 
302 Zuntz (1960) 38. Cf. the Greek army laughs from Schadenfreude at the beaten Thersites in 
Hom. Il. 2. 270: οἳ δὲ καὶ ἀχνύμενοί περ ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἡδὺ γέλασσαν, ‘for all their demoralization, 
they laughed at him with delight’, translation in Halliwell (2008) 76. For Plato’s notion as 
laughter manifesting simultaneously the feeling of pleasure and malice, see chapter I, section 
1.2.3.1.  
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constructions of γελάω with: prepositions 1) ἐπὶ ‘at, towards’303 or 2) ἐν ‘in, 
within’304, both followed by a dative; and 3) εἰς ‘to’305 succeeded with an 
accusative; cases like 4) accusative306, 5) genitive307 or 6) dative308; and finally 6) a 
predicative participle309. The passive voice of the verb also regards the aspect of 
mockery.310 At times, this aspect is indicated by the adverb σοβαρόν311 
‘haughty, disdainfully’ or πλατὺ312 ‘loudly and rudely’. Usually, malicious 
delight and scornful laughter appear together in relation to those regarded as 
ἐχθροί ‘enemies’.313 Thus, γελάω may denote the expression of pleasant albeit 
malevolent sentiments, such as a feeling of superiority, triumph, disdain or 
even hostility. 
2.1.1.2.6. The meanings of ‘shine’, ‘glitter’, ‘be bright’ 
In some lexical entries of γελάω, we find also the meaning ‘shine’.314 
Arguments based on etymology are plausible but not decisive, since the 
connection of the γελ- root with the idea of brightness remains hypothetical.315 
                                               
303 Hom. Il. 2. 270: ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἡδὺ γέλασσαν, ‘they laughed heartily at him’. 
304 Aes. Ch. 222: ἐν κακοῖσι τοῖς ἐμοῖς γελᾶν θέλεις, ‘you laugh at my misfortunes’. 
305 Soph. Ai. 79: οὔκουν γέλως ἥδιστος εἰς ἐχθροὺς γελᾶν; ‘isn’t laughing at your enemies the 
sweetest kind of laugter?’. 
306 Ar. Nu. 820: τί δὲ τοῦτ' ἐγέλασας ἐτεόν; ‘why do you laugh about that?’. 
307 Soph. Ph. 1125: γελᾷ μου ‘he laughs at me’.  
308 Philem. fr. 110-111 Kock: ἀνθρώποισιν ἡ τύχη γελᾷ ‘fate laughs at men’. 
309 Hdt. 4. 36: γελῶ δὲ ὁρέων γῆς περιόδους γράψαντας πολλοὺς ἤδη καὶ οὐδένα 
νοονεχόντως ἐξηγησάμενον ‘And I laugh to see how many have before now drawn maps of 
the world, not one of them reasonably’, translation in Godley (1921) 235. 
310 Aes. Eu. 789: γελῶμαι ‘I am laughed at’; Soph. Ph. 1023: γελώμενος πρὸς σοῦ ‘laughed by 
you’. 
311 Theoc. 20. 15: σοβαρόν μ' ἐγέλαξεν ‘she laughed at me disdainfully’; AP 6. 1. 1: σοβαρὸν 
γελάσασα ‘having laughed with forceful expiration’. 
312 Cf. n. 256 above, in which audible laughter also contains the idea of derision. 
313 E.g. Soph. 1153: γελῶσι δ' ἐχθροί· ‘the enemies laugh’. I will discuss this matter more in 
chapter IV. 
314 Abramowiczówna (1958-65) s.v.: ‘promienieć, rozbłyskać’; DGE s.v. ‘resplandecer, exultar’; 
Ewing (1827) s.v. ‘shine, glitter, flourish’. 
315 Etymological data has provoked some scholars to regard ‘shine’ as the original meaning of 
γελάω, e.g. William Bedell Stanford, who in Greek Metaphor (1936: 115) claims that the primary 
sense of the verb ‘is to be bright (original italics) and nothing more’, whereas laughter he 
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However, in the Greek corpus, there are noticeable occurences of γελάω (or its 
derivates) the uses of which strongly suggests the meaning ‘shine’ or ‘be 
radiant’. For instance, in the Iliad we hear of a laughing earth316; Hesiod in 
Theogony, describes the house of Zeus as laughing;317 in the Homeric Hymn to 
Demeter both heaven and earth are said to have laughed’318, and, in similar 
fashion, Theognis mentions a laughing earth.319 What these examples share in 
common is the fact that the subject described as laughing is discernably non-
human.320 In these cases, as West argues, the original semantics of ‘laugh’ accept 
a metaphorical meaning of ‘shine’.321 By employing the word γελάω, ancient 
authors have transferred a typically human behaviour onto inanimate objects to 
express, in a more poetic fashion, their radiance and reflection of lights.322 Thus, 
the meaning ‘shine’ occurs in the figurative sense of the verb.323 Such 
observation provides us with a metaphorical explanation for a wider semantic 
range of the lexeme, and has been as such included in the lexical entries. It is, 
thus, a metaphor that without doubt connects γελάω with the concept of 
brightness. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
considers to be ‘only an incidental meaning, although a common one’. Criticism in Halliwell 
(2008) 13, n. 33; 523, n. 16. 
316 Hom. Il. 19.362: γέλασσε δὲ πᾶσα περὶ χθὼν, ‘the whole earth laughed about’. 
317 Hes. Th. 40-1: γελᾷ δέ τε δώματα πατρὸς Ζηνὸς, ‘the house of Zeus laughed’. 
318 Hom. Hymn. 2. 14: γαῖά τε πᾶσ᾽ἐγελάσσε, ‘the whole earth laughed’. 
319 Thgn. 8-10: ἐγέλασσε δὲ γαῖα πελώρη, ‘the wide earth laughed’. 
320 Cf. Halliwell (2008) 13-14: ‘where an association between laughter and light is directly 
attested, especially in poetry, it is hard to separate it from a tendency to personify the natural 
world, to project quasi-human features (not least, emotions) onto its more-than-human forces’. 
321 West (1966) 170. 
322 I will pay more attention to this poetic tradition in chapter III, section 3.2.7. as well as chapter 
V, section 5.2.12. 
323 Cf. Arnould (1990) 138: ‘La transposition métaphorique, dans le domaine des sentiments et 
des expressions’; Chaintraine (1968) 214: ‘Tous les mots du groupe signifient <<rire>> mais cette 
notion est issue de cell d’ <<éclat>>, ce qui rend compte de l’emploi de γελάω avec χθών 
comme sujet’.  
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2.1.1.2.7. Semantic polysemy 
Detailed analysis of γελάω gives evidence for the lexeme’s semantic 
complexity. As we have seen, different concepts of laughter are encapsulated 
within this term: 1) sound, 2) facial expression, 3) experience of emotions, and 
4) their manifestation, 5) reaction to humour, 6) expression of playfulness, 7) 
derision. In addition to this, another distinctively Greek notion of laughter has 
emerged from our discussion above which is based on a conceptual association 
with 8) the idea of radiance and brightness. Apart from this last idea, we may, 
generally, recognize the fact that the main concepts encapsulated within the 
semantics of γελάω correspond to modern understandings of laughter 
discerned in chapter I. 
Moreover, just as the English term ‘laughter’ may encompass various 
concepts simultaneously, similarly γελάω may have multiple meanings. This is 
most noticeable in those cases in which both audible and visual concepts of 
laughter are evoked, as discussed in section 2.1.1.2.2 above, but may also occur 
in regard of the concepts of humour and different emotional experiences. In 
those instances in which it isn’t possible to distinguish a single meaning of 
γελάω, it becomes then evident that the lexeme reveals semantic polysemy.  
Having this said, the question arises whether a similar polysemous 
understanding of laughter can be detected in the other two main γελ-rooted 
lexemes, γέλως and γέλοιος. Let us first have a look at the basic noun for 
laughter. 
2.1.1.3. γέλως 
The chief Greek signifier for ‘laughter’ is γέλως. Modern lexica ascribe 
this lexeme with other meanings such as ‘occasion of laughter’, ‘laughable 
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object’, ‘object of ridicule’, ‘a laughing stock’, ‘derision’, also ‘smile’ and 
‘dimple’.324 
In the first place, γέλως designates sonority. The noun, clearly, accepts 
such meaning in those cases in which it occurs with certain adjectives, e.g. 
πολύς325 ‘loud’, μέγιστος326 ‘great, loud’, and πλατύς327 ‘wide, broad, loud’. In 
the company of some adjectives, the intensity of one’s laugh is evoked, for 
instance: μέτριος328 ‘moderate’, ἄσβεστος329 ‘unquenchable, inextinguishable’, 
ἄμετρος330 ‘immoderate’, ἄτακτος331 ‘inordinate’, ἐξαίσιος332 ‘vehement’, 
ἰσχυρός333 ‘violent’, and προπετής334 ‘uncontrolled’. Curiously, other bodily 
movements may accompany a loud burst of laughter, like in the instances in 
                                               
324 LSJ: I. ‘laughter’; II. ‘occasion of laughter, foof for laughter’; III. ‘dimple in the hinder parts’; 
similarly in Abramowiczówna (1958-65) who based the her Greek-Polish lexicon on the LSJ; 
DGE: I. ‘risa’, II. ‘motivo u objeto de risa, irrisión, ridículo’, III. ‘sonrisa’; Jurewicz (2000-1): 1. 
‘śmiech’; 2. ‘rzecz śmieszna, przedmiot śmiechu, pośmiewisko’; 3.’zmarszczka na twarzy od 
śmiechu’; 4. ‘fałda, dołek na pośladku’; Lampe (1961) A. ‘laughter’; B. ‘derision’; Ewin (1827): 
‘laughter, mirth’; ‘derision, an object of derision’; all s.v. γέλως. 
325 Pl. Chrm. 155 b: ἧκε γάρ, καὶ ἐποίησε γέλωτα πολύν, ‘he came and caused a loud burst of 
laughter’. 
326 Pl. Pol. 295e: γέλως ἂν ὁ μέγιστος γίγνοιτο, ‘a huge laugh would have arisen’. 
327 In Aesop. Fab. 375 Perry, the crowd shrieks with laughter (γέλως δὲ πλατὺς) on seeing a wig 
fly off a horseman’s head.  
328 Athen. 10. 41: οἱ Λακεδαιμονίων δὲ κόροι πίνουσι τοσοῦτον ὥστε φρέν' εἰς ἱλαρὰν ἐλπίδα 
πάντας ἄγειν εἴς τε φιλοφροσύνην γλῶσσαν μέτριόν τε γέλωτα ‘But the warriors of Sparta 
drink only enough to lead the spirits of all into joyous hope, the tongue to kindliness and 
moderate laughter’, translation in Gulick (1930) 461. 
329 Hom. Il. 1. 599: ἄσβεστος δ' ἄρ' ἐνῶρτο γέλως μακάρεσσι θεοῖσιν, ‘unquenchable laughter 
rose among the blessed gods’; cf. Hom. Od. 8. 326. 
330 Sext. Sent. 280a: ἄμετρος γέλως σημεῖον ἀπροσεξίας, ‘immoderate laughter – a sign for the 
want of attention’. 
331 Dio Chrys. 4. 110: προΐτω γε μὴν νὴ Δία τρυφῶν τε καὶ μύρου καὶ οἴνου ἀποπνέων ἐν 
κροκωτῷ μετὰ πολλοῦ καὶ ἀτάκτου γέλωτος ‘So, by heavens, let him step forth luxurious, 
breathing of myrrh and wine, in a saffron robe, with much inordinate laughter’ translation in 
Cohoon (1932) 220-1. 
332 Pl. Leg. 732c: δὴ γελώτων τε εἴργεσθαι χρὴ τῶν ἐξαισίων, ‘one must restrain from 
vehement laughter’. 
333 Pl. Res. 388e: ὅταν τις ἐφιῇ ἰσχυρῷ γέλωτι, ἰσχυρὰν καὶ μεταβολὴν ζητεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον‚ 
‘when anyone gives way to violent laughter, then such behavior is likely to lead to a violent 
reaction’, translation in Emlyn-Jones and Preddy (2013a) 233. 
334 Isoc. Ad. Dem. Orat. 1, 15: μήτε γέλωτα προπετῆ στέργε, ‘do not be fond of uncontrolled 
laughter’. 
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which γέλως is regarded to be συγκρούσιος335, ‘accompanied by the clapping 
of hands’. Furthermore, many verbal constructions express the evocation of 
audible laughter, as, for instance: τεύχω γέλω336 ‘stir a laugh’, τίθημι γέλων 337 
‘cause laughter’, ποιέω γέλωτα338 ‘raise laughter’, κινέω γέλωτα339 ‘arouse 
laughter’, μηχανάομαι γέλωτα340 ‘arouse laughter’ etc. Also, the sonority of 
laughter is reflected in such expressions as σὺν γέλωτι341 ‘with laughter’ or ἅμα 
γέλωτι342 ‘along with a laugh’. In these few examples, we can easily recognize 
that the basic idea of γέλως is, unquestionably, the sound of laughter. 
Apart from the audible aspect, γέλως, likewise γελάω, may signify the 
experience of pleasant sentiments such as mirth and joy. This is most noticeable 
in the noun’s occurences alongside ἡδονή343 ‘pleasure, enjoyment, delight’, 
εὐφροσύνη344 ‘mirth, merriment’, and the adjective γλυκύς345 ‘sweet, 
delightful’. What is more, one’s emotions or state of mind may be detected by 
the visible γέλως on one’s lips346, face347 or within the eyes348.  
                                               
335 In Diogenian. 3. 76 explained as Ἄκοσμος καὶ ἄτακτος· παρόσον τινὲς γελῶντες τὰς 
χεῖρας ἢ τοὺς πόδας συγκρούουσιν, ‘inappropriate and excessive; inasmuch as those who 
laugh clap their hands or stamp their feet’. 
336 Hom. Od.18.350: γέλω δ' ἑτάροισιν ἔτευχε, ’he stirred a laugh among the companions’.  
337 Eur. Io. 1172: γέλων δ’ ἔθηκε συνδείπνοις πολὺν, ‘he caused much laughter among the 
companions at the table’.  
338 A parasite speaks of his skills in entertaining others at banquets, in Epich. fr. 35 3-4 Kaibel: 
ποιέω πολὺν γέλωτα, ‘I get a big laugh’. 
339 Xen. Sym. 1. 14: οὐκ ἐκίνησε γέλωτα, ‘he did not arouse laughter’. 
340 Xen. Cyr. 2. 2. 14: ὁ γέλωτα αὐτοῖς μηχανώμενος, ‘he who arouses laughter in others’. 
341 Xen. An. 1.2.18: οἱ δὲ Ἕλληνες σὺν γέλωτι ἐπὶ τὰς σκηνὰς ἦλθον ‘the Greeks with a roar of 
laughter came up to their camp’, translation in Brownson (1921) 259. 
342 Plut. Quaest. Conv. 657 e 1: λέγων ἅμα γέλωτι, ‘speaking with laughter’. 
343 Plut. Nic. 11.6: καὶ παραυτίκα μὲν ἡδονὴν τοῦτο καὶ γέλωτα τῷ δήμῳ παρέσχεν, ‘for a 
while, this event provided delight and laughter amongst the people’. 
344 Hom. Od. 20. 8: ταὶ δ' ἐκ μεγάροιο γυναῖκες ἤϊσαν … ἀλλήλῃσι γέλω τε καὶ εὐφροσύνην 
παρέχουσαι, ‘the maids left the palace… making each other laugh in mirth’. 
345 Pi. Pyth. 9. 38: γέλως γλυκύς, ‘sweet laughter’ is used in reference to a crowd laughing with 
delight over a competitor’s victory in the games.  
346 Theocr. 7. 19-20: γέλως δέ οἱ εἴχετο χείλευς, ‘laughter beheld his lips’. 
347 In a painting described by Philostratus Major, the recently angry Apollo takes delight 
(χαίροντα) in the the playful mischief of the child Hermes, Imag. 1. 26: ‘his laughter (γέλως) is 
restrained hovering as it were over his face (ἐφιζάνων τῷ προσώπῳ), as amusement conquers 
wrath (θυμὸν ἐκνικώσης ἡδονῆς)’, translation in Fairbanks (1931) 103. 
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Next, the lexeme is also used in the context of joking and play, i.e. non-
serious activities conducted ἐπὶ παιδιᾷ καὶ γέλωτι ‘for fun and laughter’.349 The 
idea of playfulness is noticeable in expressions such as ἐν γέλωτι350 ‘in joke’, 
ἐπὶ γέλωτι351 ‘for a laugh’ or ‘for fun’, μετὰ γέλωτος352 ‘amidst laughter’; or 
along other words regarding non-serious activities such as παιδιά353 ‘childish 
play, amusement’, παίγνια354 ‘play, jests’, and σκῶμμα355 ‘jest, gibe, joke’. Often 
the objects considered to be γέλωτος ἄξια ‘worth a laugh’ imply humour. 356 
The noun γέλως denotes derision, as well. In this respect, many verbal 
constructions refer to the production of laughter at the expense of another 
person, e.g. ὀφλισκάνω γέλωτα357 ‘deserve ridicule’, παρέχω γέλωτα358 ‘cause 
laughter’, ἄγω γέλωτα359 ‘laugh at’, παρασκευάζω γέλωτα360 ‘provide a laugh’, 
                                                                                                                                         
348Aes. Ch. 738-9 τόν γ’ ἐντὸς γέλων κεύθουσ᾽, ‘behind the eyes she hid her laughter’; cf. 
chapter III, sections 3.2.1. and 3.2.6. 
349 Plut. Caes. 61. 3. 1. 
350 Plu. Mor. 2. 124d: Ταῦθ’ ἡμῖν ὁ Γλαῦκος ἐν γέλωτι προύφερεν, ‘such words Glaucus passed 
over to us in joke’. 
351 In Plut. Alc. 8. 2., Alcibiades is said to punch Hipponicus in the face for no ther reason than 
just for laughs (ἐπὶ γέλωτι). 
352 In the lost comedy Women of Lemnos (Antiph. fr. 144 Kock) a flatterer speaks of a life filled 
with laughter (ἡμῖν δὲ μετὰ γέλωτος ὁ βίος) as his profession is based on playing, provoking 
others to laugh, jesting and drinking plentiful wine (τὸ μέγιστον ἔργον ἐστὶ παιδιά ἁδρὸν 
γελάσαι, σκῶψαί τιν', ἐκπιεῖν πολύν). 
353 D. Chr. 75-6: ἧκον δὲ καὶ οἱ παῖδες τὴν ὗν ἄγοντες μετὰ γέλωτος καὶ παιδιᾶς ‘the boys 
came in laughing and full of fun, leading the pig’, translation in Cohoon (1932) 329. 
354 Suda s.v. παιγνία· (…) οἱ δὲ ναρθηκοφόροι ἐδίωκον σὺν πολλῷ γέλωτι καὶ παιγνίᾳ ‘the 
rod-bearers chased them with much laughter and play’. 
355 AP 9. 246: ἦν δὲ γέλως ἐπὶ σοὶ καὶ σκώμματα πυκνὰ ‘there was laughter and many jokes at 
you’. 
356 Cf. Men. fr. 1098 Kock: ὁ μὴ γέλωτος ἄξιος ἂν ᾖ γέλως, / αὐτὸς πέφυκε τοῦ γέλωτος 
κατάγελως, ‘if a thing not being funny makes us laugh, then that laughter makes us look 
ridiculous’. 
357 Pl. Theaet. 161 e 5: τὸ δὲ δὴ ἐμόν τε καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς τέχνης τῆς μαιευτικῆς σιγῶ ὅσον γέλωτα 
ὀφλισκάνομεν, ‘I do not speak of the ridicule I and my art of delivery deserve’; Ar. fr. 898 
Kock: ἐγὼ διὰ ταῦτα, μὴ γέλων ὀφλὼν λάθω, / περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν ἐξῆμμαι πηνίκην τινά, 
‘Out of fear of becoming an object of ridicule, I wear a wig on my head’. 
358 Ar. Th. 941-2: ἵνα μὴ 'ν κροκωτοῖς καὶ μίτραις γέρων ἀνὴρ γέλωτα παρέχω τοῖς κόραξιν 
ἑστιῶν, ‘I don’t want to give the crows a reason to laugh at me, an old man dressed up in a 
saffron gown and headband’. 
359 Soph. Ai. 382: ἦ που πολὺν γέλωθ᾽ ὑφ᾽ ἡδονῆς ἄγεις, ‘how you must be laughing in your 
delight’, translation in Garvie (1998) 31. 
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and συντίτημι γέλων361 ‘laugh at’. It is an interesting fact that expressions with 
γέλως may simultaneously regard both the audible aspect of laughter as well 
as the idea of mockery. For instance, asides ‘loud laughter’, the phrases πολὺς 
γέλως362 or μέγιστος γέλως363 may signify ‘immense derision’ or ‘a major 
laughing stock’. Similarly, the expression γέλωτος ἄξια364 ‘worth a laugh’, in 
the context of mockery accepts the meaning of that which is ‘worth ridicule’. 
Dersion, therefore, is another distinguishable concept encompassed in the 
semantic sphere of γέλως. 
Additionally, modern lexica adduce few distinctly Greek expressions 
with γέλως. For example, Ἰωνικός γέλως365 ‘Ionian laughter’ as well as 
Μεγαρικός γέλως366 ‘Megarian laughter’ signify shameless or insolent 
laughter, whereas Αἰάντειος γέλως367, literally meaning ‘the laughter of Ajax’ 
was proverbial in antiquity for expressing a madman’s laugh. Curiously, one 
original Greek phrase σαρδάνιος (vel σαρδόνιος) γέλως368, ‘sardonic laughter’, 
                                                                                                                                         
360 Pl. Leg. 669d: ποιηταὶ δὲ ἀνθρώπινοι … γέλωτ' ἂν παρασκευάζοιεν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὅσους 
φησὶν Ὀρφεὺς λαχεῖν ὥραν τῆς τέρψιος, ‘human poets … would furnish a theme for laughter 
to all the men who, in Orpheus’ phrase, “have attained the full flower of joyousness”, 
translation in Bury (1952a) 147. 
361 Soph. Ai. 303: συντιθεὶς γέλων πολύν ὅσην κατ' αὐτῶν ὕβριν ἐκτείσαιτ' ἰών, ‘he laughed 
loudly at all the violence he had gone and inflicted on them by way of vengeance’ translation in 
Garvie (1998) 47. 
362 Archil. 172. 3-4 West: πολὺς ἀστοῖσι φαίνεαι γέλως ‘you will become a major laughing-
stock to the citizens’. 
363 Gal. Nat. Fac. 2. 67. 6 Kühn: μέγιστον ὀφλεῖν γέλωτα ‘to incur great derision’. 
364 E.g. Eur. Heracl. 507-8: ‘it would deserve only ridicule (γέλωτος ἄξια) if we were to sit here 
and lament as suppliants to the gods’. 
365 Diogenian. 3. 87: Γέλως Ἰωνικός: ἐπὶ τῶν κιναίδων ‘Ionian laughter: concerning calamites’. 
366 Diogenian. 3. 88: Γέλως Μεγαρικός: ἐπὶ τῶν ἀώρως θρυπτομένων ‘Megarian laughter: 
concerning those who are improperly effeminate’. Hesychius explains the phrase with ὁ 
σκωπτικός ‘mocker’. 
367 Diogenian. 1. 41: Αἰάντειος γέλως: ἐπὶ τῶν παραφρόνως γελώντων, ‘laughter of Ajax: 
regarding those laughing in a deranged manner’. Men. fr. 401: Αἰάντειος γέλως. For a broader 
discussion on Ajax, madness and laughter, see chapter IV, section 4.2.4. 
368 The Suda gives two explanations; under sigma 123 it states: ὁ προσποίητος, ‘one who 
pretends’; under sigma 124, it gives different explainations for the saying (παροιμία), among 
which worth mentioning are 1) that it regards those who laugh themselves to death (ἐπὶ τῶν 
ἐπ' ὀλέθρῳ τῷ σφῶν αὐτῶν γελώντων), 2) it may also derive from the act of grinning 
maliciously (ἀπὸ τοῦ σεσηρέναι μετὰ ἀνίας), and 3) it may refer to the poisonous effect of a 
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which the ancients applied in reference to scornful laughter as the expression of 
malicious delight at the misfortunes of others,369 has been introduced into many 
modern languages through its Latin translation risus sardonicus.370 
Difficulty arises in rendering γέλως, ‘smile’, for two main reasons. 
Firstly, amongst the authorative Greek lexica, only the DGE explicitly attributes 
the lexeme with this meaning in a figurative sense.371 However, the Spanish 
lexicon adduces but a single as well as disputable example to support this 
claim, for other lexicographers cite the same reference in terms of a metaphor 
for waves.372 Secondly, the conceptual distinction between laughter and smile in 
the Greek language, as discussed in relation to γελάω in section 2.1.1.2.2. 
above, applies to the verb’s direct denominative, as well. In view of the fact that 
γέλως also reveals a wide range of meanings, it should not be perceived as 
limited to only a single idea of laughter. We should bare this in mind especially 
when interpreting those passages in which γέλως refers to a person’s face.373  
And finally, in some lexica we can find the meaning ‘dimple’ ascribed to 
the noun, however, not in relation to the indentation in the cheeks occurring 
while laughing, but in reference to the curves of a woman’s hips.374  
                                                                                                                                         
plant growing on Sardinia after which consumption one makes a laughing grin and dies. For a 
discussion on the etymology of σαρδάνιος, see Halliwell (2008) 93 n. 100. 
369 Hom. Od. 20. 301-2: μείδησε δὲ θυμῷ / σαρδάνιον μάλα τοῖον, ‘Odysseus smiled in his 
heart in quite a sardonic way’; Pl. Res. 337a 3: ὃς ἀκούσας ἀνεκάγχασέ τε μάλα σαρδάνιον, 
‘Upon hering this he burst out laughing very sardonically’.  
370 English: ‘sardonic laughter’; French: ‘le rire sardonique”; German: ‘Sardonisches Lachen’; 
Italian: ‘riso sardonico’ etc.; in Polish: ‘uśmiech sardoniczny’, by evoking the image of smile.  
371 Similarly in the English-Greek lexicon of Woodhouse (1910) s.v. smile: γέλως, γέλασμα, 
however without supporting references. In contrast Yonge (1849) who in his entry adduces 
μείδημα. 
372 Opp. Hal. 4. 334: κύματος ἀκροτάτοιο γέλως ὅθι χέρσον ἀμείβει. The difference in 
interpretation is observable in the passage’s two available English translations by Jones (1722) 
165: ‘Where thin expiring Waves salute the Land / With dimpled Smile, and kiss the dubious 
Strand’; and Mair (1928) 429: ‘where the laughter of the utmost wave skirts the land’.  
373 E.g. Soph. El. 1310: γέλωτι τοὐμὸν φαιδρὸν ὄψεται κάρα, ‘she will see my face beaming 
with laughter’. We discuss this example in more detail in chapter IV. 
374 Luc. Am. 14: τῶν δὲ τοῖς ἰσχίοις ἐνεσφραγισμένων ἐξ ἑκατέρων τύπων οὐκ ἂν εἴποι τις ὡς 
ἡδὺς ὁ γέλως, ‘as for the hips’ flesh pressed on both sides of the figure, one cannot find words 
to describe that sweet dimple’. 
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In this section, we have paid attention to the various interpretations of 
γέλως. As it has emerged, the sematics of the noun consist of different ideas 
regarding the discussed phenomenon. These concepts, generally, correspond to 
those distinguished in our analysis of the verb γελάω. What is more, a single 
instance of γέλως may evoke more than one idea of laughter at the same time 
e.g. sound and derision, humour and ridicule etc. The noun, therefore, just as 
the verb, shows semantic complexity as well as polysemy. 
 I would now like to turn my attention to the third main γελ- rooted 
laughter word, namely, the adjective γέλοιος. 
2.1.1.4. γέλοιος 
The literal meaning of γέλοιος is ‘laughable’ or ‘laughter-provoking’. 
Modern lexicographers, however, propose such explanations for the adjective 
such as ‘mirth-provoking’, ‘amusing’, ‘funny’, ‘entertaining’ as well as 
‘ludicrous’, ‘absurd’, ‘foolish’, and ‘ridiculous’.375 Already from these quoted 
meanings we may distinguish three main ideas of laughter appearing in 
connection with 1) humour, 2) playfulness, and 3) ridicule.  
First and foremost, γέλοιος refers to the laughable quality perceived 
within an object.376 When used in reference to a person, the adjective signifies 
‘one who makes others laugh’, thus is ‘laughable’377 or an explicit ‘joker’.378 
                                               
375 LSJ I. ‘mirth-provoking’, ‘amusing’; II. ‘ludicrous’, ‘absurd’; DGE: I. 1. a) ‘divertido’, 
‘ridículo’; b) ‘que es objeto de risa’, ‘ridículo’; 2. ‘divertido’, ‘bromista’, ‘que hace reir’; 
Abramowiczówna (1958-65): 1. ‘śmieszny’, ‘zabawny’, żartobliwy’; 2. ‘śmieszny’, 
‘bezsensowny’; Jurewicz (2000-1): 1. ‘śmieszny’, zabawny’, ‘dowcipkujacy’, ‘śmieszący’, 
dowcipny’; 2. ‘śmieszny’, ‘bezrozumny’, ‘bezsensowny’; all s.v. γέλοιος. 
376 Ar. Av. 99: Τὸ ῥάμφος ἡμῖν σου γέλοιον φαίνεται, ‘your crooked beak looks funny to us’; 
Ar. Ach. 1058: ὡς γέλοιον ... τὸ δέημα τῆς νύμφης, ‘how funny is the bride’s request’; Ar. V. 
566: Αἰσώπου τι γέλοιον, ‘some funny joke by Aesopus’; Ar. V. 1258-9: λόγον ἔλεξας αὐτὸς 
ἀστεῖόν τινα, / Αἰσωπικὸν γέλοιον ἢ Συβαριτικόν, ‘you yourself can tell him some witty 
story, something funny by Aesop or Sybaris’, translation Henderson (1998b) 383. 
377 Pl. Sym. 213 c: οὐδὲ εἴ τις ἄλλος γελοῖος ἔστι τε καὶ βούλεται, ‘neither anyone who is or 
would want to be laughable’. 
378 Aeschin. In Tim. 126: ‘And Demosthenes by way of a jest presents himself as an example, for 
he poses as a man who knows how to indulge in pleasantries and to joke about his own manner 
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Curiously, in the neuter single τὸ γελοῖον designates a ‘joke’379 or in abstract 
terms ‘the comic’380, whereas in the neuter plural γέλοια (or γελοῖα) denotes 
‘jokes’, ‘jests’381, or ‘amusements’382. On the whole, γέλοιος is conceptually 
connected with the sphere of humour, as it considers laughter the product of 
one’s reaction to the laughable, the feeling of pleasure, as well as, refers to the 
humorous quality in things, persons, words and actions which, in the end, get a 
laugh.383 
Another idea of laughter distinguishable within the semantics of the 
term is related to that of humour and often occurs simultaneously. This is the 
concept of playfulness acknowledged in terms of fun, play, in other words, a 
general suspension of ‘taking things seriously’. Such understanding of γέλοιος 
becomes most evident in its common juxtaposition with the adjective 
σπουδαῖος ‘earnest’.384 In effect, the adjective denotes non-seriousness in one’s 
words and actions. 
                                                                                                                                         
of life (ἡδὺς ὢν ἀνὴρ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἰδίας διατριβὰς γελοῖος)’, translation in Darwin Adams 
(1919) 103. 
379 Ar. Ra. 6: Τὸ πάνυ γέλοιον εἴπω; ‘what about I say a really funny joke?’; Ar. Ra. 19-20: Ὦ 
τρισκακοδαίμων ἄρ' ὁ τράχηλος οὑτοσί, / ὅτι θλίβεται μέν, τὸ δὲ γέλοιον οὐκ ἐρεῖ, ‘Oh, 
thrice wretched this neck of mine, for though it’s being crushed, it cannot make a joke’. 
380 In Pl. Sym. 215a, Alcibiades declares he will praise Socrates through liknesses, which he will 
use for the sake of the truth and not for the sake of the comic (ἔσται δ' ἡ εἰκὼν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς 
ἕνεκα, οὐ τοῦ γελοίου). An early definition of the ‘laughable’ is expressed by Aristotle in Poet. 
1449a who considers τὸ γελοῖον to be a ‘category of the shameful’ (τοῦ αἰσχροῦ μόριον) and is 
a certain type of ‘fault or mark of shame which involves no pain or destruction (ἁμάρτημά τι 
καὶ αἶσχος ἀνώδυνον καὶ οὐ φθαρτικόν)’, translation in Halliwell (2005) 45.  
381 In a fragment from the Theognidea, the author recommends telling jokes during meals with 
others; Thgn. 309-11: ‘At common meals a man should be discrete, everything escapes his notice 
so he seems absent, but he should bring laughter (εἰς δὲ φέροι τὰ γελοῖα)’, quoted in Hobden 
(2013) 117.  
382 In Aes. fr. 47a, the chorus sings to the baby Perseus about the amusements that await him 
(παρέξει τὰ γελοῖα) if he joins to live with the satyrs. See chapter III, section 3.3.1.2.  
383 Cf. Arist. Rh. 1371 b 35-1372 a 1: ἐπεὶ ἡ παιδιὰ τῶν ἡδέων καὶ πᾶσα ἄνεσις, καὶ  ὁ γέλως 
τῶν ἡδέων, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ γελοῖα ἡδέα εἶναι, καὶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ λόγους καὶ ἔργα, ‘since 
games are among pleasurable things, all relaxation is, too; and since laughter is among 
pleasurable things, necessarily laughable things (human beings and words and deeds) are also 
pleasurable’, translation in Kennedy (1991) 92. On the connection of humour with pleasure, see 
chapter I, section 1.1.3.1. 
384 Cf. chapter I, section 1.3.5.1. Comic poets could speak about both funny business and serious 
matters, cf. Ar. Ra. 389-90: Καὶ πολλὰ μὲν γέλοιά μ' εἰπεῖν, πολλὰ δὲ σπουδαῖα, ‘may I utter 
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A less humorous form of non-seriousness is that which is considered to 
be nonsensical. In this respect, γέλοιος denotes risibility within an object, 
resulting from a perceived nonsense, silliness or absurdity in it. Here, the 
adjective accepts the meanings ‘ludicrous’, ‘absurd’, ‘foolish’ but also 
‘ridiculous’, for, in certain cases, the exhibition of a lack of good sense may 
merit derision.385 Therefore, γέλοιος may signify ridicule, since it designates a 
negative perception of what is regarded as lacking sense.  
 
Up to this point, I have analyzed and discerned the main ways of 
understanding laughter encompassed within the three basic γελ- rooted words: 
γελάω, γέλως, and γελοῖος. The principal concepts represented in these three 
words recognize laughter as 1) a sound, 2) a specific facial expression, 3) the 
experience of emotions plesant to the subject, 4) the manifestation of these 
sentiments or state of mind, 5) a reaction to humour, 6) a sign of playfulness, 7) 
an act of derision, and finally 8) a connection with the concept of shinning. We 
must, however, bare in mind, that this is only a general categorization of the 
Greek understandings of the discussed phenomenon. As stated before, various 
concepts may mingle within the semantics of a term, for example, the idea of 
sound and facial display may be evoked instantaneously or derision with 
humour. Also, different aspects of a specific idea may be evoked within a text, 
for instance, a laughter-word may regard derision in various degrees, from 
playful or humorous ridicule to hostile mockery. Therefore, for a full and 
                                                                                                                                         
much that’s funny, / and also much that’s serious’, translation in Henderson (2002) 79. Cf. Pl. 
Leg. 816d:, ‘it is impossible to learn the serious without the comic (ἄνευ γὰρ γελοίων τὰ 
σπουδαῖα ... μαθεῖν μὲν οὐ δυνατόν) or any one of a pair of contraries without the other’, 
translation Bury (1952b) 97.  
385 Pl. Prot. 355a: γελοῖον τὸν λόγον γίγνεσθαι, ‘the argument becomes ridiculous’. Men. Sam. 
686: γελοῖος ἔσομαι, ‘I would be a laughing-stock’; Pl. Phdr. 236d: ‘I shall make myself 
ridiculous (γελοῖος ἔσομαι) if I, a mere amateur, try without preparation to speak on the same 
subject in competition with a master of his art’, translation in Fowler (1913) 441. It ought to be, 
however, emphasized that γέλοιος seldom regards hostile, vitriolic mockery. 
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proper interpretation of a Greek laughter-word one must always consider the 
context in which it appears in. 
2.1.1.5. Other cognates 
 The three main γελ- rooted words: γελάω, γέλως, and γελοῖος are used 
in the formation of other cognates. What is more, we may observe that the 
semantics of these three words also influence the semantics of their derivatives. 
For instance, the terms deriving from γελάω refer to such ideas of laughter: 1) 
sound (γέλασμα386 ‘laugh’, γέλασις387 ‘laughing’, γελαστύς388 ‘laughter’, 
γελαστικός389 ‘able to laugh’, γελασείω390 ‘to be ready to laugh’), 2) bodily 
movements (γελάσκω391 ‘laugh convulsively’), 3) mockery (γελασῖνος392, 
‘laugher’, γελαστής393 ‘laugher, sneerer’, possibly γελασίνη394 ‘she laugher’, 
γελάστρια395 ‘she laugher’, γελαστός396 ‘laughable, ridiculous’, γελαστέον397 
                                               
386 Aes. Pr. 90: κυμάτων ἀνήριθμον γέλασμα. ‘Laugh’ in ThGL s.v. γέλασμα: ‘risus’. However, 
in the ninth revised edition LSJ s.v. γέλασμα appears ‘smile’; same meaning in DGE s.v., 
although in figurative sense (‘fig. sonrisa’). I will discuss this particular example in detail 
chapter III, section 3.2.7. 
387 EM 801.13: Φρύαγμα· (...) λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γελάσεως ‘used also in relation to 
laughing’. 
388 Call. Del. 323-4: ἃ Δηλιὰς εὕρετο νύμφη παίγνια κουρίζοντι καὶ Ἀπόλλωνι γελαστύν 
‘These things did the nymph of Delos devise for sport and laughter to young Apollo’, 
translation in Mair (1921) 111. A hapax legomenon, cf. Mineur (1984) 250 n. 324. 
389 Luc. Vit. Auc. 5: ἄνθρωπος μὲν γελαστικόν, ὄνος δὲ οὐ γελαστικὸν ‘man is a creature that 
laughs, while asses do not’, translation in Harmon (1919) 505. 
390 Pl. Phd. 64 b: Νὴ τὸν Δία, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ πάνυ γέ με νυνδὴ γελασείοντα ἐποίησας 
γελάσαι, ‘By Zeus, Socrates, I don’t feel much like laughing just now, but you made me laugh’ 
translation in Fowler (1913) 223. 
391 In AP 7. 621 a certain Sophocles dies laughing in convulsion (γελάσκων) after eating the 
poisonous plant Sardonic celery.  
392 Epithet of Democritus, known as the ‘Laughing Philosopher’, cf. Ael. VII 4. 20: κατεγέλα δὲ 
πάντων ὁ Δημόκριτος καὶ ἔλεγεν αὐτοὺς μαίνεσθαι· ὅθεν καὶ Γελασῖνον αὐτὸν ἐκάλουν οἱ 
πολῖται ‘Democritus mocked everyone and considered them mad; due to this the citizens 
called him the Laugher’. 
393 Soph. OR 1422: Οὔθ' ὡς γελαστής, Οἰδίπους, ἐλήλυθα, ‘I have not come, as a sneerer, 
Edipus’. The derisive aspect of the term is clear amongst ancient lexicographers, e.g. Ps.-Zonar. 
explains the term as ὁ ἐπεγγελῶν ‘he who mocks‘, similarly Suda, both s.v. γελαστής. 
394 Anaxandr. fr. 25. A hapax legomenon and word without context from the lost comedy entitled 
Serio-Comedy (Κωμῳδοτρᾰγῳδία). 
395 Sch. Ar. Th. 1068. 
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‘must be laughed at’ and γέλασμα398 ‘cause for laughter’), and 4) humour 
(γελάσιμος399 ‘laughable’). Regarding the noun γέλως, its cognates include the 
concepts of derision (γελωτῖνος400, γελωτός401, both meaning ‘ridiculous’). And 
finally, the words formed from the adjective γελοῖος retain its basic meaning of 
‘laughability’ as they, generally, refer to the ideas of humour and 5) play 
(γελοίασμα402 ‘joke’, γελοιασμός403 ‘jesting’, γελοιαστής404 ‘jester, buffoon’, 
γελοιάστρια405 ‘cheerful woman, female joker’, γελοιάζω406 ‘jest, laugh, joke’, 
γελοιώδης407 ‘laughable, ridiculous’, γελοιαστικός408 ‘mith-provoking, comical, 
funny’). On the basis of the examples above we may notice that the semantic 
field of the cognates becomes limited to certain aspects of laughter.  
 
                                                                                                                                         
396 Babr. 45. 12: ὁ δ' αἰπόλος γελαστὸς ἦλθεν εἰς οἴκους αἰγῶν ἔρημος ‘the ridiculous goatherd 
returned home without any goats’. 
397 Plut. Def. Oracul. 420 b: εἰ δὲ χρὴ γελᾶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, τὰ εἴδωλα γελαστέον τὰ κωφὰ καὶ 
τυφλὰ καὶ ἄψυχα ‘If there is need for laughter in philosophy, we should laugh at those spirirts, 
dumb, blind and soulless’, translation in Babbitt (1936/2003) 405. 
398 This is an extra and late meaning attributed to the noun transmitted in the Sententiae of 
Secundus the Silent who in Sent. 18 decribes old age (γῆρας) as a ‘timeworn object of laughter’ 
(πολυχρόνιον γέλασμα), translation in Perry (1964) 91.  
399 Luc. Somn. 5: Μέχρι μὲν δὴ τούτων γελάσιμα καὶ μειρακιώδη τὰ εἰρημένα ‘Up to this point 
my story has been humorous and childish’, translation in Harmon (1921) 219. The grammarian 
Phrynichus, however, recommends the use of γελοῖος instead, Phryn. Ec. 199: γελάσιμον μὴ 
λέγε, ἀλλὰ γελοῖον, ‘do not say γελάσιμον, only γελοῖον’. 
400 A hapax legomenon in Hesychius: γελωτῖνος· καταγέλαστος. 
401 A hapax legomenon in Sopat. Rh. ad Hermog. Stat. 46. 13: γελωτὸν ἂν εἴη τὸ πρᾶγμα, ‘that 
would be a ridiculous case’. 
402 DGE s.v. ‘broma, chanza’. The word γελοίασμα is a gloss on ψιά ‘play’ in Hesychius, 
synonymous with χαρά ‘joy, delight’ and παίγνια ‘playthings’. 
403 Sch. Ar. Pl. 87. 
404 Athen. 6. 48: συμπότας … τῷ βασιλεῖ συνάγεσθαι ἐξ ἁπάσης τῆς πόλεως, οὓς 
προσαγορεύεσθαι γελοιαστάς ‘men from every city gathered to dine with the king were 
called jesters’.  
405 A hapax legomenon in Ps.-Athan. Virg. 13 in a warning before dining amongst careless and 
cheerfully joking women (μετὰ γυναικῶν ἀμελεστέρων καὶ γελοιαστριῶν). 
406 Athen. 2. 9 speaks of ‘boasting, ridicule, and jests’ (τὸ καυχᾶσθαι καὶ σκώπτειν καὶ 
γελοιάζειν) springing from the drinking of wine which alters the spirits. 
407 Sch. Ar. V. 564 considers the term to be synonymous with γελοῖος. 
408 In his commentary to the Odyssey, Eustathius recognizes the comicality of the Irus-Odysseus 
scene in Od. 18. 1-116; cf. Eust. Comm. Od. II 166 (Stallbaum): τὸ γελοιαστικὸν τοῦ Ἴρου καὶ τοῦ 
ξείνου ἐπεισόδιον.  
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2.1.1.6. Derivatives with prefixes  
In the γελ- rooted word-group, we may distinguish a large number of 
derivatives composed of a single prefix. These are shown in table 2. 
Prefix Compound  Meaning of compound 
ἀ- ‘not’, ‘without’ ἀγελαστέω  
ἀγελαστί  
ἀγέλαστος  
ἀγέλοιος  
v. 
adv. 
adj. 
adj. 
‘to be not laughing’ 
‘without laughter’ 
‘not laughing’, ‘grave’ 
‘not laughable’ 
ἀνα- ‘up’ ἀναγελάω  v. ‘laugh loud’ 
ἀντι- ‘against’ *ἀντιγελάω  v. ‘laugh back in retaliation’409 
ἀπο- ‘from’ *ἀπογελάω  v. ‘laugh’, ‘laugh out loud’410 
δια - ‘through’, ‘across’ διαγελάω  
διαγέλως  
v. 
n. 
‘laugh at’, ‘mock’ 
‘derision’ 
ἐν- ‘in’, ‘into’, ‘on’  ἐγγελάω  
ἐγγελαστής  
v. 
n. 
‘laugh at’, ‘mock’ 
‘mocker’, ‘scorner’ 
ἐκ- ‘out’, ‘out of’ ἐκγελάω  
ἐκγελιώσαιμι 
ἔκγελως  
v. 
v. 
n. 
‘laugh out’,’ laugh loud’ 
‘jest’, ‘scoff’, ‘jeer at’411 
‘loud laughter’ 
ἐπι- ‘towards’, upon’ ἐπιγελάω  
*ἐπιγέλαστος 
v. 
adj. 
‘laugh approvingly’ 
‘ridiculous’412 
 *ἐπιγελάστως adv. ‘ridiculously’413 
κατα- ‘down’, ‘against’  καταγέλαστής  
καταγέλαστικός  
καταγέλαστος  
καταγελάω  
κατάγελως  
n. 
adj. 
adj. 
v. 
n. 
 ‘mocker’ 
‘satirical’ 
‘ridiculous’, ‘absurd’ 
‘laugh scornfully’, ‘mock’ 
 ‘derision’, ‘mockery’ 
περι- ‘around’ περιγελάω v. ‘laugh all around’414 
προ- ‘before’, ‘forth’ προγελάω  v. ‘laugh before’ 
προσ- ‘toward’ προσγελάω  v. ‘laugh in the direction of’415 
συν- ‘with’, ‘together’ συγγελάω  
*συγγελοιάζω 
v. 
v. 
‘laugh with’ 
‘jest along with’416 
                                               
409 Halliwell (2008) 6 n. 15. 
410 My translation. 
411 LSJ s.v. ἐκγελιώσαιμι· ἐκχλευάσαιμι (s.v. ἐκχλευάζω: strenghtened for χλευάζω ‘jest’, 
‘scoff’, ‘jeer at’, ‘treat scornfully’). 
412 Lampe (1961) s.v. ἐπιγέλαστος. 
413 Lampe (1961) s.v. ἐπιγελάστως. 
414 My translation. 
415 My translation.  
416 My translation.  
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ὑπερ- ‘over’, ‘excessive’ ὑπεργέλοιος  adj. ‘above measure ridiculous’ 
ὑπο- ‘below’, ‘under’ ὑπογελάω  v. ‘laugh a little’, ‘smile’ 
Table 2. List of γελάω derivatives with a single prefix. 
From the examples in table 2, it is noticeable that certain words from table 1 
function as the head in the lexemes formed with a prefix; these are γελάω 
‘laugh’, γέλως ‘laughter’, γέλοιος ‘laughable’, γελάσιμος ‘laughable’, 
γελαστής ‘laugher’, γέλαστικός ‘able to laugh’, γελαστός ‘laughable’, and 
γελοιάζω ‘jest, laugh, joke’. 
In word formation, the performative affix alters the basic meaning of the 
lexeme it joins. First, the prefix ἀ- signifies negation. Hence, the verb 
ἀγελαστέω417 denotes a subject who ‘is not laughing’; the adverb ἀγελαστί418 
regards conduct or surroundings ‘without laughter’; the adjective ἀγέλαστος419 
signifies that which is ‘not-laughing’, hence ‘gloomy’ and ‘grave’, whereas 
ἀγέλοιος420 desribes that which is ‘non laughable’. Through the use of the 
privative alpha, the Greek language may regard with a single term the absence 
of laughter within an object. 
In some compounds, prefixes regard the sonority of laughter. For 
instance, the affixes ἀνα- ‘up’, ἀπο- ‘from’ and ἐκ- ‘out’ stress the aspect of a 
sudden outburst of laughter as well as the high volume of its sound. Hence, the 
                                               
417 The famous example is Heraclitus (Heraclit. Ep. 7.8.) who considers himself to ‘be always 
without laughter’(ἀεὶ ἀγελαστῶ). 
418 Hesych. s.v. ἀγελαστί explains ἄνευ τοῦ γελάσαι, ‘without laughing’; Pl. Euthd. 278e 1: 
ἀνάσχεσθον οὖν ἀγελαστὶ ἀκούοντες αὐτοί, ‘you two must restrain yourselves and listen 
without laughing’; for rituals conducted without laughter, cf. Athen. 6. 79: ‘if they sacrificed a 
bull to Poseidon and threw it into the sea without once laughing (ἀγελαστί), the evil would 
cease’, translation in Yonge (1854) I 410.  
419 Cf. Phryn. Praep. Soph. 60. 1-2: Ἀγέλαστος· ὁ πρὸς γέλωτα οὐκ ἐπιτήδειος. καὶ ὁ στυγνός, 
‘one who is not fit for laughter; also, one who is gloomy’. Similar definition in Suda s.v. 
Ἀγέλαστα: τὰ μὴ γέλωτος ἄξια, ἀλλ' ἀγανακτήσεως, ’those which do not deserve laughter, 
but pain’. In the sense ‘gloomy’, ‘grave’, cf. Hom. Hymn. 2. 200: ‘ἀγέλαστος’ describing Demeter 
struck with grief. In the sense ‘non-laughable’ i.e. ‘serious’ AP 7. 409. 4: τὰν ἀγέλαστον ὄπα 
‘grave word’  
420 Henioch. fr. 4. 6: λέγ’ αὐτό· καὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἀγέλοιόν ἐστ’ ἴσως, ‘Tell me about that! It’s 
probably not a bad joke’. 
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verbs ἀναγελάω421, ἀπογελάω422 and ἐκγελάω423 mean ‘burst out laughing’ or 
‘laugh loud’, whereas the noun ἔκγελως424 stands for ‘loud laughter’. In these 
examples, the prevailing idea of laughter is its sound. 
Other affixes emphasize the communicative role of laughter. For 
instance, the prefix ἐπι- ‘towards’ signifies the manifestation of one’s feelings 
and, at the same time, their communication to others. When this experience 
regards positive emotions, ἐπιγελάω425 accepts the meaning ‘laugh 
appreciatively’ or ‘laugh favourably in response’. Similarly προσγελάω, as the 
prefix προσ- ‘in the direction of‘ indicates the fact of conveying a favorable 
message towards others. According to Halliwell, this compound basically 
denotes ‘a perceived affability or warmth’ of the person laughing, hence, regards 
rather the emotional expressiveness of a person than his/her body language.426 
For this reason it is impossible to literally choose between the ideas of 
laughter/smiles within the semantics of this compound. Therefore, the verb 
προσγελάω427 may be interpretated in various manners such as 1) ‘smile at 
                                               
421 E.g. Plut. Alex. 74: ‘Alexander having burst out with laughter‘ (ἀναγελάσας); Xen. Sym. 45. 
11: ‘all burst out laughing‘ (ἀνεγέλασαν).  
422 The compound ἀπογελάω is a hapax legomenon in Philox. Gram. fr. 591: ‘they laugh out loud 
(ἀπογελᾶν) and then die’; the lexeme is uncertain, cf. Theodoridis (1976) 353 n. 8: ‘ἀπογελᾶν 
suspectum videtur’. 
423 E.g. Xen. Cyr. 1. 3. 9: ‘with a loud laugh (ἐκγελάσαντα) Cyrus jumped to his grandson’; 
Hom. Hymn. 2. 389: ‘Zeus laughed aloud (ἐξεγέλασσεν) at the sight of his deceitful son’. 
424 A hapax legomenon without context in Poll. 6. 200. However, in DGE s.v. ‘ἔκγελως’: capaz de 
reírse (capable of laughter). 
425 E.g. Pl. Phd. 77 e 3 Καὶ ὁ Κέβης ἐπιγελάσας … ἔφη, ‘and Cebes laughing approvingly 
said…’; Pl. Res. 398 c 7 Καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων ἐπιγελάσας… ἔφη, ‘and Glaukon laughing 
favourably… said; Xen. Cyr. 3. 1. 43. 1. ὁ Κῦρος ἐπιγελάσας εἶπε, ‘and laughing approvingly 
Cyrus said’; Ar. Th. 976-81: Ἑρμῆν τε νόμιον ἄντομαι / καὶ Πᾶνα καὶ Νύμφας φίλας / 
ἐπιγελάσαι προθύμως / ταῖς ἡμετέραισι / χαρέντα χορείαις, ‘And I entreat Hermes the 
Shepherd, and Pan and the dear Nymphs to appreciate our dances with a favorable laugh’. Cf. 
Austin and Douglas Olson (2004) 304 n. 977-80. 
426 Halliwell (2008) 525 (original italics). 
427 E.g. the greeting of a sale’s man to a client in Diph. fr. 33. 5-6 Kock: τούτων εἴ με 
προσγελάσειέ τις, / ἐδίδουν στενάξας ὁπόσον αἰτήσειέ με, ‘if one of them lads would greet 
me with a laugh of delight, with a sigh I would pay the price he would have charged me with’; 
the delight of a young tyrant described in Pl. Res. 566 d., who at the beginning of his reign 
laughs with delight and greets everyone with joy (προσγελᾷ τε καὶ ἀσπάζεται πάντα). 
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one’428, 2) ‘laugh pleasantly towards another’, 3) ‘greet’, ‘welcome joyfully’ or 
‘greet with a delighted laugh’. Noticeably, all these meanings relate to the 
aspect of signaling one’s feelings. In general, both compounds ἐπιγελάω and 
προσγελάω signify not only the manifestation of one’s emotions but especially 
their communication. 
Obviously, not every case of expressive laughter sends a favorable 
message. As it has already been mentioned in the previous chapter, one’s laugh 
may transmit information about one’s negative sentiments towards others.429 In 
the Greek language, this aspect is, particularly, emphasized by using in 
composition the prefixes ἀντι- ‘against’, δια- ‘across’, ἐν- ‘into’, κατα- ‘down’, 
and περι- ‘around’. The basic meanings of these affixes indicate a form of 
separation between the person laughing and its target. In particular, the radical 
sense of ἀντι- signifies opposition and antagonism, thus ἀντιγελάω430 means 
‘laugh back in retaliation’. The prefix δια- relates to division and separation, 
hence διαγελάω431 denotes ‘laugh at’, ‘mock’ and the noun διαγέλως432 
‘derision’. Next, ἐν- points to laughter as directed onto its target,433 thus the 
                                               
428 LSJ s.v. προσγελάω 1. 
429 Cf. Chapter I, section 1.3.5. 
430 A hapax legomenon in Gr. Nyss. Contr. Eun. 1. 1. 612. 7: ἀντιγελάσωμεν, ‘we laugh back’. 
431 E.g. Plut. Alex. 14. 5, the followers of Alexander laugh at and mock (διαγελώντων καὶ 
σκωπτόντων) the excentric Diogenes of Sinope; Xenophon gives an unfavourable description 
of the general Meno who ‘took pride in his ability to deceive, fabricate lies, and mock friends 
(τῷ φίλους διαγελᾶν, Xen. An. 2. 6. 26). Aeschines (in Athen. 5. 62) is said to laugh without 
moderation (οὐ μετρίως διαγελᾷ) at the faul clothing of the lousy orator Telauges. Cf. the 
Byzantine form διαγέλαστος meaning ‘serving for ridicule’ in Vitae Symeonis Stylitae Junioris 
194: ἦν δὲ οὗτος γνωστὸς πάσῃ τῇ πόλει καὶ τῇ χώρᾳ καὶ διαγέλαστος καὶ ἐξουθενημένος 
ὑπὸ πάντων, ‘there was once this man well known in every city and in all the land and 
ridiculed and dispised by everyone’. 
432 A unique form in Phld. Elect. 17. 18: μετὰ διαγέλωτος ἐπιφωνοῦντες, ‘they exclaim with 
derision’; Cf. Indelli and Tsouna-McKirahan (1995) 200 n. 18: ‘the author stresses the cynicism 
and hardness of the men who constitue his target: not only they do not help other people, but 
they laugh at them as well’. 
433 Cf. Schwyzer (1950/2013) 457: ‘ἐγγελάω ‘verlachen’, eig. ‘ins Gesicht lachen’ (‘to deride’, 
actually ‘to laugh at one’s face’)’. 
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lexeme ἐγγελάω434 means ‘laugh at, mock’, and the noun ἐγγελαστής435 
signifies a ‘mocker, scorner’.  
Without any doubt, the most popular laughter-words denoting derision 
consist of κατα- ‘downwards, against’. With this prefix such words are formed: 
the verb καταγελάω436 ‘laugh down, deride, mock’, the noun κατάγελως437 
‘derision, mockery’, καταγέλαστής438 ‘mocker’, as well as the adjectives 
καταγέλαστος439 ‘ridiculous, absurd’ or even at times ‘a laughing stock’, and 
καταγέλαστικός440 ‘satirical’. Whilst laughter is concerned, this prefix signifies 
antagonism between the laugher and its object, hence the meaning ‘laugh 
against’ as well as the aim of degrading the target, thus the meaning ‘laughing 
                                               
434 E.g. the mockery at a tragic poet’s style in Eub. fr. 26-27 Kock: καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖσιν ἐγγελῶσι 
πήμασιν / τὰ σῖγμα συλλέξαντες, ὡς αὐτοὶ σοφοί, ‘and they laugh at my labours counting the 
s’s, as if they were smart themselves’; for the fragment’s commentary, see Bartol and 
Danielewicz (2011) 306; the once derisive depreciation of love songs in AP 12. 23. 1-2: 
Ἠγρεύθην ὁ πρόσθεν ἐγώ ποτε τοῖς δυσέρωσι / κώμοις ἠιθέων πολλάκις ἐγγελάσας, ‘I am 
caught, I, who once often laughed at the songs of those young men madly in love’; the 
imaginary mockery of a detested enemy, as Hera speaks of Pelias in Apoll. Arg. 3. 63-65: 
ῥύσομαι ὅσσον ἐμοῖσιν ἐνὶ σθένος ἔπλετο γυίοις, / ὄφρα μὴ ἐγγελάσῃ Πελίης κακὸν οἶτον 
ἀλύξας, / ὅς μ’ ὑπερηνορέῃ θυέων ἀγέραστον ἔθηκεν, ‘I will rescue [i.e. Jason] from danger 
as long as strength lies in my limbs, so that Pelias may not laugh at escaping his ill fate, who 
dared to dishonor me without sacrifices’. 
435 Unique word in Eur. Hipp. 1001: οὐκ ἐγγελαστὴς τῶν ὁμιλούντων, πάτερ, ‘I am not a 
mocker of one’s companions, father’. Other occurences are found only in the scholia to the 
Hippolytus, cf. Sch. Eur. Hipp. 1000. See also, chapter V. 
436 Ar. Eq. 713: ἐγὼ δ’ ἐκείνου καταγελῶ γ’ ὅσον θέλω, ‘I can laugh at him as much as I want’; 
Ar. Ach. 1081: οἴμοι κακοδαίμων· καταγελᾷς ἤδη σύ μου; ‘Oh, damn my luck, are you now 
mocking me?’; Xen. Cyr. 7. 5. 14: οἱ δὲ αὖ Βαβυλώνιοι ἀκούσαντες ταῦτα πολὺ ἔτι μᾶλλον 
κατεγέλων, ‘on hearing such news the Babylonians laughed with scorn even more’. 
437 Ar. Ach. 1125: ταῦτ’ οὐ κατάγελώς ἐστιν ἀνθρώποις πλατύς; ’Isn’t this a piece of sheer 
guffawing mockery in the eyes of all men?’, translation in Sommerstein (1980) 145. 
438 A gloss in Hesychius s.v. β ε λ ά ς  explained as εἴρων, καὶ καταγελαστής, ‘a dissembler and 
mocker’. 
439 In meaning ‘laughing-stock’, often expressed with γίγνομαι ‘become’ (e.g. Pl. Lach. 184 c: 
οὐκ ἔσθ’ ὅπως ἄν τις φύγοι τὸ καταγέλαστος γενέσθαι, ‘a man cannot by any means escape 
being made a laughing-stock’, translation Lamb (1952) 25); φαίνομαι ‘appear’ (e.g. Xen. Mem. 2. 
6. 38: καταγέλαστος φαίνοιο; ‘wouldn’t you appear as a laughing-stock?’); and ποιέω make’ 
(e.g. Aesch. In Ctes. 76. 9: καταγέλαστον τὴν πόλιν ποιῶν, ‘he [i.e. Demosthenes] made the 
city look ridiculous’). On the difference between being funny (γέλοιος) and ridiculous 
(καταγέλαστος), cf. Pl. Sym. 198 b: ἐγὼ φοβοῦμαι… οὔ τι μὴ γελοῖα εἴπω… ἀλλὰ μὴ 
καταγέλαστα, ‘I am not afraid that I would say something funny but rather something 
ridiculous’. 
440 Menander Rhetor considers hymns to be καταγελαστικώτεροι ‘too satirical’, in Men. Rh. 337 
Spengel. Pollux (5. 128; 6.200) lists the adverb καταγελαστικῶς ‘scoffingly’. 
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down’. It is an interesting fact that some laughter-words with κατα- are 
composed for humorous purposes. This practice is, particularly, distinguishable 
amongst comic playwrights, for instance, Aristophanes creates the fictitious 
Καταγέλα as a joke on the name of the Sicilian town Γέλα.441 Similarly Plautus, 
who makes a comic pun on the proper name Γελάσιμος (lit. ‘laughable’) by 
composing Καταγελάσιμος (‘Serving for ridicule’).442 As we may see, terms 
with κατα- regard various degrees of ridicule, from playful derision with 
humorous elements, to vitriolic mockery.  
Futhermore, certain performatives added to γελάω regard the manner in 
which one laughs. In particular, the affix περι- signifies ‘round about, around’, 
hence the verb περιγελάω443 accepts the meaning ‘laugh around’, whereas the 
prefix προ- ‘forth’, ‘forward’ indicates the act of laughing beforehand, thus, the 
verb προγελάω444 denotes ‘laugh before’. As a result of adding ὑπο- ‘under’, 
ὑπογελάω445 (literally meaning ‘laugh underneath’) denotes a far going 
moderation in one’s laughter (the LSJ entry ‘laugh a little’) or even its 
suppression. Next, a collective manner of laughing is encapsulated within the 
prefix συν- ‘together with’, as in the compounds συγγελάω446 ‘laugh with, join 
                                               
441 Ar. Ach. 606. The name Γέλα sounds alike to γελάω ‘laugh’, whereas Καταγέλα to 
καταγελάω ‘laugh at, mock’. For a study of comic names in Aristophanean comedy, see 
Kanavou (2011) esp. 39-40 for the discussed example. 
442 Omitted in TLG, but included in LSJ s.v. καταγελάσιμος. The lexeme occurs only in Plaut. 
Stich. 630, in the Latinized ‘Catagelasimus’. For an account on word-play in Plautus, see 
Mendelsohn (1907) esp. 17, 19 for the discussed example; cf. also Fontaine (2010) 240 n. 75. 
443 Photius explains the Aristophanic περιεκόκκασα (Ar. Eq. 697) ‘I cried cuckoo all around’ 
with περιεγέλασα καὶ κατωρχησάμην ‘I laughed around and exulted over’. 
444 Phil. Jud. Mut. Nom. 162: καὶ ἡ ἡμέρα μέντοι προγελᾷ πρὸς βαθὺν ὄρθρον μέλλοντος 
ἀνίσχειν ἡλίου, ‘And the day also laughs in anticipation of the early dawn, when the sun is 
about to rise’, translation in Yonge (1894) 270. 
445 Pl. Chrm. 162b 11: ἅμα ταῦτα λέγων ὑπεγέλα τε καὶ εἰς τὸν Κριτίαν ἀπέβλεπεν, ’and he 
[i.e. Charmides] says these words while glancing at Critias with a suppressed laugh’. 
446 In Athen. 6. 55, the parasite Cheirisophus seeing Dionysius and his company laughing 
(Χειρίσοφον τὸν Διονυσίου κόλακα ἰδόντα Διονύσιον γελῶντα μετά τινων γνωρίμων) joins 
in the laughter (συγγελᾶν). 
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in the laughter’, and συγγελοιάζω447 ‘jest along with’. Therefore, the prefixes 
περι-, προ-, ὑπο- and συν- signify the mode of performing an act of laughter. 
Finally, the attachment of the prefix ὑπερ- ‘above, over’ to γελ-rooted 
adjectives emphasize the high level of risibility within the described object. 
Therefore, ὑπεργέλοιος448 accepts the meaning ‘above measure laughable’.  
At this point it is important to stress the fact that the mentioned above 
affixes may accept different meanings. As a result, certain laughter-words 
composed with a prefix may share different concepts of laughter. For example, 
ἀναγελάω along with ἐπί τινι accepts the meaning ‘laugh at someone’449; 
διαγελάω may, at times, signify ‘look bright’450, similarly περιγελάω451 'shine' 
and ἐπιγελάω ‘be bright’452. On the other hand, the latter may reflect the idea of 
laughter as a means of communication, however, instead of signaling positive 
emotions it may regard outright mockery453; thus, ἐπιγελάω may also mean 
‘laugh at, mock’. This meaning is noticeable in the adjective ἐπιγέλαστος 
‘ridiculous’454 as well as the adverb ἐπιγελάστως ‘ridiculously’455. Derision, in 
                                               
447 A hapax legomenon in Jo. Chrys. Virg. corrupt. 60: Μὴ παῤῥησιάζεσθαι δεῖ, μηδὲ χρονίζειν, 
γυναιξὶν ἀσέμνοις μὴ συγγελοιάζειν·‘one should not speak openly to ingnoble virgins, nor 
stand by them, nor make jokes with them’.  
448 Dem. 19. 211: ‘the matter was above measure ludicrous (τὸ πρᾶγμ' ἦν ὑπεργέλοιον). 
449 A derisive tone is noticeable in Xen. Cyr. 6. 1. 34: ‘He [i.e. Cyrus] heard this and laughed at 
the man who claimed himself to be superior to the passion of love (ἀναγελάσας ἐπὶ τῷ 
κρείττονι τοῦ ἔρωτοςφάσκοντι εἶναι). Cf. the medieval form ἀναγελαστής occuring uniquely 
in the anonymous Byzantine romance novel The War of Troy, in Jeffreys and Papathomopoulos 
(1996) v. 2122. 
450 E.g. Theophrastus speaks of the germination of cereals at the time ‘when the season 
brightens’ (διαγελώσης δὲ τῆς ὥρας; HP 8. 2. 4); Plut. Prim. Frig. 950b mentions ‘water itself the 
deepest looks the darkest because there is so much of it, while those parts that lie near the air 
flash and sparkle (ταῦτα περιλάμπεται καὶ διαγελᾷ)’, translation in Cherniss and Helmbold 
(1957) 255. 
451 In Synt. 284. 21, Apollonius Dyscolus argues for the Homeric form περιεγέλασε meaning 
περισσῶς ἐλαμπρύνθη ‘it shined excessively’, cf. Householder (1981) 231. 
452 Stob. Anth. 1. 49. 44: ἐπεγέλασέ τις ὕλη τῷ μίγματι, ‘sparkle on the surface’. 
453 E.g. the sayings of the sage Chilo quoted in Stob. Anth. 3. 1. 172: Τῷ δυστυχοῦντι μὴ 
ἐπιγέλα, ‘laugh not at the unfortunate’; and Stob. Anth. 4. 48a. 11: Ἀτυχοῦντι μὴ ἐπιγέλα· 
κοινὴ γὰρ ἡ τύχη, ‘laugh not at one in misfortune, for we all submit to fate’. Cf. the Laconian 
ἐπιγελαστάρ explained by Hesychius as ὁ καταγελῶν ‘he who mocks’. 
454 Gregory of Nyssa pardons his readers for quoting copiously the absurdities of Eunomius, in 
Contr. Eun. 2. 1. 606: ‘I again crave pardon for the words; it is not to make a joke that I have set 
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fact, may be denoted by the verb περιγελάω as well, which then signifies 
‘deride’.456 And lastly, ἐγγελάω may denote ‘laugh in’ or ‘laugh among’.457 We 
must, therefore, bare in mind that the interpretations of laughter-words highly 
depend on the context in which the lexemes appear. 
In general, from the discussion above we may distinguish such concepts 
encapsulated within laughter-words consisting of a single prefix: 1) the 
negation or absence of laughter; 2) the auditory aspect of laughter; 3) laughter 
as an expression of emotions; 4) the communicative role of laughter. 
Concerning communication, these laughter-words may regard sending 5) 
amiable, hence positive messages to others, or the opposite, i.e. 6) signaling 
disdain or contempt. Furthermore, the analyzed terms may indicate the mode 
of performing laughter regarding either 7) time, 8) space, or even 9) collectivity. 
A social purpose is denoted in lexemes referring to 10) one’s suppression of 
laughter. The final recognizable idea relates to the distinctly Greek connection 
of laughter with 11) the concept of radiance. We may, thus, notice that by 
attaching prefixes, the broad meanings of the γελ- rooted terms become 
narrowed to specific aspects of the phenomenon. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
these ridiculous words before my readers (ὡς οὐχὶ γελωτοποιῶν τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσι τὰς 
ἐπιγελάστους ταύτας ἐξεθέμην φωνάς), but so as to persuade my audience what sort of 
verbal equipment he starts from, this man who besmirches our simplemindedness and then 
launches himself against the truth’, translation by Stuart George Hall in Karfíková, Douglass, 
and Zachhuber (2007) 196.  
455 ThGL s.v. ἐπιγελάστως: ‘ad irridendum’, ‘ridicule’. Cf. Greg. Nyss. Contr. Eun. 3. 2. 68: ‘So 
having ridiculously (ἐπιγελάστως) spewed out this argument, the clever fellow again does not 
see that in what follows he refutes himself’, translation by Stuart George Hall in Leemans and 
Cassin (2014) 85. 
456 Phot. s.v. περιεκόκκασα explains the Aristophanic (Ar. Eq. 697) neologism (meaning ‘I cried 
cuckoo all around’) with περιεγέλασα καὶ κατωρχησάμην ‘I laughed at you and exulted over’. 
457 Sosicr. fr. 2 Kock: λεπτὴ ... ἐγγελῶσα αὖρα κύμασιν, ‘the light breeze laughed among the 
waves’.  
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2.1.1.7. Derivatives with compound prefixes  
Greek word-formation also includes compound affixes in which two or 
three different prefixes are joined together. In the γελάω based word-group, we 
find a number of cognates created this way. These are listed in table 3. 
Prefix Compound  Meaning 
ἀκατα-  *ἀκαταγέλαστος  adj. ‘that which avoids ridicule’458 
διεγ-  διεγγελάω  v. ‘twinkle in the eyes’459 
ἐγκατα-  *ἐγκαταγέλαστος  adj. ‘ridiculous’,’ risible’460 
ἐπεγ-  ἐπεγγελάω  v. ‘laugh at’, ‘exult over’ 
ἐπικατα-  *ἐπικαταγελάω  v. ‘jeer at’461 
εὐκατα- εὐκαταγέλαστος adj. ‘exposed to ridicule’ 
κατεγ-  *κατεγγελάω  v. ‘mock’, ‘laugh at’462 
προκατα-  προκαταγελάω  v. ‘ridicule before’ 
προσεγ-  προσεγγελάω  v. ‘laugh at’ 
προσκατα προσκαταγελάω  v. ‘laugh at besides’ 
συνεπι-  συνεπιγελάω  v. ‘laugh at together’ 
ὑπερκατα-  ὑπερκαταγέλαστος  adj. ‘exceedingly absurd’ 
ὑποκατα-  ὑποκαταγελάω  v. ‘laugh in one’s sleeve’ 
Table 3. List of γελάω derivatives with compound prefixes. 
As the above table demonstrates, a majority of the lexemes with 
composite prefixes (11 of 13) adjoin the verb γελάω ‘laugh’, whereas only a few 
(3) attach to the adjective γελαστός ‘laughable’. Regarding the compound 
prefixes, these are formed with two various prefixes, such as ἀκατα- from ἀ- 
with κατα-, διεγ- from δια- with ἐν-, ἐγκατα- from ἐν- with κατα-, ἐπεγ- from 
ἐπι- with ἐν-, ἐπικατα- from ἐπι- with κατα-, εὐκατα- from εὐ- with κατα-, 
κατεγ- from κατα- with ἐν-, προκατα- from προ- with κατα-, προσεγ- from 
προσ- with ἐν-, προσκατα- from προσ- with κατα-, συνεπι- from συν- with 
ἐπι-, ὑπερκατα- from ὑπερ- with κατα-, and ὑποκατα- from ὑπο- with κατα-. 
                                               
458 DGE s.v. ἀκαταγέλαστος: ‘no risible, que escapa al ridículo’. 
459 LSJ s.v. διεγγελάω: gloss on γλοιάζω. 
460 DGE s.v. ἐγκαταγέλαστος: ‘ridículo, risible’. 
461 Lampe (1961) s.v. ἐπικαταγελάω. 
462 Ibid. s.v. κατεγγελάω. 
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It is an interesting fact that, besides the single occurance of the adverb ἐὖ, 
‘well’, in εὐκαταγέλαστος, the components of these compound affixes are the 
same as the main prefixes listed in table 2.  
The main idea of laughter discernable within these lexemes is that of 
derision. This occurs due to the fact that the basis of the new lexeme is a 
laughter-word composing already of one prefix, such as: ἐγγελάω, ἐπιγελάω, 
καταγελάω and καταγέλαστος. The addition of an extra prefix modifies the 
basic meaning which already pertains to ridicule and mockery. In particular, 
the prefixes ἐπι-, κατα-, and προσ- added to ἐγγελάω reinforce the derisive 
aspect of laughter; hence the meaning ‘laugh at’ shared by ἐπεγγελάω463, 
κατεγγελάω464 and προσεγγελάω465. Regarding καταγελάω, the additional 
prefix indicates the mode of derisive laughter: προ- in προκαταγελάω466 points 
to the act of ridiculing beforehand; προσ- in προσκαταγελάω467 signifies that 
ridicule occurs besides another act; and ὑπο- in ὑποκαταγελάω468 points out 
the fact of concealing one’s derisive laughter. As for ἐπικαταγελάω469, it seems 
that the additional ἐπι- only serves to underline the main concept of mockery in 
                                               
463 Xen. Cyr. 5. 5. 9: ‘For I think I should rather ten times sink into the earth than be seen so 
humiliated and see my own men disregarding me and laughing at me (ἐπεγγελῶντας ἐμοί) ’, 
translation Miller (1914) 99. Cf. Ps.-Zonar. s.v. γελαστής. ὁ ἐπεγγελῶν ‘sneerer: he who laughs 
at’. Aeschin. Fals. leg. 182: ‘Is he not indeed to be pitied who must look into the sneering face of 
an enemy (βλέπειν ἐχθροῦ πρόσωπον ἐπεγγελῶντος), and hear with his ears his insults?’, 
translation Darwin Adams (1919) 299. 
464 Jo. Dam. Vita Barl. 341: ‘with a sober mind, Ioasaph laughed (κατεγγελῶν) the devil to 
scorn’. 
465 This is the observation of the wolf after seeing a man laughing at a raven pecking on the back 
of a donkey, in Aesop. Fab. 190 Perry: ‘How miserable we are! The minute people see us, they 
chase us away. But at this they only laugh (προσεγγελῶσιν)’. 
466 By προκαταγελάσαντες the Emperor Julian refers to those who may ridicule his arguments 
against the Cynics, Jul. Or. 6. 182B. 
467 ThGL s.v. προσκαταγελάω: ‘insuper irrideo’. Athenaeus mentions the Athenian citizens 
adopting the laws of Solon and Draco but deriding (προσκαταγελᾶν) those of Plato, in Athen. 
11. 508. 
468 Arr. Epict. Diss. 4. 6. 21: καὶ ἅμα ὑποκαταγελῶ τῶν οἰκτειρόντων με, ‘at the same time I 
laugh into my sleeve at those who pity me’.  
469 Par. Jer. 1. 5. 23: ‘I would laugh at you (ἐπικαταγέλων ἄν σοι) and say that you are crazy’, 
translation in Herzer (2005) 17. 
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καταγελάω. In relation to συνεπιγελάω470, the prefix συν- plays the same role 
as in the case of συγκαταγελάω, i.e. indicates the collective act of ridicule. As 
far as the four adjectives from table 3 are concerned, these are all based on the 
lexeme καταγέλαστος ‘ridiculous’, and the extra prefixes only slightly modify 
the basic meaning. For instance, ἐν- emphasizes the risibility of an object 
described as ἐγκαταγέλαστος471 ‘ridiculous’; similarly with ἐὖ ‘well’ in 
εὐκαταγέλαστος472, which literally means ‘well-ridiculous’, hence also 
‘exposed to ridicule’; and ὑπερ indicates the high degree of ridiculousness of 
that which is considered to be ὑπερκαταγέλαστος473 ‘exceedingly absurd’. The 
negation with the ἀ- privative in ἀκαταγέλαστος474 denotes ‘that which avoids 
ridicule’. 
The final lexeme, διεγγελάω, is an interesting case. It could be expected 
that the addition of δια- would function as an emphasis on the idea of mockery 
already encapsulated in ἐγγελάω,475 but the lexeme’s single occurrence does 
not regard this. In fact, it rather regards the idea of brightness, however, due to 
the scarcity of evidence, this interpretation remains hypothetical. 476 
In general, laughter-words composed of two prefixes pertain to the idea 
of mockery and ridicule. Except for ἐπεγγελάω, these lexemes do not appear in 
                                               
470 The lexeme συνεπιγελάω occurs only in Amm. Vocab. diff. 57: ‘ἐπιχαίρειν μὲν γάρ ἐστι τὸ 
συνεπιγελᾶν τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις κακοῖς’’to exult over is to share a laugh at the misfortunes of 
others’. However, the form is dubious as Valckenaer (1822) 56 n. 65 proposes the conjecture 
ἐπιγελᾶν.  
471 Unique form in A. Mart.10.18.14: ὡς ἐγκαταγέλαστον, ‘how ridiculous’. 
472 Aesop. Prov. 104: Τὰ νυκτερινὰ ἔργα ἐν ἡμέρᾳ εὐκαταγέλαστα, ‘activities of the night are 
exposed to ridicule in the daytime’. 
473 Aeschin. In Ctes. 192: ‘What is going on now with the case is utterly absurd 
(ὑπερκαταγέλαστος)’. 
474 The explanation of the term ‘Christian’ (χριστιανός) in Theophil. Apol. ad Autol. 1. 12. 2-3: 
‘That what is anointed is pleasant and useful and far from being ridiculed (τὸ χριστὸν ἡδὺ καὶ 
εὔχρηστον καὶ ἀκαταγέλαστόν ἐστιν)’. 
475 This is the understanding in ThGL s.v. ἐγγελάω, which explains the lexeme with ‘irrideo’ 
(mock, deride) and ‘illudo’ (ridicule); a vague explanation in DGE s.v. διεγγελάω: ‘reír’ (to 
laugh). 
476 The single occurrence is found in Hsch. s.v. γλοιάζειν: τὸ καταφερόμενον εἰς ὕπνον [καὶ] 
ἐπιμύειν τοῖς ὄμμασι καὶ κατιλλώπτειν, οἱ δὲ διεγγελᾶν, ‘twinkle or wink: to wink with the 
eyes falling asleep and look through the lit of the eyes; according to others [it means] to laugh’.  
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a large number within the extant Greek corpus and most of their occurances are 
of late date.  
2.1.1.8. Compounds 
The γελάω based word-family consists of many compound forms 
created with other words, as well. Here, a γελ- rooted lexeme appears as one of 
the new word’s components. These compounds are catalogued in table 4. 
                                               
477 LSJ s.v. γελοδυτία: ἡλιοδυσία.  
478 Lampe (1961) s.v. γελοιολογία. 
479 DGE s.v. γελωτολόγος: ‘que hace chistes frívolos, sin substancia’. 
480 My translation. 
481 My translation. 
482 LSJ s.v. κωμῳδογέλως: = κωμῳδός. 
483 My translation. 
484 My translation. 
Compound  Components Meaning 
αἰσχρόγελως n. αἰσχρός + γέλως  ‘shamefully ridiculous’ 
ἀκαιρόγελως  n. ἄκαιρος + γέλως  ‘given to unseemly laughter’ 
ἀχρειόγελως adj. ἀχρεῖος + γέλως  ‘untimely-laughing’ 
γελοδυτία n. γέλως + δύσις ‘sunset’477 
*γελοιολογία n. γέλοιος + λόγος ‘jesting language’478 
γελοιωμελέω v. γέλοιος + μέλος ‘write comic songs’ 
γελοωμιλία n. γέλοιος + ὁμιλία ‘fellowship in laughing’ 
*γελωτολόγος adj. γέλως + λόγος ’one who makes frivolous jokes’479 
γελωτοποιέω v. γέλως + ποιέω  ‘to create, make laughter’ 
γελωτοποιΐα n. γέλως + ποιέω  ‘buffoonery’ 
γελωτοποιϊκῶς adv. γέλως + ποιέω  ‘ridiculously’ 
γελωτοποιός n. γέλως + ποιέω  ‘exciting laughter’, ‘ridiculous’ 
γελωτοφυή n. γέλως + φυή ‘laughter- plant’480 
γελωτόφυλλις n. γέλως + φυλλίς ‘laughter- salad’481 
ἐγερσιγέλως n. ἔγερσις + γέλως ‘laughter stirring’ 
ἡδύγελως  n. ἡδύς + γέλως  ‘sweetly laughing’ 
κλαυσίγελως n. κλαῦσις + γέλως  ‘smiles mingled with tears’ 
κωμῳδογέλως  n. κωμῳδός + γέλως ‘comic actor’482 
μισογέλως  n. μῖσος + γέλως  ‘laughter-hating’ 
παγγέλοιος adj. πᾶς + γέλοιος  ‘thoroughly ridiculous’ 
πολυγέλως  n. πολύς + γέλως ‘laughing often or a lot’483 
πραΰγελως n. πρᾶος + γέλως ‘softly laughing’484 
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Table 4. List of γελ- rooted compound words. 
Apparently, four basic laughter-words are used in word-composition; these are 
γελαστός ‘laughable’, γελοιαστής ‘jester, buffoon’, γέλοιος ‘mirth-provoking’, 
and γέλως ‘laughter’. A majority of these (26 words) are formed with the 
γελως. Accordingly, 15 lexemes, consist of this noun as the head of the 
compound, in which the modifiers are either adjectives (αἰσχρός ‘shameful’, 
ἄκαιρος ‘ill-timed’, ἀχρεῖος ‘unfit’, πολύς ‘many’, ἡδύς ‘sweet, pleasant’, 
πρᾶος ‘mild, soft, gentle’, ὑγρός ‘pliant’, φίλος ‘loved’), or nouns (ἔγερσις 
‘awaking’, κλαῦσις ‘weeping’, κωμῳδός ‘comic poet’, μῖσος ‘hate, hatred’, 
ὕβρις ‘insolence’). Interestingly, more than one adjective may be attached to 
γέλως, as in the example of φιλοπολύγελως (φίλος ‘loved’ and πολύς 
‘many’). Furthermore, 7 words have γέλως as the modifier of the lexeme. In 
particular, it is attached to such nouns as δύσις ‘setting of the sun’, φυή ‘plant’, 
and φυλλίς ‘leaves, salad’; in four cases it is adjoined to different forms of the 
verb ποιέω ‘make’ (γελωτοποιέω, γελωτοποιΐα, γελωτοποιϊκῶς, 
γελωτοποιός). Next, 6 compounds consist of γέλοιος. This adjective, alike 
γέλως, is used twofold in word-composition: either as the compound’s 
modifier or as its head. In the first case, γέλοιος becomes attached to such 
words as λόγος ‘speech’, μέλος ‘song’, ὁμιλία ‘company’; in the second, it is 
preceeded by the adjectives πᾶς ‘many’, σπουδαῖος ‘earnest’ and φίλος ‘loved’. 
In the end, the lexeme γελοιαστής ‘jester, buffoon’ composes but a single 
compound; with φίλος ‘loved’ it creates φιλόγελοιαστής.  
σπουδογέλοιος adj. σπουδαῖος + γέλοιος ‘blending jest with earnest’ 
ὑβρίγελως n. ὕβρις + γέλως  ‘a scornful laugher’ 
ὑγρογέλως adj. ὑγρός + γέλως  ‘softly laughing’ 
φιλόγελοιαστής n. φίλος + γελοιαστής ‘a friend of jesters’ 
φιλόγέλοιος adj. φίλος + γέλοιος  ‘fond of the ludicrous’ 
φιλόγελως  n. φίλος + γέλως  ‘laughter-loving’ 
φιλοπολύγελως n. φίλος + πολύς + γέλως ‘loving much laughter’ 
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Within these compounds, we may distinguish different concepts 
concerning the phenomenon of laughter. Firstly, the compounds reflect the 
basic ideas of the audible (sound) and visual (facial expression) aspects of 
laughter. For instance, the nouns πολυγέλως485 ‘laughing a lot’ and 
φιλοπολύγελως486 ‘loving much laughter’ denote one’s high tendency to laugh. 
Furthermore, the adjectives πραΰγελως487 and ὑγρογέλως488 denote a person 
who laughs in a gentle and relaxed way. 489 Other words, like κλαυσίγελως490, 
‘laughter mingled with tears’, refer to the actions of a laugher’s face. We may, 
then, easily recognize that a number of compounds refer to the physiology of 
laughter. 
Another idea included in these composite forms is the production of 
laughter. For example, the Greeks recognize the fact that one begins to laugh 
after consuming certain plants; hence, the terms γελωτοφυή491 ‘laughter-plant’ 
and γελωτόφυλλις492 ‘laughter-salad’. Also, it is obvious that the words and 
actions of a person (or people) may arouse laughter in others. This act is 
signified by the verb γελωτοποιέω493 ‘create laughter’. A person who makes 
                                               
485 Lib. Decl. 27. 1: ἥκω τὸπολύγελων τουτὶ μειράκιον ‘I come upon a much laughing youth’. 
Listed without context by Aelius Herodianus in his Partitiones, cf. Boissonade (1819) 206. 
486 A hapax legomenon in AP 5. 243: Τὴν φιλοπουλυγέλωτα κόρην, ‘a girl loving much laughter’. 
487 AP 10. 4. 4: πρηΰγελως Ζέφυρος, ‘gently laughing Zephyr’; Licymn. fr. 2. 3: πραΰγελως 
Ὑγίεια, ‘tenderly laughing Hygieia’. 
488 A hapax legomenon in Phryn. Praep. Soph. s.v. ὑγρογέλως: ὁ ὑγρὸν καὶ διακεχυμένον γελῶν, 
καὶ μὴ αὐστηρὸν μηδὲ βίαιον, ‘”soft-laugher”: one who laughs softly and in a relaxed way, not 
harsh or violent’. 
489 Hsch. s.v. μειλιχομειδής’sweetly smiling’ lists πραΰγελως ‘softly laughing’ and ἡδύγελως 
‘sweetly laughing’; these instances, however, are not decisive. 
490 Xen. Hell. 7. 2. 9: πάντας δὲτοὺς παρόντας τότε γε τῷ ὄντι κλαυσίγελως εἶχεν, ‘laughter 
mingled with tears did on that occasion really possess all who were present’, translation in 
Brownson (1921) 159. 
491 Transmitted in Latinized form gelotophyen in the Ps.-Apul. Herb. VIII; included in LSJ as the 
Greek γελωτοφυή (s.v.), however omitted by DGE. 
492 Transmitted in Latinized form gelotophyllis in Plin. Hist. Nat. 24.164. Jones (1966) 116 n. e, 
translates ‘leaves of laughter’. Today, this plant is recognized to be Indian hemp (Cannabis 
sativa), cf. LSJ, DGE, both s.v. γελωτόφυλλις. Curiously, modern English street names for 
Cannabis include ‘laughing salad’ or just ‘salad’, cf. Jacquette (2011) 17.  
493 In Pl. Sym. 189 a, Aristophanes is said to be joking than instead of making his speech about 
Eros (γελωτοποιεῖς μέλλων λέγειν). Socrates, in Xen. Mem. 3. 9. 9, admits that those who make 
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others laugh is considered to be an ἐγερσιγέλως494 ‘laughter stirring’ or 
γελωτοποιός495 ‘exciting laughter’ or ‘laughter-maker’; he/she behaves 
γελωτοποιϊκῶς496, i.e. in a manner which is laughter-producing, or simply 
foolish; and his/her conduct is regarded to be γελωτοποιΐα497 ‘laughter-
provoking’ or just ‘buffoonery’. Moreover, the mode of speech is another way 
of eliciting laughter, as it is signified by the nouns γελοιολογία498 meaning 
‘jesting language’ i.e. saying things which provoke a laugh, hence are considerd 
to be amusing or absurd; and γελωτολόγος499 ‘one who makes frivolous jokes’. 
However, one who provokes a laugh discussing serious matters, albeit in a 
funny way, is called a σπουδογέλοιος500 ‘earnest jester’. Some compounds refer 
to literary genres, which aim at making its recipients (audience or listeners) 
                                                                                                                                         
others laugh their profession (τοὺς γελωτοποιοῦντας), surely, do something (ποιεῖν τι) , but, 
since it is a form of leisure, they should do something else (πάντας δὲ τούτους ἔφη 
σχολάζειν·ἐξεῖναι γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἰέναι πράξοντας τὰ βελτίω τούτων). Also, the provocation of 
laughter is not desired at funerary rites, cf. Plut. Brut. 45. 5: οὐ καλῶς …τεθνηκότι Κασσίῳ 
παίζοντες καὶ γελωτοποιοῦντες ἐναγίζομεν, ‘it is not appropriate for us, joking and 
provoking laughter, to bury the desceased Cassius’. 
494 An epithet of Bacchus in AP 11. 60. 1: Σπείσομεν οἰνοποτῆρες ἐγερσιγέλωτι Λυαίῳ, ‘We 
wine drinkers pour a libation to Bacchus, the Eliciter of Laughter’. 
495 As a noun, e.g. Socrates considers himself to be a ‘laughter-maker’ in Xen. Sym. 4. 50: 
γελωτοποιός εἰμι, ‘I am a laughter-maker’. As an adjective, e.g. Pl. Res. 620 c, speaks of the soul 
of ‘the the ridiculous Thersites’ (τὴν τοῦ γελωτοποιοῦ Θερσίτου). 
496 A hapax legomenon listed in Poll. 149. 
497 E.g. Xen. Sym. 4. 50: ἠρώτων αὐτὸν τί ὁρῶν ἐν τῇ γελωτοποιίᾳ μέγα ἐπ’ αὐτῇ φρονοίη, 
‘they asked him [i.e. Socrates] what he saw to be proud of in causing laughter’, translation in 
Bowen (1998) 59. Cassius Dio speaks of the name Comazo as appropriate to provoking laughter 
(a play on words with the verb κωμάζω ‘revel, make merry’), in Cass. Dio 80. 4: ὁ Κωμάζων … 
τοῦτο τοὔνομα ἔκ τε μίμων καὶ γελωτοποιίας ἔχων, ‘Comazo had a name befitting mimes 
and buffoonery’. Luc. Salt. 68 speaks of comedy’s capacity to provoke laughter (κωμικὴ 
γελωτοποιία) as the single activity appealing to the eye and ears of the spectators.  
498 DGE s.v. ‘lenguaje bromista, divertido’. A hapax legomenon found in Athan. Or. Con. Ar. 1. 4: 
‘ὁ θαυμαστὸς Ἄρειος … πλεῖστά τε τῶν ἄλλων αἱρέσεων ὑποκλέψας, τὴν τοῦ Σωτάδου 
μόνου γελοιολογίαν ἐζήλωσε’, ‘This excellent Arius … after taking plenty from other heresies, 
could only compete with Sotades in speaking absurdities’. 
499 One of the undesirable characteristics of a Christian reader according to Jacob, Sent. Ap. p. 84: 
Ἰάκωβος εἶπεν· Ἀναγνώστης καθιστανέσθω ... μὴ γλωσσοκόπος, μὴ μέθυσος, μήτε 
γελωτολόγος..., ‘May there be a reader… neither of a sharp tongue, nor given to drink, nor one 
who makes frivolous jokes… ’. 
500 E.g, the Cynic philosopher and satirist Menippus, according to Strabo 16. 2. 29. 8: Μένιππος 
ὁ σπουδογέλοιος. 
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laugh, for instance, the verb γελοιωμελέω501 meaning ‘write comic songs’ and 
the noun κωμῳδογέλως502 standing another word for ‘comic actor’. Also, an 
object or person acknowledged to be extremely risible may be described with 
the compound παγγέλοιος503. In these examples, we may notice that the 
production of laughter is often connected with the idea of humour.  
Next, some compound laughter-words contain positive or negative 
evaluations of the phenomenon. In particular, one who enjoys laughter is 
considered a φιλόγελως504 ‘laughter-loving’ or ἡδύγελως505 ‘sweetly laughing’. 
Another positive opinion about laughter, but in relation to humour and 
playfulness, is noticeable in the words φιλόγέλοιος506, ’fond of the ludicrous’, 
and φιλόγελοιαστής507, ‘friend of jesters’. In opposition stands μισογέλως508, 
                                               
501 A hapax legomenon in AP 7. 719: Τέλληνος ὅδε τύμβος· ἔχω δ’ ὑπὸ βώλακι πρέσβυν / 
τῆνον τὸν πρᾶτον γνόντα γελοιομελεῖν, ‘I am the tomb of Tellen, and under ground I hold 
the old man, who was the first to learn how to compose comic songs’, translation in Paton 
(1919) 383. 
502 A hapax legomenon in AP 13. 6. 1-4: Τοῦτ’ ἐγὼ τὸ περισσὸν εἰκόνισμα /τοῦ κωμῳδογέλωτος 
εἰς θρίαμβον /κισσῷ καὶ στεφάνοισιν ἀμπυκασθὲν / ἕστακ’, ὄφρα Λύκωνι σᾶμ’ ἐπείη, ‘This 
admirable portrait of the comedian, crowned for a triumph with ivy and garlands, I set up that 
it might stand as a monument on Lycon’s grave’, translation in Paton (1918) 5. 
503 E.g. the ludicrousness of speaking about a donkey as if it were a horse, in Pl. Phdr. 260 c 2: 
Παγγέλοιόν γ’ ἂν ἤδη εἴη, ‘that would be completely ridiculous’; Agamemnon presented as a 
ridiculous general in tragedies, in Pl. Res. 522. 1-2: Παγγέλοιον γοῦν … στρατηγὸν 
Ἀγαμέμνονα ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις Παλαμήδης ἑκάστοτε ἀποφαίνει, ‘In the tragedies, 
Palamedes shows Agamemnon as a ludicrous general’. 
504 Aristotle regards the young to be φιλογέλωτες ‘lovers of laughter’ in Rh. 1389b 11. As an 
abstract noun φιλόγελως ‘love of laughter’, cf. Arist. Rh. 1390a 22-23: ἐναντίον γὰρ τὸ 
ὀδυρτικὸν τῷ φιλογέλωτι, ‘the inclination to lamenting stands in opposition to a fondness for 
laughter’. 
505 Pan is described ἡδύγελως ‘sweetly-laughing’ at Hom. Hymn. 19. 37. Here, the ‘sweetness’ of 
one’s laughter indicates the subject’s delight or taking pleasure in laughter; such interpretation 
seems plausible in AP 5. 135. 4 in which a jug of wine is addressed as ἡδύγελως ‘laughter-
enjoying’; cf. Halliwell (2008) 68 n. 41. 
506 Aristotle speaks of the sullen character of the old in  Rh. 1390a 21-22: ὅθεν ὀδυρτικοί εἰσι, καὶ 
οὐκ εὐτράπελοι οὐδὲ φιλογέλοιοι, ‘they are more inclined to crying, than joking and laughing 
merrily’. 
507 Listed by Pollux without context, amongst other Greek compounds with φιλός, cf. Poll. 
161.1-2: Φιλοπαίκτης ‘fond of play’, φιλοπαίγμων ‘sportive’, φιλοπαίσμων ‘fond of play’, 
φιλοπαίστης ‘sportive’, φιλόγελως ‘fond of laughter’, φιλόγελοιαστής ‘fond of jesters’. 
508 In relation to the tragedian Euripides, in Alex. Aet. fr. 7. 1-2 CA: στρυφνὸς μὲν ἔμοιγε 
προσειπεῖν,καὶ μισογέλως, καὶ τωθάζειν οὐδὲ παρ’ οἴνῳ μεμαθηκώς, ‘morose to speak to, a 
 119 
 
which indicates one who despises laughter. Also, a negative view of laughter is 
recognizable in few compounds which regard the phenomenon as something 
shameful (αἰσχρόγελως509 ‘shamefully ridiculous’), improper (ἀκαιρόγελως510 
‘given to unseemly laughter’), or ill-timed (ἀχρειόγελως511 ‘untimely-
laughing’). We may easily recognize the fact that these critical notions are of 
moral nature. 
A number compounds represent other concepts of laughter. In 
particular, explicit mockery is indicated by the noun ὑβρίγελως512 signifying a 
‘scornful laugher’, whereas γελοωμιλία513 ‘fellowship in laughing’ refers to the 
social aspect of sharing a laugh with others. Lastly, the unique word 
γελοδυτία514 meaning ‘sunset’ alludes to the distinctively Greek association of 
laughter with the idea of shining. 
In this section, we have seen the different ideas of laughter reflected in 
the compounds of γελ- rooted words. These concepts, generally, include such 
meanings of the discussed phenomenon: 1) sound, 2) facial expression, 3) 
stimuli (plants, human conduct, speech, jokes, comic songs), 4) humour, 5) 
derision, 6) brightness, but also its evaluation as 8) a pleasant, thus positive 
experience, or 9) a morally dissaproved phenomenon. 
At this point it is important to specify that the concepts of laughter 
included in these compounds depend on the context in which the lexemes 
                                                                                                                                         
laughter-hater, and someone who hasn’t learnt how to engage in mocking banter even at a 
drinking-party’, translation in Halliwell (2008) 270. 
509 Unique form in Man. Apot. IV. 283: αἰσχρογέλωτας. 
510 Though included in the LSJ, this hapax legomenon is of late date, occurring only in Aëtius 6.8: 
ἀκαιρογέλωτες. 
511 Cratinus rebukes the audiences untimely laughter during the performances, in Crat. fr. 323 
Kock: χαῖρ’, ὦ μέγ’ ἀχρειόγελως ὅμιλε ταῖς ἐπίβδαις, ‘greetings, oh mob untimely laughing 
much just after the festival’. 
512 Appears only twice in Man. Apot. IV. 280 (ὑβριγέλωτας) and IV 446 (ὑβριγέλωτας) . 
513 In AP 9. 573, Ammianus speaks of a fellow who feigns his behaviour at a feast, whilst not 
being inclined to neither sharing tears (the unique κλαιωμιλίη), not laughter (γελοωμιλίη). 
514 A hapax legomenon in Hsch. s.v. γελοδυτία: ἡλιοδυσία ‘sunset’. The lexicographer quotes also 
other unique words connected to the concept of brightness and possibly based on the γελ- root: 
γέλας explained as αὐγάς ‘lights’ and γέλαν explained as αὐγὴν ἡλίου ‘light of the sun’.  
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occur in. For instance, the noun γελωτοποιός may signify a ‘jester’, a non-
serious ‘buffoon’, but also a disdainful ‘mocker’. Similarly, παγγέλοιος may 
refer to the risibility of a person or object due to its absurdity but also 
ridiculousness; the latter meaning, hence, may pertain to derision.515 In this 
respect, compounds may also reflect different ideas of laughter simultaneously. 
 
In the discussion above, I have examined the first word-family regarding 
laughter in the Grek language. These lexemes, created from the root γελ-, form 
the largest as well as the most diverse lexical group referring to the 
phenomenon. Without any doubt, the three main lexemes, i.e. γελάω, γέλως, 
and γέλοιος surpass this word-family in regard of their semantic complexity as 
well as their number of occurrences in the whole extant Greek corpus.516 
2.1.2. Word-group with καχ- root 
The second family-word designating laughter is formed from the καχ- 
root. In my research, I have found 15 lexemes belonging to this word group, as 
presented in table 5. In particular, it consists of verbs (13), mostly derivatives of 
καχάζω with attached prefixes (8), and of nouns (3). 
Lexeme Form Meaning 
ἀνακαγχάζω verb ‘burst out laughing’ 
*ἐγκαγχάζω verb ‘laugh loudly’517 
ἐκκα(γ)χάζω verb ‘burst out into loud laughter’ 
                                               
515 Notice the fear of becoming a laughing- stock expressed in Eub. fr. 53. 5-6 Kock: ‘χεζητιῶν 
μακρὰν βαδίζων, πολλὰ δ' ἰδίων ἀνήρ, δάκνων τὰ χείλη, παγγέλοιός ἐστ' ἰδεῖν’, ‘for one 
who needs to take a dump, walks far, sweats like hell and bites his lips, looks utterly 
ridiculous’. 
516 According to the TLG, the total amount of all occurrences in extant Greek texts is: for γελάω: 
6002, γέλως: 4975, and γέλοιος: 2893, retrieved 3 February 2015 from 
http://stephanus.tlg.uci.edu/inst/textsearch. For a survey on Greek laughter from Homer till 
early Christianity, see Halliwell (2008); also Gilhus (1997) 30-45, 64-82. For laughter in 
Byzantine literature, cf. Maltese (2005). The γελ- rooted words still exist in Modern Greek: 
γελώ ‘laugh’, and το γέλιο ‘laughter’. 
517 Lampe (1961) s.v. ἐγκαγχάζω. 
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ἐπεγκαχάζω verb ‘laugh at’ 
ἐπικαγχάζω verb ‘laugh loud’ 
καγχαλάω (?) verb ‘shout with joy’ 
‘laugh out loud’ 
‘rejoice’ 
καγχάομαι verb ‘laugh excessively’518 
καγχαστής noun ‘loud laugher’ 
καγχλάζω (?) verb ‘laugh aloud’519 
κακχαδίαι noun ‘thin-voiced’ 
κατακαγχάζω verb ‘laugh aloud at’ 
κα(γ)χάζω, κα(κ)χάζω  verb ‘laugh aloud’ 
‘jeer’ 
‘mock’ 
κα(γ)χασμός noun ‘loud laugher’ 
*συγκαχάζω verb ‘laugh loud together’520 
ὑπερκαγχάζω verb ‘laugh to excess’ 
Table 5. List of καχ- rooted lexemes. (?) indicates the disputable origin of a lexeme. 
The root καχ- is of Indo European origin and of onomatopoeic character, for it 
derives from the reduplicated interjection of laughter kha kha ‘ha, ha’.521 
Consequently, the original semantic content of this word family reflects the 
auditory aspect of laughter. Thus, the verb καχάζω (as well as its other forms 
κακχάζω and καγχάζω)522 carries the concept of loud laughter.523 Apart from 
the basic meaning ‘laugh loud’, this verb may additionally signify mockery and 
derision depending on the context it appears.524 Many verbal compositions are 
attested, such as ἀνακαγχάζω, ἐκκαχάζω (also ἐκκαγχάζω, ἐκκακχάζω), 
                                               
518 My translation. LSJ s.v. καγχαλίζομαι, καγχάομαι redirects to καγχαλάω. 
519 LSJ s.v redirects to καγχάζω. 
520 My translation. 
521 Pokorny (1959) 634; Mallory and Adams (2006) 359-60. The reduplicated sound word 
appears in other Indo European languages, e.g. Sanskrit ‘kákhati’, Classical Armenian ‘xaxan-
k̒’, Old Church Slavonic ‘chochotati’, Old High German ‘kachazzen’ ‘loud laughter’, Latin 
‘cachinnus’ ‘resounding laughter’ and the verb ‘cachinnare’. Cf. Frisk (1960), Beekes (2010) I, 
both s.v. καχάζω. On the etymology of English ‘laugh’, see Chapter I, section 1.1., n. 23. 
522 Schwyzer (1950) I 315 for gemination, 647 for nasalization. 
523 Lopez Eire (2000) 15, esp. 23: ‘καχάζω évoque fondamentalement la realisation sonore du 
<<rire>>’. 
524 Ajax imagines his enemies laughing out loud with their tongues at him (ἐχθρῶν δ' ὕβρις… 
πάντων καγχαζόντων γλώσσαις) in Soph. Ai. 199. For the passage’s detailed discussion, See 
chapter III. 
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ἐγκαγχάζω, ἐπικαγχάζω, συγκαχάζω, and ὑπερκαγχάζω. In the same way 
as in the compounds with γελάω, also, in the compunds with καχάζω, the 
prefixes not only modify the word’s semantics, but specify certain aspects of its 
basic concept, i.e. audible laughter. In particular, the attachement of ἀνα- and 
ἐκ- stress the sonority, intensiveness or suddenness of a burst of laughter. The 
same meaning is denoted by the prefix ἐν-, which signifies motion directed 
outwards in the direction of others. As a result, the verbs ἀνακαγχάζω525, 
ἐκκαχάζω,526 and ἐγκαγχάζω527 semantically encompass the concept of an 
outburst of loud laughter, thus share the meaning ‘burst out laughing’. 
Concerning ἐπικαγχάζω ‘laugh loud’, the prefix ἐπι- denotes signaling one’s 
sentiments to others, in this case, of derisive quality.528 This is noticeable in the 
example of the unique noun ἐπικαγχάστρια529 ‘a she mocker’. Moreover, the 
prefix ὑπερ- signifies superfluity in one’s guffaw, thus ὑπερκαγχάζω530 means 
‘laugh to excess’; in συγκαχάζω531 ‘laugh out loud together’ συν- indicates the 
shared experience of laughing with others, whereas in ἐπεγκαχάζω532 ‘laugh 
                                               
525 Thrasymachus bursts with loud laughter (ἀνεκάγχασέ) in reaction to the words of Socrates 
in Pl. Res. 337a 3; similarly Ctesippus who guffaws (μέγα πάνυ ἀνακαγχάσας) at the comment 
of Dionysodoros, cf. Pl. Euthd. 300 d 3.  
526 Critobulus bursts out laughing (ἐξεκάγχασεν) at the weeping jester Philip, cf. Xen. Sym. I 16; 
Aristotle mentions the outburst (ἐκκαγχάζουσιν) of those who tried to restrain their laughter, 
but in vain (Eth. Nic. 1150b 11). 
527 DGE s.v. ἐγκαγχάζω: ‘reír a carcajadas’ (guffaw, laugh out loud, break into laughter). Cf. 
Basil. M. 31. 961B: ‘raucous laughter (ἐγκαγχάζειν δὲ τῇ φωνῇ) and uncontrollable shaking of 
the body are not indications of a well-regulated soul’, translation in Wagner (1950) 271. 
528 Hesychius glosses ἐπικαγχάζων with ἐπιγελῶν. Cf. Ps.-Zonar. s.v. ἐπικαγχάζειν: ἀκόσμως 
γελᾷν, ‘to laugh inappropriately’. Zonaras 8. 2. regards the derisive reaction of the Tarantines 
who were ‘laughing out loud’ (ἐπικαγχαζόντων) at the soiling of the clothing of senator 
Postumus; quoted in Cary (1914) 300. 
529 Ps.-Zonar. explains ἐπικαγχάστρια as ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰωθυῖα γελᾷν. ἢ γελάστρια, ‘for “woman 
accustomed to laugh” or “she laugher”’.  
530 The death of the Stoic Chrysippus was caused by a fit of laughter, cf. D. L. 7. 185: 
ὑπερκαγχάσαντα τελευτῆσαι ‘he laughed so much that he died’. 
531 A hapax legomenon in Pall. V. Chrys. XII 69. 28-70.1: if there would not be anyone to laugh 
together (συγκαχάσῃ) with ignoble laughter’. 
532 E.g. Lyc. 285: ὁ λῃστὴς Δωριεὺς γελᾷ στρατός, ἐπεγκαχάζων τοῦ δεδουπότος μόρῳ ‘the 
pirate Dorian host [shall not] laugh exulting in the doom of the fallen’, translation in Mair 
(1921) 519. 
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at’ and κατακαγχάζω533 ‘laugh aloud at’, the prefixes emphasize the social 
aspect of laughter directed and simultaneously aimed at another person. 
Αmong derivates, we may find such nouns as καχασμός (vel καγχασμός) 
‘loud laughter’534, καγχαστής ‘loud laugher’535, κακχαδίαι ‘thin-voiced’536 as 
well as the verb καγχάομαι ‘laugh uncontrolably’537. A possible derivate of the 
latter is καγχλάζω.538 Also, καγχαλάω (vel καγχαλόω) is considered to be a 
possible cognate, although the word’s origin remains obscure.539 However, just 
as καγχάζω, it is of expressive and onomatopoeic character.540 As far as 
semantics is concerned, καγχαλάω contains the idea of manifesting positive 
emotions in an audible fashion,541 thus, denotes ‘shout with joy, laugh out loud, 
rejoice’.542 In general, this word group regards two main concepts: 1) the body 
                                               
533 E.g. AP 5.215.5-6: ἔργον γάρ τι γυναιξὶν… κατακαγχάζειν τῶν ἄγαν οἰκτροτάτων ‘For it is 
more or less the business of women… to make fun of those who are too exceedingly pitiful’. 
English translaition in Paton (1916) 235.  
534 Worse Argument lists καχασμῶν ‘laughs’ as one of life’s simple pleasures in Ar. Nu. 1073; 
Suid. s.v. καγχασμός explains as ὁ ἔκχυτος γέλως, ‘immoderate laughter’. 
535 Phryn. Praep. Soph. 78. 15, explains the lexeme as ‘ὁ ἐπὶ τοῖς φορτικοῖς γελῶν καὶ μὴ 
ἀστείοις’ ‘he who laughs at vulgar things and uncivilized jokes’. 
536 A unique word in Hsch. s.v. κακχαδίαι: ἰσχνόφωνοι. 
537 A hapax legomenon in Hsch. s.v. καγχᾶται: γελᾷ ἀτάκτως ‘laugh excessively’. 
538 Duhoux (2000) 77 includes the variant καγχλάζω as a lengthened form of καγχάζω. 
However, etymologists favor the verb’s connection with χαλάω ‘to relax, loosen, let go’. Cf. 
Chantraine (1970), Beekes (2010), both s.v. καγχαλάω. Cf. the explanation of Apollonius 
Sophista for the Homeric καγχαλόωσα (from Hom. Od. 23. 1) as χαίρουσα, διὰ τὸ ἐν 
χαλάσματι εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, τουτέστιν ἐν ἀνέσει, ‘she is rejoicing due to the easing of the 
mind, i.e. its relaxation’. 
539 Tichy (1983) 222-5, argues for the lenghthening of the stem καγχ- with the suffix –αλάω, as 
occurs in the cases of other words (e.g. ἀσχαλάω ‘grieve’, from ἄσχαλος ‘who cannot hold 
himself’). 
540 Frisk (1960-70), Chantraine (1970), Beekes (2010), all s.v. καγχαλάω. 
541 Hom. Il. 10.565, Odysseus laughs raucously with delight (καγχαλόων) as he leads to the 
Greek camp the horses he has stolen from Rhesus; Hom. Od. 23.1 the Nurse laughs loud with 
joy (καγχαλόωσα) at her master’s return, as she heads to tell the news of this to Penelope. Cf. 
Halliwell (2008) 57 n. 15, 87 n. 88. 
542 Abramowiczówna (1960) II s.v. καγχαλάω: ‘cieszyć się głośno, śmiać się, radować’. 
Curiously, the lexeme’s entry in the 8th edition of LSJ (1889) ‘laugh out loud’, has been 
modified in LSJ (1996) to ‘rejoice, exult’ (repeated in Beekes (2010) I s.v.). Cf. Chantraine (1970) 
II ‘éclater de rire, rire aux éclats’; Frisk (1960-70) I, 751: ‘laut jubeln, frohlocken’, both s.v. 
καγχαλάω. 
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language of laughter, particularly its auditory aspect, and 2) the idea of 
mockery.  
2.1.3. Word-group with χασκ- root 
This laughter related family-word is formed from the χασκ- root. In 
comparison to the previous group, it is only a bit larger, as it contains of 7 
lexemes: 3 verbs and 4 nouns. These we may find in table 6. 
Lexeme Form Meaning 
ἐγχάσκω verb ‘gape’, ‘grin’, ‘scoff at’ 
ἐπεγχάσκω verb ‘make mouths at another’ 
καταχάσκω verb ‘gape’, ‘jeer at’ 
καταχάσμησις noun ‘mockery’543 
καταχήνη noun ‘flouting’, ‘mockery’ 
χήνημα noun ‘wide gape’, ‘mocking laugh’ 
*χηνάω (χηνέω) verb ‘gape wide’, ‘laugh 
mockingly’544 
Table 6. List of χασκ- rooted lexemes related to laughter. 
This group of laughter words is also of Indo European origin, as its stem 
derives from *ǵheh₂n-, which means ‘to break open, to yawn’.545 The verb 
χάσκω basically regards the act of opening the mouth wide, hence its primary 
meaning ‘to gape’. The connection with laughter, however, is established in few 
cognates. In particular, the addition of the prefixes ἐν-, and κατα- alter the 
original semantics of χάσκω from ‘gape’ to ‘laugh at’. Accordingly, ἐγχάσκω 
accepts the meaning ‘laugh at’, ‘make fun of’, ‘tease’, ‘mock’546 and in 
                                               
543 LSJ s.v. καταχάσμησις: gloss on καταχήνη. 
544 LSJ s.v. χήνημα. 
545 Pokorny (1959) 419; Beekes (2010) II, s.v. χάσκω. 
546 Cf. Hsch. s.v. ἐγχάσκειν· καταγελᾶν; Phot. s.v. ἐγχανεῖν· καταγελάσαι, 
καταμωκήσασθαι. Employed in Aristophanes to describe a prospective act of derision by: 1) a 
perpetrator, in Ach. 222: διωκτέος δέ· μὴ γὰρ ἐγχάνῃ ποτὲ … ἐκφυγὼν Ἀχαρνέας, ‘ we must 
go after him, so he won’t laugh at escaping us, the Acharnians’; 2) an enemy, in Ach. 1197: 
ἐκεῖνο δ’ οὖν αἰακτὸν ἂν γένοιτο, Δικαιόπολις εἴ μ’ ἴδοι τετρωμένον, κᾆτ’ ἐγχάνοι ταῖς 
ἐμαῖς τύχαισιν, ‘But it would be true agony/ if Dicaeopolis should see me wounded/and jeer at 
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καταχάσκω the prefix changes the meaning to ‘jeer at’547. Similarly the nouns 
καταχήνη548 and its gloss καταχάσμησις549, in which the addition of κατα- 
alters the meaning to ‘scorn, mockery’550. In case of ἐπεγχάσκω551, the only 
connection with laughter may be established through the concept of derision, 
as the lexeme accepts the meaning ‘to make mouths at another’. Finally, two 
unique forms also regard derisive laughter: the iterative verb χηνάω or χηνέω 
(transmitted only in the aorist χηνῆσαι) accepts the meaning ‘gape wide, laugh 
mockingly’ and the noun χήνημα signifies a ‘wide gape, mocking laugh’.552 In 
these examples, we may notice that the semantics of cognates alter the original 
meaning of χάσκω from the act of gaping into the act of mocking, deriding, 
hence, laughing at another. It becomes, then, apparent that the words based on 
χάσκω regard two aspects of laughter: 1) the body language of the 
phenomenon, as they refer to the facial display of a person laughing, i.e. the 
wide opening of the mouth; and 2) the communicative role of one’s laughter 
                                                                                                                                         
my misfortunes’, translation in Henderson (1998a) 211; 3) a lying demagogue: Eq. 1313: οὐ γὰρ 
ἡμῶν γε στρατηγῶν ἐγχανεῖται τῇ πόλει, ‘he will not mock the city by being our 
commander’; V. 1007: κοὐκ ἐγχανεῖταί σ’ ἐξαπατῶν Ὑπέρβολος, ‘no longer will Hyperbolus 
make a fool of you with his lies’, translation in Henderson (1998b) 351; 4) a deceitful woman, in 
V. 1349: ἐξαπατήσεις κἀγχανεῖ τούτῳ μέγα, ‘you will trick me and laugh at this greatly’; 5) a 
disdainful father to his son, in Nu. 1436: σὺ δ’ ἐγχανὼν τεθνήξεις, ‘you will die mocking me’; 
6) a crowd towards a weird old man, in V. 720-1: ἐγώ σ’ ἀπέκλειον ἀεὶ/ βόσκειν ἐθέλων καὶ 
μὴ τούτους / ἐγχάσκειν σοι στομφάζοντας, ‘I locked you up as to feed you and so the rants 
would not mock you’; 7) women towards the chorus of men, in Lys. 271: οὐ γὰρ μὰ τὴν 
Δήμητρ’ ἐμοῦ ζῶντος ἐγχανοῦνται, ‘By Demeter, they’ll not laugh at me while I’m alive’, 
translation in Henderson (2000) 305. Cf. Sommerstein (2009) 107-8. 
547 Sommerstein (1994) 228 n. 1089, argues for the verbs occurrence in Ar. Th. 1089-90 
κἀκκάσκις μοι, ‘you jeer at me’, expressed in the Scythian archer’s broken Greek (instead of 
καταχάσκεις). In contrast Austin and Douglas Olson (2004) n. 1087-9, who explain ‘κἀκκάσκις’ 
as ‘κα(ι ἐ)κκασκις’, thus ‘καὶ ἐγχάσκεις’. This explanation seems probable, due to the late 
instances of καταχάσκω found in the works of Byzantine authors, e.g. Eust. Comm. Il. 3. 143. 3: 
καταχάσκοντες. 
548 Ar. V. 575: τοῦ πλούτου καταχήνη, ‘derision of wealth’, Ar. Ec. 631-2: καταχήνητῶν 
σεμνοτέρων ἔσται πολλὴ, ‘it will be a great mockery of the rich [lit. those wearing signets]’.  
549 Cf. the lexica of Photius and Hesychius, both s.v. καταχήνη. 
550 Cf. Suid. s.v. καταχήνη: κατάγελως; same entry repeated in Phot. s.v. καταχήνη. 
551 Soph. fr. 210. 49 Radt: οὐκ ἐ̣ς̣ τ̣οσοῦτ̣̣ον ἦλθ̣̣ον ὥστ’ ἐπε̣γχανεῖν, ‘ They did not get so far as 
to insult him’, translation in Lloyd Jones (1996) 91. For a broader discussion, see chapter IV. 
552 Cf. Schwyzer 719. Hesychius glosses these two lexemes with words explicitly denoting 
mockery: χηνῆσαι with καταμωκήσασθαι ‘mock at’, and χήνημα with the unique noun 
καταμώκημα. 
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which conveys the message of treating another with disdain. In short, it is the 
act of making a face at another, in both literal and figurative senses, that 
underlies the concept of laughter encapsulated by this word-group.  
2.1.4. Other Greek words for laughter 
Lexicographers list many Greek terms in relation to laughter. Although 
these terms do not appear in the corpus of texts I will analyse in the second part 
of this dissertation, however, it will be useful to briefly pay our attention to 
them, in order to supplement our understanding of the Greek ideas on 
concerning laughter. 
Apart from the the three main word-families discussed above, we may 
further distinguish two groups of laughter-words: 1) those formed with the 
root κιχλ-, and 2) lexemes based on various roots.  
2.1.4.1. Word-group with κιχλ- root 
This group of laughter-words is based on the κιχλ- root. In fact, this is 
the smallest word-family, for it consists of only 3 lexemes: 2 verbs and 1 noun. 
Table 7 demonstrates these few lexemes. 
Lexeme Form Meaning 
κιχλιδιάω  verb ‘have a desire to giggle’ 
κιχλίζω verb ‘titter’, ‘giggle’ 
κιχλισμός noun ‘tittering’, ‘giggling’ 
Table 7. List of κιχλ- rooted lexemes. 
Similarly to the case of the καχάζω based word group, this word-family 
is also of onomatopoeic origin and again refers to the audible aspect of 
laughter. It is based on the Greek word κίχλη, which means ‘thrush’. Since the 
lexemes are formed from the name of a bird, the verbal form κιχλίζω denotes 
the sound of laughter resembling that of a bird’s chirping. In result, the verb 
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accepts the meaning ‘laugh’ and ‘giggle’.553 Other derivates of κίχλη include: 
the verb κιχλιδιάω ‘have a desire to giggle’554 and the noun κιχλισμός 
‘tittering, giggling’555. Although some linguists connect this group with 
‘χελιδών’556, i.e. ‘swallow’, however it’s origin remains unclear.557 Again, as in 
the case of the lexemes based on the root καχ-, the main sense of the words 
formed with κιχλ- is the sound of laughter.  
2.1.4.2. Laughter-words with various roots 
Ancient Greek has also other words related to the phenomenon of 
laughter. Apart from the four group-words mentioned above, the LSJ reports 
also other verbs and nouns created from different roots. In particular, these few 
words are either unique or only loosely related to the discussed phenomenon. 
These lexemes are listed in table 8 below. 
Lexeme Form Meaning 
διαληκάομαι verb ‘laugh at’ 
διαμωκάομαι verb ‘mock’, ‘laugh at’ 
διαπαίζω verb ‘laugh’, ‘jest at’ 
ἐκπαίζω verb ‘laugh to scorn’ 
ἐπιμύσσω verb ‘laugh at’ 
ἐπισκώπτω verb ‘laugh at’, ‘make fun at’ 
προσπαίζω verb ‘laugh at’, ‘make fun of’ 
                                               
553 In the comedy Clouds, the Better Argument prohibits inter alia giggling (οὐδὲ κιχλίζειν, Ar. 
Nu. 983) in the proper education of young men; the giant Polyphemus speaks of girls laughing 
when he responds to their invitation, Theoc. 11. 77-8: πολλαὶ συμπαίσδεν με κόραι τὰν νύκτα 
κέλονται,/ κιχλίζοντι δὲ πᾶσαι, ἐπεί κ’ αὐταῖς ὑπακούσω, ‘Many girls seek me out, / Calling 
in the night, „come play with me”, / Giggling when I answer’, translation in Arnson Svarlien 
(1997) 163. On female giggling in an erotic context, cf. Halliwell (2008) 491 n. 52. 
554 Com. Adesp. 1038 Kock, without context. 
555 Paus. Gram. explains κιχλισμός with ὁ λεπτὸς καὶ ἀκόλαστος γέλως, ‘delicate but 
uncontrolled laughter’; Hesychius describes the term as γέλως σφοδρός, ‘vehement laughter’. 
Curiously, in Ar. Nu. 1073, all manuscripts, except for Ravennas 429, contain κιχλισμῶν instead 
of καχασμῶν (cf. n. 307 above). However, scholars consider it to be an accommodation to 
κιχλίζειν in Ar. Nu. 983; cf. Dover (1968) 226 n. 1073; Sommerstein (1982) 213 n. 1073. 
556 Cf. Chantraine (1968) s.v. κίχλη, who explains its etymology as a reduplicated form related 
to χελιδών (‘forme populaire à redoublement qui doit être apparantée à χελιδών’). 
557 Beekes (2010) I, s.v. κίχλη regards it as a Pre-Greek word. 
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χαραμβαλιαστύς noun ‘loud laughter’ 
τριγλίζω verb ‘giggle’ 
Table 8. List of lexemes related to laughter stemming from different roots. 
 In these examples, only two lexemes refer to laughter explicitly, namely 
χαραμβαλιαστύς558 (also its accepted reading κραμβαλιαστύς) ‘loud laughter’ 
and τριγλίζω559 ‘giggle’. Although both terms are transmitted without a 
context, we may recognize that the basic idea of laughter encapsulated in them 
is sound. 
Considering the other lexemes listed above, they are, generally, 
employed in relation to derision. However, the intensity of such act of derisive 
laughter varies: some words refer to playful ridicule at the expense of others 
(ἐπισκώπτω560 ‘laugh at, make fun at’), others signifiy one’s non-serious 
treatment of an object or person (διαπαίζω561 ‘laugh, jest at’, προσπαίζω562 
‘laugh at’), some imply the manifestation of disdain (διαληκάομαι563 ‘laugh at’, 
διαμωκάομαι564 ‘mock, laugh at’, ἐκπαίζω565 ‘laugh to scorn’), and finally, some 
                                               
558 A hapax legomenon in Hsch. s.v. χαραμβαλιαστύς reports γέλως ὁ μετὰ παιδιᾶς (one’s 
laughter amidst play). The form κραμβαλιαστύς is the commonly accepted reading of 
χαραμβαλιαστύς, thus a plausible derivate of κράμβος ‘loud’, cf. Hsch. s.v. κραμβόν: 
καπυρόν τινα <γέλωτα> καὶ ξηρόν φασιν (under κραμβόν they refer to something loud 
<laughter> and crackly).  
559 Hesychius defines τριγλίζω as κατὰ μίμησιν ἐπὶ τῶν γελώντων (‘regarding the imitation of 
those laughing’). Here, the verb is based on the noun τρίγλη ‘gurnard’ or ‘red mullet’, formed 
from τρίζω ‘to buzz, gnash, squeak’, an onomatopoeic verb regarding the utterance of sounds 
by animals. Beekes explains that this noun refers ‘to the grunting sound from the friction of the 
gill cover bones when the fish is taken out of water’, cf. Beekes (2010) II, s.v. τρίγλη. Since 
τριγλίζω is a hapax legomenon in Hesychius, the LSJ regards it as a synonym to κιχλίζω. 
560 In Xen. Sym. 1.5, Socrates speaks of Callias making fun of his guests (σὺ ἐπισκώπτεις ἡμᾶς). 
561 D. L. 4. 53: καὶ ὅλως καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ γεωμετρίαν διέπαιζεν ‘in general, he [i.e. Bion] 
laughed at music and geometry’.  
562 Men. Epit. 182: προσπαίζεις ἐμοί; ‘ you’re making fun at me?’. 
563 Ael. Dion. fr. 125 defines διαληκᾶσθαι as διαμωκᾶσθαι καὶ διαπαίζειν, ‘to mock and jest 
at’; similarly Hesychius s.v. διαληκᾶσθαι: διασύρειν ‘to laugh at: to ridicule’. 
564 Cf. n. above. 
565 Phld. Rh. 2. 216 S quotes the philosopher Diogenes speaking of the Lacedaemonians mocking 
the art of rhetoric: Λακεδαιμόνιοι … ἐκπαίζοντες αὐτήν (Diog. fr. 119). 
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simply refer to outwright mockery (ἐπιμύσσω566 ‘laugh at’). We must, however, 
remember that these subtleties in meanings highly depend on the context in 
which the laughter-word appears. Also, we should bare in mind the fact that 
although the LSJ renders these terms with ‘laugh’, these words do not denote 
laughter, but may only imply it.567 Due to this fact, these lexemes will not be 
taken into consideration in my discussion on laughter in Greek drama. 
2.2. Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have investigated the Greek vocabulary associated with 
laughter and its related phenomena. The purpose for this has been to 
distinguish the chief ideas on the phenomenon discernible within the semantics 
of the analysed terminology. Accepting such an approach has, on the one hand, 
been necessary due to the lack of ancient theoretical explanations for laughter, 
as I have discussed in chapter I. On the other hand, it has allowed me to explore 
and distinguish the ideas on laughter reflected in the general conceptual system 
of the Ancient Greek language, in accordance with the observation of Whorf 
quoted in the epigraph to this chapter.  
My examination has included those lexemes related to laughter found in 
the authoritative English, Spanish and Polish lexica to the ancient Greek 
language. Also, the lexical-semantic analysis has been based on a set of data 
found within the extant literature composed in Ancient Greek, beginning with 
epic poetry of the archaic age, until the writings of Christian scholars in late 
antiquity. Such an extensive range of material has enabled me to follow the 
                                               
566 Such meaning is uncertain for it is based on two vague instances: a conjecture in Luc. Dial. 
Mort. 6. 3., and Hesychius’ corrupted entry ἐπέμυξαν· ἐπεμυκτήρισαν ‘they laughed at: they 
sneered at’. In Homer, the verb originally means ‘murmur’, cf. Cunliffe (1963) s.v. ἐπιμύζω: ‘to 
murmur or mutter at something’; e.g. Athena and Hera discontent at Zeus’ policy mutter 
threats against Troy (αἳ δ’ ἐπέμυξαν Ἀθηναίη τε καὶ Ἥρη, Il. 4. 20, repeated verbatim in Il. 8. 
457).  
567 Original meanings of the words’ stems are: childish behavior (παίζω ‘to behave like a child’), 
sexual activity (ληκάω ‘to have intercourse’), movement of the nose (μύσσομαι ‘to snort’) and 
derision (σκώπτω ‘to mock’). Cf. Beekes (2010) s.v. ‘ληκάω’, ‘μύσσομαι’, ‘παίζω’, ‘σκώπτω’. 
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evolution of Greek laughter-words as well as track modifications within the 
concepts regarding the phenomenon.  
In the course of writing this chapter, some important conclusions have 
emerged. Firstly, in contrast to the English language, the Hellenic tongue 
consists of a larger lexical system used in reference to the phenomenon of 
laughter.568 Secondly, the lexical-semantic analysis has provided me with 
evidence that already the ancient Greeks shared the view of laughter being a 
multifaceted action. Thirdly, the vast set of data has shown that despite the 
evolution of the terminology (especially by compounding), the general concepts 
of laughter encapsulated within their semantics of the four main word-groups 
remain the same. And finally, the Greek concepts of laughter resemble, on the 
whole, many modern perceptions of the phenomenon I have distinguished in 
the previous chapter. Let us, then, recapitulate the basic Greek ideas of laughter 
acknowledged in modern lexica. 
First and foremost, the analysed lexemes reflect the understanding of 
laughter in terms of human physiology. Sound is the principal idea reflected in 
the original semantics within the roots’of three word-families (γελ-, καχ-, κιχλ-
). The second idea concerns the specific facial expression a person shows while 
laughing. This is the main concept reflected in the semantic prototype of the 
root χασκ- forming the forth large word-group, but it is also present in other 
lexemes with the root γελ-. At times, I have also found within these words the 
idea referring to the movements of the whole body. Next, the examined Greek 
lore considers the phenomenon in terms of emotions. In this sense, the 
laughter-words may denote an emotional experience of pleasant nature (joy, 
cheerfulness, mirth, amusement, merriment, and delight). Depending on the 
context, this feeling of pleasure may be of malevolent nature, in which case 
laughter may signify one’s malice towards others (Schadenfreude, triumph). 
                                               
568 Cf. chapter I, n. 210. 
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Furthermore, humour is another concept found in many laughter-words. Here, 
the Greek terminology recognizes laughter as a reaction to the perception of 
humour, i.e. the laughable, or to specific humorous devices which cause 
laughter (jokes, jeering, literary genres like comedy etc.). Often, the concept of 
humour occurs along with the idea of playfulness understood, basically, as 
non-serious conduct. Next, the idea of laughter as a symptom of mental 
disturbances is also noticeable. Lastly, a large number of lexemes signify 
laughter in terms of derision, ridicule and scorn. To this list of concepts, which, 
on the whole correspond with modern interpretations of laughter, we must add 
one more which has emerged in the course of working on this chapter. This is 
the distinctly Greek association of the phenomenon of laughter with the ideas 
of radiance, brightness and shining. It becomes, then, evident that the Greek 
terminology associated with for laughter reflects the manifold nature of 
laughter within the Greek language. 
We must, however, bear in mind the fact that lexicographers aim at 
giving only a general explanation of lexemes. As a consequence, lexica do not, 
or rather may not include every possible concept regarding such a multifaceted 
phenomenon as laughter. This especially refers to the aspect of laughter as a 
means of communication, for whether one’s laugh sends a friendly or hostile 
signal depends on a much wider context. In a similar vein, certain social aspects 
of laughter, for instance, the social consequences of group enhancement or 
exclusion need a wider context to be fully recognized. These are subtleties in 
meanings which emerge in a detailed analysis of a lexeme’s use within a 
specific text, but become omitted by the lexicographer in his/her general 
overview. Hence, it should not come as a surprise that I may refer to certain 
aspects of laughter discussed in chapter I, albeit not included in chapter II, if 
these are ostensibly discernible in the discussed passages of Greek drama. 
Having said this, we may enumerate the general ideas on laughter which 
will form the interpretative framework of my investigation of the meanings of 
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laughter in the dramatic Greek texts. For this purpose, I will refer to the 
following types of laughter:  
In terms of physiology, laughter may be associated with: 
1) a sound, 
2) a specific facial display, 
3) a set of bodily movements. 
In terms of humour, laughter may refer to: 
4) cognition, 
5) various humorous devices, 
6) incongruity 
7) amusement evoked by humour-related devices. 
In terms of emotions, laughter may consider the expression of: 
8) joy, cheerfulness, merriment, 
9) success, feeling of winning, 
10) delight, pleasure, 
11) relief, 
12) playfulness, 
13) superiority, 
14) malice, Schadenfreude, 
15) feeling of triumph, 
16) madness. 
In terms of communication and sociality, laughter may refer to the ideas 
of: 
17) friendliness, 
18) play, 
19) derision, mockery, 
20) hostility, 
21) triumph, 
22) feigned laughter. 
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In terms of Greek interpretations, laughter may be connected with: 
 23) the ideas of brightness and shining. 
Lastly, in terms of evaluation, laughter may be considered: 
 24) a positive experience, 
25) a negative behaviour. 
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Part II 
 
Greek drama of the classical period 
 
 
And so, if you want to discern a man and know his soul, you 
must look, not at how he keeps silent, or how he speaks, or 
how he weeps, or even how he is stirred by the noblest ideas, 
but you had better look at him when he laughs. 
Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Adolescent 569 
 
 
Fifth-century Greek drama contains of many references to laughter. In 
my research, I have distinguished twenty-six different Greek lexemes used to 
evoke the idea of laughter within the surviving plays and transmitted 
fragments of Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides as well as Aristophanes. These 
laughter-words are applied by the four playwrights in the following numbers: 
Lexeme Aeschylus Sophocles Euripides Aristophanes 
ἀγέλαστος 3 - - - 
ἀναγελάω - - 1 (?) - 
γελάω 6 18 12 21 
γέλασμα 1 - - - 
γελαστής - 1 - - 
γελοῖος 1 1 1 13 
γελωτοποιός 1 - - - 
γέλως 3 10 23 10 
διαγελάω - 1 2 - 
ἐγγελαστής - - 1 - 
ἐγγελάω - 3 6 - 
ἐγχάσκω - 1 - 8 
ἐκγελάω - - 1 - 
ἐπεγγελάω - 3 - - 
ἐπεγχάσκω - 1 - - 
ἐπιγελάω - - - 1 
καταγέλαστος - - - 9 
                                               
569 Dostoevsky (2004) 353. 
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καταγελάω 1 - 2 16 
κατάγελως 1 - - 3 
καταχάσκω - - - 2 
καταχήνη - - - 3 
καχάζω - 1 - 1 
καχασμός - - - 1 
κιχλίζω - - - 2 
προσγελάω 1 1 2 1 
συγγελάω - - 1 - 
Sum of instances 18 41 52 91 
Table 9. List of Greek terms on laughter present in the extant plays and fragments of the 
four playwrights. (?) indicates an uncertain lesson in the text. 
As we can see, from a total of 202 instances of terms regarding laughter and 
laughter-related phenomena, nearly a half appears only in the works of the 
comic playwright Aristophanes (91 instances). In order to conduct a thorough 
analysis of the meanings of laughter in Greek drama and not exceed the limits 
of this thesis, my current inquiry will be limited to the tragedies and satyr plays 
of the three tragedians. In the future, however, I intend to extend my analysis of 
laughter onto the works and fragments of Aristophanes. 
In what follows, I examine all 111 references found in the extant works 
and fragments of plays of the three tragic poets. My examination includes both 
genres of tragedy and satyr play. For the purpose of clarity, I have divided the 
discussion into three chapters according to the authors: Aeschylus, Sophocles, 
and Euripides. Each chapter contains of two parts: in the first, I analyse the 
passages regarding laughter from the extant plays; in the second part, I 
distinguish the concepts of laughter evoked in the fragments. Here, the 
discussion is based on the universal categories of laughter we have 
distinguished in chapter I as well as on its Greek understandings discussed in 
chapter II.  
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Chapter III 
 
Laughter in Aeschylean drama 
 
 
And travellers, now, within that valley, 
  Through the red-litten windows see 
Vast forms, that move fantastically 
  To a discordant melody; 
While, like a rapid ghastly river, 
  Through the pale door, 
A hideous throng rush out forever, 
  And laugh — but smile no more. 
 
Edgar Allan Poe, The Fall of the House of Usher570 
 
This chapter presents the analysis of laughter in the works of Aeschylus. 
Firstly, I examine the Greek laughter-words and discuss the concepts laughter 
in the extant tragedies: Agamemnon, Libation Bearers, Eumenides, and Prometheus 
Bound; secondly, I extend my discussion onto the references to laughter 
noticeable in the fragments of Aeschylus. The chapter concludes with final 
remarks on the general meaning of laughter in Aeschylean drama. 
3.1. Laughter-words in the extant tragedies  
Seven tragedies of Aeschylus have been completely transmitted to 
modern times. In regard of Greek laughter-words, we may count a total of 
twelve instances appearing only in four surviving dramas. Interestingly, a 
majority of these references (11 words) are found in the Oresteia trilogy, i.e. the 
tragedies Agamemnon (3 instances), The Libation Bearers (4 instances) and The 
                                               
570 Poe (1981) 44. 
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Eumenides (4 instances). One laughter word occurs in Prometheus Bound.571 The 
lexemes appear in the plays as follows572: 
Verse Lexeme Form in text Grammatic form 
 
Ag. 794 ἀγέλαστος ἀγέλαστα (πρόσωπα) Acc. pl. (n) 
Ch. 29  ἀγέλαστος ἀγελάστοις (ξυμφοραῖς) Dat. pl. 
Pr. 90 γέλασμα γέλασμα Voc. sg. 
Ch. 222 γελάω γελᾶν (θέλεις) Inf. pr. act. 
Eu. 560 γελάω γελᾷ  Ind. pr. act. 3rd sg. 
Eu. 789 γελάω γελῶμαι Ind. pr. m./p. 1st sg. 
Eu. 819 γελάω γελῶμαι Ind. pr. m./p. 1st sg. 
Ch. 448 γέλως γέλωτος (ἑτοιμότερα) Gen. sg. 
Ch. 738 γέλως γέλων (κεύθουσα) Acc. sg. 
Ag. 1271 καταγελάω καταγελωμένην Part. pr. m./p. Acc. sg. 
Ag. 1264 κατάγελως καταγέλωτα (ἔχω) Acc. Sg. 
Eu. 254 προσγελάω προσγελᾷ Ind. pr. act. 3rd sg. 
 
Table 10. List of Greek laughter-words present in the extant tragedies of Aeschylus. 
As we may notice from the table above, Aeschylus, generally, employs 
seven laughter-words: the verbs γελάω, καταγελάω and προσγελάω; the 
nouns γέλασμα, γέλως and κατάγελως; and the adjective ἀγέλαστος. 
 The grammatical forms of these lexemes provide us already with some 
information on their employment by the dramatist. Firstly, the only adjective 
used by Aeschylus is ἀγέλαστος, with which he refers twice to the absence of 
‘laughter’ within certain objects (ἀγέλαστα πρόσωπα, ‘laughterless faces’, Ag. 
794; ἀγελάστοις ξυμφοραῖς, ‘laughterless misfortunes’, Ch. 29). Furthermore, 
                                               
571 I follow the classical attribution of this play to Aeschylus, despite the debate on its 
authorship. The dispute against the tragedy’s designation as Aeschylean began in the 19th 
century with the so-called ‘Zeus Problem’, (the author of Prometheus Bound paints an 
unfavorable portrait of Zeus, which contrasts with the reverential treatment of the god in other 
tragedies, e.g. The Suppliants and Agamemnon), cf. Conacher (1980) 141-74. Modern arguments 
against the play’s authenticity are based on the detailed analysis of its metres, dramatic 
techniques, vocabulary, style, and syntax, cf. Griffith (1977) 224: ‘Had Prometheus Bound been 
newly dug up from the sands of Oxyrynchus, miraculously intact, but anonymous and lacking 
any ancient testimony linking it to any particular author, I think it is far to say that few scholars 
would regard it as the work of Aeschylus’; West (1990) 51-72, especially 67: ‘From beginning to 
end the play offends against Aeschylean canons of composition.’  
572 Cf. the concordance of Italie (1964). 
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in two cases, the substantives for laughter, γέλως and κατάγελως, appear as 
the direct object of the verbs ἔχω ‘have’ (καταγέλωτα ἔχω, ‘I receive mockery’, 
Ag. 1264) and κεύθω ‘hide; conceal’ (γέλων κεύθουσα, ‘her concealing 
laughter’, Ch. 738). In another example, the noun γέλως appears in the 
grammatical construction genetivus comparativus to express the relation of 
laughter to another object (ἑτοιμότερα γέλωτος … λίβη, ‘more ready for 
laughter than tears’, Ch. 448). Also, one character directly addresses ‘laughter’, 
and uses the noun γέλασμα in the vocative case (Pr. 90). Next, we may already 
recognize the fact that the six verbal forms of γελάω and its compounds are 
constructed in the present tense (Ag. 1271, Ch. 222, Eu. 254, Eu. 560, Eu. 789, Eu. 
819). Three of these instances appear in the active voice: γελᾷ ‘he/she laughs’ 
(Eu. 560), προσγελᾷ ‘he/she laughs in the direction of’ (Eu. 254), and γελᾶν ‘to 
laugh’ (γελᾶν θέλεις ‘you wish to laugh’, Ch. 222); the other three references 
occur in the passive voice: twice the form γελῶμαι ‘I am laughed at’ (Eu. 789, 
Eu. 819) and the participle καταγελωμένην ‘her being laughed at, mocked’ 
(Ag. 1271), in which the female subject recognizes the act of ‘laughing’ directed 
at herself. It is interesting that these verbal forms as well as the two verbs to 
which a laughter-word is the direct object (Ag. 1264, Ch. 738) appear only in the 
present tense. It would suggest that most laughter-words in Aeschylean 
tragedy (8 out of 12) would signify a direct reference to laughter (or an act 
perceived as such) taking place onstage or at present in the plot of the play.  
Let us, therefore, proceed with my examination of the interpretations of 
the Greek vocabulary for laughter employed by Aeschylus in the preserved 
tragedies. 
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3.2. Ideas of laughter in Aeschylean tragedy 
The extant tragedies of Aeschylus contain only twelve laughter-words. 
Despite such small number of instances, we will see that the poet evokes 
different universal as well as typically Greek concepts of laughter.  
3.2.1. Delight 
The pleasant feeling of delight or satisfaction may arise from something 
coming to one’s liking.573 In the Libation Bearers, Aeschylus connects the 
vocabulary of laughter with the image of a delighted Clytaemestra. Orestes 
arrives in Argos to take revenge on his mother for the murder of his father. In 
the company of Pylades and disguised as merchants, the prince enters the royal 
palace, meets the queen, and passes to her the false news of her son’s death. On 
hearing this Clytaemestra seems moved and expresses her sorrow (Ch. 691-99). 
She then invites the guests into the palace and leaves for her chambers. After a 
while, the old nurse Cilissa comes out of the palace and relates to the Chorus 
the queen’s real reaction on hearing about the passing of Orestes (Ch. 737-41): 
Τρ.         πρὸς μὲν οἰκέτας  
θέτο σκυθρωπὸν ὄμμα, τόν γ’ ἐντὸς γέλων  
κεύθουσ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἔργοις διαπεπραγμένοις καλῶς  
κείνῃ, δόμοις δὲ τοῖσδε παγκάκως ἔχειν,  
φήμης ὕφ᾽ ἧς ἤγγειλαν οἱ ξένοι τορῶς. 
Nurse:  In front of the servants she put on a sorrowful face – 
concealing the laughter that is underneath on account of the 
event that has come to pass, which is a good thing for her, 
but for this house things are thoroughly bad, as a result of 
the news that the visitors have reported very plainly.574 
From the description above, Clytaemestra’s appearance as a grieving mother 
turns out to be nothing more but hypocrisy. According to Cilissa, the mistress’ 
                                               
573 Cf. OED s.v. ‘delight’ , n.¹, 1. a.: ‘the fact or condition of being delighted; pleasure, joy or 
gratification felt in a high degree’. 
574 Translation in Sommerstein (2008b) 305-7. Hereon, I adduce the original texts and 
translations from Sommerstein (2008a) and (2008b). However, other English translations may 
be, occasionally, of use, since translators differ in their interpretations of Greek laughter-words. 
These exceptions are provided with appropriate annotations. Also, I present in bold the Greek 
laughter-words as well as their English translation. 
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genuine reaction is not sadness but an emotional response she terms ‘laughter’ 
(γέλως). In her opinion, the queen only assumes a sad look in front of the 
servants (θέτο σκυθρωπὸν ὄμμα, Ch. 738), concealing, at the same time, her 
true feelings behind her eyes (τόν γ’ ἐντὸς γέλων κεύθουσα, Ch. 738-9). It is, 
however, through these eyes that the nurse manages to detect Clytaemestra’s 
‘laughter’, i.e. positive response to the news about the death of Orestes. In 
truth, the news of her son’s death, albeit false, is considered by her to be most 
favourable (ἐπ᾽ ἔργοις διαπεπραγμένοις καλῶς, Ch. 739).575 The reason for this 
is the fact that with her son’s passing, the queen and her accomplice Aegisthus, 
who have been ruling Argos together after the killing of her husband, would be 
freed from dreading the return of Agamemnon’s heir and justified avenger.576 
The mention of Clytaemestra’s γέλως, then, refers to her inner delight at the 
things that have worked out well for her (ἐπ᾽ ἔργοις διαπεπραγμένοις καλῶς 
κείνῃ, Ch. 739-40). In this interpretation, the word γέλως reflects the queen’s 
‘mind full of delight’577 stimulated by a fortunate for her turn of events.  
Delight, however, is not the only possible interpretation of 
Clytaemestra’s laughter in this passage. We must bear in mind the fact that the 
degree of one’s positive reaction to the news about another’s passing depends 
on the rapport between the two. If this relationship is more of an antagonistic 
character, then the death of an opponent may evoke a certain type of rapturous 
delight. I will, then, analyze this example once again in the part of my 
discussion concerning laughter in the context of triumph. 
 
 
 
                                               
575 This favorability is stressed by the adverb καλῶς ‘of good fortune’, cf. LSJ s.v. καλός, C. adv. 
II. 2. 
576 Moreau (2000) 402.  
577 Rose (1959) on v. 738. 
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3.2.2. Joy 
Another pleasant feeling encapsulated in the semantics of Greek 
laughter is joy.578 In the extant tragedies, we may distinguish that Aeschylus 
evokes the image of laughter in connection with joy in two general meanings, 
i.e. 1) a state of well-being, and 2) an outward expression of an inner feeling of 
gladness or rejoicing. 579 
3.2.2.1. State of happiness 
It is a universal truth that laughter may denote one’s happiness; its lack, 
however, signifies the opposite. Aeschylus reflects such an idea in the parodos, 
i.e. entrance song (Ch. 23-83) of the Libation Bearers. Sent by their mistress, 
Clytaemestra, the chorus of slave women comes to the grave of Agamemnon to 
pour libations to the dead. After reaching their destination, the women begin to 
sing about the misery they suffer in the royal household (Ch. 23-31):  
Χο. ἰαλτὸς ἐκ δόμων ἔβαν  
χοὰς προπομπὸς ὀξύχειρι σὺν κόπῳ· 
πρέπει παρῂς φοίνισσ’ ἀμυγμοῖς ὄνυχος ἄλοκι  
   νεοτόμῳ— 
δι᾽ αἰῶνος δ᾽ ἰυγ- 
μοῖσι βόσκεται κέαρ—  
λινοφθόροι δ᾽ ὑφασμάτων  
λακίδες ἔφλαδον ὑπ᾽ ἄλγεσιν,  
πρόστερνοι στολμοὶ πέπλων ἀγελάστοις  
ξυμφοραῖς πεπληγμένοι. 
Chorus:  I have been sent here from the house; I come 
in procession with libations, hands in the quick beat of grief, 
cheeks torn into bright crimson-red, 
my nails cutting furrows afresh- 
life-long my heart is fed upon wailing!- 
fine linens and their weave destroyed, 
noisily rent, ripping in grief, 
the folds of the robe over my breast 
battered by laughterless disaster.580 
                                               
578 Cf. chapter II, section 2.1.1.2.3. 
579 Cf. OED s.v. ‘joy’, , n.¹, 1. a. and 1. c. 
580 English translation in Collard (2002) 52.  
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These grim words about the women’s distress correspond with their 
appearance; their cheeks are torn and they wear ragged garments. Dressed in 
black, they bear the traditional signs of mourning, which, according to John 
Herington, visually sets the mood of grief within the play.581 The chorus 
explains that its clothing has been tattered because of the ‘laughterless disaster’, 
(ἀγελάστοις ξυμφοραῖς, Ch. 29). Without any doubt, this expression refers to 
the tragic events that occurred in the House of Atreus, the murder of the king 
by his adulterous wife.582 Although many years have already passed, the 
women still grieve after the loss of their master, as they mention further in the 
choral ode (‘chilled by hidden grief I weep beneath my garments for the 
senseless sufferings of my masters’, δακρύω δ᾽ ὑφ᾽ εἱμάτων ματαίοισι 
δεσποτᾶν τύχαις, Ch. 82-83). It ought to be, however, stressed that in the Greek 
original the expression ἀγελάστοις ξυμφοραῖς appears in the plural dative and 
literally regards the robe tattered ‘by misfortunes non-fit for laughter’.583 The 
adjective ἀγέλαστος, then, does not only refer to the single disastrous event (as 
Collard’s quoted translation would suggest584), but to the many misfortunes the 
killing of Agamemnon has caused in the royal household of which the chorus 
speaks further in the parodos: the fall of a once majestic kingdom (‘O hearth 
full of woe! O ruin of the house! Sunless darkness, abhorred by all, shrouds the 
house because its rulers have perished’, ἰὼ πάνοιζυς ἑστία, / ἰὼ κατασκαφαὶ 
δόμων / ἀνήλιοι βροτοστυγεῖς / δνόφοι καλύπτουσι δόμους / δεσποτᾶν 
θανάτοισι, Ch. 49-53), and the disgraceful ruling of the treacherous queen (‘that 
godless woman’, δύσθεος γυνά, Ch. 46) aside her lover (‘him who violates the 
                                               
581 Herington (1986) 131. 
582 Aeschylus presented this in the Agamemnon, the previous part of the Oresteia trilogy. 
583 The plural form of συμφορά, lit. ‘fates’, ‘misfortunes’ (cf. LSJ s.v.) has been aptly retained in 
other translations such as Smyth’s (1926) 161 ‘fortunes stranger to all mirth’. Sommerstein’s 
(2008b) ‘mirthless disaster’ omits the plural form of συμφορά referring only to a single 
misfortune, i.e., the killing of Agamemnon. Similarly, Way (1908) 82 who also connects 
ἀγέλαστος with the image of smiling: ‘Since calamity withered the blossom / of smiles from 
my eyes’. 
584 Similarly, the translation of Sommerstein (2008b) 215: ‘mirthless disaster’. 
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bower of maidenhood’, θιγόντι… νυμφικῶν ἑδωλίων, Ch. 71). Since the 
sudden death of their king and rightful ruler of Argos, the slave women have 
suffered a life full of misery and sorrow, deprived of happiness and the joys, 
which laughter expresses. By employing the laughter-word with an alpha 
privative, Aeschylus verbally depicts the image of the ‘lack of laughter’, i.e. the 
lack of happiness amongst the servants. This verbal imagery of non-existing joy 
supplements the visual aspect of the mourning chorus. The word ἀγέλαστος, 
therefore, emphasizes the grief-stricken atmosphere of the House of Atreus.  
3.2.2.2. Feeling of joy 
Aeschylus evokes the idea of laughter as an expression of inner joy, 
content and gladness, in the third episode of the Agamemnon. On his return to 
Argos after the victorious siege of Troy, Agamemnon is greeted at the entrance 
to the palace by the Chorus of Elders (Ag. 782-93): 
Χο.  ἄγε δὴ βασιλεῦ, Τροίας πτολίπορθ’,  
Ἀτρέως γένεθλον, 
πῶς σε προσείπω; πῶς σε σεβίξω  
μήθ’ ὑπεράρας μήθ’ ὑποκάμψας 
καιρὸν χάριτος; 
πολλοὶ δὲ βροτῶν τὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι  
προτίουσι δίκην παραβάντες. 
τῷ δυσπραγοῦντι τ᾽ ἐπιστενάχειν  
πᾶς τις ἕτοιμος, δῆγμα δὲ λύπης  
οὐδὲν ἐφ᾽ ἧπαρ προσικνεῖται,  
καὶ ξυγχαίρουσιν ὁμοιοπρεπεῖς  
ἀγέλαστα πρόσωπα βιαζόμενοι. 
<        > 
ὅστις δ’ ἀγαθὸς προβατογνώμων,  
οὐκ ἔστι λαθεῖν ὄμματα φωτὸς 
τὰ δοκοῦντ’ εὔφρονος ἐκ διανοίας 
ὑδαρεῖ σαίνειν φιλότητι. 
Chorus: All hail, son of Atreus, captor of Troy, 
All hail to thee, King! 
How shall I greet thee, how tune my address 
So as neither to fall too short nor surpass 
Due measure of joy? 
Full many are they who unjustly respect 
Mere semblance of truth, and all men are quick 
With a tear to the eye for a neighbour’s distress, 
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But with hearts untouched by his trouble. 
Just so they rejoice with him, forcing a smile 
Like his on their laughterless faces.585 
In this passage, the Chorus speaks of different manners in which the people 
may welcome their king after war. While the Elders express their concern in 
showing a sufficient amount of delight towards Agamemnon (καιρὸν χάριτος, 
Ag. 786), they are fully aware of the fact that not all subjects will greet their 
ruler sincerely. As the Chorus observes in lines 797-8, there are people who 
assume false appearances (ὁμοιοπρεπεῖς, Ag. 792) by forcing their ‘faces 
without laughter’ (ἀγέλαστα πρόσωπα, Ag. 793) into a grin only to appear as 
rejoicing (ξυγχαίρουσιν, Ag. 792) at a fortunate turn of events.586 Clearly, the 
Elders attempt to warn Agamemnon against those citizens of Argos who are 
displeased with the king’s actions at Troy.587 Here, Aeschylus evokes the image 
of laughter in connection with the experience of joy, as he juxtaposes the 
adjective ἀγέλαστος ‘without laughter’ with the verb συγχαίρω ‘rejoice 
with’.588 What is more, the poet uses the metaphor of ‘faces lacking laughter’ in 
regard of the negative emotions dwelling within some people discontent with 
the success of a neighbor (Ch. 790-793), whereas by employing the laughter-
word negated with the α-privativum, this lack of positive sentiments becomes 
emphasized. In this example, therefore, the general idea of laughter evoked by 
the term ἀγέλαστος regards the feeling of joy, albeit through negation. 
The lack of positive sentiments, however, is not the only possible aspect 
of the idea of laughter evoked in this passage. Since the Chorus speaks of 
people forcing their faces to conceal their ‘lack of laughter’, in order to appear 
cheery, it becomes apparent that the image of laughter in this passage is also 
connected with the aspect of communicating one’s sentiments towards others. 
                                               
585 English translation in Thomson (2013) 147-49. 
586 Denniston and Page (1957) 138 n. 793-4. Sommerstein (2008b) 91 n. 164 sees this to be the 
sense of the missing line 794 which he proposes as ‘<to welcome one who has gained success>’. 
587 Sommerstein (2008b) 90 n. 162. 
588 On the connection of laughter with the idea of joy, cf. chapter II, section  2.1.1.2.3. 
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I will, therefore, discuss this example again in the following section in which 
we turn our attention to the informative aspect of laughter. 
3.2.3. Feigned laughter 
Feigned laughter, undoubtedly, functions as a voluntary mean of 
communication. Through such controlled behaviour one may transmit the false 
message of non-genuine sentiments by assuming a certain facial expression or 
simulating an outburst of laughter. It is a strictly purposeful as well as social 
act, aimed at gaining personal benefits from others.589 
In their welcoming speech to Agamemnon (Ag. 782-98), which we have 
discussed above in the previous section, we may notice the fact that the Chorus 
of Elders makes a clear distinction between expressing genuine and false 
sentiments. Accordingly, people are ready to feign emotions both positive and 
negative, for the Chorus speaks of those who groan with the misfortunate (τῷ 
δυσπραγοῦντι τ᾽ ἐπιστενάχειν, Ag. 798), despite not feeling any grief (δῆγμα 
δὲ λύπης/ οὐδὲν ἐφ᾽ ἧπαρ προσικνεῖται, Ag. 790-91), as well as of those who 
rejoice with the fortunate (ξυγχαίρουσιν ὁμοιοπρεπεῖς, Ag. 792) by ‘using 
force on their laughterless faces’ (ἀγέλαστα πρόσωπα βιαζόμενοι, Ag. 793). 
Here, it remains clear, just as we have mentioned in the previous section, that 
the idea of laughter evoked by the word ἀγέλαστος is connected with an 
emotional experience. However, it is also evident that in the context of 
simulating feelings, in this case joy, the concept of laughter is connected with 
the manifestation of these emotions, as well. The Chorus explains, a little 
further in their speech, the futility of such non-genuine actions (Ag. 795-98): 
Χο.  ὅστις δ’ ἀγαθὸς προβατογνώμων,  
οὐκ ἔστι λαθεῖν ὄμματα φωτὸς 
τὰ δοκοῦντ’ εὔφρονος ἐκ διανοίας 
ὑδαρεῖ σαίνειν φιλότητι. 
Chorus: But whoever is a good judge of his flock 
                                               
589 Cf. chapter I, section 1.3.5.5. 
 147 
 
  will certainly not be fooled by a man’s eyes 
  whose gaze, pretending to come from a loyal disposition, 
  is fawning on him with watery affection. 
In this passage, we may observe that the Elders explicitly point to the reasons 
governing those who feign emotions, and, consequently, simulate appropriate 
non-verbal behaviours, amongst other laughter; this is to pretend a ‘cheery 
spirit’, or as Sommerstein renders it, ‘a loyal disposition’ (εὔφρονος ἐκ 
διανοίας, Ag. 797). The Chorus is aware that the king’s decision to set off on a 
punitive expedition against Troy in response to the abduction of his brother’s 
wife, Helen, gained criticism amongst the citizens of Argos. Earlier in the play, 
the Chorus mentions the public hostility towards Agamemnon for having the 
Argive men perish in Troy in pursuit of a woman (Ag. 432-60): 
Χο.   πολλὰ γοῦν θιγγάνει πρὸς ἧπαρ·    
οὓς μὲν γάρ <τις> ἔπεμψεν  
οἶδεν, ἀντὶ δὲ φωτῶν  
τεύχη καὶ σποδὸς εἰς ἑκάσ- 
του δόμους ἀφικνεῖται.  
ὁ χρυσαμοιβὸς δ' Ἄρης σωμάτων 
καὶ ταλαντοῦχος ἐν μάχᾳ δορὸς  
πυρωθὲν ἐξ Ἰλίου  
φίλοισι πέμπει βαρὺ  
ψῆγμα δυσδάκρυτον, ἀν- 
τήνορος σποδοῦ γεμί- 
ζων λέβητας εὐθέτους. 
στένουσι δ' εὖ λέγοντες ἄν- 
δρα τὸν μὲν ὡς μάχας ἴδρις,  
τὸν δ' ἐν φοναῖς καλῶς πεσόντ'  
 ˝ἀλλοτρίας διαὶ γυναι- 
κoς”· τάδε σῖγά τις βαΰ- 
ζει, φθονερὸν δ' ὑπ' ἄλγος ἕρ- 
πει προδίκοις Ἀτρείδαις.  
οἱ δ' αὐτοῦ περὶ τεῖχος  
θήκας Ἰλιάδος γᾶς  
εὔμορφοι κατέχουσιν, ἐχ- 
θρὰ δ' ἔχοντας ἔκρυψεν.  
βαρεῖα δ' ἀστῶν φάτις σὺν κότῳ·  
δημοκράντου δ' ἀρᾶς τίνει χρέος·  
μένει δ' ἀκοῦσαί τί μοι    
μέριμνα νυκτηρεφές. 
Chorus: There is much, at any rate, that strikes deep into the soul; 
  one knows the men sent off, 
  but instead of human beings 
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  urns and ashes arrive back 
  at each man’s home. 
  Ares, the moneychanger of bodies, 
  holding his scales in the battle of spears, 
  sends back from Ilium to their dear ones 
  heavy dust that has been through fire, 
  to be sadly wept over, 
  filling easily-stowed urns 
  with ash given in exchange for men. 
  And they lament, and praise this man 
  as one expert in battle, 
  that man as having fallen nobly amid the slaughter –  
  “because of someone else’s wife”. 
  That is what they are snarling, under their breath; 
  and grief steals over them, mixed with resentment 
  against the chief prosecutors, the Atreidae. 
  And over there, around the city wall, 
  the men in their beauty occupy 
  sepulchers in the land of Ilium: 
  the enemy’s soil covers its conquerors. 
The talk of the citizens, mixed with anger, is a dangerous 
thing: 
  it is the equivalent of a publicly ordained curse: 
  I have an anxiety that waits to hear 
  of something happening under cover of night. 
The loss of loved ones at the Trojan war elicited negative emotions within the 
citizens towards Agamemnon and Menelaos (Ag. 451), such as grief (ἄλγος, Ag. 
450), resentment (φθονερὸν, Ag. 450), but also anger (κότος, Ag. 456). Since the 
people of Argos are visibly disaffected with their king, although for now they 
express their discontent only verbally through snarling in secret (σῖγά τις 
βαΰζει, Ag. 449-50) or just talking with one another (βαρεῖα δ' ἀστῶν φάτις, 
Ag. 456), however, the Chorus fears the possibility of their anger assuming a 
more physical form.590 It becomes apparent that in their welcoming speech 782-
809, the Elders attempt to warn Agamemnon against the hostility of some 
citizens, who will not openly manifest their true disposition towards their ruler. 
One of the modes of concealing these negative feelings is by assuming a false 
                                               
590 Cf. Sommerstein (2008b) 54 n. 99: ‘A veiled reference to the possibility of a coup d’état and/or 
an assassination attempt against one or both of the Atreidae’. 
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image of rejoicing with cheer at the return of their king.591 It is this ‘cheer’ which 
the Chorus regards as laughter, or, precisely, points to its lack. It becomes then 
apparent that ἀγέλαστος in line 793 refers also to the idea of laughter as 
simulated non-verbal communication.592 
The idea of feigned laughter may also be suggested by Aeschylus in the 
kommos (Ch. 306-478) of the Libation Bearers. After many years living apart, the 
siblings Electra and Orestes have finally reunited. Together with the Chorus of 
captive women, they lament upon their father’s ignoble death and pray to his 
spirit for vengeance. As Electra enlists the misfortunes she has suffered, at one 
point she recalls the day of the king’s funeral (Ch. 444(5)-449): 
Ηλ. λέγεις πατρῷον μόρον· ἐγὼ δ᾽ ἀπεστάτουν  
ἄτιμος, οὐδὲν ἀξία,  
μυχῷ δ᾽ ἄφειρκτος πολυσινοῦς κυνὸς δίκαν  
ἑτοιμότερα γέλωτος ἀνέφερον λίβη,  
χέουσα πολύδακρυν γόον κεκρυμμένα. 
Electra: You speak of our father’s death. I was not there- 
I was dishonoured, treated as worthless; 
shut up in the bowels of the house, like a dangerous dog, 
I brought up drops that flowed more readily than laughter, 
pouring out a lament full of tears, though hidden from view. 
Electra was not allowed to mourn her father in public, for she was locked up in 
the palace. Only in seclusion, according to line 448, did she have the 
opportunity to give vent to her tears ‘more readily than laughter’ (ἑτοιμότερα 
γέλωτος). Although the antithesis of tears with laughter is a universal trait, the 
interpretation of this line raises certain problems. First of all, we must bear in 
mind the fact that the word ἑτοιμότερα, ‘more ready for’, is the comparative 
female form of the adjective ἑτοῖμος ‘ready, prepared for’, and as such regards 
                                               
591 Thus, in their translations of ἀγέλαστος many scholars favour the word ‘smile’, in order to 
regard the communicative role of the facial display, cf. Smyth (1926): 67: ‘…in seeming 
sympathy they join in others’ joy, forcing their faces to smile’; Lattimore (2013a) 30: ‘And in joy 
likewise they show joy’s semblance, and torture the face to the false smile’; Sommerstein (2008b) 
91: ‘…they put on an appearance of sharing joy forcing their unsmiling faces into a grin’ (my 
emphasis). 
592 Arnould (1990) 140. 
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Electra being more ready to shed tears than laughter. However, this reference 
occurs in the most pathetic part of a tragedy, namely, the dirge (kommos), in 
which there are no explicit references to events associated with laughter or 
people rejoicing to which Electra could be referring to. Due to this, the word 
γέλως remains open for interpretation, which is noticeable in the various 
understandings of the term provided by translators and scholars. For instance, 
the translations of the early twentieth century connect γέλως with the idea of 
Electra acknowledging her miserable, i.e. not apt for laughter position.593 
Another approach regards the reference to laughter as a comparatio compendaria, 
according to which the heroin in general compares her burst of tears to a burst 
of laughter.594 Finally, a third interpretation of γέλως is based on the idea of 
Electra being forced to publicly accept and rejoice at her mother’s new 
relationship with Aegisthus. This idea is reflected in the commentaries by Rose 
(1958) and Garvie (1986), in which the former considers Clytaemestra as the 
source of stress on her daughter,595 whereas the latter suggests that Electra, 
generally, acknowledges the fact that there where ‘others who did laugh’.596 In 
these views, the word ‘laughter’ bears the understanding that Electra was more 
ready for tears than to publicly share the joy of her mother’s new nuptials. Such 
interpretation of line 448 would shed light on the reasons for Electra’s seclusion 
and not being granted permission to attend her father’s funeral, as it would 
imply that she was either incapable of accepting Clytaemestra’s liason or, what 
seems more plausible, had no intention to assume a false appearance in order to 
                                               
593 Through γέλως translators regard Electra’s: 1) loss of happiness, e.g. Morshead (1901) 102: 
‘in place of my laughter rose sobbing and tears’; 2) state of sorrow, e.g. Murray (1923) 36: ‘I 
laughed not, yet rejoiced that none saw me weep’; or 3) recognition of the situation apt for 
tears, e.g. Smyth (1926) 203: ‘I gave full vent to my streaming tears – that came more readily 
than laughter’. Today, a similar understanding is found in Moreau (2000) 401, who considers 
γέλως to be a sentimental reference to past moments for laughter (‘la nostalgie du rire’). 
594 Cf. Burian and Shapiro (2003) 123: ‘crying great streams of grief as readily as someone else 
might laugh’. 
595 Rose (1958) 161. 
596 Garvie (1986) 166 n. 447-9.  
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please one she considers to be a ‘cruel, shameless mother’ (ἰὼ ἰὼ δαΐα 
πάντολμε μᾶτερ, Ch. 429-30).597 With such interpretation, the word γέλως in 
Ch. 448 may refer to feigned laughter. 
3.2.4. Positive communication 
In the Eumenides, Aeschylus connects the imagery of communicative 
laughter with the alluring power of blood. Orestes has taken revenge on his 
father’s murderers and comes to Athens to stand trial for his deed. Just after 
reaching the temple of Athena Polias on the Acropolis (Eu. 235-43), he is 
followed by the chorus of Furies (Ἐρινύες). As guardians of the primal law of 
vengeance, the Erinyes are compelled to chase and terrorize the young prince 
because of spilling kindred blood, as they say: ‘a mother’s blood is drawing me 
on: I shall pursue this man to punish him – I shall hunt him down!’ (ἐγὼ δ', 
ἄγει γὰρ αἷμα μητρῷον, δίκας / μέτειμι τόνδε φῶτα κἀκκυνηγέσω, Eu. 230-
1). Like a pack of hunting dogs following the blood trail of an injured prey, the 
chorus manages to track Orestes down by picking up ‘a clear sign of the man’ 
(τἀνδρὸς ἐκφανὲς τέκμαρ, Eu. 244), i.e. the trail of blood left behind him. We 
may, however, observe that this trail, albeit of a sensory kind, pertains more to 
the Furies’ sense of smell than sight, for once they move closer to Orestes, they 
exclaim (Eu. 253-4): 
Χο.  καὶ νῦν ὅδ' ἐνθάδ' ἐστί που καταπτακών΄ 
ὀσμὴ βροτείων αἱμάτων με προσγελᾷ. 
Chorus:  And now that the man is here somewhere, cowering down: 
the scent of human blood is greeting me. 
                                               
597 From her outraged cries in the kommos, it is evident that Electra holds resentments against 
her mother for the killing of her father as well as his ignominous burial unfit for a king (‘it was 
a cruel funeral / when you had the hardihood to bury your husband, / a king, without the 
presence of his city’s people, / without mourning and with no lamentation!’ δαΐαις ἐν ἐκφοραῖς 
/ ἄνευ πολιτᾶν ἄνακτ', / ἄνευ δὲ πενθημάτων / ἔτλας ἀνοίμωκτον ἄνδρα θάψαι, Ch. 430-33), 
but also for her own mistreatment: being forbidden to attend her father’s burial (‘I was 
dishonoured, treated as worthless’, ἄτιμος, οὐδὲν ἀξία, Ch. 445) and being treated as a slave (‘I 
am no better than a slave’, κἀγὼ μὲν ἀντίδουλος, Ch. 135). For the connection of Electra’s tears 
with the feeling of dishonour, see Arnould (1990) 53. 
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The chorus, literally, sniffs the matricide out by following the smell of 
Clytaemestra’s blood whiffing off her son. In fact, this scent plays an active role 
in helping the Furies pursue their victim; it is, in their own words, a ‘voiceless 
informant’ (μηνυτῆρος ἀφθέγκτου, Eu. 245) leading the avengers of perjury to 
the perpetrator’s hideout. In the end, as the Erynies approach their prey, this 
smell (ὀσμὴ) of human bloodshed (βροτείων αἱμάτων) comes out to welcome 
(προσγελᾷ) them. The odour of blood, therefore, does not only appeal to the 
chorus, but practically allures them.  
In order to describe the communicative power of kindred blood spilt in 
murder, Aeschylus applies the word προσγελάω. As we have seen in chapter 
II, the addition of the prefix προσ- to γελάω emphasizes the informative aspect 
of laughter, hence its literal meaning ‘laugh in the direction of’. As mentioned 
before, this lexeme basically refers to the expressive act of signaling one’s 
feelings.598 For this reason many scholars favour rendering the word ‘smile’.599 
In similar vein translators of the Eumenides, who in the discussed passage, refer 
to the scent of blood as ‘smiling’.600 However, according to Halliwell’s 
argumentation (2008), it is generally impossible to literally choose between the 
ideas of laughter/smiles as the only meaning of προσγελάω.601 The same 
applies to its occurrence in Eu. 254. Nevertheless, we may discern the 
communicative aspect within the semantics of προσγελάω which enables the 
                                               
598 Cf. chapter II, section 2.1.1.6. 
599 Cf. LSJ s.v. προσγελάω 1: ‘smile at one’. In classical literature e.g. Ar. Pax 596-600: ‘And so 
the vines /  and the young fig trees / and all the other plants together / will receive you with 
joyful smiles (προσγελάσεται)’, translation in Henderson (1998b) 503; Eur. Med. 1162: ‘smiling 
(προσγελῶσα) at her own phantom image there’, translation in Way (1894) 111; Eur. Med. 1041: 
‘why smile (προσγελᾶτε) to me the latest smile of all?’, translation in Way (1894) 106. Both 
Euripidean examples are discussed in chapter V.  On the ideas of laughter and smiling within 
semantics of the γελ- root, see chapter II, section 2.1.1.2.2. 
600 Collard (2002) 92: ‘the scent of human blood smiles its greeting to me’; Podlecki (1989) 151 n. 
253: ‘the smell of human blood smiles’. In contrast, Smyth (1926) 297: ‘the smell of human blood 
makes me laugh for joy’, who seems incapable of imagining such a horrific object as blood or its 
odour in terms of a ‘laughing’ agent. Hogan (1984) 158 n. 253 correctly observes that the Greek 
in this line is ‘bolder’ than the English translation of Smyth. 
601 Halliwell (2008) 524. 
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figurative meaning of ‘greet, welcome’. What is more, by combining the idea of 
laughter as a message of amiability with that of odorous bloodshed, Aeschylus 
creates a macabre image of human blood ‘smiling in welcome’ or ‘inviting 
delightfully’ non amiable forces.602 The verb προσγελάω, then, refers to the 
intangible communication between the whiffing evidence of kindred bloodshed 
and the pursuing archaic powers of vengeance. It is also another example of the 
scant but stirring imagery of laughter within Aeschylean drama.  
3.2.5. Mockery 
Mockery connects the idea of laughter with contemptuous speech and 
behaviour. It is an interpersonal phenomenon, because it always concerns at 
least two people. The aim of derision is for its agent to express non friendly 
emotions towards another in a hurtful way and take pleasure in this act. 
Mocking or scornful laughter has at the same time a communicative as well as 
social role, for it informs the target of the agent’s non amicable feelings, such as 
disregard, disrespect, contempt or even hostility. The social role of scornful 
laughter is that it disrupts any positive relations between the people involved, 
or preserves the already broken relations.603 
In the extant tragedies, we may observe that the characters are aware of 
this disrespectful aspect of laughter and fear it. A noticeable example is found 
in the Libation Bearers, in the recognition scene of Electra and Orestes. Sent to 
pour offerings at her father’s grave, the princess finds there a lock of hair which 
resembles her own (Ch. 168). She is aware that this hair can only belong to her 
brother, who lives in a land far away from Argos (Ch. 177). She speaks of this 
with the chorus that Orestes might have sent his hair to pay respects to their 
                                               
602 Sommerstein (1989) 127 n. 253: ‘to the Erinyes the scent of human blood is as delightful as the 
face of a friend’. Podlecki (1989) 151 n. 253: ‘a bold, chilling image… its horror lies precisely in 
the repulsiveness of the object which is said to “smile in welcome” to the Erinyes’. A similar 
horrific image will be discussed on the example of Eur. Tr. 1176-7 in chapter V, section 5.2.12. 
603 Cf. chapter I, section 1.3.5.4. 
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deceased father (Ch. 179), yet then she discovers footprints around the grave 
(Ch. 205). Astonished that the prints fit the seize of her own feet (Ch. 206), she 
follows them until she meets a young man unknown to her. Orestes, hidden 
nearby the grave, overheard Electra’s hopes about her brother’s return. Now, 
face to face with his sister, her reveals to her his identity (Ch. 217-23):  
Ορ.  σύνοιδ' Ὀρέστην πολλά σ' ἐκπαγλουμένην. 
Ηλ.  καὶ πρὸς τί δῆτα τυγχάνω κατευγμάτων; 
Ορ.  ὅδ' εἰμί· μὴ μάτευ' ἐμοῦ μᾶλλον φίλον. 
Ηλ.  ἀλλ' ἦ δόλον τιν', ὦ ξέν', ἀμφί μοι πλέκεις; 
Ορ.  αὐτὸς κατ' αὐτοῦ τἄρα μηχανορραφῶ. 
Ηλ.   ἀλλ' ἐν κακοῖσι τοῖς ἐμοῖς γελᾶν θέλεις; 
Ορ.   κἀν τοῖς ἐμοῖς ἄρ᾽, εἴπερ ἔν γε τοῖσι σοῖς. 
Orestes: I’m aware that you were very much extolling Orestes. 
Electra: And in what way, may I ask, have I gained what I prayed 
for? 
Orestes:  I am he. Don’t try to find one that’s more your friend than I 
am. 
Electra:  Look here, sir, are you trying to weave some web of trickery 
around me? 
Orestes: If I am, then I must be hatching plots against myself! 
Electra:  What, will you laugh at my sufferings? 
Orestes:  If I’m laughing at yours, then I’m also laughing at my 
own.604 
This dialogue, mainly based on the disbelieving sister questioning the brother, 
is presented in stichomythia, a technique of dramatic verse serving to increase 
tension and gradually lead to the characters’ recognition.605 Although Orestes 
reveals to Electra that he is her brother with the blatant ‘I am he’ (ὅδ' εἰμί, Ch. 
219) she, at first, does not receive the news well. In fact, she accuses him of 
being a stranger (ὦ ξέν', Ch. 220) who laughs at her amidst her misfortunes (ἐν 
κακοῖσι τοῖς ἐμοῖς γελᾶν θέλεις, Ch. 222).606 Here, we may recognize that the 
expression γελᾶν θέλεις, literally meaning ‘you wish to laugh at’, refers to 
Electra’s disbelief in unexpectedly meeting her brother. With this expression, 
the princess apprehends Orestes’ response as a possible act of ridiculing her. 
                                               
604 English translation in Sommerstein (2008b) 241. 
605 Rutherford (2012) 170. 
606 Garvie (1986) 100 n. 222 notices that ‘in the midst of my misfortunes’ is a common expression 
in tragedy. 
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Noticeably, in her reserve towards the encountered stranger, Electra shows her 
fear of meeting a person negatively disposed to her, who would take pleasure 
in making her hope for her brother’s return in vain. Her anxiety, therefore, is 
for being mocked.607 In this passage, then, the meaning of γελᾶν θέλεις ‘you 
wish to laugh at’ regards the idea of laughter as mockery, i.e. a disdainful 
behaviour, one that is set to hurt another by showing the laugher’s non-friendly 
disposition. 
Curiously, in his edition of the play, Sommerstein adds a stage note in 
this passage suggesting the fact that Orestes is ‘laughing’ as he says line 221.608 
In this respect, the brother’s laughter would be in reaction to Electra’s 
accusation of pulling a trick (δόλος) on her (Ch. 220). With such interpretation, 
Electra’s line 222 would be referring not only to the incredulity of Orestes’ 
words, but also to his vocal burst of laughter. Such stage direction is an 
interesting addition, although possible, however, it is not necessary in 
explaining the meaning behind γελᾶν θέλεις in line 222. Whether the actor 
playing Orestes would, indeed, laugh or not, it remains clear that Electra’s 
mention of laughter regards her perception of dealing with the mockery of a 
possible imposter with hostile intentions. 
An unfriendly disposition may be expressed by one person to another, 
be it a mortal or a god. In the Eumenides, Aeschylus presents the chilling image 
of a god laughing with superior delight at the misfortunes of a perpetrator. 
Orestes stands trial for matricide. Whilst Athena has gone to establish a jury of 
the best Athenian citizens to hear his case, the chorus of Erinyes sing of their 
role in maintaining the divine laws of vengeance (Eu. 489-565). Accordingly, the 
Furies speak of the a mortal man’s obligation to ‘respect the altar of Justice’ 
(βωμὸν αἴδεσαι δίκας, Eu. 539) if a one seeks prosperity in his life (οὐκ 
                                               
607 Similar fear expressed by the Sophoclean Electra in Soph. El. 880. 
608 Sommerstein (2008b) 241. In contrast, Smyth (1926) 183, Murray (1923) 26, Lloyd Jones (1979) 
143. 
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ἄνολβος ἔσται, Eu. 551) and wishes to avoid total ruin (πανώλεθρος δ' οὔποτ' 
ἂν γένοιτο, Eu. 552). Such life devoid of misery is possible only when, apart 
from honouring the gods, one obeys two other ordained laws: honour thy 
parents (τοκέων σέβας εὖ προτίων, Eu. 545), and honour thy guests 
(ξενοτίμους / ἐπιστροφὰς δωμάτων / αἰδόμενός, Eu. 546-8). The chorus, then, 
through the metaphor of a sailor whose ship has gone off course, describes the 
miserable fate of a perpetrator of these laws (Eu. 558-65). 
Χο.   καλεῖ δ' ἀκούοντας οὐδὲν ἐν μέσᾳ 
δυσπαλεῖ τε δίνᾳ·  
γελᾷ δὲ δαίμων ἐπ᾽ ἀνδρὶ θερμῷ,  
τὸν οὔποτ᾽ αὐχοῦντ᾽ ἰδὼν ἀμαχάνοις  
δύαις λαπαδνὸν οὐδ᾽ ὑπερθέοντ᾽ ἄκραν: 
δι' αἰῶνος δὲ τὸν πρὶν ὄλβον  
ἕρματι προσβαλὼν δίκας  
ὤλετ' ἄκλαυστος, ᾆστος.  
Chorus:  In the middle of the eddies, unable to fight his way out, 
he calls, but they [i.e. the gods] pay no heed; 
the deity laughs at the headstrong man, 
seeing him powerless, the one who boasted it could never 
happen, 
helpless distress, as he fails to surmount the crest of the 
wave: 
he has wrecked the ship of his former lifelong prosperity  
on the reef of Justice 
and perishes unwept, unseen. 
Aeschylus depicts the chilling image of an unspecified divinity laughing (γελᾷ 
δὲ δαίμων) with malicious delight at the pleading of a man who thought he can 
avoid punishment for transgressing divine laws.609 What increases the 
horrifying effect of this image is the fact that this undefined deity, justly and 
without remorse, laughs at the destruction of the perpetrator. Without any sign 
of mercy, for ordained justice requires punishment, the vengeful god takes 
pleasure in seeing the ruin of the violator of law. Thus, the god’s laughter 
signifies his/her justified negative disposition and, particularly, his/her 
Schadenfreude.  
                                               
609 Podlecki (1989) 174 n. 560. 
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Olympian gods are also presented as scornful and vengeful forces. In the 
Agamemnon, Apollo is depicted not only as the patron of the prophetess 
Cassandra, but also as her destroyer. Taken captive by Agamemnon after the 
war, the Trojan princess accompanies her new master to Argos. Upon arrival, 
once the king and queen enter the palace, Cassandra speaks in prophetic frenzy 
of her future doom (Ag. 1256-60; 1264-76): 
Κα. παπαῖ, οἷον τὸ πῦρ· ἐπέρχεται δέ μοι.  
ὀτοτοῖ, Λύκει' Ἄπολλον, οἲ ἐγὼ ἐγώ.  
αὕτη δίπους λέαινα συγκοιμωμένη  
λύκῳ, λέοντος εὐγενοῦς ἀπουσίᾳ,  
κτενεῖ με τὴν τάλαιναν·  
(…) 
τί δῆτ᾽ ἐμαυτῆς καταγέλωτ᾽ ἔχω τάδε,  
καὶ σκῆπτρα καὶ μαντεία περὶ δέρῃ στέφη;  
σὲ μὲν πρὸ μοίρας τῆς ἐμῆς διαφθερῶ· 
ἴτ' ἐς φθόρον· πεσόντα γ' ὧδ' ἀμείβομαι.  
ἄλλην τιν' Ἄτην ἀντ' ἐμοῦ πλουτίζετε.  
ἰδοὺ δ᾽ Ἀπόλλων αὐτὸς οὑκδύων ἐμὲ  
χρηστηρίαν ἐσθῆτ᾽. ἐποπτεύσας δέ με  
κἀν τοῖσδε κόσμοις καταγελωμένην μέγα  
φίλων ὑπ᾽ ἐχθρῶν οὐ διχορρόπως, μάτην 
<      > 
κακουμένη δέ, φοιτὰς ὡς ἀγύρτρια,   
πτωχὸς τάλαινα λιμοθνὴς ἠνεσχόμην·  
καὶ νῦν ὁ μάντις μάντιν ἐκπράξας ἐμὲ  
ἀπήγαγ' ἐς τοιάσδε θανασίμους τύχας610  
Cassandra:  Papai! How the fire comes upon me! Ototoi! Apollo the 
Wolf-god! Ah me, ah me, <the pain!> [Pointing wildly again] 
This is the two footed-lioness, sleeping with a wolf while the 
noble lion was away, who will kill me, wretched that I am: 
(…) 
Why, then, have I got this gear on to mock me, and this 
staff, and the prophetic bands about my neck? I’ll destroy 
you before meeting my own fate! [She breaks her staff and 
throws the pieces to the ground.] Go to perdition [throwing off 
her neck-bands] – now you’re on the ground, this is how I get 
my own back on you [trampling on them]! Makes some other 
woman rich with ruin, instead of me! [As she tears of her robe] 
Look, it is Apollo himself who is stripping me of my 
prophetic garb. He looked on when I, wearing all these 
accoutrements, was being roundly and unanimously 
mocked by friends who acted like enemies <while I 
prophesied the truth> in vain, <and he did nothing to help 
                                               
610 Greek text in Sommerstein (2008b) 152-4. 
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me>; I endured having to wander like an itinerant begging 
priestess, a wretched, starving pauper. And now he, the 
Seer, has collected his debt from me, the seer, by hauling me 
off to this deadly fate; 
 
The central point of this speech is the malignant influence of Apollo on 
Cassandra’s life.611 The god had fallen in love with the beautiful Trojan princess 
and, in exchange for the promise of marriage, bestowed upon her the gift of 
prophecy (‘the seer Apollo assigned me to this function’, μάντις μ' Ἀπόλλων 
τῷδ' ἐπέστησεν τέλει, Ag. 1202). Cassandra, however, was not willing to 
submit her body to the god, hence rejected his seductive advances (‘I consented, 
and then I cheated Loxias’, ξυναινέσασα Λοξίαν ἐψευσάμην. Ag. 1208). In 
revenge for such deception, Apollo cursed the girl so that no one would believe 
her prophecies (‘After I had done him this wrong, I could never make anyone 
believe anything I said’, ἔπειθον οὐδέν' οὐδέν, ὡς τάδ' ἤμπλακον, Ag. 1212). 
From this point on, Cassandra’s life was deeply affected by Apollo’s curse: 
although she became his priestess, her surroundings gave no credence to her 
words considering her to be mad.612 As we hear in her speech in lines 1258-60, 
Cassandra expresses her knowledge about her awaiting doom. She, then, 
blames her vengeful patron, Apollo, for leading her to this dreadful fate, as 
punishment for her misconduct: ‘And now he, the Seer, has collected his debt 
from me, the seer, by hauling me off to this deadly fate’ (καὶ νῦν ὁ μάντις 
μάντιν ἐκπράξας ἐμὲ /ἀπήγαγ' ἐς τοιάσδε θανασίμους τύχας, Ag. 1275-6). 
In the passage quoted above, Cassandra makes two references to 
laughter: the expression καταγέλωτα ἔχω (Ag. 1264), literally meaning ‘I 
receive, accept mockery’, and the participle καταγελωμένην (Ag. 1271), 
meaning ‘laughed down, mocked’. 
The first laughter-word appears in line 1264, in which the princess 
speaks of her accoutrements as dispensing κατάγελως ‘mockery’ onto her. 
                                               
611 For a detailed analysis of the so-called Cassandra scene in Ag. 1072-1330, see  Chodkowski 
(1985) 233-67. 
612 On Cassandra and prophetic madness, see Feder (1980) 84-90. 
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Here, she is referring to the prophetic regalia she is wearing: a staff (σκῆπτρα), 
woolen ribbons hanging around her neck (μαντεία περὶ δέρῃ στέφη) and 
prophetic robe (χρηστηρίαν ἐσθῆτ᾽). These garments indicate her office as a 
prophetess, but also stand an ambiguous symbol of her dedication to Apollo as 
well as the god’s curse sent upon her. In face of upcoming death, the Trojan 
princess has no longer reasons to fear Apollo’s wrath, thus tears off the 
prophetic insignia, which to her have become a symbol of the god’s mockery.613 
Significant is the fact that as punishment for his rejection, Apollo did not 
unstow the gift of prophecy from Cassandra, but modified it in such a way that 
it became a burden.614 The garments, then, embody Apollo’s derisive vengeance 
of the deceitful princess.  
Curiously, despite her office as a priestess, Cassandra was also laughed 
at by her friends and family whose mocking disposition was influenced by the 
insulted god. Apollo, then, only watched as the princess experienced ridicule 
and humiliation in Troy. The laughter of her fellowmen, therefore, was also a 
part of Cassandra’s punishment.  
In the discussed passage, therefore, we may recognize that both 
references to laughter concern the idea of mockery: the expression καταγέλωτα 
ἔχω (Ag. 1264), considers indirectly Cassandra’s vengeful pursuer, Apollo, 
whereas the word καταγελωμένην (Ag. 1271) relates to the hostile reaction of 
the princess’ Trojan fellowmen towards her.  
A final example of laughter connected with mockery in the extant plays 
of Aeschylus can be found in the Eumenides. Orestes has been freed by the 
Athenian court from the accusation of matricide. The Erinyes are furious with 
this sentence and take it as a dishonor to their ordained role as persecutors of 
                                               
613 Denniston and Page (1957) 185 n. 1264ff. ‘Since she is to die, and Apollo has long ago turned 
against her, she has nothing more to fear from man or god, and there is nothing to deter her 
from wreaking such feeble vengeance on Apollo as she may be destroying the symbols of his 
worship.’ 
614 Schein (1982) 12 
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mortal guilt. Despite Athena’s efforts to calm them down, the chorus twice 
expresses its outrage (Eu. 789-92 and repeated verbatim in 819-22) 
Χο.   γελῶμαι· δύσοιστ' ἐν  
πολίταις ἔπαθον· 
ἰὼ μεγάλατοὶ κόραι δυστυχεῖς  
Νυκτὸς ἀτιμοπενθεῖς. 
Chorus:  I am laughed at; what I suffer 
from the citizens is hard to bear. 
Oh, your ruin is great, 
you ill-fated daughters of Night 
grieving for your dishonour!615 
Here, the horrific deities of vengeance, the Erinyes themselves, become the 
object of laughter. The Furies hold the gods, Athena and Apollo, as well as the 
Athenians responsible for their situation: losing the case, losing the rights to the 
perpetrator Orestes, and most importantly, losing their honour. The chorus is 
extremely protective of its τιμή ‘honour’, which may be understood also as 
‘worship’ as well as ‘office’.616 Here, the chorus equates the adjective ἄτιμος 
‘dishonoured’ (Eu. 780; 810) with the passive γελῶμαι ‘I am laughed at’ (Eu. 
789; 819). Again the image of laughter is a social one for it is associated with the 
idea of disrespect and personal disgrace from others.617 This aspect is 
underlined by the social setting of the scene – the Erinyes are surrounded by 
the Athenian judges, representatives of the state and Athena herself.618 The 
outraged Erinyes fall into their retaliatory mood and swear to send misfortune 
onto Athens for their dishonor (Eu. 780-87; 810-17). However, Athena manages 
to persuade them not to do that by ascribing new roles to them, as benevolent 
goddesses. Their new office will be preventing mortals from transgressing 
ancient laws of piety, hospitality and honoring one’s parents (Eu. 903-15). At 
                                               
615 English translation in Collard (2002) 106-7. 
616 Cf. LSJ s.v. τιμή. 
617 Cf. the translation of γελῶμαι  in Sommerstein (2008b) 455: ‘I am a laughing-stock”. 
618 Chodkowski (1975) 95. Orestes leaves the scene at Eu. 778, during the chorus’ cry of outrage. 
Likewise Apollo, although the text does not indicate the exact moment of his exit. In his edition 
of the play, Sommerstein (2008b) 451 n. 157 places this moment at Eu. 754. 
 161 
 
first reluctant, the Furies agree to change their functions and become, hence, 
known as the Eumenides. 
 
From the examples above it becomes apparent that references to laughter 
in Aeschylus may regard the idea of mockery. Interestingly, both mortals and 
gods are capable of laughing in derision, however, we have seen that the gods 
are justified for such action – they laugh at perpetrators and transgressors of 
divine laws. In the extant plays, we find examples of men laughing at men 
(Orestes at Electra, friends at Cassandra), and gods laughing at men (a god at a 
perjurer, Apollo at Cassandra), but not men laughing at gods. Such action 
would only bring suffering onto man, for it would be a transgression. The 
social role of laughter is presented to remind the audience that one must 
maintain respectful relations with the divine, or else he/she will experience the 
gods’ wrath. The message emerging from these few occurrences of mockery is 
clear: honour thy gods, or else, apart from punishment, you will earn their 
malicious, yet justified, laughter. 
3.2.6. Triumph 
Triumphant laughter may be connected with the feeling of glee over 
one’s achievements, a fortunate turn of events, but most commonly with the 
defeat of an enemy.619 The main difference between a laugh of triumph and a 
laugh of simple delight lies in the fact that the former explicitly regards 
interpersonal relations, whereas the latter needs not. Since the killing of 
Agamemnon antagonized Clytaemestra with her children, some scholars view 
the nurse’s remark about the queen’s γέλως (Ch. 738) in terms of a ‘gloating 
laugh of triumph’.620 In order to accept such an interpretation of laughter for 
                                               
619 Cf. chapter I, section 1.3.5.3. 
620 Burian and Shapiro (2003) 134; Arnould (1990) 40: ‘rire de triomphe’; similarly, Moreau 
(2000) 402: ‘le sourire du méchant triomphant’, here γέλως interpreted as ‘smile’.  
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this example, we must specify the quality of the relations between Clytaemestra 
and her offspring. 
Agamemnon’s children reveal a highly negative disposition towards 
their mother. In particular, such attitude is discernible already from the 
beginning of the play. In the first episode, Electra’s prayer at her father’s tomb 
reflects the general reasons for her animosity with Clytaemestra (Ch. 132-144):  
Ηλ.  πεπραμένοι γὰρ νῦν γέ πως ἀλώμεθα  
πρὸς τῆς τεκούσης, ἄνδρα δ' ἀντηλλάξατο  
Αἴγισθον, ὅσπερ σοῦ φόνου μεταίτιος.  
κἀγὼ μὲν ἀντίδουλος, ἐκ δὲ χρημάτων  
φεύγων Ὀρέστης ἐστίν, οἱ δ' ὑπερκόπως  
ἐν τοῖσι σοῖς πόνοισι χλίουσιν μέγα.  
ἐλθεῖν δ' Ὀρέστην δεῦρο σὺν τύχῃ τινὶ  
κατεύχομαί σοι, καὶ σὺ κλῦθί μου, πάτερ·  
αὐτῇ τέ μοι δὸς σωφρονεστέραν πολὺ  
μητρὸς γενέσθαι χεῖρά τ' εὐσεβεστέραν.  
ἡμῖν μὲν εὐχὰς τάσδε, τοῖς δ' ἐναντίοις  
λέγω φανῆναι σοῦ, πάτερ, τιμάορον,  
καὶ τοὺς κτανόντας ἀντικατθανεῖν δίκῃ. 
Electra: For at present we are [i.e. Electra and Orestes] virtually 
vagrants, sold by our mother, who has received in exchange 
a new man – Aegisthus, the same who shared the guilt of 
your murder. I am in the position of a slave, Orestes is in 
exile, deprived of his property, and they are greatly and 
extravagantly luxuriating in the wealth for which you 
toiled. I pray to you – and do hear me, father – for Orestes to 
come here by some stroke of fortune; and for myself, grant 
that I may be far more virtuous than my mother, and more 
righteous in action. These prayers for us. Upon our enemies 
I ask for there to appear an avenger for you, and for the 
killers to meet justice and perish in their turn. 
As we can see, Electra refers to her mother in the most unfavourable 
terms; the queen is depicted as a shameless murderess and lustful woman 
(‘[She] has received in exchange a new man – Aegisthus, the same who shared 
the guilt of your murder’, ἄνδρα δ' ἀντηλλάξατο / Αἴγισθον, ὅσπερ σοῦ 
φόνου μεταίτιος, Ch. 133-34), an illegitimate ruler (‘they are greatly and 
extravagantly luxuriating the wealth for which you [i.e. Agamemnon] toiled’, οἱ 
δ' ὑπερκόπως / ἐν τοῖσι σοῖς πόνοισι χλίουσιν μέγα, Ch. 136-37), and a 
 163 
 
considerably cruel parent (‘we are virtually vagrants, sold by our mother’, 
πεπραμένοι γὰρ νῦν γέ πως ἀλώμεθα, Ch. 132-33; ‘I am in the position of a 
slave, Orestes is in exile’, κἀγὼ μὲν ἀντίδουλος, ἐκ δὲ χρημάτων / φεύγων 
Ὀρέστης ἐστίν, Ch. 135-35). The princess ends her prayer by asking for 
Clytaemestra and her accomplice to be ‘justly slain in turn’ (ἀντικατθανεῖν 
δίκῃ, Ch. 144). Without any doubt, Electra holds a grudge against her mother 
for the killing of her father as well as for her own and Orestes’ mistreatment. In 
fact, she considers Clytaemestra to be an explicit ‘enemy’ of hers,621 what she 
later straightforwardly tells Orestes: ‘for her I hate, with every justification’ (ἡ 
δὲ πανδίκως ἐχθαίρεται, Ch. 241).622 Throughout the play Electra speaks only 
ill of her mother and plots against her. It is, hence, obvious that the princess’ 
sentiments towards her mother are far from filial love. 
Not surprisingly, Orestes shares his sister’s hostility towards 
Clytaemestra. His reason for returning to Argos is to take revenge on 
Agamemnon’s murderers, which means killing his own mother, as he says in 
Ch. 435-37: 
Ορ.  πατρὸς δ' ἀτίμωσιν ἆρα τείσει 
ἕκατι μὲν δαιμόνων,  
ἕκατι δ' ἀμᾶν χερῶν. 
Orestes: Well, she shall pay for degrading my father 
with the help of the gods 
and with the help of my hands. 
Orestes will maintain his stance even after having slayed Clytaemestra and 
Aegisthus; upon the corpses of his mother and her lover, the young prince will 
stress the fact of the hostility which has risen between the queen and her 
children ‘who were once her friends but are now, as they have shown, her 
deadly enemies’ (φίλον τέως, νῦν δ' ἐχθρόν, ὡς φαίνει, δάκος, Ch. 993). It 
                                               
621 After finding on Agamemnon’s grave a lock of hair resembling her own (Ch. 168), Electra 
deliberates upon its only two possible sources: her mother or brother. Interestingly, she makes a 
clear distinction between whom she considers to be her ‘enemy’ (ἐχθρός, Ch. 198), i.e. 
Clytaemnestra, and whom her ‘kin’ (ξυγγενὴς, Ch. 199), i.e. Orestes. 
622 Original emphasis. Literal meaning: ‘she is justly detested’. 
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becomes, then, evident that Electra and Orestes share the hostility towards their 
mother. 
 In relation to the queen’s disposition towards her children, the siblings 
are convinced that their antagonism is reciprocal. Orestes explicitly speaks of 
this just after revealing his true identity to his sister: ‘I know that our closest kin 
are bitterly hostile to us both’ (τοὺς φιλτάτους γὰρ οἶδα νῷν ὄντας πικρούς, 
Ch. 234). Also the Chorus of elderly women, who accompany Electra and 
Orestes during their reunion, reflect the same negative opinion about the 
queen’s animosity with her kin and support the siblings in their plans for her 
killing.623 However, in the Libation Bearers we have more opportunities to hear 
about Clytaemestra from other characters than to witness her words and 
actions onstage. As a dramatis persona, Aeschylus has the queen to appear for 
the first time only midway through the play when she meets her son disguised 
as a merchant (Ch. 668-718). Apart from this short scene, we only see her next 
when her son is about to kill her (Ch. 885-930). Therefore, the only opportunity 
to observe Clytaemestra’s character occurs during her two encounters with 
Orestes. 
In the third episode, on hearing the news about her son’s death (albeit 
false), the queen raises a lament (Ch. 691-699): 
Κλ.  οἲ 'γώ, κατ' ἄκρας εἶπας ὡς πορθούμεθα.  
ὦ δυσπάλαιστε τῶνδε δωμάτων Ἀρά,  
ὡς πόλλ' ἐπωπᾷς κἀκποδὼν εὖ κείμενα,  
τόξοις πρόσωθεν εὐσκόποις χειρουμένη.  
φίλων ἀποψιλοῖς με τὴν παναθλίαν. 
καὶ νῦν – Ὀρέστης ἦν γὰρ εὐβούλως ἔχων,  
ἔξω κομίζων ὀλεθρίου πηλοῦ πόδα –  
νῦν δ' ἥπερ ἐν δόμοισι † βακχίας καλῆς  
ἰατρὸς ἐλπὶς ἦν, παροῦσαν ἐγγράφει. 
                                               
623 The Chorus also refers to the queen in terms of an ‘enemy’, cf. Ch. 123: τὸν ἐχθρὸν 
ἀνταμείβεσθαι κακοῖς, ‘to return your enemy evil for evil’; and Ch. 173: ἐχθροὶ γὰρ οἷς 
προσῆκε πενθῆσαι τριχί, ‘those who ought to have mourned him with hair-offerings are his 
enemies’. Cf. Sommerstein (2008b) 233 n. 35: ‘Despite the plural, the description fits no one but 
Clytaemestra’. 
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Clytaemestra:  Ah me, we are completely, utterly ruined! Curse of this 
house, so hard to wrestle free of, how much you keep your 
eye on, even when it’s placed well out of the way! Scoring 
hits at long range with well-aimed arrows, you strip me, 
wretched me, of my loved ones! And now Orestes – he was 
showing wisdom in keeping his feet clear of the deadly 
mire; but now, the hope there was in the house of a cure for 
your evil revelry – write it down as having betrayed us! 
With such a spontaneous reaction to the sad news, we may be of the impression 
that Clytaemestra’s response seems contradictive to her negative image as a 
parent presented earlier in the play by other characters, i.e. Electra and Orestes 
who described her as a ‘mother, who has an impious spirit towards her 
children that belies the name of mother’(μήτηρ, οὐδαμῶς ἐπώνυμον / 
φρόνημα παισὶ δύσθεον πεπαμένη, Ch. 190-91). In fact, her lament seems 
typical of a parent shocked to find out about the passing of her child.624 In this 
respect, the scene of Clytaemestra’s first encounter with Orestes does not give 
decisive evidence for the queen’s animosity towards her children, at least in 
regard of her son Orestes. 
However, Cilissa’s remarks in Ch. 668-718 about Clytaemestra’s feigned 
sorrow and concealed inner ‘laughter’ shatter the ambivalent impression the 
queen might have made in her first appearance (Ch. 668-718). In his 1994 study, 
Chodkowski points to the important role the nurse’s description plays in the 
audiences reception of the queen’s character.625 In particular, any sympathy 
Clytaemestra could have evoked with her lament is lost through Cilissa’s astute 
observations about the queen’s clandestine response to the news (Ch. 737-41). 
The most striking image is that of Clytaemestra’s γέλως, i.e. inward laughter 
(Ch. 738) at the news of her son’s death. As discussed in the previous section, it 
is the queen’s eyes that function as a non-verbal leakage, i.e. they give away her 
                                               
624 Garvie (1986) on vv. 691-99: ‘There is… not a word in the speech that need be taken as 
anything other than the sincere and natural reaction of a mother who has lost her son’. 
625 Chodkowski (1994) 230: ‘Wspomniana uwaga prostej kobiety o niegodziwej radości królowej 
ma na celu eliminację jakiejkolwiek sympatii widza dla tej, którą Orestes ma zabić jako swą 
matkę’. Cf. Rosenmeyer (1982) 218: ‘She [i.e. Cilissa] helps us immunize against 
Clytaemnestra’s terror’. 
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true sentiments. Clytaemestra, therefore, is but a vicious murderess laughing at 
the fact to get away with her crime.626 Indeed, little sympathy, if not none, 
becomes a heartless mother pictured as laughing over the death of her son. 
Aeschylus reinforces the queen’s negative image by juxtaposing the 
information of her feigned maternal grief with the nurse’s expression of 
genuine sorrow (Ch. 743-63): 
Τρ.     ὦ τάλαιν' ἐγώ·  
ὥς μοι τὰ μὲν παλαιὰ συγκεκραμένα  
ἄλγη δύσοιστα τοῖσδ' ἐν Ἀτρέως δόμοις  
τυχόντ' ἐμὴν ἤλγυνεν ἐν στέρνοις φρένα,  
ἀλλ' οὔτι πω τοιόνδε πῆμ' ἀνεσχόμην.  
τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα τλημόνως ἤντλουν κακά·  
φίλον δ' Ὀρέστην, τῆς ἐμῆς ψυχῆς τριβήν,  
ὃν ἐξέθρεψα μητρόθεν δεδεγμένη  
καὶ νυκτιπλάγκτων ὀρθίων κελευμάτων 
<     > 
καὶ πολλὰ καὶ μοχθήρ' ἀνωφέλητ' ἐμοὶ  
τλάσῃ – τὸ μὴ φρονοῦν γὰρ ὡσπερεὶ βοτὸν  
τρέφειν ἀνάγκη, πῶς γὰρ οὔ; τρόπῳ φρενός·   
οὐ γάρ τι φωνεῖ παῖς ἔτ' ὢν ἐν σπαργάνοις,  
εἰ λιμός, ἢ δίψη τις, ἢ λιψουρία  
ἔχει· νέα δὲ νηδὺς αὐτάρκης τέκνων.  
τούτων πρόμαντις οὖσα, πολλὰ δ', οἴομαι,  
ψευσθεῖσα, παιδὸς σπαργάνων φαιδρύντρια –  
κναφεὺς τροφεύς τε ταὐτὸν εἰχέτην τέλος.  
ἐγὼ διπλᾶς δὲ τάσδε χειρωναξίας  
ἔχουσ' Ὀρέστην ἐξεδεξάμην πατρί·  
τεθνηκότος δὲ νῦν τάλαινα πεύθομαι.  
Cilissa:  O wretched me! For I found the old griefs that have 
happened in this house of Atreus hard enough to bear, all 
mixed together as they were, and they pained my heart 
within my breast; but I have never yet had to endure a 
sorrow like this. Under the other troubles I patiently bore 
up. But dear Orestes, who wore away my life with toil, 
whom I reared after receiving him straight from his 
mother’s womb! <Over and Over again I heard> his shrill, 
imperative cries, which forced me to wander around at 
night <and perform> many disagreeable tasks which I had 
to endure and which did me no good. A child without 
intelligence must needs be reared like an animal – how 
could it be otherwise? – by the intelligence of his nurse; 
when he’s still an infant in swaddling clothes he can’t speak 
at all if he’s in the grip of hunger or thirst, say, or of an urge 
                                               
626 Hogan (1984) 133 n. 737.  
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to make water – and the immature bowel of small children 
is its own master. I had to divine these things in advance, 
and often, I fancy, I was mistaken, and as cleaner of the 
baby’s wrappings - well, a launderer and a career were 
holding the same post. Practising both these two crafts, I 
reared up Orestes for his father; and now, to my misery, I 
learn that he is dead! 
In comparison to Clytaemestra’s lament in Ch. 691-699, Cilissa’s sadness 
seems more sincere. Her reminiscence of the past toils she had to endure while 
nursing the baby prince, albeit meticulous in certain details, which some 
scholars find pertaining to the comic (especially the reference to nappies and 
urination)627, is far more personal, than the queen’s complaints about Orestes 
being another victim of a curse sent upon the House of Atreus (Ch. 692-94).628 
With this juxtaposition of feigned and genuine maternal grief, Aeschylus makes 
a first direct reference to the queen’s animosity with her son. 
Any remaining doubts regarding Clytaemestra’s negative disposition 
towards Orestes are completely dispelled in her second appearance within the 
play which also happens to be her final encounter with her son in Ch. 892-931. 
As the queen recognizes that Agamemnon’s heir has come to avenge his father, 
the first thing she does is seek a weapon for self-defense: ‘Someone give me, 
right away, an axe that can kill a man! (δοίη τις ἀνδροκμῆτα πέλεκυν ὡς 
τάχος, Ch. 889). Confronted with Orestes but unskilled with weaponry, she 
attempts to emotionally manipulate her son by the gesture of baring one breast 
(Ch. 896-98): 
Κλ.  ἐπίσχες, ὦ παῖ, τόνδε δ' αἴδεσαι, τέκνον,  
μαστόν, πρὸς ᾧ σὺ πολλὰ δὴ βρίζων ἅμα  
οὔλοισιν ἐξήμελξας εὐτραφὲς γάλα.  
                                               
627 Cf. Jouanna (1998) 168-69; Burnett (1998) 111 considers Cillissa an ‘almost carnivalesque 
figure… who is a fresh surprise each time one turns to this play’; Moreau (2000) 404 stresses the 
incongruity between the nurse’s low style of language and the tragic milieu (‘Le spectateur 
sourit, bien sûr, du décalage entre les occupations triviales de la nourrice et l’atmosphère 
tragique’); Goldhill (2006) 89: ‘It might be suggested that this combination of words that we 
might not expect to see except in comedy, delivered by a less elevated character, is a scene, 
therefore, of comic potential’. 
628 Bennett Anderson (1932) 306; Sommerstein (1996) 267. 
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Clytaemestra:  Stop, my son, and have respect, my child, for this breast, at 
which you many times drowsed while sucking nourishing 
milk with your gums! 
Although the gesture makes the prince hesitate for a moment, however, in the 
end, it does not stop him from fulfilling his plan. The queen then tries to use 
persuasion by giving arguments for her past crime, but in vain.629 Finally, when 
she realizes her end is near, Clytaemestra threatens Orestes with the Furies, 
goddesses of vengeance, who will haunt him for matricide: ‘Take care! Beware 
your mother’s wrathful hounds!’ (ὅρα, φύλαξαι μητρὸς ἐγκότους κύνας, Ch. 
924). On the basis of the queen’s behaviour towards her son based on 1) 
physical self-defense, 2) manipulation, 3) mediation and finally 4) posing 
threats, it is evident that Clytaemestra does not treat Orestes with maternal 
love. On the contrary, her actions are typical of a person attacked by an 
aggressor. The hostility between mother and son is most visible in 
Clytaemestra’s statement expressed just after demanding an axe: ‘Let us find 
out whether we’re to be the winners or the losers’ (εἰδῶμεν εἰ νικῶμεν, ἢ 
νικώμεθα, Ch. 890). In the end, it is Orestes, Agamemnon’s avenger who wins 
the fight over the House of Atreus, as the prince refers to his act of matricide as 
a ‘victory’ (νίκη, Ch. 1017). 
 It becomes, thus, clear that, from the beginning of the play, reciprocal 
antagonism forms the basis of the rapport between Clytaemestra and her 
children. In this respect, apart from ‘delight’, the queen’s γέλως, i.e. inner 
laughter mentioned by the nurse in Ch. 738, may also be interpreted as a ‘laugh 
of triumph’, namely, of a person believing to have been freed of a dreaded 
enemy.  
 
                                               
629 The manipulation is obvious when we bear in mind Cilissa’s remark about caring for 
Orestes, whom she ‘reared after receiving him straight from his mother’s womb’ (ὃν ἐξέθρεψα 
μητρόθεν δεδεγμένη , Ch. 750). In this respect, Clytaemestra had little to do with her son’s 
nursing. 
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3.2.7. Idea of brightness 
A typically Greek understanding of laughter connects the phenomenon with 
the concept of shinning. As discussed in chapter II, many Greek laughter-words 
contain this idea within their semantics, especially γελ- rooted terms.630  
Such reference to laughter in relation to brightness is traceable in the 
tragedy Prometheus Bound. By Zeus’ command, Prometheus is to be punished 
for stealing fire from the gods and supporting the race of mortal men. After 
being chained to a mountain in the Caucasus, the Titan begins his speech with 
an invocation to the elements (Pr. 88-92): 
Πρ. ὦ δῖος αἰθὴρ καὶ ταχύπτεροι πνοαί,  
ποταμῶν τε πηγαί, ποντίων τε κυμάτων  
ἀνήριθμον γέλασμα, παμμῆτόρ τε γῆ,  
καὶ τὸν πανόπτην κύκλον ἡλίου καλῶ.  
ἴδεσθέ μ᾽ οἷα πρὸς θεῶν πάσχω θεός. 
Prometheus:  Bright sky, springs of the rivers, swift-winged winds, 
numberless laughter of the sea’s waves, Earth, 
mother of all, and all-seeing circle of the sun: 
I call upon you all to see what I, 
a god, suffer at the hands of gods.631 
 
In this passage, Prometheus calls upon the sky (αἰθὴρ), the winds (πνοαί), the 
rivers (ποταμοί), the sea (πόντια κύματα), the earth (γῆ) and the sun (ἥλιος) to 
witness his torture.632 Whilst summoning the sea, the Titan speaks of its waves’ 
‘numberless laughter’ (ἀνήριθμον γέλασμα, Pr. 89). Here, Aeschylus connects 
the image of a typically human phenomenon with that of the actions of a 
natural element, in this case, the sea. What is of our interest is the fact that the 
reference to laughter occurs in relation to a non-human subject. 
The connection of nature with laughter is well attested in Greek 
literature of the archaic and classical period. In regard of the sea, Theognis 
                                               
630 Cf. chapter II, section 2.1.1.2.6. 
631 English translation in Grene (2013) 73. 
632 For other similar apostrophes in Greek tragedy to inanimate or non-human witnesses of a 
hero’s suffering, see Griffith (1983) 101-102 n. 88-92. On the Eastern convention of calling upon 
gods or cosmic elements as witnesses, see West (1997) 20-21, 580. 
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describes it as ‘rejoicing’ along with ‘laughing’ as he presents nature’s reaction 
to the birth of Apollo.633 Moreover, the image of the sea explicitly laughing is 
found in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter. Here, along with the earth and sky, the 
sea ‘laughs’ at the appearance of the sweetly scented narcissus.634 In drama, we 
find another reference to a ‘laughing’ sea in fr. 336 of a tragedy of unknown 
authorship, according to which ‘the calm sea laughs in its ripples’.635 On the 
basis of the examples above, we may recognize that ancient Greek poetry had a 
well-established tradition of projecting human behaviours onto natural 
elements, with the sea, in particular. 636  
It is, therefore, apparent that by having the title character speak of the 
sea waves’ ‘countless laughter’ in the quoted passage, Aeschylus follows this 
poetic tradition of regarding nature in a metaphorical manner.637 In view of the 
fact that the γελ- root has a strong connection with the concepts of brightness,638 
the figurative sense of γέλασμα, chiefly, alludes to the visual aspect of 
                                               
633 Thgn. 8-10: ἐγέλασσε δὲ γαῖα πελώρη, γήθησεν δὲ βαθὺς πόντος ἁλὸς πολιῆς, ‘the huge 
Earth laughed, and the deep waters of the hoary brine rejoiced’; translation in Edmonds (1954) 
231. Cf. Zalewska-Jura (2003) 68. For the debate on the disputable authenticity of v. 1-18 of the 
Corpus Theognidum, see Bartol (2005) 341. 
634 Hom. Hymn. 2. 13-14: πᾶς τ᾽ οὐρανὸς εὐρὺς ὕπερθεν γαῖά τε πᾶσ᾽ἐγελάσσε καὶ ἁλμυρὸν 
οἶδμα θαλάσσης, ‘the whole vast heaven and the whole earth laughed, and the salty swell of 
the sea’; translation in Foley (1994) 2. 
635 Adesp. trag. 336 N: ἀκύματος δὲ πορθμὸς ἐν φρίκῃ γελᾷ (my translation).  
636 Cf. Poll.6.200: παρὰ τοῖς ποιηταῖς (Aischyl Prom 89) τὸ τῆς θαλάττης γέλασμα, ‘in poetry, 
(Aes. Pr. 89) the laughter of the sea’. Same motive in Roman literature, e.g. Lucretius 1.8: ‘tibi 
rident aequora ponti’; Catullus 64. 269-74: ‘quae tarde primum clementi flamine pulsae / 
procedunt leviterque sonant plangore cachinni’, ‘The breakers are sluggish at first in the gentle 
breeze / and splash on the beach with the sound of quiet laughter’, translation in Mulroy (2002) 
67. Noticeable examples in English literature: Milton, Paradise Lost, 4. 165: ‘Cheer’d with the 
grateful smell old ocean smiles’; Moore, Light in the Haram: 158-70: ‘for she brighten’d all over – 
/like any fair lake that the breeze is upon, / when it breaks into dimples and laughs in the sun’; 
Byron, Giaour 12-15: There mildly dimpling Ocean’s cheek /Reflects the tints of many a peak, 
/Caught by the laughing tides that lave /Those Edens of the eastern wave.’ Modern Greek 
poetry also maintains this tradition, cf. Y. Kotzioulas, Love of Nature: “Under the haze of 
Nature’s mantle/I see the land laugh:/Oh, could I but rise, at such a time/Ever upwards with the 
smoke”, cited in Merry (2004) 287. 
637 In contrast, Castoriadis (2007) 24, who by hypallage ascribes ἀνήριθμον ‘countless’ to 
κυμάτων ‘waves’ and not to γέλασμα ‘laughter’. Cf, the scholiast’s interpretation of the 
laughter-word as a substitution for χῦμα, ‘flow’ in Sch. Aes. Pr. 90a (ed. Herington). 
638 See chapter II, section 2.1.1.1 for etymological evidence. 
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Prometheus’ perception of the sea, i.e. the innumerous reflections of light on the 
sea’s surface. Although we may not exclude the evocation of other concepts 
through this lexeme, for instance, the idea of sound, however, scholars agree 
upon the predominance of the visual element in the semantics of γέλασμα.639 
Noticeably, such is the main understanding of this laughter-word reflected in 
the many English translations of this Aeschylean tragedy.640 In the Prometheus 
Bound, then, γέλασμα reflects the distinctly Greek perception of laughter’s 
relation to the phenomenon of shining.  
What is of importance in this example is the fact that the poet, again, 
employs the image of laughter for metaphorical purposes. As Gilbert Norwood 
notices in his 1920 study Greek Tragedy, ‘metaphor is the natural speech’ of 
Aeschylus, with which he creates in his dramas a picturesque style of 
language.641 The word γέλασμα, then, with its figurative sense, enriches the 
picturesqueness of the Prometheus Bound. 
 
In the first part of this chapter, I have discussed the interpretations of 
laughter-words employed by Aeschylus in the preserved tragedies. What has 
emerged from my examination is the fact that the poet evokes various concepts 
of laughter, despite a small number of its references. On the basis of our 
analysis above, we may distinguish four main ideas of the discussed 
phenomenon. Three of these refer to the universal understandings of laughter 
                                               
639 For γέλασμα perceived as exclusively visual, see Mather (1883) 71 n. 89-92: ‘laughter always 
implies sound as well as sight, which makes it inappropriate here’; Griffith (1983) 102 n. 90: 
γέλασμα: the twinkling of the sunlight on the surface’; Rackham (2013) 47 n. 90: ‘γέλασμα 
betokens the flashing of ripples in the sun… not their plashing on the beach’. 
640 The idea of shining is common, although translators render γέλασμα differently: 1) 
‘laughter’, e.g. Smyth (1952) 225: ‘multitudinous laughter of the waves of ocean’; Scully and 
Herington (1989) 33-34: ‘you the waves the immense laughter easing the sea’; 2) ‘smile’: 
Podlecki (2005) 81: ‘countless smiles on the billowing sea’; Conacher (1980) 34-35: ‘many-
twinkling smiles of ocean waves’; 3) ‘twinkle’: Sommerstein (2008a) 455: ‘countless twinkling 
waves of the sea’. For modern problems in translating the expression ποντίων τε κυμάτων  
ἀνήριθμον γέλασμα (although in the French language), see Mund-Dopchie (1984). 
641 Norwood (1920) 121-4, who considers picturesqueness as one of the three characteristics of 
Aeschylean drama, along with grandeur and simplicity. 
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in terms of 1) expression of emotions, 2) mean of communication, and 3) act of 
derision. Considering the sphere of sentiments, we find images of laughter 
related to the experience of triumphant delight. Interestingly, Aeschylus also 
mentions laughter in association with a feeling of joy or a state of happiness, 
however through negation. In regard of communication, the references to the 
phenomenon include sending a positive message in the form of a greeting as 
well as a feigned message of amiability. Next, the concept of mockery is clearly 
discernible in those instances in which the characters recognize themselves to 
be the object of others’ laughter and, hence, fear it or resent it. Finally, the last 
general concept of the discussed phenomenon appears in connection with 4) 
the idea of brightness. It is, therefore, apparent that, in his tragedies, Aeschylus 
is fully aware of the complexity of the phenomenon of laughter. 
3.3. Laughter in the fragments 
Aeschylus is assumed to have composed approximately 70 tragedies and 
15 satyr plays.642 Apart from the extant 7 tragedies, we are in the possession of 
around 400 fragments of lost plays. Out of these fragments only 6 contain 
discernible laughter-words. These lexemes are enlisted in table 10 below.643 
Fragment Lexeme Form in text Grammar 
fr. 290  ἀγέλαστος ἀγέλαστος (φρὴν) Nom. sg. (m) 
fr. 47a  γελάω γελᾷ  Ind. pr. act. 3rd sg.  
fr. 281a  γελάω κἀγέλα  Imp. pr. act. 2nd sg. 
fr. 47a  γελοῖος τὰ γελ[οῖ]α Acc. pl. (n) 
fr. 180  γελοτοποιός γελωτοποιόν (βέλος) Acc. sg. (n) 
fr. 455  γέλως γέλως (σαρδόνιος) Nom. sg. (m) 
Table 11. List of Greek laughter-words in the fragments of Aeschylus. 
                                               
642 Information from ancient sources remains inconclusive, however scholars tend to accept this 
number, e.g. Chodkowski (1993) 24. In general, the Vita Aeschyli (13) ascribes 70 tragedies and 5 
satyr plays, Suda declares 90 dramas in whole, whereas the incomplete catalogue of Aeschylean 
works in the oldest manuscript Mediceus (M) seu Laurentianus enlists 73 (or 72) titles. For the 
debate on the number of dramas, see Steffen (1958) 21, Lesky (2006) 74, Zalewska-Jura (2006) 50. 
643 The fragments of Aeschylus are numbered according to the edition of Radt in TrGF III. 
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Four of these references to laughter are found in attributed fragments, i.e. fr. 
180 fr.281a and twice in fr. 47a; whereas the sources of the other two, namely fr. 
290 and fr. 455 remain unknown. Moreover, fr. 290 has been preserved only in 
the form of two-word expressions: φρὴν ἀγέλαστος ‘laughterless mind’, 
whereas fr. 455 with the reference to σαρδόνιος γέλως ‘Sardonic laughter’ is 
generally considered to be non-authentic. Noticeably, the other four fragments 
occur in a larger context which enables a broader discussion. For this reason, I 
have divided this section into three parts: firstly, I will examine the fragments 
with a preserved context; secondly, I will analyze the fragment preserved as an 
expression; and finally, I will shortly discuss the single spurious fragment. 
3.3.1. Fragments with context 
From the six instances of laughter-words in Aeschylean fragments, four 
occur within larger passages. I will discuss these references to laughter in 
relation to such general concepts: 1) signal of amiability, 2) amusement, 3) 
derision, and 4) Schadenfreude. 
3.3.1.1. Signal of amiability 
A reference to laughter as a mean of communication is found in fr. 47a 
attributed to the satyr-drama Net-Haulers (Δικτυουλκοί). Although only seven 
fragments of this play have survived, scholars, however, have been able to 
reconstruct its general plot.644 Set on the island of Seriphos, the drama narrates 
the story of the rescue of Danaë and her baby by the satyrs. The Argive princess 
and her son had been cast into the sea in a wooden chest by her father Acrisius. 
In fr. 46a, we hear of two characters spotting the chest at sea and seeking help 
                                               
644 Cf. Podlecki (2005) 9-11. 
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to haul it on shore.645 Next, in fr. 46c, we find out that these characters are in 
need of further assistance to pull the object in, thus, call upon the locals for 
help. Instead of the island farmers, the chorus of satyrs appears along with 
Silenus.646 The next fragment 47a, the longest surviving of the play, contains the 
dialogue between Danaë and the smitten Silenus, who woos her and tries to 
convince her to stay with him. The fragment ends with the chorus of satyrs 
singing about the pleasures of the life of a satyr and rejoicing at the union of 
Silenus and the princess. Scholars suggest that the play must have resolved in 
Danaë being rescued by Dictys, the brother of the island’s ruler, Polydectes, 
from her forthcoming ‘marriage’ to the Father of the satyrs.647 
The explicit reference to laughter appears in this longest fragment 47a of 
the Net-Haulers. Silenus expresses his interest in the beautiful Danaë and wants 
to become her official supporter as well as protector (πρόξενόν… καὶ 
προπράκτορα, fr. 47 a 768-769). In order to convince the princess, he points to 
her son’s visibly favourable disposition towards him (fr. 47a 770-771):  
Σι.   ]. ε μαῖαν ὡς γερασμίαν 
].. ἠπίοις προσφθέγμασιν  
Silenus:  [And look, the baby is greeting me fondly] as if I were his 
honoured nurse, [and address]ing me with tender sounds.648 
Despite the fragmentary state of the verses, scholars, generally, perceive 
the baby’s reaction to the Father of the satyrs as positive. For instance, Denys L. 
Page proposes reconstructing the missing predicate in line 771 referring to the 
                                               
645 Scholars disagree in indicating these two characters, e.g. two fishermen (piscatores) in Steffen 
(1935) 11; Dictys and Silenus in Lloyd-Jones (1957) 532; a fisherman and Dictys in Sommerstein 
(2008c) 44-47.  
646 Argued by Zalewska-Jura (2006) 51, who points at the similarities with Soph. Ich. 39-44 
Lloyd-Jones. Here, the chorus of satyrs response to Apollo’s summon for help in finding his 
stolen cattle, although the god referred to local men. 
647 Cf. Sommerstein (1996) 332;  
648 Translation in Sommerstein (2008c) 49. Hereon, all Greek texts and English translations 
regarding Aeschylean fragments come from Sommerstein (2008c). 
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infant’s action with σαίνει meaning ‘greets’.649 According to Silenus, Perseus 
treats him as if he were a familiar ‘old woman who takes care of him’ (μαῖαν 
γερασμίαν), and, hence, makes towards him ‘tender sounds’ (literally ‘childish 
salutations’, ἠπίοις προσφθέγμασιν). This idea is repeated a little further by 
Silenus in line 786, in which he recognizes these sounds to be the baby’s 
laughter sent in his direction (fr. 47a 786-88): 
Σι.   ἰδο]ύ, γελᾷ̣ μου̣ π̣ρ̣οσορῶν   
   ].. ὁ μικκὸς λιπαρὸν  
τὸ μ]ι̣λτ̣[ό]πρεπ̣τ̣ον̣ φαλακρ̣ὸν  
Silenus:  [Loo]k, [this] little one is laughing 
As he looks at my sleek 
Smooth dome, picked out in red… 
Here, the image of laughter is clearly evoked as the papyrus preserves the form 
γελᾷ ‘he laughs’. The baby Perseus is said to be laughing (ὁ μικκὸς… γελᾷ) 
while he is looking at Silenus’ bald head (προσορῶν… φαλακρὸν). In this 
example, we may notice that the chief concept behind the word γελᾷ is the 
baby’s positive disposition signaled to and recognized by Silenus as a 
greeting.650 This idea remains the same even in those translations of line 786 
which render the laughter-word ‘smile’651. Moreover, by evoking the concept of 
laughter as a signal of amicability, Aeschylus creates a comic effect by 
juxtaposing Perseus’ positive reaction to Danaë’s suitor to that of his mother. In 
particular, Silenus’ two remarks about the infant’s friendliness towards him 
enclose the princess’ negative reaction to the proposition of marriage. In her 
monologue (lines 773-785), Danaë appeals to the gods to save her from a life of 
slavery among the satyrs (‘a captive’ αἰχμάλωτος, v. 777), regarded as ‘beasts’ 
(κνωδάλοις, v. 775) who will only mistreat her (‘I will be disgraced’ 
                                               
649 Page (1950) ad. loc.: [καὶ μὴν ὁ παῖς] γε μαῖαν ὡς γερασμίαν [σαίνει προσαυδ]ῶν ἠπίοις 
προσφθέγμασιν. For other conjectures of lines 770-771, see Werre-de Haas (1961) 40-41. 
650 Arnould (1990) 86: ‘un accueil aimable’ (‘a friendly greeting’). 
651 E.g. Lloyd-Jones (1957) 539: ‘Look, the little one is smiling sweetly as he looks on this shining 
raddled bald plate’. Although the complex semantics of γελάω enable different interpretations, 
(see chapter II, section 2.1.1.2), nevertheless, in view of Silenus’ remark about the baby’s 
emission of sounds in lines 770-771, the interpretation of ‘laugh’ in line 786 seems more likely. 
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λυμανθήσομαι, v. 776). For a moment, she even considers committing suicide 
(‘I will hang myself’ ἀγχόνην ἄρ' ἅψομαι, v. 778) to avoid a fate worse than 
death. In the end, Danaë’s quasi-pathetic rhesis appears to be for nothing since 
Silenus does not respond to her words. In fact, throughout his speech in lines 
786-801, although poorly preserved by the papyrus, we may clearly distinguish 
the fact that the Father of satyrs takes no more notice of the princess, but only 
focuses on his future stepson.652 Silenus, then, takes Perseus’ laughter to be a 
positive sign in his advances towards Danaë for in lines 786-832 he seems to 
treat the matter of marriage as settled. As we can see, a baby’s laughter may 
communicate a message contrary to its mother’s wishes. 
At this point, it ought to be stressed that in fr. 47a Aeschylus invokes the 
image of a laughing baby only for humorous purposes. In order to create such 
effect, the poet, basically, employs verbal humour in lines 786-788 when Silenus 
describes the direct object the baby is laughing at, namely his ‘shinning, bright-
red bald head’ (λιπαρὸν τὸ μιλτόπρεπτον φαλακρὸν). In his 1987 article 
entitled ‘Silenus erectus: Euripides Cyclops 227’, Seaford points to the linguistic 
similarities between the terms φαλακρόν ‘bald head’ and φαλλόν ‘phallus’, 
proposing that the former may function as a pun on φαλλόν ἄκρον ‘erected 
penis’.653 Such double entendre coming from Silenus corresponds with the satyrs’ 
two distinct features: 1) brazen sexuality, and 2) phallic appearance. In a satyr 
drama, the sexual nature of Silenus and the satyr-chorus was reflected in their 
bawdy speech and obscene actions, but also in their costumes which included 
furry shorts, a mask, a tail and, most noticeably, a phallus.654 In this respect, we 
may observe that the humour of lines 786-788 is produced by little Perseus 
                                               
652 It is also possible that Silenus again mentions the baby laughing (or smiling) at him in the 
fragmentary verse 792 restored as [προ]σγελᾷς μοι ‘you smile to me’, see  Sommerstein (2008c) 
51, who considers this restoration plausible. 
653 Seaford (1987) 143. Similar pun in fr. 171 of a Sophoclean satyr play, cf. chapter IV, section 
4.3.1. 
654 On the satyr-costume, see Kocur (2001) 227-229. 
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taking notice of Silenus’ visible membrum virile.655 Moreover, since we have 
discussed that the baby’s laughter functions as a friendly greeting, then the 
comicality of the passage is increased by depicting the infant as showing its 
positive disposition not towards Silenus but towards his φαλακρόν. In result, 
the child’s laughter signals its interest as well as friendliness to the character’s 
phallus, and it is of this fondness that the Father of satyrs speaks a little further 
in line 795, when he refers to the baby as ‘the penis-loving child’ (π̣οσθοφιλὴς 
ὁ νεοσσὸς). It becomes, then, apparent, that the comicality of this passage is 
based on a baby’s laughter being the expression of its liking in such a sexual 
object.  
We have to keep in mind the fact that in a classical dramatic performance 
no actor played the role of a baby. On the contrary, scholars argue that props 
were used to represent corpses, detached body parts, and also infants.656 
Therefore, the character of baby Perseus would have been represented by an 
object, a sack or other sort of model. In this regard, Silenus’s remarks about the 
actions of little Perseus occur as necessary not only in creating the comic effect 
but maintaining the illusion of the play, as well. Therefore, in this satyr drama, 
the image of a baby laughing at a character’s membrum virile is evoked only to 
entertain and amuse the audience of the play. As it, then, appears innocent 
laughter in a sexual context also belongs to the rich imagery of Aeschylean 
drama.  
3.3.1.2. Amusement 
Another laughter-word appearing in association with positive emotions 
is traceable in the same fragment 47a of the Net-Haulers. After proposing to 
Danaë, Silenus and the satyrs play with her child. In lines 805-820, from the 
                                               
655 According to Shaw (2014) 74-75, Aeschylus bases the comicality of the passage by making the 
audience expect a sexual reference by enlisting first the adjectives ‘shiny’ and ‘bright-red’ but 
then using φαλακρόν instead of φαλλόν. See also Zalewska-Jura (2012) 17-18. 
656 Cf. Roisman (2014b) s.v. ‘props’. 
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longest continuous passage preserved by the papyrus (v. 802-83), the chorus657 
sings to little Perseus about the future that awaits him once his mother marries 
Silenus: 
Χο.  δε̣ῦρ' ἐις παῖδας ἴωμεν ὡς τά[χιστα· 
ἵξῃ παιδοτρόφους ἐμά[ς,  
ὦ φίλος, χέρας εὐμενεῖς,  
τέρψῃ δ' ἴκτ̣ισι κα[ὶ] ν̣ε̣βρο̣[ῖς  
ὑστρίχων τ' ὀβρί̣χοι̣σ̣[ι,]    
κοιμάσῃ δ̣ὲ τρίτ̣ος ξὺν  
ματρὶ [καὶ π]ατρὶ τῷδε. 
ὁ πάπα[ς δ]ὲ παρέξει  
τῷ μικκῷ τ̣ὰ γελ[οῖ]α  
καὶ τροφὰς ἀνόσ̣ους, ὅπωσ̣ π[  
ἀλδὼν αὐτὸς ε....[.]...[  
χαλᾷ νεβροφονο[̣υ] π̣οδ[ὸς  
μάρπτων θῆρας ἄν̣ευ δ[    
    θῶσθαι ματρὶ παρέξεις 
    κ]ηδεστ̣ῶν τρόπον οἷσιν  
     ἔ]ν̣τροφος πελατεύσεις. 
Ch.   Come here, let’s join the boys ri[ght away:] 
you’ll come, my dear, to my kindly 
child-rearing hands, 
you’ll take delight in martens, fawns, 
and young porcupines, 
and you’ll make a third in bed 
with your mother [and] your father here. 
And daddy will provide  
his little one with fun 
   and a healthy upbringing, so that [eventually,] after  
growing  
[to full strength,] you can yourself [in the mountains], 
with the hoof of your fawn-slaying foot, 
chase down the wild creatures, and without a s[pear] 
provide fare for your mother to feast on,  
in the same way as do your stepbrothers, 
among whom you will be reared as a dependent.  
It appears that the satyrs have already accepted the baby and its mother into 
their family.658 According to the chorus, the baby’s new ‘dad’ (ὁ πάπας, v. 812) 
will provide his ‘little one’ (ῷ μικκῷ, v. 813) with a proper satyr-education 
                                               
657 I follow the opinion of Sommerstein (2008c) who attributes these lines to the Chorus. Other 
scholars, however, ascribe this song to Silenus, cf. Steffen (1958) 36; Lloyd-Jones (1957) 539. 
658 Cf. Werre-de Haas (1961) 65: ‘Neither Silenus nor the chorus doubt for a moment that their 
plans will be carried out. Perseus belongs to them already, and with him, Danae!’. 
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based on ‘fun’ (τ̣ὰ γελ[οῖ]α659, v. 813) and a ‘healthy life-style’ (τροφὰς 
ἀνόσους, 814). Concerning the laughter-word in line 813, two interpretations 
have emerged. Some scholars, like Lobel, perceive τὰ γελοῖα in relation to 
humour, hence, translate it as ‘jokes’.660 Such interpretation seems to correspond 
with the understandings of the other few instances of this substantive plural 
neuter for γελοῖος preserved in classical drama.661 However, despite their poor 
state, the preserved fragments of the Net-Haulers give no slight indication of a 
self-aware joking Silenus. Therefore, the predominant understanding of τὰ 
γελοῖα, as seen in the translation of Sommerstein adduced above, regards the 
concept of ‘fun’, i.e. those things which please, amuse, excite, hence, evoke 
pleasant emotional experiences which may be expressed in laughter. What is 
more, the two paternal tasks of Silenus explained in lines 812-814, i.e. providing 
fun and a healthy upbringing for his stepson, do not have to indicate two 
independent actions.662 Due to the fact that both direct objects to the predicate 
παρέξει ‘he will provide’ in line 812 are expressed in the plural: τὰ γελοῖα and 
τροφὰς ἀνόσους, it would be possible to classify these apposed independent 
terms as hendiadys. With this figure of speech, the lexeme τὰ γελοῖα would not 
refer to separate amusements a father has to arrange for his child,663 but would 
rather function as a modifier to τροφὰς ἀνόσους. In result, lines 812-814 could 
be interpreted as ‘daddy will provide his little one with an amusing life’. This 
                                               
659 Supplied by Lobel et al. (1941) 11. 
660 Lobel et al. (1941) 13 n. 16: ‘Dad will provide you with jokes’.  
661 In comparison to the many instances of γελοῖος in the singular in classical drama (e.g.), its 
form in the plural neuter is quite rare: cf. Soph. Ich. 370: ‘You should not make silly jokes 
(γελοῖα)’, translation in Lloyd-Jones (1996) 173; for a broader discussion, see chapter IV, section 
4.3.2. Cf. also Ar. Ra. 389-390: ‘And may I utter much that’s funny (γέλοιά), and also much 
that’s serious (σπουδαῖα)’, translation in Henderson (2002) 79; Anaxandr. 10: γελοῖα λέγειν ‘to 
make jokes’.  
662 As suggested in the translation of Lloyd-Jones (1957) 541: ‘And daddy shall give the little one 
his fun. And you shall lead a healthy life’. 
663 Cf. Werre-de Haas (1961) 65: “What exactly this [i.e. τὰ γελοῖα] means is of no consequence. 
It does appear to belong to the task of bringing up the child which the father takes upon 
himself. Mentioned in the same breath with τροφή it strengthens our impression that an 
authentic satyr-education is awaiting Perseus from his “father”.’ 
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interpretation would stand in continuation to the idea expressed in lines 808-
809 of the joys of living among the satyrs (‘you’ll take delight in martens, 
fawns, and young porcupines’, τέρψῃ δ' ἴκτ̣ισι κα[ὶ] ν̣εβ̣ρο[̣ῖς ὑστρίχων τ' 
ὀβρίχ̣οι̣σ̣[ι,], v. 808-809) and would aptly introduce the detailed explanation of 
this ‘life-style filled with fun’ comprising of hunting wild animals, providing 
food for the family and sharing things with each other, for instance, the bed. 
Obviously, the chorus attempts to depict a positive picture of their life-style. In 
this case, and whether we consider the expression of ‘fun’ and ‘a healthy life-
style’ as hendiadys, or not, the lexeme τὰ γελοῖα is used to evoke the idea of 
pleasant experiences that await those who accept the satyric modus vivendi. 
3.3.1.3. Derision 
The idea of laughter in association with mockery appears in fr. 180 
attributed to the play Bone-Gatherers (Ὀστολόγοι). As only two short fragments 
of this play have been transmitted by Atheneus, albeit without additional 
commentary, its classification remains disputable.664 Scholars, generally, concur 
that the play presented the story of the family of the suitors coming to the 
palace of Odysseus to collect their loved-ones’ bodies.665 It is, generally, 
accepted that the two fragments are spoken by Odysseus justifying his actions 
to the enraged families. In fr. 180, the hero describes the mistreatments he had 
suffered from the suitors in his palace, in which he managed to sneak in under 
the guise of a beggar (fr. 180, 1-5): 
Οδ.   ὅδ' ἔστιν, ὅς ποτ' ἀμφ' ἐμοὶ βέλος  
                                               
664 Fr. 179 = Athen. 15. 667c; fr. 180 = Athen. 1.17c. Scholars disagree whether this drama was a 
tragedy of satyr-play. In his Satyrographorum Graecorum Fragmenta, Steffen (1952) included these 
fragments in his appendix for questionable genre. Sutton (1974) 128 regards it a satyr-play, 
similarly Podlecki (2005) 16, though with caution. In contrast Sommerstein (1996) 349-353, who 
considers it to be the third tragedy of the Odyssean tetralogy comprising of  The Ghost-raisers 
(Ψυχαγωγοί), Penelope (Πηνελόπη), The Bone-gatherers (Ὀστόλογοι) and Circe (Κίρκη) as the 
satyr play.  
665 Cf. Od. 24. 413 ff. Sommerstein (2008c) 178 suggests that the urns containing the ashes of the 
killed suitors were displayed on stage. 
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γελωτοποιὸν, τὴν κάκοσμον οὐράνην,  
ἔρριψεν οὐδ' ἥμαρτε· περὶ δ' ἐμῷ κάρᾳ  
πληγεῖσ' ἐναυάγησεν ὀστρακουμένη  
χωρὶς μυρηρῶν τευχέων πνέουσ' ἐμοί  
Odysseus: This is the man who once threw in my direction an object  
designed to make me a laughing-stock, the evil-smelling  
chamber-pot, and he did not miss his aim; it struck me on  
the head and smashed into fragments, wafting over me an  
odour very unlike that of perfume-jars. 
Clearly, Odysseus complains about having become the victim of a suitor’s 
assault. Accordingly, this aggressor (the fragment does not specify his identity) 
threw a chamber-pot (τὴν οὐράνην) at the beggar-Odysseus, which hit him on 
the head and spilled excrements all over him.666 Here, we may observe how 
Aeschylus refers to the well-known motif of the indignities inflicted upon the 
hero by his wife’s suitors at his own house. For instance, in the Odyssey, the 
courter Ctesippus throws an ox hoof at the beggar-Odysseus only for his and 
his companions amusement.667 Similar reasons are noticeable in fr. 180, in which 
the hero describes the chamber-pot as a γελωτοποιός βέλος ‘a missile aimed to 
mock’. Odysseus is, therefore, fully aware of the fact that the suitors mistreat 
him only to laugh at his expense. It becomes, then, apparent that the semantics 
of the lexeme γελωτοποιός do regard the meaning ‘laughter-maker’, however 
not in the sense of a ‘joker’ or ‘jester’ but in relation to a person who becomes 
the object of laughter.668 The fragment, therefore, evokes the concept of 
mockery.  
3.3.1.4. Schadenfreude 
A direct reference to laughter has been preserved in fr. 281a attributed to 
the so-called Dike Play. However, the real title of this play remains unknown as 
                                               
666 The dispute of the play’s classification rises, generally, from the locution τὴν κάκοσμον 
οὐράνην ‘the evil-smelling chamber-pot’ argued by some scholars to be un-tragic; cf. Podlecki 
(2005) 16  
667 Hom. Od. 20. 287-302. 
668 Cf. chapter II, section 2.1.1.8. 
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well as and it is not certain whether this was a tragedy or satyr play.669 Despite 
the poor state of the verses of which almost none have been preserved 
complete, we may recognize that they contain the dialogue between Justice 
(Δίκη) and an unknown character.670 At one point, Justice speaks of her role in 
upbringing a young god (fr. 281a 31-41): 
 
Δι.  ἔθρε[ψ.] παῖδα μ̣άργον ὃν τίκ̣̣τ̣ει ̣[ ποτέ 
Ἥρα μιγεῖσα Ζηνὶ θυμοιδ[  
δ]ύ̣σ̣α̣ρκ̣τ[ο]ν, αἰδὼς δ' οὐκ ἐνῆ[ν] φ̣ρ[̣ον]ήματι·  
            ].υκτα τῶν ὁδοιπόρων βέλη  
                         ].δως ἀγκύλαισιν ἀρταμῶν·  
                           ]ῶ̣ν ἔχ̣[αι]ρ̣ε κἀγέλα κακὸν  
                        ]ν στάζοι φόνος·  
Justice:  I reared the savage son whom Hera [once] bore in union 
with Zeus, an unruly [child(?)] of swollen spirit, in whose 
mentality there was no shame; [he shot many (?)] wayfarers 
with arrows [from which] one could [not escape (?) 
shameless]sly (?) slaughtering them with the bowstring, 
[and] he laughed and rejoiced [in doing these (?)] evil deeds 
[whenever (?)] the blood [of his victims (?)] dripped [from 
his hand]s (?).  
In this passage, Dike speaks of an unspecified offspring of Hera and Zeus. In 
particular, Justice depicts an unfavourable portrayal of the gods’ son described 
as ‘violent’ (μ̣άργον, v. 31), ‘irascible’ (θυμοιδές or θυμοίδη, v. 32)671, ‘unruly’ 
(δ]ύ̣σ̣α̣ρ̣κτ[ο]ν, v. 33), and ‘shameless in mind’ (αἰδὼς δ' οὐκ ἐνῆ[ν] 
φ̣ρ̣[ον]ήματι, v. 33). The subsequent lines 34-37 have been poorly preserved, 
but we may notice that Dike speaks of a person who shoots arrows at wayfarers 
(τῶν ὁδοιπόρων βέλη, v. 34), slaughters them with a bow-string (ἀγκύλαισιν 
ἀρταμῶν, v. 35) and takes delight in such cruelty (ἔχ[̣αι]ρ̣ε κἀγέλα κακὸν, v. 
36) leading to murder (φόνος, v. 37). Since these actions appear in immediate 
                                               
669 Radt (TrGF III 380ff.) lists it in the Incertarum Fabularum Fragmenta. Podlecki (2005) 15-16, 
includes this play in his analysis of Aeschylean satyr-drama, although stressing the uncertainty 
of its genre.  
670 Lloyd-Jones (1957) 576 sees the possibility of this being the Chorus-leader. 
671 Conjectures ad loc. by: Mette (1959): θυμοιδ[ὲς τέκνον] ‘irascible child’; Lloyd-Jones (1957): 
θυμοί[δη θεόν] ‘irascible god’. 
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context to lines 31-33, scholars consider them to be a reference to the young god 
Justice mentioned first. Also, the brutality of deeds, and most importantly, the 
fact of enjoying their fulfilment corresponds to the violent character of Zeus’ 
and Hera’s son. Not surprisingly, scholars, generally, view this cryptic 
description to be of Ares.672 Dike, therefore, would be describing the hot-
tempered character of the Greek god of savage and brutal war.673 
What is of our particular interest is the fact, that this young god is 
presented as ‘rejoicing and laughing’ while posing violence on others. Despite 
the need of a minor conjecture the meaning of the expression ἔχ[̣αι]ρ̣ε κἀγέλα 
in line 36 is clear and understood as ‘he rejoiced and laughed’. As we have 
discussed in chapter II, the Greek language does recognize the connection of 
the phenomenon of laughter with the experience of pleasant emotions, such as 
joy and delight.674 Without any doubt, the emotional aspect of laughter is 
emphasized by the juxtaposition of the γελάω word with the verb χαίρω 
‘rejoice’. Moreover, the context in which the young god’s laughter occurs 
specifies the feelings he expresses, namely, the delight in seeing as well as 
inflicting harm on others, in this case, innocent travelers (οἱ ὁδοίποροι, v. 34). In 
this respect, we may notice that, apart from the basic understanding as sound, 
the idea of laughter evoked in this passage pertains to the concept of feeling 
and expressing malicious pleasure described today as Schadenfreude. 
 
As we have seen, the preserved context of the fragments discussed above 
allows us to specify the ideas of the phenomenon Aeschylus evokes by 
employing certain laughter-words. Thus, we may recognize such general 
                                               
672 Lobel et al.(1952) 41: ‘there is no choice but to take Ares as meant’; similarly Cipolla (2010) 
139-141.  
673 On the connection between Ares and justice, cf. Hom. Hymn. 8. 4: συναρωγὲ Θέμιστος 
‘helper of Justice’ and 8.5: δικαιοτάτων ἀγὲ φωτῶν ‘leader of the most righteous men’;  Aes. 
Ch. 461: Ἄρης Ἄρει ξυμβαλεῖ, Δίκᾳ Δίκα ‘Ares will meet with Ares, and Dike with Dike’, 
translated by Sommerstein (2008b) 271: ‘Violence will clash with violence, justice with justice!’. 
674 Cf. chapter II section 2.1.1.2.3. 
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concepts of laughter understood as 1) a mean of communication (fr. 47a 786), 2) 
an expression of experienced pleasant emotions (fr. 47a 813, fr. 281a), and 3) an 
act of disdainful behaviour towards another (fr. 180). Despite the fragmentary 
state of the discussed passages, we may clearly see that, in similar vein to the 
extant tragedies, also these four fragments reflect the poet’s understanding of 
the complexity of the phenomenon of laughter. 
3.3.2. Fragments transmitted without a context 
A single Aeschylean reference to laughter has been transmitted as a 
fragment without a context. The genre of the play, its titles or even the character 
who speak this expressions remain unknown. Fr. 290 comprising only of the 
two-word expression may be found in the Synagoge, one of the largest lexica of 
the ancient Greek language675 (Σβ  α 269 Cunningham): 
ἀγέλαστος· ὁ μὴ πρὸς γέλωτα ἐπιτήδειος καὶ ὁ στυγνός. ἔστι δὲ καὶ 
πέτρα Ἀθήνησιν οὕτω λεγομένη. Αἰσχύλος δέ φησι καὶ φρὴν 
ἀγέλαστος. οὐκοῦν οὐκ ἐκώλυσε λέγειν καὶ νοῦς ἀγέλαστος καὶ διάνοια 
ἀγέλαστος καὶ τὰ ὅμοια. 
Laughterless: a person not inclined to laugh as well as someone sullen. 
There is also a rock named like this by the Athenians. Aeschylus says 
‘laughterless heart’. Therefore, it is not permitted to say also ‘laughterless 
mind’ as well as ‘laughterless thought’ and the like.676 
In this entry to ἀγέλαστος, we may notice the wide range of the 
semantics of the term. It seems that the lexicographer distinguishes two main 
understandings of the adjective: emotional and intellectual. Without any doubt, 
the former is noticeable in the term’s main definition regarding man’s 
incapability to feel positive feelings (ὁ στυγνός) as well as to express them 
through laughter (ὁ μὴ πρὸς γέλωτα ἐπιτήδειος); the emotional aspect is also 
traceable in the Attic name ἀγέλαστος πέτρα ‘laughterless rock’ to which the 
                                               
675 Same entry in Phot. s.v. ἀγέλαστος. 
676 My translation. The same Greek quote is found in the lexicon of Photius  s. v.  ἀγέλαστος;  it 
is also ascribed to the Attic orator Phrynichus, cf. Praep. Soph. fr. 60. 
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lexicographer refers to.677 The latter understanding, on the other hand, is 
reflected in the few expressions the author of the Synagoge adduces, composed 
of the adjective with words referring to mental faculties such as the νοῦς ‘mind’ 
and διάνοια ‘thought, process of thinking, intelligence’.678 However, it is a 
curious fact that the lexicographer forms these two expressions on the basis of 
an Aeschylean quote φρὴν ἀγέλαστος ‘laughterless heart’ which seems to 
pertain to the sphere of emotions than cognition. In order to specify whether 
this phrase refers to the emotional or intellectual aspect of ἀγέλαστος, as well 
as to explain my translation of the expression, we must pay some attention to 
the traditional Greek understanding of the term φρήν. 
The LSJ defines the word φρήν variously in terms of human 1) 
physiology, 2) emotionality, 3) cognition and 4) volition. Firstly, the word may 
regard a bodily organ, which scholars, chiefly, discern as the diaphragm or 
midriff, i.e. the muscles separating the heart and lungs from the abdominal 
viscera.679 Secondly, φρήν may indicate a seat of emotions, hence its general 
meaning ‘the heart’. Thirdly, the term may refer to a seat of intellect, as well, 
thus may signify ‘the mind’. Finally, the LSJ also defines φρήν in relation to the 
process of making and acting upon decisions. What we may observe from these 
explanations is the fact that the semantics of one term, generally, comprise of 
two distinct, as it would seem from a modern point of view, ideas: a bodily 
organ (the diaphragm) and the psychological-cognitive processes that occur 
                                               
677 The adjective regards the condition of the goddess Demeter who sat on a rock at the entrance 
to Hades grief-stricken by the abduction of her daughter Persephone; cf. Apollod. 1.5.1: καὶ 
πρῶτον μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνης κληθεῖσαν Ἀγέλαστον ἐκάθισε πέτραν ‘And first she sat 
down on the rock which has been named Laughless after her’, translation in Frazer (1921) 37. 
See also, Hsch. s.v. ἀγέλαστος πέτρα· ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ, ἐφ' ἧς ἐκαθέσθη ἡ Δημήτηρ, ὅτε τὴν 
κόρην ἐζήτει, ‘Laughterless rock: in Attica upon which Demeter sat during her search for 
Kore’; similarly Suda s.v. Σαλαμῖνος. Demeter is described to be ἀγέλαστος ‘laughterless’ in 
Hom. Hymn. 2. 200. 
678 LSJ s.v. νοῦς and διάνοια. 
679 E.g. Pr. 881: κραδία δὲ φόβῳ φρένα λακτίζει, ‘the heart kicks the midriff out of fear’. For the 
discussion on indicating the internal organ, see Thalmann (1986) 489, Sullivan (1997) 49. 
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within it. In short, the term pertains to either a part of the human body or to 
human inward faculties. 
The connection of sentiments and mental activities encapsulated in the 
semantics of φρήν has been analyzed by Padel in her 1992 study entitled In and 
Out of the Mind: Greek Images of the tragic Self. The British Hellenist argues that, 
in the view of fifth century Greeks, man perceives and feels with the internal 
organs, of which the diaphragm plays a key role.680 Accordingly, the φρήν is 
perceived to be a sort of inward ‘container’ or ‘receptacle’, which 
accommodates ‘emotion, practical ideas, and knowledge’.681 Furthermore, Padel 
explains that although in classical tragedy φρήν (also expressed in its plural 
form φρένες without greater semantic distinction) becomes a popular word for 
‘mind’, it is still regarded to be a conscious inwardness responsive and 
receptive to sentiments, especially that of love and grief.682 It comes, then, as no 
surprise that in the preserved tragedies the word φρήν (or φρένες) occurs often 
in both emotional and intellectual contexts.  
In her study Aeschylus’ Use of Psychological Terminology, Sullivan views 
the term φρήν as highly psychological.683 The Canadian scholar examines all 
104 instances of the word φρήν (or φρένες) found in Aeschylean drama being 
the most often employed psychic term by the poet.684 What is of our particular 
interest, Sullivan analyzes 41 examples of φρήν described by an adjective or 
participle, of which a quarter reflects a distinctly emotional dimension; these 
                                               
680 Such understanding of φρήν is criticized by the author of the work On the Sacred Disease, cf. 
Ps.-Hippoc. Morb. Sacr. 20: ‘The diaphragm (φρένες) has a name due merely to chance and 
custom, not to reality and nature, and I do not know what power the diaphragm has for 
thought (νοεῖν) and intelligence (φρονεῖν). It can only be said that, if a man be unexpectedly 
over-joyed or grieved, the diaphragm jumps and causes him to start. This is due, however, to its 
being thin, and having a wider extent than any other organ; it has no cavity where it can receive 
any accident, good or bad, but it is disturbed by both owing to the weakness of its nature. Since 
it perceives nothing before the other parts do, but is idly named as though it were the cause of 
perception’, translation in Jones (1959) 179-81 (my emphasis). 
681 Padel (1992) 21. 
682 Ibid. 22. 
683 Sullivan (1997) 49. 
684 Ibid. 13, excluding the occurrences from Prometheus Bound (14 instances).  
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are ἀγέλαστος ‘mirthless’ fr. 290, ἄκρος ‘top of, highest’ Ag. 805, ἀμαυρός 
‘dark, dim’ Ag. 546 and Ch. 158, ἀπένθητος ‘free from sorrow’ Ag. 895, 
γαθοῦσα ‘rejoicing, cheerful’ Ch. 772, εὔθυμος ‘cheerful, confident’ Per. 372, 
μελαγχίτων ‘black-robed’ Per. 115, φαιδρός ‘joyous, bright, cheerful’ Ch. 565, 
φίλιος ‘loving’ Ag. 1491, and φίλοικτος ‘mournful, sad’ Ag. 1143.685 From these 
examples we may distinguish four main emotions Aeschylus connects φρήν 
with: 1) grief (ἀμαυρός ‘dark, dim’ Ag. 546 and Ch. 158, ἀπένθητος ‘free from 
sorrow’ Ag. 895, φίλοικτος ‘mournful, sad’ Ag. 1143) , 2) love (ἄκρος ‘top of, 
highest’ Ag. 805, φίλιος ‘loving’ Ag. 1491), 3) joy (γαθοῦσα ‘rejoicing, cheerful’ 
Ch. 772, εὔθυμος ‘cheerful, confident’ Per. 372, φαιδρός ‘joyous, bright, 
cheerful’ Ch. 565), and 4) fear (μελαγχίτων ‘black-robed’ Per. 115). In relation to 
the discussed fr. 290, Sullivan places the expression φρὴν ἀγέλαστος in the 
context of grief, as she considers the adjective to signify ‘mirthless’.686 It 
becomes, hence, apparent that in Aeschylean drama the word φρήν may be a 
psychological term used in regard of the sphere of emotions. 
In order to determine the meaning of the adjective ἀγέλαστος in fr. 290, 
let us compare the understandings of this word from its other instances 
preserved in the works of Aeschylus. We may recognize the fact that Sullivan’s 
interpretation of ἀγέλαστος as ‘mirthless’ follows that of the meanings of its 
other two references: ἀγέλαστα πρόσωπα ‘laughterless faces’ in Ag. 794, and 
ἀγελάστοις ξυμφοραῖς ‘by laughterless misfortunes’ in Ch. 29. I have already 
discussed these two examples of the adjective in the sections above of this 
chapter.687 Therefore, it suffices only to reiterate the main idea encapsulated 
within this term. In general, ἀγέλαστος functions as an antonym to the 
experience of those sentiments or mental states which stimulate one to laugh, 
                                               
685 Sullivan (1997) 49. The other contexts are: 1) intelligence, 2) age, 3) memory, 4) holiness, 5) 
madness, 6) pride, 7) justice, 8) prophecy, 9) speech, 10) courage, 11) physicality, 12) depth, and 
13) deception. 
686 Ibid. 60, 178. 
687 See section 3.2.2.1. and 3.2.2.2. above. 
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such as cheer, joy, delight or even a state of happiness. By indicating one’s ‘lack 
of laughter’ the adjective refers to an inward incapability of laughing due to the 
presence of non-pleasant emotions such as sadness or grief.688 Aeschylus, then, 
by employing the word ἀγέλαστος, evokes the image of laughter only to 
emphasize the fact of its nonexistence.  
In light of the discussion above it becomes clear that the lack of a wider 
context in fr. 290 does not restrain us from distinguishing the general idea of 
laughter within this two-word expression. In view of the uses of the adjective in 
Ag. 794 and Ch. 29, the interpretation of ἀγέλαστος raises little, if not any 
doubts. By emphasizing the fact of the conditions non-fit for laughter, 
Aeschylus with φρὴν ἀγέλαστος seems to refer to an inner, emotional 
incapability of experiencing pleasant feelings. In this respect, the term φρήν in 
fr. 290 would signify the inward faculty to feel emotions. Therefore, the 
translation ‘laughterless heart’, which I propose, regards the noun in terms of a 
seat of emotions (not a physical organ), i.e. an inward receptacle overwhelmed 
by sorrow or any other non-pleasant emotion which impedes one to laugh. 
Here, the translation ‘grief-stricken heart’ could also be applied.689  
We must, however, bear in mind the fact that without a specific context, 
the term φρήν is open for interpretation. For instance, the noun may also 
signify the intellectual activity of the mind interrupted by emotions which 
make it ‘non-fit for laughter’.690 This understanding would also explain the 
instances of νοῦς ἀγέλαστος and διάνοια ἀγέλαστος adduced by the 
lexicographer of the Synagoge. And finally, it remains in the sphere of 
possibility that Aeschylus, known for his preference for the use of metaphor, 
could have made an explicit reference to the ‘laughterless diaphragm’ within a 
                                               
688 Cf. the obscure explanation by Moreau (2000) 397: ‘this adjective regards a person who does 
not laugh, who is not capable of laughing’ (‘cet adjectif qualifie celui qui ne rit pas, qui n’est pas 
capable de rire’), my translation. 
689 Such interpretation would also tempt us to ascribe fr. 290 to a lost tragedy. However, until 
new evidence is discovered, this assumption remains undefended. 
690 Cf. Halliwell (2008) 18 n. 40 who considers the noun a metonymy for ‘mind’. 
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body. As we can see, the wide semantics of φρήν enables its various 
understandings, in contrast to ἀγέλαστος which, without any doubt, refers to 
the sphere of emotions.  
3.3.3. A dubious fragment 
The expression Σαρδόνιος γέλως had been proverbial in antiquity.691 
Aeschylus is ascribed with making a reference to ‘Sardonic laughter’ in fr. 455, 
which has been transmitted by the Greek sophist, Zenobius, in his work 
Collected Proverbs (5.85):692 
Σαρδόνιος γέλως: Αἰσχύλος ἐν τοῖς Περὶ παροιμιῶν περὶ τούτου φησὶν 
οὕτως· ‘Οἱ τὴν Σαρδὼ κατοικοῦτες, Καρχηδονίων ὄντες ἄποικοι, τοὺς 
ὑπὲρ τὰ ἑβδομήκοντα ἔτη γεγονότας τῷ Κρόνῳ ἔθυον γελῶντες καὶ 
ἀσπαζόμενοι ἀλλήλους· αἰσχρὸν γὰρ ἡγοῦντο δακρύειν καὶ θρηνεῖν. 
Τὸν οὖν προσποίητον γέλωτα Σαρδόνιον κληθῆναι.’ 
Sardonic laughter: Aeschylus in his work On Proverbs gives such an 
explanation of this: ‘The inhabitants of Sardon, who were Carthaginian 
settlers, sacrificed to Cronos old men who have exceeded the age of 
seventy; while doing so they laughed and embraced each other, for they 
believed it was shameful to shed tears and lament. This is how an artificial 
laugh was called ‘sardonic’.693 
This fragment, however, is not considered to be genuinely Aeschylean, since 
the fifth-century dramatist is not known to compose other forms of poetry apart 
from drama. Scholars, generally, ascribe this explanation for ‘sardonic laughter’ 
to another Aeschylus of Alexandria, an epic poet of the second century, who 
may have written a collection of proverbs.694 As a consequence, Radt lists fr. 455 
in the section of Fragmenta dubia in his edition of the fragments of Aeschylus.695 
Due to the commonly accepted spuriousness of fr, 455, I exclude a thorough 
examination of the phrase Σαρδόνιος γέλως in my discussion on Aeschylean 
drama. 
                                               
691 Cf. chapter II, section 2.1.1.3. 
692 CPG 1, 154, 1. Similar explanations are given by Phot. and Hsch, both s.v. Σαρδόνιος γέλως. 
693 My translation.  
694 Cf. Jacoby’s commentary on Demon in FGrHist 327 F 18; also  Crusius (1883) 148 n.1.  
695 TrGF III, 499.  
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In this part of the chapter, I have examined the Greek vocabulary of 
laughter as well as its interpretations within the fragments of Aeschylus. As we 
can see, despite their small number, the fragments reveal a variety of 
understandings of the discussed phenomenon. In particular, Aeschylus evokes 
such ideas of laughter in connection with 1) communicating one’s positive 
disposition towards another (fr. 47 a 786), 2) feeling amusement and pleasure 
(fr. 47 a 813), 3) dispensing mockery (fr. 180), 4) experiencing malicious delight 
at inflicting harm onto others (fr. 281a), as well as 5) emphasizing the lack of 
pleasant emotions within a person (fr. 290). Therefore, the chief ideas of 
laughter within the fragments relate to the concepts of emotion (amusement, 
Schadenfreude, non-mirthful sentiments), communication (amiability), and 
derision. 
3.4. Conclusion 
This chapter contains the examination of Aeschylean references to 
laughter. My discussion has been based on the analysis of the Greek vocabulary 
for laughter found within the works and fragments of Aeschylus. From the 
investigation we may distinguish such conclusions. Firstly, in the seven 
tragedies and many fragments which have been preserved till our times, we 
may find only a handful of references to laughter, a mere number of 18 in sum 
(12 instances in the tragedies and 6 in the fragments). Secondly, only one 
instance (fr. 47a 786) might have referred to the sound of laughter occurring 
onstage. The other references, however, regard various concepts connected 
with the discussed phenomenon. The first discernible idea regards the sphere 
of emotions. In Aeschylean drama, we have distinguished positive sentiments 
associated with laughter such as 1) amusement, 2) delight, and 3) joy. 
Interestingly, however, apart from amusement, the poet evokes these positive 
emotions through negation by employing the adjective ἀγέλαστος. In relation 
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to negative sentiments, I have analysed passages in which we may discern such 
emotions as 4) a feeling of triumph, and 5) Schadenfreude. Therefore, the 
expressive nature of Aeschylean laughter becomes apparent. 
Throughout the course of this chapter it has emerged that such feelings 
of malicious delight, particularly, regard interpersonal relations, since they 
arise with the subject’s recognition of harm being done to others. This leads us 
to the second general idea of Aeschylean laughter which is connected with its 
social aspect. In particular, we may distinguish that laughter serves as a mean 
of communicating one’s sentiments about another and to the other. Here, the 
message sent may be favourable, non-favourable, or feigned. In regard of 
favourability, I have found examples of laughter signalling one’s 6) amiability, 
or serving as a greeting. Considering non-genuine laughter, we have seen 
references to 7) artificial laughter adapted by others to feign a positive 
disposition or the experience of benign feelings. Finally, many examples refer to 
8) mockery in which a character recognizes the fact of becoming the object of 
others’ laughter. In this case, the target perceives another’s action as a form of 
disrespectful treatment, hence fears it and resents it. What is of great 
importance is the fact that these references to mockery do not only describe the 
disdainful actions of one character against another, but inform of the quality of 
the relationship between the subject and target of laughter. In this respect, the 
social aspect of laughter is visible, since it regards and defines interpersonal 
relations. Thus, it is evident that Aeschylean laughter is social. 
On the basis of the analysed material, we may notice a complex image of 
laughter emerging from Aeschylean drama. It is also quite a negative view. We 
do find examples of benign laughter in fr. 47 a, which presents the friendly 
laugh of baby Perseus or of laughter rising out of pleasure mentioned further 
when the chorus of satyrs sings of the joys and amusements one may 
experience living the life of a satyr. As we may see, Aeschylus, without any 
doubt, was aware of the pleasant side of laughter associated with joy, pleasure 
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and play. However, we must bear in mind the fact that these two examples 
referring to the innocent laughter of that of a baby as well as the joys of 
fantastic beings like satyrs, occur but in a satyr play, i.e. a drama which was 
aimed to provide fun and amusement to the audience. These instances, 
therefore, stand out as an exception.  
A noticeably grimmer image of laughter emerges from the rest of the 
Aeschylean fragments and complete dramas. The reason for this is the fact that 
the world depicted by Aeschylus is governed by divinely ordained laws both 
mortals and gods must obey. One’s life, however, becomes disrupted with the 
violation of these laws, as the perpetrator must pay the consequences for his 
crime. This wrongdoing can be either dishonouring a god (the example of 
Cassandra) or spilling kindred blood (the curse of the House of Atreus). As it is 
shown in the preserved tragedies, violation deprives the perpetrator, but also 
his/her kin of laughter i.e. joy, mirth and a general state of happiness. As a 
result, life becomes filled with misery and misfortune. Apart from this, such 
violation many-a-case antagonizes relations making them want to triumph over 
each other. Bloodshed often is the effect of an earlier violation in the family, 
which then again requires retaliation. A chilling metaphor of this is the image 
of Clytaemestra’s blood spilt on Orestes alluring the Furies, the personification 
of vengeance for kindred bloodshed, with a welcoming laugh. 
While the gods are concerned, they remain the only ones with the full 
right to laugh in scorn. Moreover, as part of a violator’s punishment the gods 
may influence the reaction of others, as we have seen in Cassandra’s case. 
Finally, even gods who violate laws are punished, as it is with Prometheus. For 
violating Zeus’ law, the Titan has been chained to Caucasus for eternity. It is 
there where the god makes the only reference to laughter in the Prometheus 
Bound which is that of the sparkle of the sea. Prometheus but can only observe 
the waves’ ‘laughter’ from afar, evoking the ideas of sunshine and freedom, for 
he too has violated divine law.  
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Derision in Aeschylus is also ascribed to those in power or in a socially 
superior position. In Ch. 222, Electra, at first, believes Orestes to be a stranger 
mocking her amidst her misfortunes; in fr. 180 the suitors show their 
superiority towards Odysseus in guise of beggar by mistreating him for fun; 
and fr. 281, despite its poor state, preserves well the line in which a god laughs 
in delight at the harm inflicted on others (mortals plausibly). 
We may, therefore notice that the predominant image of laughter in 
Aeschylean drama is not quite negative, as it is just. What is more, laughter in 
Aeschylus is highly social for it generally refers to the quality of relations 
between two or more characters. Social and just, associated with derision, 
Schadenfreude and triumph, Aeschylus sure does depict a grim image of 
laughter which reflects the type of interpersonal relations between gods and 
men, but also between men themselves. In many cases, Aeschylean laughter is 
about relationships. 
Noteworthy is the fact that Aeschylus is the only tragedian, in contrast to 
Sophocles and Euripides, who uses the lexeme ἀγέλαστος ‘laughterless’. In 
general, we may recognize that this adjective aptly describes the dark side of 
laughter devoid of pleasant and benign emotions such as joy, cheerfulness or a 
feeling of happiness. In this respect, we find a parallel to Poe’s similarly grim 
image of laughter depicted in his poem quoted at the beginning of this chapter. 
The House of Usher, once a prosperous and happy residence, but now ruined, 
is described as haunted and howling with loud laughter. As the American 
writer stresses in his famous line, the haunting ghouls ‘laugh, but smile no 
more’, referring to the lack of benign, hence positive emotional load manifested 
and communicated through the laughter resonating in the infamous estate. 
What Poe defines as devoid of a ‘smile’, Aeschylus describes by the adjective 
‘laughterless’, and, in this respect, both poets evoke a similar dark image of 
laughter. In relation to Aeschylean laughter, we may, generally, consider it as 
ἀγέλαστος, indeed. 
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Chapter IV 
 
Laughter in Sophoclean drama 
 
 
 
And the little prince broke into a lovely peal of laughter, which 
irritated me very much. I like my misfortunes to be taken 
seriously. 
Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, The Little Prince 696 
 
 
This chapter examines the instances of laughter-words in the works of 
Sophocles. I have divided the analysis into two parts: in the first, I examine the 
Greek laughter-words and discuss the understandings of laughter in the extant 
tragedies: Ajax, Antigone, Electra, Oedipus the King, Oedipus at Colonus and 
Philoctetes; in the second, I discuss the references to laughter noticeable in the 
fragments of Sophocles, including the surviving passages of the Searchers 
(Ichneutae). The chapter concludes with final remarks on the general meaning of 
laughter in Sophoclean drama. 
4.1. Laughter-words in the extant tragedies 
Thirty-four laughter words appear in six extant plays of Sophocles. 
However, their distribution within the dramas is very uneven: Ajax contains of 
fifteen instances,697 Electra has eight examples, Antigone contains of five 
references, both Oedipus Coloneus and Philoctetus have three instances each, 
whereas only one laughter-word is found in Oedipus Rex. In spite of the fact that 
the same number of tragedies of both Aeschylus and Sophocles have survived 
till today, the latter poet employs laughter terms considerably more often. In 
                                               
696 de Saint-Exupéry (1971) 9. 
697 Nota bene, the largest amount of laughter terms in a single play from all the extant dramas of 
the three poets. 
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the table below, I have listed the lexemes connected to laughter and their 
passages from the surviving plays of Sophocles:698 
Verse Word Form Grammatic form 
 
OR 1422 γελαστής γελαστής Nom. sg. (m) 
Ai. 79 γελάω γελᾶν Inf. pr. act 
Ai. 383 γελάω γελᾷ  Ind. pr. act. 3rd sg. 
Ai. 957 γελάω γελᾷ  Ind. pr. act. 3rd sg. 
Ai. 961 γελάω γελώντων  Imperat. pr. act. 3rd. pl.  
Ai. 1011 γελάω γελᾶν  Inf. pr. act. 
Ai. 1043 γελάω γελῶν  Part. pr. act. Nom. sg. (m) 
Ant. 483 γελάω γελᾶν  Inf. pr. act. 
Ant. 
551699 
γελάω γελῶ Ind. pr. act. 1st sg. 
Ant. 838 γελάω γελῶμαι Ind. pr. m./p. 1st sg. 
El. 880 γελάω γελᾷς Ind. pr. act. 2nd sg. 
El. 1153 γελάω γελῶσι  Ind. pr. act. 3rd pl. 
El. 1295 γελάω γελῶντας  Part. pr. act. Acc. pl. (m) 
El. 1300 γελάω γελᾶν  Inf. pr. act. 
OC 1423 γελάω γελᾶσθαι Inf. pr. m./p. 
Ph. 258 γελάω γελῶσι Ind. pr. act. 3rd pl. 
Ph. 1023 γελάω γελώμενος Part. pr. m./p. Nom. sg. (m) 
Ph. 1125 γελάω γελᾷ Ind. pr. act. 3rd sg. 
Ai. 79 γέλως γέλως  Nom. sg. 
Ai. 303 γέλως γέλων (πολὺν 
συντιθεὶς) 
Acc. sg. 
Ai. 367 γέλως γέλωτος (οἴμοι) Gen. sg. 
Ai. 382 γέλως γέλωτα (ἄγεις) Acc. sg. 
Ai. 958 γέλως γέλωτα (πολὺν) Acc. sg. 
Ant. 647 γέλως γέλων (φῦσαι) Acc. sg. 
El. 1310 γέλως γέλωτι (φαιδρὸν 
κάρα) 
Dat. sg. 
OC 902 γέλως γέλως (γένωμαι) Nom. sg. 
El. 277 ἐγγελάω ἐγγελῶσα Part. pr. act. Nom. sg. (f) 
El. 807 ἐγγελάω ἐγγελῶσα Part. pr. act. Nom. sg. (f) 
OC 1339 ἐγγελάω ἐγγελῶν  Part. pr. act. Nom. sg. (m) 
                                               
698 Cf. the concordance of Ellendt and Genthe (1965). 
699 In this line, the verb γελάω appears twice in the same form (ἀλγοῦσα μὲν δῆτ', εἰ γέλῶ ἐν 
σοὶ γελῶ, Ant. 551). Here, I accept the grammatic form in the indicative mood, although it may 
be also  a coniunctivus. Also I follow the commonly accepted lesson of εἰ γέλῶ, cf. n. 765 below. 
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Ai. 454 ἐπεγγελάω ἐπεγγελῶσιν  Ind. pr. act. 3rd pl. 
Ai. 969 ἐπεγγελάω ἐπεγγελῷεν  Opt. pr. act. 3rd pl. 
Ai. 989 ἐπεγγελάω ἐπεγγελᾶν  Inf. pr. act. 
Ai. 199 καχάζω καγχαζόντων  Part. pr. act. Gen. pl. (m) 
 
Table 12. List of Greek words on laughter present in the extant tragedies of Sophocles. 
Out of the total thirty-four instances, twenty-five laughter-words appear in 
verbal form. Besides γελάω and its compounds (ἐγγελάω ‘laugh at, mock’; 
ἐπεγγελάω, ‘laugh at, exult over’), Sophocles may have also employed the 
word καχάζω, ‘laugh loud’ (Ai. 199).700 In particular, only three instances occur 
in the passive voice: γελῶμαι ‘I am laughed at’ (Ant. 838), γελᾶσθαι ‘to be 
laughed at’ (OC 1423), γελώμενος ‘laughed at’ (Ph. 1023), whereas the rest 
appears in the active voice. Out of these, two examples occur in the first person 
singular (γελῶ, ‘I laugh’, repeated twice in Ant. 551), and only one in the 
second person singular (γελᾷς, ‘you laugh’, El. 880). The majority, however, 
regards a third person laughing, either in the singular (Ai. 383, Ai. 957-8, Ai. 
1043, El. 277, El. 807, OC 1339, Ph. 1125) or in the plural (Ai. 199, Ai. 454, Ai. 961, 
Ai. 969, El. 1153, El. 1295, Ph. 258). Amongst these forms, one appears in the 
optative mood (ἐπεγγελῷεν, Ai. 969) and a single example occurs in the 
imperative mood (γελώντων, Ai. 961); the rest, however, are found in the 
indicative. For this reason, we may expect that these terms refer to current acts 
of ‘laughing’ performed by the characters on stage or to other behaviours 
related to laughter. Apart from personal forms of verbs, we may find six 
participles in the active voice and in the present tense (Ai. 199, Ai. 1043, El. 277, 
El. 807, El. 1295, OC 1339). Noticeably, the forms themselves of these particles 
indicate the agent of the action described by the verb; these may be a single 
man (γελῶν, Ai. 1043; ἐγγελῶν, OC 1339), a single woman (ἐγγελῶσα in El. 
277 and El. 807), but also a group of men (καγχαζόντων, Ai. 199; γελῶντας, El. 
1295). This observation is of significance to my discussion on laughter in 
                                               
700 Some scholars question this lesson, cf. section 4.2.7.5. below. 
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Sophocles, for it implies that six times in the plays the act of laughing occurs 
simultaneously with another activities. As for the nouns, two forms are found: 
γελαστής ‘laugher’ (OR 1422) and γέλως ‘laughter’. The latter appears in many 
cases: twice in the nominative (Ai. 79, OC 902); once in the genitive in the 
function of genetivus exclamationis (οἴμοι γέλωτος, ‘Oh! The laughter!’, Ai. 367); 
once in the dative in the function of a dativus instrumenti (γέλωτι φαιδρὸν 
κάρα, ‘face bright with laughter’, El. 1310), and four times as the direct object of 
an action (συντιθεὶς πολὺν γέλων, ‘constructing loud laughter’, Ai. 303; 
γέλωτα ἄγεις, ‘you keep laughing’, Ai. 382; γέλωτα γελᾷ, ‘he/she laughs loud, 
Ai. 958; γέλων φῦσαι, ‘to bear laughter’, Ant. 647). This brief analysis of the 
grammatical forms of the laughter-words suggests that Sophoclean characters, 
generally, use these lexmes in reference to current actions in the plot. Thus, the 
examination of the context in which these terms appear will allow us to 
recognize the specific understandings of the phenomenon of laughter as well as 
its connotations. 
4.2. Ideas of laughter in Sophoclean tragedy 
Greek laughter-words are traceable in six surviving tragedies of 
Sophocles. In this part of the chapter, we will see that the playwright applies 
the Greek terminology in order to evoke different aspects of the phenomenon 
of laughter.  
4.2.1. Sound 
Laughter is, primarily, a sound. As it has emerged from my analysis in 
chapter II, the audible aspect of laughter forms the basis of the semantics of 
γελ- rooted words.701 Sophocles evokes the idea of audible laughter in the Ajax. 
In the first episode of the play, Tecmessa explains to the Chorus about her 
                                               
701 Cf. chapter II, section 2.1.1.2.1. 
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husband’s dreadful acts committed in a sudden stroke of frenzy (‘Seized by 
madness our famous Ajax fell into disgrace in the night’, μανίᾳ γὰρ ἁλοὺς 
ἡμὶν ὁ κλεινὸς / νύκτερος Αἴας ἀπελωβήθη, Ai. 216-17).702 In a detailed 
account, she describes how the hero suddenly left their tent at night, carrying a 
sword in his hand (Ai. 285-94). To her surprise, he later returned dragging some 
domestic animals with him (Ai. 296-7), which he eventually slaughtered (Ai. 
298-300).703 Moreover, Ajax’s odd behaviour did not cease after his killing of the 
animals (Ai. 301-4): 
Τε. τέλος δ᾽ ὑπᾴξας διὰ θυρῶν σκιᾷ τινι  
λόγους ἀνέσπα, τοὺς μὲν Ἀτρειδῶν κάτα,  
τοὺς δ᾽ ἀμφ᾽ Ὀδυσσεῖ, συντιθεὶς γέλων πολύν,  
ὅσην κατ᾽ αὐτῶν ὕβριν ἐκτίσαιτ᾽ ἰών: 
Tecmessa:  In the end he rushed off through the door, and talked to some 
shadow painfully dragging out his words, some against the 
sons of Atreus, others about Odysseus, and with them he 
laughed loudly at all the violence he had gone and inflicted 
on them by way of vengeance… 
According to Tecmessa, who was observing her husband from inside their tent, 
the maddened hero ran outside and spoke there with ‘some shadow’ (σκιᾷ τινι, 
Ai. 301). Moreover, she recounts the fact that while he was talking about the 
Atreidae and Odysseus (λόγους ἀνέσπα…, Ai. 302), he was also laughing 
loudly (συντιθεὶς γέλων πολύν, Ai. 303). In this example, the expression 
γέλως πολύς evokes the image of laughter in connection with the concept of 
sound, for the original meaning of the phrase is ‘loud laughter’.704 Also, since 
the verb συντιθέναι accepts the meaning ‘to combine’ or ‘to mingle with’, it 
refers to the fact of the hero emitting audible laughter intermittently while 
speaking.705 On the basis of line 303, we may notice that, from inside the tent, 
                                               
702 Translation in Garvie (1998) 41. Hereon, I quote other English passages from this edition of 
the Ajax, unless stated otherwise. 
703 In his delusion, Ajax slaughters a flock of sheep and herd of cattle, which the Greeks took as 
spoils after capturing Troy. 
704 Cf. chapter II, section 2.1.1.3. 
705 Cf. Jebb (1896) 56 n. 303; similarly Kamerbeek (1953) 76. 
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Tecmessa was able to hear not only Ajax’s words spoken to some shadow but 
also his laughter. The hero’s wife, therefore, indicates loud laughter as one of 
the mad behaviours of her deluded husband.706 
Interestingly, scholars have suggested that Tecmessa’s remark about 
Ajax’s laughter may be a stage direction for an earlier scene in the play, i.e. the 
prologue scene, in which the maddened hero appears onstage. Athena unfolds 
to her favourite, Odysseus, about how she prevented Ajax from killing him and 
the Greek leaders (Ai. 39-65). Enraged with the Atreidae, who decided that 
Odysseus should receive the famous shield of Achilles (‘Anger overwhelmed 
him because of Achilles’ armour’, Χόλῳ βαρυνθεὶς τῶν Ἀχιλλείων ὅπλων, Ai. 
41), the title character decided to take revenge for his dishonour and kill his 
enemies at night (‘He set out alone against you, by night and stealthily’, 
Νύκτωρ ἐφ' ὑμᾶς δόλιος ὁρμᾶται μόνος, Ai. 47). Yet, his plan was disrupted 
by the goddess, who sent a fit a madness on the warrior (Ai. 51-4). In order to 
demonstrate to the son of Laertes her powers over Ajax, Athena decides to 
summon the hero, who is still in a maddened state and is torturing the animals 
in his tent (Ai. 65-7). She then makes Odysseus invisible and calls the madman 
to her (Ai. 89-117): 
Αθ.   Ὦ οὗτος, Αἶαν, δεύτερόν σε προσκαλῶ·  
τί βαιὸν οὕτως ἐντρέπῃ τῆς συμμάχου;  
Αι.   Ὦ χαῖρ', Ἀθάνα, χαῖρε, Διογενὲς τέκνον,  
ὡς εὖ παρέστης· καί σε παγχρύσοις ἐγὼ  
στέψω λαφύροις τῆσδε τῆς ἄγρας χάριν.  
Αθ.  Καλῶς ἔλεξας· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνό μοι φράσον,  
ἔβαψας ἔγχος εὖ πρὸς Ἀργείων στρατῷ;  
Αι.  Κόμπος πάρεστι κοὐκ ἀπαρνοῦμαι τὸ μή.  
Αθ.   Ἦ καὶ πρὸς Ἀτρείδαισιν ᾔχμασας χέρας;  
Αι.  Ὥστ' οὔποτ' Αἴαντ', οἶδ', ἀτιμάσουσ' ἔτι.  
Αθ.   Τεθνᾶσιν ἅνδρες, ὡς τὸ σὸν ξυνῆκ' ἐγώ.  
Αι.  Θανόντες ἤδη τἄμ' ἀφαιρείσθων ὅπλα.  
Αθ.   Εἶεν· τί γὰρ δὴ παῖς ὁ τοῦ Λαερτίου;  
ποῦ σοι τύχης ἕστηκεν; ἦ πέφευγέ σε;  
Αι.  Ἦ τοὐπίτριπτον κίναδος ἐξήρου μ' ὅπου;  
                                               
706 I discuss this example in relation to laughter as a symptom of madness in section 4.2.4. 
below. 
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Αθ.  Ἔγωγ'· Ὀδυσσέα τὸν σὸν ἐνστάτην λέγω.    
  * 
Αι.  Ἥδιστος, ὦ δέσποινα, δεσμώτης ἔσω  
θακεῖ· θανεῖν γὰρ αὐτὸν οὔ τί πω θέλω.  
Αθ.   Πρὶν ἂν τί δράσῃς ἢ τί κερδάνῃς πλέον;  
  * 
Αι.  Πρὶν ἂν δεθεὶς πρὸς κίον' ἑρκείου στέγης –   
Αθ.   Τί δῆτα τὸν δύστηνον ἐργάσῃ κακόν;  
Αι.  Μάστιγι πρῶτον νῶτα φοινιχθεὶς θάνῃ.  
Αθ.   Μὴ δῆτα τὸν δύστηνον ὧδέ γ' αἰκίσῃ.  
Αι.  Χαίρειν, Ἀθάνα, τἄλλ' ἐγώ σ' ἐφίεμαι,  
κεῖνος δὲ τείσει τήνδε κοὐκ ἄλλην δίκην.  
Αθ.   Σὺ δ' οὖν, ἐπειδὴ τέρψις ἥδε σοι τὸ δρᾶν,  
χρῶ χειρί, φείδου μηδὲν ὧνπερ ἐννοεῖς.  
Αι.  Χωρῶ πρὸς ἔργον, τοῦτό σοι δ' ἐφίεμαι,  
τοιάνδ' ἀεί μοι σύμμαχον παρεστάναι. 
Athena: You there, Ajax, I summon you a second time. Why do you 
pay so little heed to your ally? 
Ajax: Oh hail, Athena, hail daughter of Zeus, how well you have 
stood by my side; and I shall honour you with golden spoils 
in gratitude for this hint. 
Athena: Well said. But tell me this, did you dye your sword 
thoroughly in the army of the Argives? 
Ajax: I can freely boast of it, and I don’t deny that I did it. 
Athena: Did you really turn your armed hand on the sons of Atreus? 
Ajax: The result is that these men will never again dishonour Ajax. 
Athena: The men are dead, as I understand your word. 
Ajax:  They are dead. Now let them deprive me of my arms. 
Athena: Well then, what of Laertes’ son? In what state do you have 
him? Has he escaped you? 
Ajax: Are you asking me where the villainous fox is? 
Athena:  I am; I mean Odysseus your adversary. 
 * 
Ajax: He is sitting inside, mistress, a most welcome prisoner; 
 for I do not want him to die for a while yet. 
Athena:  Until you do what or gain what benefit? 
 * 
Ajax: Until tied to a pillar of my house –  
Athena: What harm, pray, will you do to the wretched man? 
Ajax: Until his back is first reddened with the whip before he dies. 
Athena: Pray do not torture so the wretched man. 
Ajax: In everything else, Athena, I bid you have your way, but this, 
and no other, is the punishment that he will receive. 
Athena: Very well then, since it is your pleasure to act like this, take 
action, spare none of the things you plan. 
Ajax: I am off to work; but this I bid you, always stand beside me as 
an ally of this kind.707 
                                               
707 * indicates the possible moments for the actor playing Ajax to have raised a laugh. 
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As we can see, lines 91-117 correspond with Tecmessa’s account in 301-5: Ajax 
comes out of the tent (after Ai. 90), speaks of the violence he has inflicted on the 
Atreidae (Ai. 97-100) and on Odysseus (Ai. 101-113), and then goes back into the 
hut (after Ai. 117).708 In his 1953 commentary to the play, Kamerbeek argues for 
considering Tecmessa’s mention of her husband’s loud laughter in line 303 
(συντιθεὶς γέλων πολύν) to be an indicator for the character’s bout of laughter 
during his encounter with Athena; the critic states that ‘somewhere Ajax must 
laugh’ and suggests that this should take place either before line 108, in which 
Ajax describes what he will do to the prisoned Odysseus, or optionally before 
line 105, in which Ajax answers Athena’s question to the whereabouts of 
Odysseus.709 In effect, some scholars, like Revermann, fully accept Kamerbeek’s 
suggestion and consider the reference to loud laughter in line 303 to be an 
explicit stage direction for the scene in the prologue.710 However, apart from 
Tecmessa’s remark, we possess no other evidence to support this hypothesis. 
For this reason, the matter of the original audience of the Ajax hearing the title 
character’s delusional laughter on stage remains only in the sphere or 
possibility.711  
Apart from the title character of the Ajax, also Odysseus is refered to as 
laughing aloud. In the first episode of the same tragedy, once the main hero 
returns to his senses, he recognizes the consequences of his actions committed 
in the state of madness, i.e. the failed attempt at taking revenge on his enemies 
and, consequently, his loss of honour as a warrior (Ai. 348-76). At one point of 
his lamentation, Ajax imagines the reaction of Odysseus upon learning about 
the hero’s madness (Ai. 379-82):  
                                               
708 Cf. Stanford (1963) 100 n. 301-5; Garvie (1998) 153 n. 301-4. 
709 Kamerbeek (1953) 76 n. 303. 
710 Revermann (2006) 60: ‘Where it not for Tecmessa’s mentioning it [i.e. laughter] in passing, 
we would not have the faintest idea of this stage direction’. 
711 Cf. Taplin (1996) 191; Finglass (2011) 229 n. 302-4.  
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Αι. ἰὼ πάνθ᾽ ὁρῶν ἁπάντων τ᾽ ἀεὶ  
κακῶν ὄργανον, τέκνον Λαρτίου,  
κακοπινέστατόν τ᾽ ἄλημα στρατοῦ,  
ἦ που πολὺν γέλωθ᾽ ὑφ᾽ ἡδονῆς ἄγεις. 
Ajax:  Ah, thou who watchest all things, thou ready tool of every 
crime, ah, son of Lartius, thou foulest knave in all the host, I 
warrant thou laughest loud and long for joy!712 
As we can see, Ajax is convinced of the fact that the son of Laertes, his arch-
enemy since the contest for the armour of Achilles, rejoices at his former rival’s 
disgrace and expresses his delight with laughter (‘thou laughest loud and long 
for joy’ πολὺν γέλωθ᾽ ὑφ᾽ ἡδονῆς ἄγεις, Ai. 382). Here, we find the expression 
πολὺς γέλως used to denote ‘loud laughter’. Moreover, since this phrase is the 
direct object to the verb ἄγω, which in this example accepts the meaning ‘keep 
up, sustain, maintain’,713 the reference, then, suggests prolonged laughter.714 
Ajax, therefore, envisions his most detested enemy as laughing loudly at the 
hero’s misfortunes. 
Interestingly, the same image of Odysseus raising a loud laugh at the 
ruin of Ajax is evoked by the Chorus in the kommos after the fourth episode. In 
this scene, Tecmessa and the Salaminian Sailors lament upon the death of their 
master, who has committed suicide to restore his honour (Ai. 866-972). Aware 
of the fact that Ajax’s utter destruction will bring delight to his enemies, the 
Sailors imagine their outrageous reaction upon hearing the news (Ai. 955-60): 
Χο.  ἦ ῥα κελαινώπαν θυμὸν ἐφυβρίζει  
πολύτλας ἀνήρ,  
γελᾷ δὲ τοῖσδε μαινομένοις ἄχεσιν  
πολὺν γέλωτα, φεῦ φεῦ,  
ξύν τε διπλοῖ βασιλῆς  
κλύοντες Ἀτρεῖδαι. 
Chorus: In truth the much-enduring man exults over us in his dark 
mind, and laughs loudly at our frenzied sorrows, and with 
                                               
712 Translation in Jebb (1896) 67. 
713 LSJ s.v. ἄγω. 
714 Garvie (1998) 161 n. 383; similarly Stanford (1963) 111 n. 379-82: ‘It implies a more prolonged 
bout of laughter than συντιθεὶς γέλων πολύν  in 303’; cf. the translation of the line in Finglass 
(2011) 252 n. 383: ‘I suppose you laugh long and loud in your delight’. 
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him will laugh, when they hear the news, the two sons of 
Atreus.715 
Observably, the Chorus evokes the image of Odysseus laughing loud at the 
hero’s misfortunes, in similar fashion to Ajax’s evocation in the example 
previously discussed (Ai. 379-83). Again, the audible aspect of laughter is 
denoted by the expression πολὺν γέλωτα, ‘a loud laugh’, which is the direct 
object to the verb γελᾷ, ‘he laughs’. It appears, then, that the Salaminian 
Sailors, alike their master earlier, are convinced of their misfortunes causing 
their enemies to laugh loud with delight at their adversaries’ misfortunes. 
As we have seen, Sophocles seems to evoke the image of laughter in 
connection with the concept of sound only in one tragedy, i.e. the Ajax. In all 
three examples, the audible aspect of the phenomenon is denoted by the 
expression πολὺς γέλως. However, as we have seen, only one instance may 
refer to loud laughter emitted onstage by the actor playing Ajax (Ai. 303), 
whereas the other two examples in relation to Odysseus are merely 
interpretations by other characters (Ajax in Ai. 382; the Chorus in 957-8) of his 
anticipated reaction to the news of the title hero’s ruin. In this respect, in one 
case it is possible that the protagonist’s laughter may have resounded in the 
original production of the Ajax, however, in the other two instances, the loud 
laughter of Odysseus in merely spoken of.  
4.2.2. Facial expression 
Sophocles makes a single reference to laughter in connection with a 
facial expression. In the fourth episode of the Electra, the title character is 
overwhelmed with joy, after discovering the fact of her brother being alive and 
returning to Mycenae to avenge the murder of their father Agamemnon (El. 
1224-87). Orestes, however, fearing that his sister’s excitement may reveal his 
identity to their mother when they enter the palace, urges Electra to subdue her 
                                               
715 Translation in Lloyd-Jones (1994a) 119. 
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emotions (‘And see to it that our mother does not learn your state from that 
joyous countenance when we go into the house, but lament as though the 
disaster falsely told of were the truth!’, Οὕτω δ' ὅπως μήτηρ σε μὴ 
'πιγνώσεται / φαιδρῷ προσώπῳ νῷν ἐπελθόντοιν δόμους / ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπ' ἄτῃ 
τῇ μάτην λελεγμένῃ / στέναζ', El. 1296-9). The protagonist obliges to restrain 
her enthusiasm and tells her brother where to find their enemies (El. 1307-12): 
Ηλ.  Ἀλλ' οἶσθα μὲν τἀνθένδε, πῶς γὰρ οὔ; κλύων  
ὁθούνεκ' Αἴγισθος μὲν οὐ κατὰ στέγας,  
μήτηρ δ' ἐν οἴκοις· ἣν σὺ μὴ δείσῃς ποθ' ὡς  
γέλωτι τοὐμὸν φαιδρὸν ὄψεται κάρα·  
μῖσός τε γὰρ παλαιὸν ἐντέτηκέ μοι,  
κἀπεί σ' ἐσεῖδον, οὔ ποτ' ἐκλήξω χαρᾶς 
δακρυρροοῦσα.  
Electra:  Well, you know how things lie here, of course; you have 
heard that Aegisthus is not in the house, but that my mother 
is at home. Do not be afraid that she will ever see my face 
radiant with smiles; for long since hatred for her has seeped 
into me, and now that I have seen you, I shall never cease to 
weep for joy.716 
 
In particular, Electra reassures Orestes that she will not allow their mother to 
see her face ‘radiant with smiles’ (γέλωτι… φαιδρὸν ὄψεται κάρα, El. 1310). 
However, in the Greek original, the heroine literally speaks of her face being 
bright ‘with laughter’ (γέλωτι). Interestingly, since the noun γέλως appears 
here in direct connection with the face, many English translators prefer to 
render the term ‘smile’:717 Jebb (1894), Storr (1913), Young (1920) and Lloyd-
Jones (1994a) render γέλωτι, ‘with smiles’, Meineck and Woodruff (2007) 
sustain the original singular form with ‘smile’, whereas Campbell (2009) 
translates ‘with a smiling face’.718 Although there is no doubt about γέλως 
                                               
716 Translation in Lloyd-Jones (1994a) 295. Hereon, I adduce other English passages from this 
edition of the Electra, unless indicated otherwise. 
717 As of May 2015, I have not yet found an English translation, which renders γέλως, ‘laughter’, 
in El. 1310. 
718 Cf. lines 1309-10 in Jebb (1894) 175: ‘face lit up with smiles’, and same translation in Storr 
(1913) 233; Young (1920) 120: ‘countenance radiant with smiles’; Meineck and Woodruff (2007) 
173: ‘She won’t see me with a smile or a shining face’; Campbell (1883) 288: ‘Not fear / She 
should behold me with a a smiling face’. 
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referring to the face, however, the interpretation of ‘smile’, albeit possible, gives 
rise to difficulties. Firstly, the plural translation ‘with smiles’ for the singular 
γέλωτι may suggest that Electra would not allow herself to be caught smiling 
by her mother more than once, yet, from the context it is clear that both she and 
Orestes are talking about her restraining her facial expression only once, i.e. the 
moment they enter the palace to take revenge on Clytaemestra. Secondly, the 
translations of Campbell (2009), ‘with a smiling face’ as well as of Meineck and 
Woodruff (2007), ‘with a smile or a shining face’, omit the fact that in the Greek 
original Electra describes her face (κάρα) to be ‘bright’ or ‘beaming’ (φαιδρόν), 
whereas with γέλωτι in the dative she specifies what her face particularly 
radiates. In other words, her face is literally described as beaming with 
laughter.719 In this respect, we may notice that in line 1310 the word γέλως, 
although it does regard Electra’s facial appearance, nevertheless it rather 
indicates what her bright face expresses. For this reason, the choice of the 
interpretation of ‘smile’ for γέλως limits the originally broad semantics of the 
noun, which may evoke the idea of laughter in connection with the expression 
of emotions.720 As I have discussed in chapter I, the chief role of any physical 
manifestation of laughter, especially through a specific facial expression, is 
nonverbal communication.721 Certainly, in lines 1307-12 Electra is fully aware of 
this fact, since she promises her brother to keep her face ‘beaming with 
laughter’ away from their mother’s eyes. Therefore, the visible γέλως on her 
countenance denotes her feelings outwardly expressed. Having said this, I will 
analyze the same example in the following section, in which I discuss the idea 
of laughter evoked in relation to the sphere of emotions. 
 
                                               
719 Some translations stress the aspect of radiance on Electra’s face, e.g. Carson (2001) 102: ‘And 
don’t worry: / she’ll see no glow on my face’, (my emphasis). 
720 Cf. chapter II, section 2.1.1.3. 
721 Cf. chapter I, section 1.3.3. 
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4.2.3. Joy 
One’s laughter may be the manifestation of joy elicited by good fortune. 
In the fourth episode of the Electra, the reunited children of Agamemnon make 
two references to laughter in connection with elation. Earlier in the play, 
Orestes sents to Mycenae false news about his death, in order to have his 
mother and her lover lulled into a false sense of safety (El. 32-50).722 The prince, 
then, comes to the royal palace, in order to deliver to the queen the urn with her 
son’s supposed ashes (El. 1098ff.). At the entrance he meets Electra, who on 
hearing that the stranger is carrying the remains of her brother, raises a loud 
lament (El. 1126-70). After learning that the grieving woman is his sister, 
Orestes reveals to her his true identity (El. 1205-23). Not surprisingly, the news 
elevates Electra’s spirits from despair to immense joy: she hugs her brother 
passionately (‘Do I hold you in my arms?’, El. 1226) and expresses her elation 
fervently (‘Dearest of bodies ever engendered, now you have comes; you have 
found, you have arrived, you have seen those whom you desired!’, Ἰὼ γοναί, / 
γοναὶ σωμάτων ἐμοὶ φιλτάτων, / ἐμόλετ' ἀρτίως, / ἐφεύρετ', ἤλθετ', εἴδεθ' 
οὓς ἐχρῄζετε, El. 1232-35). In fact, the woman’s rapture is so great that Orestes 
calms her down as not to have anyone in the palace hear them (‘I am here; but 
keep silent, and wait!’, Πάρεσμεν· ἀλλὰ σῖγ' ἔχουσα πρόσμενε, El. 1236; ‘It is 
best to keep silent, in case anyone inside should hear’, Σιγᾶν ἄμεινον, μή τις 
ἔνδοθεν κλύῃ, El. 1238). Also, due to the fact that the prince wants to carry out 
his revenge immediately, he urges Electra to subdue her excitement and control 
her emotions when they enter the palace (El. 1296-1300): 
Ορ.     Οὕτω δ' ὅπως μήτηρ σε μὴ 'πιγνώσεται 
φαιδρῷ προσώπῳ νῷν ἐπελθόντοιν δόμους· 
ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπ' ἄτῃ τῇ μάτην λελεγμένῃ 
στέναζ'· ὅταν γὰρ εὐτυχήσωμεν, τότε 
                                               
722 In El. 293-8, Electra speaks of her mother dreading Orestes’ return. After receiving the false 
news of his death, Clytaemestra expresses her relief of no longer having to fear her husband’s 
avenger, cf. El. 773-87.  
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 χαίρειν παρέσται καὶ γελᾶν ἐλευθέρως.  
Orestes:  And see to it that our mother does not learn your state from 
that joyous countenance when we go into the house, but 
lament as though the disaster falsely told of were the truth! 
When we are triumphant, then we shall be able to rejoice and 
laugh in freedom. 
Apparently, Orestes points to the fact that only after executing vengeance on 
the murderers of their father will it be appropriate for them ‘to rejoice and 
laugh’ (χαίρειν… καὶ γελᾶν, El. 1300). In this example, we may notice that the 
verb γελᾶν, ‘to laugh’, evokes the idea of laughter in association with the 
expression of emotions, for it appears in close proximity to the verb χαίρειν, ‘to 
rejoice’, which denotes the experience of pleasant sentiments. Orestes, 
therefore, conjures the image of laughter to describe the joyful state he and his 
sister will be in as well as will be capable of expressing freely (ἐλευθέρως) after 
having their enemies punished.723 
In light of the discussion above, we may recognize a more suitable 
interpretation for the term γέλως used by Electra in the response she gives to 
her brother in lines 1307-12, which I have examined in the previous section. 
Since the sister accepts Orestes’ request not to reveal a ‘joyous countenance’ 
(φαιδρῷ προσώπῳ, El. 1297), we may recognize that her mention of her ‘face 
beaming with laughter’ (γέλωτι τοὐμὸν φαιδρὸν… κάρα, El. 1310) regards her 
expressing the state of joy. Hence, with the word ‘laughter’, Electra would be 
referring to the elation she is experiencing after being reunited with her 
brother.724 Electra, however, reassures that she will not adapt a cheerful 
expression in front of their mother, because of her feeling a mixture of 
                                               
723 Blundell (1989) 177. 
724 Finglass (2007) 486 n. 1297 points to the fact that φαιδρῷ προσώπῳ is ‘a characteristic 
expected often of those welcoming a long-expected member of the household. Cf. chapter II, 
section 2.1.1.2.3. Curiously, Orestes’ reaction to the family reunion is less emotional in 
comparison to his sister’s extreme joy. For this reason, some scholars view his treatment of 
Electra as a sign of indifference, cf. Blundell (1989) 174: ‘After recognizing his sister Orestes 
shows her little affection’; Wright (2005) 186: ‘Brother and sister have completely different 
temperaments and emotions, and there is no affinity whatsoever between them’. 
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emotions: joy, on the one hand (‘now that I have seen you, I shall never cease to 
weep for joy’, κἀπεί σ' ἐσεῖδον, οὔ ποτ' ἐκλήξω χαρᾷ / δακρυρροοῦσα, El. 
1312-13) after the happy reunion, but on the other, the constant hatred towards 
Clytaemestra (‘for long since hatred for her has seeped into me’, μῖσός τε γὰρ 
παλαιὸν ἐντέτηκέ μοι, El. 1311). Because of the simultaneous experience of 
two extreme feelings, Electra declares that she will be weeping out of joy, and 
by accepting such a countenance, she will deceive the queen of her true 
feelings. In this case, we may agree that in line 1310 γέλως primarily denotes 
the protagonist’s emotional state of joy, which she promises not to show on her 
face. 725 
Another Sophoclean example of joyous laughter appears in the first 
episode of the Ajax. After the temporary fit of madness sent by Athena, the title 
character returns to sanity only to recognize the true outcome of his deranged 
actions, i.e. the killing of animals instead of his enemies. Sitting in his tent 
amidst the slaughtered sheep and cattle (Ai. 346-7), Ajax laments upon his utter 
humiliation because of the failure to kill the Atreidae and Odysseus (Ai. 372-6). 
Especially in regard of the latter, the hero expresses his anger and 
disappointment in having his rival for Achilles’ shield escape his revenge and, 
to his horror, imagines the son of Laertes as taking delight in his misfortune (Ai. 
379-82). At this point, the Chorus of Sailors attempts to console its agonized 
master with a universal truth about the nature of opportunities in life (Ai. 383): 
Χo.   Ξὺν τῷ θεῷ πᾶς καὶ γελᾷ κὠδύρεται. 
Chorus:  It depends on the god whether any man laughs or wails.  
                                               
725 Interestingly, the interpretation of ‘smile’ for γέλως in El. 1310 dominates in modern 
translations. As of May 2015, I have only managed to find two English translations of the play 
which interpret γέλως as an emotion, cf. Plumptre (1878) 228: ‘fear not / Lest she should see my 
face blithe with joy’; Kitto (1998) 145: ‘you need have no fear / That she will see a look of 
happiness / Upon my face’. Such interpretation is also found in the latest Polish translation by 
Chodkowski (2012) 426: ‘Nie musisz się lękać, / że może ujrzeć radość na mej twarzy’, (my 
emphasis). 
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In this passage, the Sailors utter a gnome about one’s circumstances being 
dependent on divine will. The sententious tone of line 383 is evident due to its 
generalizing character, noticeable in the use of the expression ξὺν τῷ θεῷ, 
which regards divinity in general,726 as well as the adjective πᾶς, here denoting 
‘every man’. Interestingly, the Chorus expresses such opinion with the 
juxtaposition of two images of man’s possible reactions to different experiences 
in life: one of him laughing (γελᾷ) in case of success, the other of him crying 
(καὶ ὀδύρεται) in case of failure. As we can see, Sophocles refers to the 
dichotomy of laughter and tears understood to be audible or visible signs of 
one’s feelings: joy in relation to the former, and sadness in regard of the latter. 
Therefore, in line 383 of the Ajax, the verb γελάω denotes joyous laughter 
occasioned by fortunate opportunities.727 
Curiously, in the same tragedy, Sophocles again makes a reference to 
laughter in connection with expression of joy, albeit through negation. In the 
fifth episode, Teucer, the half-brother of the title character, laments upon the 
body of Ajax, who has just committed suicide (Ai. 992-1039). At one point, 
Teucer anticipates the reaction of their father Telamon on learning about the 
death of his older son (Ai. 1008-16): 
Τευ.   ἦ πού με Τελαμών, σὸς πατὴρ ἐμός θ’ ἅμα, 
δέξαιτ' ἂν εὐπρόσωπος ἵλεώς τ' ἴσως 
χωροῦντ’ ἄνευ σοῦ. πῶς γὰρ οὔχ; ὅτῳ πάρα  
μηδ' εὐτυχοῦντι μηδὲν ἥδιον γελᾶν. 
Οὗτος τί κρύψει; ποῖον οὐκ ἐρεῖ κακόν,  
τὸν ἐκ δορὸς γεγῶτα πολεμίου νόθον,  
τὸν δειλίᾳ προδόντα καὶ κακανδρίᾳ  
σέ, φίλτατ' Αἴας, ἢ δόλοισιν, ὡς τὰ σὰ  
κράτη θανόντος καὶ δόμους νέμοιμι σούς.  
Teucer:  Telamon, no doubt, your father and mine alike, would receive 
me cheerfully and graciously when he sees me coming 
                                               
726 Finglass (2011) 252 n. 383. Stanford (1963) 111 n. 383 calls attention to the emphatic 
positioning of ξὺν τῷ θεῷ. Although the expression appears in the singular person (‘with a 
god’), however its generalizing sense permits the translation in the plural, cf. line 383 in 
Meineck and Woodruff (2007) 20: ‘It’s up to the gods if a man laughs or cries’ (my emphasis). 
727 On the idea for the cyclical change of human fortune, see Garvie (1998) 161-2 n. 383. 
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without you. Of course he will; he who even in good fortune 
finds it just as impossible to laugh with pleasure. What will 
he keep back? What kind of insult will he not utter against the 
bastard born from the enemy’s spear, the man who betrayed 
you, dearest Ajax, by cowardice and unmanliness, or by 
deceit, so that I might administer your power and house 
when you are dead! 
In particular, Teucer dreads the moment of his homecoming to Salamis and 
facing his father without Ajax (χωροῦντ’ ἄνευ σοῦ, Ai. 1010). With detectable 
sarcasm, the younger son is sure to receive a ‘warm welcome’ from Telamon 
(‘with a kind and cheerful face’, εὐπρόσωπος ἵλεώς τ' ἴσως, Ai. 1009), who is 
known for his stern temper.728 Continuing his speech in a sarcastic tone, Teucer 
gives an austere description of his father’s character, ‘who even in good fortune 
finds it impossible to laugh with pleasure’ (ὅτῳ πάρα / μηδ' εὐτυχοῦντι μηδὲν 
ἥδιον γελᾶν, Ai. 1010-11). As we may observe, the hero’s brother evokes the 
image of laughter in relation to their parent’s reaction to circumstances 
regarded as fortunate, which, generally, should give reasons for joy and 
laughter. However, as Teucer explains, it is not Telamon’s custom ‘to laugh 
more sweetly’ (μηδὲν ἥδιον γελᾶν) even when ‘enjoying good luck’ (μηδ' 
εὐτυχοῦντι). Here, the son emphasizes not the fact that his father’s laughter is 
less sweet than it should be in positive circumstances, but the fact of Telamon 
not performing such laughter at all.729 In this respect, Teucer evokes the image 
of laughter to describe the father’s inability to experience positive emotions, 
                                               
728 Both Ajax (Ai. 462-5) and Teucer (Ai. 1008-10) expect a hostile reception from their father. For 
this reason, according to Kyriakou (2011) 194  Telamon ‘seems to hover over the play, an 
imposing and unforgiving figure of a severe elder’. 
729 Finglass (2011) 426 n. 1010-11: ‘the contrast is between not laughter which is more and less 
sweet, but the absence of laughter and sweet laughter (which is sweeter than no laughter at 
all)’; similarly Arnould (1990) 86 who considers this absence to be ‘a sign of a particularly 
cheerless and difficult character’ (‘comme la marque d’un caractère particulièrement sombre et 
difficile’), (my translation). For the opposite view, which regards the comparative ἥδιον to 
contrast Telamon’s degree of laughing, see Kamerbeek (1953) 197: ‘ἥδιον γελᾶν: more brightly, 
more kindly than usual’; cf. also Jebb (1896) 154 n. 1010f. ‘the man whose wont it is to wear no 
brighter smile (than usual), even when he is fortunate’, here with the interpretation of  ‘smile’ 
for γελᾶν.  
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such as joy or pleasure, which are commonly expressed with laughter.730 
Therefore, we may agree that in line 1011 the phrase ἥδιον γελᾶν731 denotes the 
act of laughing pleasantly in connection with the feeling of joy or a joyous state 
of mind.732  
4.2.4. Madness 
Laughter may manifest the condition of being mentally deranged. In 
Sophoclean drama, only one character is regarded as having laughed in a 
delusional state, i.e. the title character of the tragedy Ajax. As I have discussed 
before, the hero’s wife, Tecmessa, mentions her husband as laughing aloud in 
her account of his maniacal actions (Ai. 284-306). Lines 302-4 particularly regard 
the moment of the hero’s deranged laughter: 
Τε. τέλος δ᾽ ὑπᾴξας διὰ θυρῶν σκιᾷ τινι  
λόγους ἀνέσπα, τοὺς μὲν Ἀτρειδῶν κάτα,  
τοὺς δ᾽ ἀμφ᾽ Ὀδυσσεῖ, συντιθεὶς γέλων πολύν,  
ὅσην κατ᾽ αὐτῶν ὕβριν ἐκτίσαιτ᾽ ἰών: 
Tecmessa:  At last he darted through the door and rapped out words 
addressed to some shadow, denouncing now the sons of 
Atreus, now Odysseus, laughing loudly at the thought of 
what violence he had inflicted in his raid.733 
The analysis of this passage in section 4.2.1. above has shown that the idea of 
laughter evoked by Tecmessa primarily appears in connection with the audible 
aspect of the phenomenon, since she reports to the Chorus that she heard her 
                                               
730 Garvie (1998) 219 n. 1010-11: ‘Telamon is no more cheerful in good fortune than in bad’. 
731 For a discussion on the meanings of the expression ἡδὺ γελᾶν, ‘to laugh sweetly’, see 
Arnould (1990) 165. Cf. also chapter II, sections 2.1.1.2.3. and 2.1.1.2.5. 
732 Curiously, many scholars tend to interpret γελᾶν in Ai. 1011 as ‘to smile’, cf. Jebb (1896) 155: 
‘he who, even when good fortune befalls him, is not wont to smile more brightly than before’; 
Storr (1913) 85: ‘Telamon / Who in his hours of fortune never smiles!’; Stanford (1963) 188 n. 
1010-11: ‘…being the kind of man who is incapable if smiling cheerfully even in good fortune’; 
Meineck and Woodruff (2007) 45: ‘Has the man ever smiled, even at good news?’; Garvie (1998) 
is inconsequential in his interpretation of γελᾶν, which he renders ‘to laugh’ in his translation, 
yet ‘to smile’ in the commentary to lines 1010-11. In my opinion, this may be due to the close 
proximity of εὐπρόσωπος, ‘with glad countenance’ in Ai. 1008. For the discussion on the 
meaning of ‘smile’ for γελάω, cf. chapter II, section 2.1.1.2.2. 
733 Translation in Lloyd-Jones (1994a) 59. 
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husband ‘laughing loudly’ (συντιθεὶς γέλων πολύν, Ai. 303) as he vilified the 
Atreidae and Odysseus. However, an additional interpretation for this 
reference to laughter emerges as well, since Tecmessa includes the reason for 
the hero’s audible outburst, i.e. his delusional conviction of having executed 
vengeance on his enemies (ὅσην κατ᾽ αὐτῶν ὕβριν ἐκτίσαιτ᾽ ἰών, Ai. 304).734 In 
his maddened state, Ajax believes to have fulfilled his plan of killing Odysseus 
and the sons of Atreus.735 Yet, it is apparent to the other characters of the play 
(Tecmessa, Athena, Odysseus) as well as to the audience of the tragedy that the 
hero’s attempt to kill his enemies ended in failure, due to Athena’s 
intervention. In effect, the divinely ordained stroke of madness altered Ajax’s 
senses to the point that he mistook sheep and cattle for the Greek leaders.736 
Nonetheless, in his deranged mind the hero considers his revenge to be 
complete and laughs at the thought of this. Thus, without any doubt, Ajax’s 
laughter is that of a madman, i.e. of one who sees things the way they are not 
and, hence, reacts accordingly to his hallucinations.737 
In this example, we may observe that to the bystanders the hero’s mad 
laughter appears as one of the aberrant actions performed in derangement. 
However, we may also recognize that the protagonist laughs out loud in his 
delusion to express his self-contentment. In other words, we may observe that 
the maddened Ajax laughs loud in a ‘state of wild joy’738, elicited by his 
imagined victory over his opponents. Such understanding of the hero’s mad 
                                               
734 Cf. Kamerbeek (1953) 77 n. 304; Stanford (1963) 101 n. 304; Finglass (2011) 228 n. 302-4. 
735 The hero himself speaks of this to Athena in the prologue, cf. Ai. 91-117. 
736 Cf. Knox (1961) 5: ‘He [i.e. Ajax] is mad, of course, and the madness has been inflicted on him 
by Athena. But it consists only in his mistaking animals for men; the madness affects his vision 
more than his mind’. Similarly, Holt (1980) 22 who states that the hero’s frenzy is ‘nothing 
more, and nothing less, than a failure to see things correctly – a delusion that he was killing and 
torturing Greek warriors when in fact he was only venting his wrath upon sheep and cattle’. 
For a discussion on Ajax’s madness based on inverted vision, see Padel (1995) 66-79. 
737 Halliwell (2008) 18 points to the fact that the hero is ‘roaring with derision as he imagines 
himself gloating in front of the army’s commanders’. The laughter of the delusional Ajax later 
became proverbial: Αἰάντειος γέλως; cf. chapter II, section 2.1.1.3. Cf. also Grossmann (1968) 
65. 
738 Papadopoulou (2005) 67. 
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laughter finds support in other passages in the plays. For instance, Tecmessa 
notices her husband’s delusional joy, as she says to the Chorus: ‘he himself, 
when he was still sick, enjoyed the troubles which held him in their grip, but to 
us who were sane his company caused distress’ (Ἁνὴρ ἐκεῖνος, ἡνίκ' ἦν ἐν τῇ 
νόσῳ, / αὐτὸς μὲν ἥδεθ' οἷσιν εἴχετ' ἐν κακοῖς, / ἡμᾶς δὲ τοὺς φρονοῦντας 
ἠνία ξυνών, Ai. 271-3). Moreover, the hero’s deranged self-complacency is 
evidently shown in the prologue during his short conversation with Athena (Ai. 
91-117). In particular, when he is asked by the goddess whether he managed to 
carry out his vengeance, the hero exclaims ‘I can freely boast of it, and I don’t 
deny that I did it’ (Κόμπος πάρεστι κοὐκ ἀπαρνοῦμαι τὸ μή, Ai. 96). Ajax, 
also, exults that the Atreidae will never again dishonour him (Ὥστ' οὔποτ' 
Αἴαντ', οἶδ', ἀτιμάσουσ' ἔτι, Ai. 98) for, in his deluded view, they are dead 
(Τεθνᾶσιν ἅνδρες, Ai. 99). When Athena ironically asks Ajax about his 
treatment of Odysseus, the hero boasts about keeping his enemy as ‘a most 
welcome prisoner’(ἥδιστος δεσμώτης Ai. 105) in his tent,739 in order to torture 
him before killing him (Μάστιγι πρῶτον νῶτα φοινιχθεὶς θάνῃ, Ai. 110). As I 
have mentioned before, it is during this exchange of words that the actor 
playing the protagonist might have burst out with loud laughter.740 What is 
more, the two possible moments for Ajax to have laughed are suggested in that 
part of the conversation which particularly concerns the hero’s treatment of 
Odysseus.741 In this respect, we may recognize the fact that, should have Ajax 
laughed just before line 105 or 108, he would have been expressing his 
malicious delight at capturing his most detested enemy. In other words, the 
hero’s deranged laughter would be, in fact, also the expression of his exultation 
over defeating Odysseus.742 Such interpretation has been proposed by Gustav 
                                               
739 Literally ‘the sweetest prisoner’. 
740 Cf. section 4.2.1. above. 
741 Kamerbeek (1953) 76 n. 303: ‘Somewhere Ajax must laugh; probably before vs. 108 (or before 
105)’. 
742 Arnould (1990) 228-9: ‘le rire de triomphe et l’insulte’.  
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Grossmann, in his article entitled ‘Das Lachen des Aias’ (1968). According to 
the German scholar, Ajax’s insane laughter occurs as an ironic inversion of the 
heroic laughter of triumph well known in the Homeric poems.743 However, the 
irony of the situation of the Sophoclean hero is the fact that his triumph takes 
place only in his mind. After Ajax regains his senses, he regards the temporary 
stroke of madness as well as the deeds he committed in such state as utterly 
shameful.744 Moreover, the actions which made him laugh in his delusion, now, 
when he is sobre, make him cry (‘with some difficulty he eventually returned to 
sanity, and when he saw the house so full of carnage he struck his head and 
cried aloud’, ἔμφρων μόλις πως ξὺν χρόνῳ καθίσταται, / καὶ πλῆρες ἄτης ὡς 
διοπτεύει στέγος, / παίσας κάρα θώϋξεν, Ai. 306-8). Indeed, the hero 
recognizes the fact that his previous laughter was completely misplaced. 
In the Ajax, therefore, we may notice that the hero’s deranged laughter of 
mistaken triumph (Ai. 303 and possibly emitted onstage in the prologue) only 
increases the dramatic effect of his ominous derangement, which brings him 
public disgrace and loss of honour. In other words, Ajax’s mad laughter 
anticipates the ruin of a once glorious warrior, which is the central theme of this 
tragedy.745 Since ‘madness’, in the words of Padel, ‘is the perfect image of a 
tragic fall”,746 we may agree that Sophocles also evokes the image of the hero 
laughing in frenzy for tragic purposes.  
4.2.5. Mockery 
Derision regards interpersonal behaviours aimed at expressing and 
communicating one’s disdain or contempt towards others. As mentioned 
before, it is a purposeful act with the intention to depreciate the target of 
                                               
743 Grossmann (1968) 71. 
744 Padel (1995) 155: ‘Ajax is shamed and dishonoured by having been mad, having failed to do 
what he meant, and having let his enemies live; and he is ashamed at killing cattle… All these 
are elements of his shame’. 
745 Barlow (1981)113: ‘the humiliation of a great man through madness’. 
746 Padel (1995) 241.  
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ridicule, and may lead to the damage of reputation in society. In other words, 
to dispense mockery, generally, means to treat another with disrespect.747 
The title character of the Antigone reveals a great sensitivity to being an 
object of other’s laughter in the fourth episode of the play. In particular, the 
daughter of Oedipus defies Creon’s orders not to bury the body of Polynices for 
his being a traitor to the city of Thebes (Ant. 21-38; 45-6). Antigone, however, 
performs funerary rites over her brother’s corpse, and once caught, she is 
sentenced to being buried alive in a cave (Ant. 773-80). In the kommos scene, 
while she is being led to her death, the Chorus praises her glorious deed (‘Is it 
not with glory and with praise that you depart to this cavern of the dead?’, 
Οὐκοῦν κλεινὴ καὶ ἔπαινον ἔχουσ' / ἐς τόδ' ἀπέρχῃ κεῦθος νεκύων; Ant. 817-
18).748 When Antigone compares her fate to that of Niobe, a descendent of Zeus, 
who died through petrification (Ant. 823-33), the Old Theban Men profess that 
she too will gain similar fame after death (‘it is a great thing for the departed to 
have the credit of a fate like that of those equal to gods, both in life and later in 
death’, Καίτοι φθιμένῃ μέγα κἀκοῦσαι / τοῖς ἰσοθέοις ἔγκληρα λαχεῖν / 
ζῶσαν καὶ ἔπειτα θανοῦσαν, Ant. 836-8). Surprisingly, Antigone does not 
receive these words of praise well (Ant. 838-52): 
Αν.  οἴμοι γελῶμαι.  
τί με, πρὸς θεῶν πατρῴων.  
οὐκ οἰχομέναν ὑβρίζεις,  
ἀλλ᾽ ἐπίφαντον; 
Ὦ πόλις, ὦ πόλεως  
πολυκτήμονες ἄνδρες·  
ἰὼ Διρκαῖαι κρῆναι Θή- 
βας τ' εὐαρμάτου ἄλσος, ἔμ- 
πας ξυμμάρτυρας ὔμμ' ἐπικτῶμαι,  
οἵα φίλων ἄκλαυτος, οἵοις νόμοις  
πρὸς ἕργμα τυμβόχωστον ἔρ- 
χομαι τάφου ποταινίου·  
ἰὼ δύστανος, βροτοῖς  
οὔτε <νεκρὸς> νεκροῖσιν  
                                               
747 Cf. chapter I, section 1.3.5.4. 
748 Translation in Lloyd-Jones (1994b) 81. Hereon, I adduce other English quotes from this 
edition of the Antigone, unless stated otherwise. 
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μέτοικος, οὐ ζῶσιν, οὐ θανοῦσιν.  
Antigone:  Ah, I am laughed at! 
Why, by the gods of my fathers, do you 
Insult me not 
When I have gone 
But when you see 
Me still before you? 
   O city, O men 
     Of the city, with 
   Your many possessions! 
     Ah, springs of Dirkê 
   And sacred ground 
     Of Thebes of the 
   Beautiful chariots – at least 
     You will be 
   Witnesses to how I go, un- 
     Lamented by any 
   Friends, and because of what 
     Kinds of laws, to the high- 
   Heaped prison of my 
     Tomb, my strange and 
   Dreadful grave. Ah, 
     Unfortunate that I am – 
   Neither living among those 
     Who are alive, nor 
   Dwelling as a corpse 
     Among corpses, having 
   No home with either 
     The living of the dead.749 
As we may observe, Antigone’s complaint at the words of the Old Men of 
Thebes comes as unexpected. Earlier, in the first episode, the girl expressed her 
determination in fulfilling her sisterly duty towards her dead brother, although 
she knew it would mean breaking the law (Ant. 21-38). Moreover, she was fully 
aware that her civic disobedience would bring upon her the ultimate 
punishment, however, in spite of this, she kept to her decision with full 
conviction that it was the right thing to do (‘It is honorable for me to do this and 
die’, καλόν μοι τοῦτο ποιούσῃ θανεῖν, Ant. 72). Yet, once Antigone faces the 
anticipated consequences for her actions and receives the expected praise from 
others for her act of defiance, she behaves in a manner which contradicts her 
                                               
749 Translation in Gibbons and Segal (2003) 91-2. 
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words earlier expressed.750 In fact, with her surprising exclamation, ‘Ah, I am 
laughed at!’ (οἴμοι γελῶμαι, Ant. 838), it is evident that she regards the Chorus’ 
praise of her and favourable comparison to the gods as an insult.751 In this 
reference to laughter, we may recognize that the protagonist evokes the idea of 
mockery by using the passive form of the verb γελάω, with which she 
considers herself to be object of the Chorus’ laughter.752 Furthermore, she 
accuses the Old Theban Men of insulting her (ὑβρίζεις, Ant. 840) for expressing 
their opinion into her face, albeit sympathetic, about her coming to die in 
glorious fashion and not waiting for the moment after her death (Ant. 838-41). 
Antigone, hence, reacts in a pejorative manner to the discernible praise of her 
brave and heroic deed. In effect, she evokes the image of derisive laughter to 
denote her negative response to the Chorus’ approval of her heroism. In short, 
she considers their words to be a mockery of her person. 
The question, therefore, rises why should Antigone feel mocked by the 
Chorus of Old Theban Men, who speak of her facing death with glory and 
praise (κλεινὴ καὶ ἔπαινον ἔχουσ', Ant. 817)? In my opinion, a convincing 
explanation has been provided by Robert Chodkowski in his 2012 Polish 
edition of the tragedy. Accordingly, the scholar points out that, as Antigone is 
being led to death, her distinguishable heroism, previously expressed in the 
first part of the play, gives way to her emotions. In other words, in her last 
moments of life, the title character reacts more as a young girl reluctant to die 
than as a hero.753 This is noticeable in her regrets, expressed further in the 
                                               
750 Blundell (1989) 110. 
751 Gibbons and Segal (2003) 149 n. 899/839. 
752 Griffith (1999) 270-1 n. 839-52. This aspect of laughter is, generally, recognized in most 
translations, e.g. Jebb (1928) 155: ‘Ah, I am mocked’; Storr (1912) 379: ‘Alack, alack! Ye mock 
me’; Brown (1987) 91: ‘Oh, this is mockery’; Lloyd-Jones (1994b) 83: ‘Ah, I am being mocked!’; 
Slavitt (2007) 38: ‘You mock me?’. 
753 Chodkowski (2012) 260 n. 106: ‘In the first part of the play, Antigone was overwhelemed 
with heroic passion, however, now her disposition of a young girl comes out, of one is reluctant 
to die’ (‘W pierwszej części sztuki Antygona była ogarnięta heroicznym uniesieniem, obecnie 
do głosu dochodzi jej natura młodej dziewczyny, która broni się przed śmiercią’). My 
translation. 
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kommos scene, about not having the chance of being married (Ant. 876-8; 916-
17), nor having children (Ant. 918). Although it is obvious that Antigone shows 
no signs of remorse for her deed, nevertheless, she is overwhelmed with 
sadness at the fact of dying prematurely. In this respect, we may notice a 
discrepancy occurring between the protagonist and the Chorus in the 
perception of her fate: the heroine views her misfortunes from the point of a 
young woman, whereas the Old Men of Thebes regard them as those of a 
glorious hero. As a result of this discordance of perception, Antigone becomes 
irritated with the treatment she receives from the Chorus, considering it to be 
disrespectful and insulting. As we can see, one’s misapprehension of another’s 
feelings may be perceived as an act of derision.754 
Incredulous opinions may be regarded as mockery, as well. In the 
Electra, the title character has come to believe in the false news about Orestes’ 
death (El. 808-22). After the kommos scene in the second stasimon, in which 
Electra laments upon the loss of her brother as the long-awaited avenger of her 
murdered father (El. 823-70), she encounters her sister Chrysothemis, who 
brings to her tidings of joy (El. 871-80): 
Χρ.  Ὑφ' ἡδονῆς τοι, φιλτάτη, διώκομαι  
τὸ κόσμιον μεθεῖσα σὺν τάχει μολεῖν·  
φέρω γὰρ ἡδονάς τε κἀνάπαυλαν ὧν  
πάροιθεν εἶχες καὶ κατέστενες κακῶν.  
Ηλ.  Πόθεν δ' ἂν εὕροις τῶν ἐμῶν σὺ πημάτων  
ἄρηξιν, οἷς ἴασιν οὐκ ἔνεστ' ἰδεῖν;  
Χρ.  Πάρεστ' Ὀρέστης ἡμίν, ἴσθι τοῦτ' ἐμοῦ  
κλύουσ', ἐναργῶς, ὥσπερ εἰσορᾷς ἐμέ.  
Ηλ.  ἀλλ' ἦ μέμηνας, ὦ τάλαινα, κἀπὶ τοῖς  
σαυτῆς κακοῖσι κἀπὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς γελᾷς; 
Chrysothemis: Delight, dearest one, spurs me to come fast, letting go care 
for dignity! For I bring happiness and relief from your 
previous troubles, over which you have lamented. 
Electra: And where could you find help for my sorrows, for which it 
is possible to see a remedy? 
                                               
754 For an alternative interpretation of the reference to laughter, see Brown (1987) 194 n. 839-52: 
‘Antigone is conscious only of the cruelty and injustice of Creon’s sentence, and the ‘mockery’ 
and ‘insult’ lie in trying to present it as a privilege’. 
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Chrysothemis: We have Orestes here – know this from me – unmistakably, 
just as you see me! 
Electra:  Are you mad, poor creature, and are you mocking my 
troubles and your own? 
Evidently, Electra gives no credence to her sister’s words about their brother’s 
arrival to Mycenae.755 The reason for this is obvious, for the heroine has just 
recently heard for herself about the death of Orestes from the stranger who 
brought the news to the queen (El. 673-763). Consequently, she considers 
Chrysothemis’ words to be a sign of either madness (μέμηνας, El. 879) or 
mockery (γελᾷς, El. 880). Here, the verb γελάω clearly evokes the idea of 
laughter in connection with derision. Utter disbelief has Electra disregard her 
sister’s discovery and reject it as mere ridicule of their mutual misfortune. 
Despite Chrysosthemis’ denial of mockery and further explanataion of how she 
came about this revelation (El. 892-919), Electra reaffirms only of her sister’s 
madness (‘Alas, how I have been pitying you for your folly all this while!’, Φεῦ 
τῆς ἀνοίας, ὥς σ' ἐποικτίρω πάλαι, El. 920) and reveals to her the sad news, 
which she has earlier learned from the stranger (‘He is dead, poor creature! 
Your chance of salvation by him is lost; do not look to him!’, Τέθνηκεν, ὦ 
τάλαινα· τἀκείνου δέ σοι / σωτήρι' ἔρρει· μηδὲν ἐς κεῖνόν γ' ὅρα, El. 924-5). In 
the Electra, therefore, the idea of derisive laughter is evoked in connection with 
the title protagonist’s disbelief in her sister’s revelation. 
Sophoclean characters fear of incurring derisive laughter in others. In the 
Oedipus at Colonus, Theseus takes certain actions in order to prevent the 
possibility of becoming the object of mockery. The Athenian king has granted 
asylum to the blind Oedipus (OC 631-41), promising to protect him in case of 
any danger (OC 649). However, Creon arrives at Colonus with his men 
determined to bring his brother-in-law back to Thebes (OC 728-60). When 
Oedipus resists, the Thebans inform him of having already abducted his 
daughter Ismene (OC 818-19) and seize his other child, Antigone (OC 826-32), 
                                               
755 Finglass (2007) 376 n. 879-80. 
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who accompanied her father in his exile. Upon hearing the calls of the Chorus, 
Theseus comes to Oedipus’ aid and orders his attendant to form a search party 
in order to reclaim the two abducted girls (OC 897-903): 
Θη. οὔκουν τις ὡς τάχιστα προσπόλων μολὼν  
πρὸς τούσδε βωμούς, πάντ᾽ ἀναγκάσει λεὼν  
ἄνιππον ἱππότην τε θυμάτων ἄπο  
σπεύδειν ἀπὸ ῥυτῆρος, ἔνθα δίστομοι  
μάλιστα συμβάλλουσιν ἐμπόρων ὁδοί,  
ὡς μὴ παρέλθωσ᾽ αἱ κόραι, γέλως δ᾽ ἐγὼ  
ξένῳ γένωμαι τῷδε, χειρωθεὶς βίᾳ. 
Theseus:  Ho! hasten to the altars, one of you, 
Command my liegemen leave the sacrifice 
And hurry, foot and horse, with rein unchecked, 
To where the paths that packmen use diverge, 
Lest the two maidens slip away, and I 
Become a mockery to this my guest, 
As one despoiled by force.756 
Evidently, Theseus is willing to keep his promise given to Oedipus in line 649. 
Should he fail to do so, then he would be violating two laws sacred to the 
Greeks: 1) ξενία, i.e. the law of hospitality, and 2) ἱκετεία, i.e. the law of 
suppliancy, both considered to be ‘formal relationships involving reciprocal 
rights and obligations’.757 Once Oedipus has been granted asylum in Colonus, 
he has become an official guest (ξένος) but also supplicant (ἱκέτης) to the 
Athenian king.  
In this respect, it is clear that, by coming to his guest’s aid, Theseus fulfils 
a formal obligation towards Oedipus. In the passage quoted above, he 
specifically refers to this in lines 902-3, in which he expresses his fear of 
becoming a mockery to his guest, should he fail to bring the two girls back (ὡς 
μὴ παρέλθωσ᾽ αἱ κόραι, γέλως δ᾽ ἐγὼ / ξένῳ γένωμαι τῷδε, χειρωθεὶς βίᾳ). 
It is, hence, apparent that the Athenian hero wishes to avoid becoming a 
laughing-stock (γέλως δ᾽ ἐγὼ) in the eyes of his guest (ξένῳ γένωμαι τῷδε) for 
not being able to resist the violence inflicted (χειρωθεὶς βίᾳ). We may, then, 
                                               
756 Translation in Storr (1912) 237. 
757 Belfiore (1998) 144. 
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recognize that the noun γέλως denotes derision.758 In other words, Theseus 
sends his men to retake Oedipus’ daughters in order to fulfil his duty as a host 
and a person earlier supplicated to,759 but also to avoid the possibility of 
becoming the object of his guest’s mockery. 
Some scholars, however, favour another interpretation for the word 
ξένος, as they render it ‘stranger’ and not ‘guest’. As a result, the term in OC 
903 would not refer to Oedipus as the ‘guest’ of the Athenian king, but to 
Creon, the ‘stranger’, who has used violence against his brother-in-law. 
Moreover, if we accept a different reading for ξένος in this example, then the 
meaning of γέλως in OC 902 alters, as well. In this case, I will discuss this 
example once more in section 4.2.7. below, in which I analyze those Sophoclean 
references to laughter evoked in connection with the concept of triumph. 
 
As it has emerged from the discussion in this section, in the tragedies of 
Sophocles, different circumstances may occasion derision. Firstly, we have seen 
that one’s disbelief in the views of others may have one discredit these opinions 
and regard them as a mockery (El. 880). Secondly, one’s misapprehension may 
be also considered to be a derisive act of depreciating another (Ant. 838). And 
finally, one’s failure to act accordingly to a situation may provoke mockery (OC 
902). In all three cases, laughter is evoked in connection with incredulous 
words, misunderstood views or failed actions, however, not in regard of the 
rapport between two or more characters. In other words, these few examples 
present laughter in terms of a temporary act of disdain (El. 880; Ant. 838) or 
possible loss of face (OC 902), but not as a signifier of interpersonal relations. 
Yet, mockery may signal stronger emotions than only that of disdain if it is 
dispensed amongst people opposed to each other. When the rapport between 
two or more persons is of antagonistic nature, one’s laughter becomes the 
                                               
758 Cf. Kamerbeek (1984) 132 n. 897-904 s.v. γέλως: ‘food for laughter, object of derision’. 
759 Belfiore (1998) 146. 
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manifestation of mutual unfriendliness or enmity. I would like to now pay 
attention to those Sophoclean examples in which the terminology for laughter 
is used to denote outright hostility between the characters. 
4.2.6. Hostility  
In fifth-century literature, the Greek term φιλία is used to signify 
relationships based on affection, friendliness or alliance. Chiefly translated as 
‘friendship’ or ‘kinsmanship’,760 this word denotes various types of rapports 
amongst family members: parents, children, siblings, spouses, relatives but also 
friends, business partners, citizens of a polis or even between other Greek 
communities, which are based on reciprocity and solidarity.761 Φιλία, according 
to Schein, ‘allows, even requires, that one person think of another as someone 
on whom to rely and who can rely on one in turn’.762 Reliability, therefore, is 
crucial among those who consider themselves to be φίλοι, literally translated as 
‘friends’, ‘beloved’, ‘dear ones’ or ‘our own’.763 According to Belfiore, apart 
from possible reciprocal affection, such people also have ‘ethical and legal 
obligations to help one another’.764 In the classical period, therefore, close 
relationships, whether of personal, social or even political character, bonded 
people with affection and trust, but also with mutual responsibility.  
Yet, the ties of φιλία may be destroyed, should one fail to fulfil the 
expectations of the relationship. As a consequence, the previous rapport of 
reciprocal good-will converts into mutual enmity, whereas people turn into 
explicit ἐχθροί, ‘enemies’.765 As we will see below, Sophocles applies the 
                                               
760 LSJ s.v. φιλία. For the history and evolution of the semantics of the term, cf. Schein (1988) 
182-90. 
761 For a discussion on the various rapports regarded as φιλία, see Blundell (1989) 31-50 
762 Schein (1988) 179. 
763 LSJ s.v. φίλος. For the meaning of ‘one’s own’ (‘swój’) as the sematic prototype of the term, 
see the Introduction in Sowa (2007) 8. 
764 Belfiore (2000) 19. 
765 Blundell (1989) 37. 
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language of laughter in relation to the hostility that has occurred between 
φίλοι. 
Enmity between family members may be the result of one’s 
disappointment with the other. In particular, the tragedy Antigone shows the 
disruption of the loving relationship between the title character and her sister. 
In the prologue of the play, Antigone reveals to Ismene her plan to bury their 
brother Polynices, whose body, by the order of king Creon, was supposed to be 
left unburied after the battle of Thebes (‘Will you bury the dead man, together 
with this hand of mine?’, Εἰ τὸν νεκρὸν ξὺν τῇδε κουφιεῖς χερί, Ant. 43). Her 
sister, however, afraid of committing an act of defiance against the city and its 
ruler, refuses to assist the illegal burial (Ant. 49-68), considering it to be futile to 
resist those with power (‘for there is no sense in actions that exceed our 
powers’, τὸ γὰρ / περισσὰ πράσσειν οὐκ ἔχει νοῦν οὐδένα, Ant. 67-8). 
Observably, Ismene’s decision immediately elicits her sister’s aversion towards 
her (‘I would not tell you to do it, and even if you were willing to act after all I 
would not be content for you to act with me!’, Οὔτ' ἂν κελεύσαιμ' οὔτ' ἄν, εἰ 
θέλοις ἔτι / πράσσειν, ἐμοῦ γ' ἂν ἡδέως δρῴης μέτα Ant. 69-70), which 
increases throughout their dialogue to the point that it turns into outright 
hostility. In effect, Antigone expresses her enmity twice towards her sister: first, 
when she is urged to conceal her dangerous plan (‘Ah, tell them all! I shall hate 
you far more if you remain silent, and do not proclaim this to all’, Οἴμοι, 
καταύδα· πολλὸν ἐχθίων ἔσῃ / σιγῶσ', ἐὰν μὴ πᾶσι κηρύξῃς τάδε, Ant. 86-7); 
and second, when she is told not to attempt the impossible (‘If you say that, you 
will be hated by me, and you will justly incur the hatred of the dead man’, Εἰ 
ταῦτα λέξεις, ἐχθαρῇ μὲν ἐξ ἐμοῦ / ἐχθρὰ δὲ τῷ θανόντι προσκείσῃ δίκῃ, 
Ant. 93-4). The title character, then, expresses sarcastically her determination in 
fulfilling her obligation towards the deceased brother by herself and leaves her 
disappointing sister alone (Ant. 95-7). Therefore, by refusing her sister, Ismene 
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has incurred Antigone’s animosity, which, consequently has led to the 
disruption of their familial rapport. 
It is in relation to this perverted bond between the two daughters of 
Oedipus that Sophocles applies the language of laughter in the third episode of 
the tragedy. Antigone has been arrested by the king’s guards for breaking the 
law that forbade Polynices any burial rites (Ant. 376ff.). When Creon accuses 
also Ismene of being her sister’s accomplice in the crime, she immediately 
accepts the allegations (Ant. 536-51): 
Ισ.  Δέδρακα τοὔργον, εἴπερ ἥδ' ὁμορροθεῖ, 
καὶ ξυμμετίσχω καὶ φέρω τῆς αἰτίας.  
Αν.   Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐάσει τοῦτό γ' ἡ Δίκη σ', ἐπεὶ  
οὔτ' ἠθέλησας οὔτ' ἐγὼ 'κοινωσάμην.  
Ισ.   Ἀλλ' ἐν κακοῖς τοῖς σοῖσιν οὐκ αἰσχύνομαι  
ξύμπλουν ἐμαυτὴν τοῦ πάθους ποιουμένη.  
Αν.  Ὧν τοὔργον Ἅιδης χοἰ κάτω ξυνίστορες·  
λόγοις δ' ἐγὼ φιλοῦσαν οὐ στέργω φίλην.  
Ισ.   Μήτοι, κασιγνήτη, μ' ἀτιμάσῃς τὸ μὴ οὐ  
θανεῖν τε σὺν σοὶ τὸν θανόντα θ' ἁγνίσαι.  
Αν.  Μή μοι θάνῃς σὺ κοινά, μηδ' ἃ μὴ 'θιγες  
ποιοῦ σεαυτῆς· ἀρκέσω θνῄσκουσ' ἐγώ.  
Ισ.   Καὶ τίς βίος μοι σοῦ λελειμμένῃ φίλος;  
Αν.  Κρέοντ' ἐρώτα· τοῦδε γὰρ σὺ κηδεμών.   
Ισ.   Τί ταῦτ' ἀνιᾷς μ' οὐδὲν ὠφελουμένη;  
Αν.   Ἀλγοῦσα μὲν δῆτ', εἰ γελῶ γ', ἐν σοὶ γελῶ.  
Ismene:  I did the deed, if she agrees, and I take and bear my share of 
the blame. 
Antigone: Why, justice will not allow you this, since you refused and I 
was not your associate! 
Ismene: But it you time of trouble I am not ashamed to make myself a 
fellow voyager in your suffering. 
Antigone: Hades and those below know to whom the deed belongs! 
And I do not tolerate a loved one who shows her love only in 
words. 
Ismene: Sister, do no so dishonour me as not to let me die with you 
and grant the dead man proper rites! 
Antigone: Do not try to share my death, and do not claim as your own 
something you never put a hand to! My death will be enough! 
Ismene: And what desire for life will be mine if you leave me? 
Antigone: Ask Creon! You are his champion! 
Ismene: Why do you give me such pain, when it does you no good? 
Antigone: It grieves me to mock you, if I do mock you. 
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As we can see, Ismene claims to share responsibility for the forbidden deed, in 
order to show her support for her sibling. However, Antigone rejects such late 
display of familial loyalty (οὔτ' ἠθέλησας οὔτ' ἐγὼ 'κοινωσάμην, Ant. 539), 
reaffirms the earlier expressed hatred towards her sister (λόγοις δ' ἐγὼ 
φιλοῦσαν οὐ στέργω φίλην, Ant. 543), and uses sarcasm against her (Κρέοντ' 
ἐρώτα· τοῦδε γὰρ σὺ κηδεμών, Ant. 549). When Ismene complains about her 
sister’s taunt causing her great pain (Ant. 550),766 Antigone calls attention to her 
own sisterly pain by saying ‘it grieves me to mock you, if I do mock you’ 
(Ἀλγοῦσα μὲν δῆτ', εἰ γελῶ γ', ἐν σοὶ γελῶ, Ant. 551). With such statement, 
the title protagonist makes it clear that she grieves over the fact of the hostility 
that has risen between them, which compels her to act towards her sister in a 
particular way typical of an antagonist.767 In line 551, the verb γελῶ, ‘I laugh’, 
denotes (twice) Antigone’s hostile disposition towards her sister provoked by 
the latter’s earlier refusal to fulfil her familial duty.768 As we can see, one’s 
action, or rather its lack may be considered to be an act of betrayal of sisterly 
φιλία. 
 
On the basis of the example above it becomes apparent that the reference 
to hostile laughter occurs in the context of perversed family bonds. As we have 
seen, the ties between Antigone and Ismene become disrupted by one side of 
the relationship failing to fulfil the expectations of the other. As a consequence 
                                               
766 Griffith (1999) 215 n. 549: ‘a sneer by which Ismene is understandably ‘hurt’ (550)’. 
767 Brown (1987) 167 n. 551-60 points out the softening of Antigone’s tone in line 551, in which 
she admits ‘her grief at the estrangement’. Cf. the translation of line 551, albeit without the 
reference to laughter, by Slavitt (2007): ‘…It gives me pain to say harsh things’. The opinion of 
Griffith (1999) 215 n. 550-3, who regards Antigone in line 551 regretting the fact of her mockery 
directed at Creon being also directed at Ismene, seems unconvincing. 
768 In my analysis, I have followed Heath’s conjecture εἰ γελῶ γ', commonly accepted by other 
editors, cf. ad loc. Storr (1912); Jebb (1928); Brown (1987) Lloyd-Jones and Wilson (1990); Griffith 
(1999). Few scholars, e.g. Dain and Mazon (1967), retain the original lesson εἰ  γέλωτ’ from the 
manuscripts, which transmit the accusative (sometimes in the form of γελῶτ’) of the noun 
γέλως. For the transmission of the text, cf.  Lloyd-Jones and Wilson (1990) v-xvi. However, 
accepting this lesson would not have changed the interpretation of laughter in line 551. 
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of the betrayal of φιλία, the disappointed side has the right to laugh at its 
offender. In this example, the applied laughter-word clearly refers to the hostile 
rapport between the antagonized φίλοι. 
 As I will demonstrate below, there are many more references to laughter 
in regard of the disrupted bonds of φιλία between Sophoclean characters. 
However, what distinguishes the next group of examples from the one in Ant. 
551 discussed above, is the fact that the rapport between the former φίλοι is not 
only based on hostility, often mutual, but also on outright aggression. Although 
Antigone declares herself to be her sister’s enemy and dispenses hostile 
mockery at her, nevertheless she does not seek Ismene’s ruin. In this unique 
case, the applied laughter-word refers to the enmity but not ill will of one sister 
towards the other. Hatred and malice are the basis of triumphant laughter, the 
subject of the following section. 
4.2.7. Triumph  
A laugh of triumph may denote hostile rapports, in which one side gains 
superiority over the other by acts of violence or injustice. As it will emerge from 
the discussion below, triumphant laughter may occur amongst those 
Sophoclean characters, whose conduct is governed by the basic moral principle 
contained in the maxim ‘help your friends and harm your enemies’.769 
According to this ethical code, one is expected to act in a certain manner 
appropriate to the quality of the relationship with another, i.e. to support and 
provide aid to those considered to be φίλοι, but also to inflict injuries or 
suffering on those regarded as ἐχθροί. Notably, the second part of the principle 
proves of the importance to the Greeks of retaliation or repayment in kind for 
received harm, since enmity, generally, is caused by one’s act of wronging 
                                               
769 Pl. Men. 71 e 4: τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς κακῶς. Scholars agree that this 
ethical code, although dominant in the heroic society of the times of Homer, was still valid in 
the fifth century and continued to be recognized unti the Roman period, cf. Knox (1961) 3; 
Blundell (1989) 26. 
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another.770 As a consequence, the unjust mistreatment stimulates aggression in 
the victim towards the offender, which may lead to the use of violence against 
the antagonist. Thus, the traditional moral code of ‘helping friends and 
harming enemies’ functions, simultaneously, as a definition of justice for 
injuries sustained.771  
This ethos determines the behaviour of those, who have become enemies 
after having the bonds of φιλία disrupted. In Sophoclean drama, we may find 
examples in which the image of triumphant laughter is evoked in relation to the 
antagonism between such φίλοι:772 1) spouses, 2) parents and children, 3) 
siblings, 4) kin and 5) allies. 
4.2.7.1. Spouses 
The vanquish of one’s detested spouse may occasion a feeling of 
triumph. In the Electra, Clytaemestra is described as laughing triumphantly at 
the thought of having murdered her husband, Agamemnon. In the first 
episode, Electra, who has despised her mother ever since the death of her 
father, gives a detailed account to the Chorus on her mother’s actions ever since 
the killing of the legitimate king (El. 261-81): 
Ηλ.  ᾗ πρῶτα μὲν τὰ μητρὸς ἥ μ' ἐγείνατο  
ἔχθιστα συμβέβηκεν· εἶτα δώμασιν  
ἐν τοῖς ἐμαυτῆς τοῖς φονεῦσι τοῦ πατρὸς  
ξύνειμι, κἀκ τῶνδ' ἄρχομαι, κἀκ τῶνδέ μοι  
λαβεῖν θ' ὁμοίως καὶ τὸ τητᾶσθαι πέλει.  
Ἔπειτα ποίας ἡμέρας δοκεῖς μ' ἄγειν,  
ὅταν θρόνοις Αἴγισθον ἐνθακοῦντ' ἴδω  
τοῖσιν πατρῴοις, εἰσίδω δ' ἐσθήματα  
φοροῦντ' ἐκείνῳ ταὐτὰ καὶ παρεστίους  
σπένδοντα λοιβὰς ἔνθ' ἐκεῖνον ὤλεσεν;  
ἴδω δὲ τούτων τὴν τελευταίαν ὕβριν,  
τὸν αὐτοφόντην ἡμὶν ἐν κοίτῃ πατρὸς  
ξὺν τῇ ταλαίνῃ μητρί, μητέρ' εἰ χρεὼν  
ταύτην προσαυδᾶν τῷδε συγκοιμωμένην.  
                                               
770 Blundell (1989) 38. 
771 Cohen (1995) 65-6. 
772 For a broader discussion on different φίλοι, cf. Blundell (1989) 39-49. 
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ἡ δ᾽ ὧδε τλήμων ὥστε τῷ μιάστορι  
ξύνεστ᾽, ἐρινὺν οὔτιν᾽ ἐκφοβουμένη:  
ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ ἐγγελῶσα τοῖς ποιουμένοις,  
εὑροῦσ᾽ ἐκείνην ἡμέραν, ἐν ᾗ τότε  
πατέρα τὸν ἀμὸν ἐκ δόλου κατέκτανεν,  
ταύτῃ χοροὺς ἵστησι καὶ μηλοσφαγεῖ  
θεοῖσιν ἔμμην᾽ ἱερὰ τοῖς σωτηρίοις. 
Electra:  First, my relation with the mother who bore me is one of 
bitter enmity; next, I am living in my own home with my 
father’s murderers; they are my rulers, and it rests with them 
whether I receive or go without. And then what kind of days 
do you think I pass when I see Aegisthus sitting on my 
father’s throne, and when I see him wearing the same clothes 
he wore, and pouring libations by the same hearth at which 
he murdered him; and when I see their final outrage, the 
murderer in my father’s bed with my miserable mother, if she 
cann be called mother when she sleeps with him? But she is 
so abandoned that she lives with the polluter, having no fear 
of any Erinys; but as though she is gloating over what she 
has done, she observes the day on which she treacherously 
killed my father and on it sets up dances and slaughters 
cattle, sacrificing monthly victims to the gods that have 
preserved her. 
In this passage, Electra calls attention to the fact that every month Clytaemestra 
marks the anniversary of her shameful crime with festivities and sacrifices (El. 
278-81), during which she seems to be ‘gloating over what she has done’ 
(ὥσπερ ἐγγελῶσα τοῖς ποιουμένοις, El. 277).773 Here, Electra uses the verb 
ἐγγελάω, ‘laugh at, mock’, to denote her mother’s state of mind during the 
monthly celebrations. In her view, the queen performs these practices in order 
to commemorate not the death of her husband, but the fact of having him 
murdered. Therefore, we may notice that Electra’s reference to Clytaemestra’s 
laughter (ἐγγελῶσα) indicates the queen’s continuous exultation over having 
killed Agamemnon.774 In this respect, the daughter describes her mother as 
laughing triumphantly over her deed.775 Therefore, in line 277, ἐγγελάω 
                                               
773 Cf. the translation of line 277 in Meineck and Woodruff (2007) 130: ‘It’s as if she’s laughing 
away her crimes’. 
774 Cf. Jebb (1894) 44 n. 277: ‘with mocking exultation in her course of conduct’. 
775 Cf. Kells (1973) 98: ‘Here Clytaemnestra triumphs at her own deeds’. In contrast Finglass 
(2007) 182 n. 277, who argues for the interpretation of ‘mockery’ and states that the laughter-
word ‘cannot mean ‘exulting in’’. 
230 
 
denotes the queen’s triumphant laughter over the successful killing of her 
husband.776  
We must, however, keep in mind the fact that such an unfavourable 
image of Clytaemestra is simultaneously the reflection of her daughter’s 
feelings towards her. As Electra mentions herself in the passage quoted above, 
after the killing of Agamemnon, her mother has become her ‘bitter enemy’ 
(ἔχθιστα συμβέβηκεν, El. 261). In addition to this, Electra not only had to share 
the same house with his murderers (τοῖς φονεῦσι τοῦ πατρὸς / ξύνειμι, El. 
263-4), but also had to comply with their will (κἀκ τῶνδ' ἄρχομαι, El. 264), see 
how Aegisthus usurped the role of her father as king (El. 266-70), and, to her 
dismay, observe his dishonourable union with her mother (El. 271-4). As a 
consequence of this, the relationship between Electra and her mother has been 
perverted and deveopled into outright as well as mutual hostility. In the 
following section, I will demonstrate that, in the same tragedy, Sophocles 
conjures the image of triumphant laughter in relation to the disrupted bonds of 
family φιλία between the royal mother and her children. 
4.2.7.2. Parents and children  
The hostility between Clytaemestra and her children is an important 
theme in the tragedy Electra. Again, we will see that the title heroine describes 
her mother as laughing triumphantly, however, this time over the supposed 
death of her son. In the second episode of the play, Electra and her mother 
receive the false information about Orestes’ sudden death at the Pythian games 
(El. 673-763). At first, the queen does not seem to know how to accept such 
news of her son (‘O Zeus! What of this? Am I to call it fortunate, or terrible, but 
beneficial? It is painful, if I preserve my life by means of my own calamities’, Ὦ 
                                               
776 In the second episode, Clytaemestra unfolds to Electra her motives for murdering 
Agamemnon in revenge for the sacrifice of Iphigenia, cf. El. 526-46. For this reason, the queen 
regards her deed as just, ‘Yes, Justice was his killer, not I alone’ (ἡ γὰρ Δίκη νιν εἷλεν, οὐκ ἐγὼ 
μόνη, El. 528). 
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Ζεῦ, τί ταῦτα; πότερον εὐτυχῆ λέγω / ἢ δεινὰ μέν, κέρδη δέ; λυπηρῶς δ' ἔχει, 
/ εἰ τοῖς ἐμαυτῆς τὸν βίον σῴζω κακοῖς, El. 766-8). Her uncertainty, however, 
is only shortwhile, for she soon recalls the anxiety she has lived in for so many 
years, dreading the return of her husband’s heir and avenger (El. 773-82). The 
news, albeit sad, has liberated her from this fear (El. 783-7). Electra, on the other 
hand, is stricken with grief over the loss of her brother (El. 674; 677; 788-90), but 
also of her only chance of avenging Agamemnon’s death on his murderers (‘We 
have been stopped, far from stopping you’, Πεπαύμεθ' ἡμεῖς, οὐχ ὅπως σὲ 
παύσομεν, El. 796). Moreover, she clearly acknowledges the fact that this news, 
which is utterly disastrous to herself, comes to her mother’s liking (‘Now is you 
moment of good fortune’, νῦν γὰρ εὐτυχοῦσα τυγχάνεις, El. 794). When 
Clytaemestra leaves for the palace, Electra comments upon her mother’s 
outrageous behaviour (El. 804-7):  
Ηλ. ἆρ᾽ ὑμὶν ὡς ἀλγοῦσα κὠδυνωμένη  
δεινῶς δακρῦσαι κἀπικωκῦσαι δοκεῖ  
τὸν υἱὸν ἡ δύστηνος ὧδ᾽ ὀλωλότα;  
ἀλλ᾽ ἐγγελῶσα φροῦδος: 
Electra:  Well how did she look to you – shattered by grief? 
Heartbroken mother bewailing her only son? 
No – you saw her – she went off laughing!777 
Here, it is evident that Electra condemns Clytaemestra for her failure to display 
any signs of sorrow at the loss of her son. Moreover, the daughter recognizes, to 
her dismay, that the queen accepted the news as quite favourable, since she left 
for the palace ‘laughing’ (ἐγγελῶσα, El. 807). In this line, Electra, again, 
employs the verb ἐγγελάω to describe her mother’s glee over the fortunate 
turn of events.778 Due to the fact that the queen clearly regarded Orestes as a 
dreaded enemy, it is apparent that the evoked image of her laughter may be in 
                                               
777 Translation in Carson (2001) 81. 
778 Finglass (2007) 351 n. 807. 
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relation to triumph.779 Hence, in line 807 the title heroine expresses her 
abhorrence toward her mother’s triumphant laughter. 
Electra speaks of the queen as laughing in triumph for the third time in 
the fourth episode. After receiving the urn with her brother’s (suppossedly) 
ashes (El. 1123-5), the princess expresses her grief in a long and emotionally-
charged speech (El. 1126-70). At one point, she describes her miserable state 
with Orestes being dead (El. 1149-56): 
Ηλ.  Νῦν δ' ἐκλέλοιπε ταῦτ' ἐν ἡμέρᾳ μιᾷ  
θανόντι σὺν σοί· πάντα γὰρ συναρπάσας  
θύελλ' ὅπως βέβηκας· οἴχεται πατήρ·  
τέθνηκ᾽ ἐγὼ σοί: φροῦδος αὐτὸς εἶ θανών·  
γελῶσι δ᾽ ἐχθροί· μαίνεται δ᾽ ὑφ᾽ ἡδονῆς  
μήτηρ ἀμήτωρ, ἧς ἐμοὶ σὺ πολλάκις  
φήμας λάθρᾳ προύπεμπες ὡς φανούμενος  
τιμωρὸς αὐτός. 
Electra:  And now all this has vanished in one day, with your death; 
like a whirlwind, you have gone, carrying of everything! My 
father is gone; you have killed me; you yourself are dead and 
gone. Our enemies are laughing; and our evil mother is mad 
with delight, she whom you often said in secret messages, 
that you yourself would come and punish. 
In particular, the belief of having lost Orestes adds to Electra’s misery, for now 
she is deprived of both a father and a brother (οἴχεται πατήρ· / τέθνηκ᾽ ἐγὼ 
σοί: φροῦδος αὐτὸς εἶ θανών, El. 1151-2). In addition to this, she is fully aware 
of the fact that her loss comes to the advantage of here enemies, i.e. Aegisthus 
and Clytaemestra, whom she imagines as laughing (γελῶσι δ᾽ ἐχθροί, El. 1153). 
In light of the fact that her mother earlier regarded the news of Orestes’ death 
as positive,780 it is evident that Electra, in line 1153, considers her enemies’ 
laughter to be the expression of their ultimate triumph over her and her 
deceased brother. Also, by evoking such an image of the king and queen, the 
heroine reflects her losing hope of avenging Agamemnon’s murder. 
                                               
779 Cf. the translation of line 807 in Jebb (1894) 117: ‘Nay, she left us with a laugh’; Lloyd-Jones 
(1994a) 239: ‘No, she is gone gloating’. 
780 Cf. El. 773-87.  
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Electra’s feeling of devastation appears to be shortwhile, for Orestes, 
who witnessed her lamentation upon the urn, reveals to her his true identity 
(El. 1205-23). As I have discussed before, the recently grieving sister becomes 
overwhelemed with extreme joy to the degree, that her brother has to calm her 
down.781 Furthermore, although the prince is pleased with the familial reunion 
(El. 1224-6), however, he is in haste to fulfil the plan of revenge. For this reason, 
he asks Electra to briefly explain to him the whereabouts of their enemies (El. 
1288-95): 
Ορ. Τὰ μὲν περισσεύοντα τῶν λόγων ἄφες,  
καὶ μήτε μήτηρ ὡς κακὴ δίδασκέ με  
μήθ' ὡς πατρῴαν κτῆσιν Αἴγισθος δόμων  
ἀντλεῖ, τὰ δ' ἐκχεῖ, τὰ δὲ διασπείρει μάτην·  
χρόνου γὰρ ἄν σοι καιρὸν ἐξείργοι λόγος.  
ἃ δ᾽ ἁρμόσει μοι τῷ παρόντι νῦν χρόνῳ  
σήμαιν᾽, ὅπου φανέντες ἢ κεκρυμμένοι  
γελῶντας ἐχθροὺς παύσομεν τῇ νῦν ὁδῷ. 
Orestes:  Let go all superfluous words, and do not explain to me that 
our mother is evil, nor that Aegisthus is dissipating the 
wealth of our father’s house by waste and aimless spending; 
for the recital would deprive you of the moment for action. 
But tell me what will suit the present time, where we must 
appear or where we must hide to put a stop to our enemies’ 
laughter by our present expedition. 
Orestes is determined to execute vengeance on his father’s killers and put a 
stop to the ‘enemies laughing in triumph’ (γελῶντας ἐχθροὺς παύσομεν, El. 
1295). Here, we may clearly recognize the fact that the evoked image of hostile 
laughter appears in direct connection with the idea of triumph, i.e. the 
victorious glee over the defeat of an antagonist. In fact, this was the reason for 
Orestes sending the news of his false death to the royal palace, i.e. to have his 
mother and her lover believe that their enemy, the son of Agamemnon, is dead, 
which would lull them into a false sense of security. The prince, therefore, 
envisages his enemies, Clytaemestra and Aegisthus, as laughing triumphantly 
over their suppossed good fortune. Yet, he knows that their sense of victory is 
                                               
781 For Electra’s emotional reaction to the reunion, see section 4.2.3. above. 
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temporary, for he has come to turn the tables on the illegitimate rulers and take 
revenge for the disgraceful killing of his father. 
To the children of Agamemnon, retribution will be their moment of 
triumph. Orestes, particularly, speaks of this to his sister, when he urges her to 
restrain her joy until their enemies receive punishment for their crime (El. 1299-
1300): 
Ορ.  ὅταν γὰρ εὐτυχήσωμεν, τότε 
χαίρειν παρέσται καὶ γελᾶν ἐλευθέρως. 
Orestes:  When we are triumphant, then we shall be able to rejoice and 
laugh in freedom.  
As I have discussed before, the brother asserts that he and Electra will have the 
possibility ‘to rejoice and laugh’ (χαίρειν… καὶ γελᾶν, El. 1300) when they will 
be prosperous (ὅταν γὰρ εὐτυχήσωμεν, El. 1299). Without any doubt, with 
εὐτυχήσωμεν, ‘we will be successful’, Orestes alludes to the the future victory 
over their adversaries (‘we put an end to our enemies laughter’, γελῶντας 
ἐχθροὺς παύσομεν El. 1295). Since the siblings’ good fortune depends on their 
enemies’ defeat, we may notice that the anticipated time for rejoicing and 
laughter refers to the moment in which they may express their triumph.782 In 
this case, the term γελᾶν, ‘to laugh’, in line 1300 pertains not only to the idea of 
manifesting one’s joy, but also one’s feeling of glee over a vanquished foe. 
Therefore, we can see that Orestes promises his sister to laugh triumphantly 
together, after taking revenge on their mother and her lover. 
It is apparent that the animosity between Clytaemestra and her children 
is an important theme in the tragedy Electra. Sophocles, alike Aeschylus, 
employs the language of laughter in relation to the antagonistic relationship 
between the royal mother and her two children.783 
                                               
782 The tragedy, however, does not show this moment, as it ends with Orestes leading Aegisthus 
to his death inside the palace. 
783 Cf. chapter III, section 3.2.6. 
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A parent’s misfortune caused by a son’s act of defiance may bring 
malicious delight to one’s enemies. In the Antigone, Creon fears that an act of 
betrayal of family φιλία may, generally, incur the laughter of his enemies. In 
the fourth episode, Haemon comes to speak to his father, the king of Thebes, 
after learning about Antigone being sentenced to death (Ant. 626ff.). Creon, 
however, anticipates that his son may protest against losing his fiancé, hence, 
speaks to him about the loyalty a child is expected to show towards its parent 
(Ant. 641-7): 
Κρ.  τούτου γὰρ οὕνεκ' ἄνδρες εὔχονται γονὰς  
κατηκόους φύσαντες ἐν δόμοις ἔχειν,  
ὡς καὶ τὸν ἐχθρὸν ἀνταμύνωνται κακοῖς,  
καὶ τὸν φίλον τιμῶσιν ἐξ ἴσου πατρί.  
Ὅστις δ' ἀνωφέλητα φιτύει τέκνα,  
τί τόνδ' ἂν εἴποις ἄλλο πλὴν αὑτῷ πόνους  
φῦσαι, πολὺν δὲ τοῖσιν ἐχθροῖσιν γέλων;  
Creon:  It is for this that men pray to have obedient children born to 
them in their homes, so that they may requite their father’s 
enemy with evils and honour friends as much as he. But 
when a man begets useless children, you cannot say that he 
has bred anything but troubles for himself and much laughter 
for his enemies.784 
In this passage, Creon alludes to his son’s obligation in not only obeying but 
also sharing with his parent the same disposition towards others. Accordingly, 
whom the father considers to be friends, they should also be the friends of his 
progeny, and the same in regard of the father’s enemies. In view of the king of 
Thebes, a son’s possible act of defiance would bring about only troubles for the 
father (πόνους φῦσαι, Ant. 646-7), but also ‘much laughter for his [i.e. the 
parent’s] enemies’ (πολὺν δὲ τοῖσιν ἐχθροῖσιν γέλων, Ant. 647). In this 
example, the expression πολὺς γέλως accepts the meaning ‘much laughter’, 
hence pertains to the idea of triumphant laughter, which may be dispensed by 
undefined enemies of a father upon learning about his disrupted relation with 
his progeny. Since, according to Creon, a son’s defiance becomes a father’s 
                                               
784 Translation in Brown (1987) 75. 
236 
 
misfortune, it may well bring delight to the latter’s enemies. It becomes, 
therefore, evident that in line 647 Creon evokes the image of triumphant 
laughter in a political context. 
Although Creon evokes the image of laughter in relation to undefined 
enemies, nevertheless we may notice that this reference might also imply the 
king’s rapport with his son. We may presume that should Haemon behave in a 
defiant manner, he would also become an enemy to his father, the king of 
Thebes. Without any doubt, in adducing such an example of the negative 
outcomes of a disobedient offspring, Creon alludes to the duties Haemon has 
towards him. What is more, we may recognize that the king describes their 
father-son relationship in more political, than personal terms, as he calls 
attention to the consequences the father has to face after his son’s potential 
defiance, i.e. the laughter of his enemies.785 Since Haemon’s act of disgracing his 
father would be regarded by Creon as a betrayal of their φιλία, his son would 
have then become his enemy.  
4.2.7.3. Siblings 
Hatred between siblings may rise after one’s mistreatment of the other. 
In the Oedipus at Colonus, Sophocles evokes the idea of triumphant laughter in 
relation to the animosity between the brothers Eteocles and Polynices. In the 
first episode of the play, Ismene describes to her father at Colonus about the 
current situation at Thebes. Accordingly, after the departure of Oedipus, his 
sons were supposed to share the rule over the city, however they started to 
argue over the throne (OC 371-3). The younger son Eteocles managed to gain 
the support of the Thebans and expelled his older brother from the land (OC 
374-6). In want of revenge for his unjust treatment, Polynices entered an 
alliance with the king of Argos and gathered an army of men to retake his 
                                               
785 Lloyd-Jones (1994b) 63 in line 647 translates πολὺς γέλως as ‘much delight’. 
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rightful inheritance (OC 377-81).786 Ismene, then, stresses the fact that according 
to a prophecy he shall take rule over Thebes who shall have the support of 
Oedipus (‘They say that their power will depend on you’, Ἐν σοὶ τὰ κείνων 
φασὶ γίγνεσθαι κράτη, OC 392).787 Aware of the fact that his sons are only 
interested in the throne of Thebes and not the in well-being of their disgraced 
parent, Oedipus curses both and declares not to support any sides of the 
conflict (OC 421-7).788 However, in the fourth episode, Polynices himself arrives 
at Colonus to gain his parent’s approval for his military excursion against his 
brother (OC 1254 ff.). In a lengthy speech of over 60 lines, the son argues for his 
cause and pleas for his father’s blessing (OC 1284-1345). At one point, he 
alludes to the mistreatment he and Oedipus both suffered from Eteocles (OC 
1334-9): 
Πο. αἰτῶ πιθέσθαι καὶ παρεικαθεῖν, ἐπεὶ 
 πτωχοὶ μὲν ἡμεῖς καὶ ξένοι, ξένος δὲ σύ· 
ἄλλους δὲ θωπεύοντες οἰκοῦμεν σύ τε  
κἀγώ, τὸν αὐτὸν δαίμον᾽ ἐξειληχότες.  
ὁ δ᾽ ἐν δόμοις τύραννος, ὦ τάλας ἐγώ,  
κοινῇ καθ᾽ ἡμῶν ἐγγελῶν ἁβρύνεται· 
Polynices: I beg you to be persuaded and to give way, father, for we are 
beggars and strangers, and you are a stranger. You and I both 
live on the charity of others, since we have a fate that is the 
same; and the tyrant at home, woe is me, delights in mocking 
us both together. 
In this passage, we may notice that Polynices attempts to present his younger 
brother as an enemy of his and his father. This is especially discernible in his 
unfavourable depiction of Eteocles as a tyrant who prides in laughing 
triumphantly at his exiled family (κοινῇ καθ᾽ ἡμῶν ἐγγελῶν ἁβρύνεται, OC 
1339). Polynices’ enmity towards his brother is explicit from the succeeding two 
                                               
786 Polynices along with the other six main warriors of his army constitute the famous seven 
attackers of the city; Aeschylus describes their siege in his tragedy The Seven Against Thebes.  
787 Translation in Lloyd-Jones (1994b) 457. Hereon I adduce other English quotes from this 
edition of Oedipus at Colonus, unless stated otherwise. 
788 In lines 342-5, Oedipus points to the fact that only his daughters take care of him in his 
misfortune, but non of his sons. 
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lines, in which he declares to crush Eteocles, should Oedipus support his cause 
(‘If you will stand by my purpose, with small trouble and toil I will destroy 
him’, ὅν, εἰ σὺ τἠμῇ ξυμπαραστήσῃ φρενί, / βραχεῖ σὺν ὄγκῳ καὶ χρόνῳ 
διασκεδῶ, OC 1340-1). It is, therefore, clear that in this example Polynices 
evokes the image of laughter in connection with the feeling of triumph he 
imagines his brother to express at himself and his father.789 Yet, such reference 
to Eteocles’ laughter of triumph appears to be for naught, for Oedipus spurns 
his son’s plea and curses him again. 
Despite his father’s rejection, Polynices intends to carry out his plan of 
attacking Thebes. Antigone tries to persuade him to abandon his cursed 
expedition, yet he remains determined and briefly gives his reasons for doing 
so (OC 1422-3): 
Πο.   αἰσχρὸν τὸ φεύγειν καὶ τὸ πρεσβεύοντ' ἐμὲ  
οὕτω γελᾶσθαι τοῦ κασιγνήτου πάρα. 
Polynices: To run away is shameful, and it is shameful for me, the 
senior, to be mocked like this by my brother. 
Evidently, Polynices stresses the fact of the shamefulness of being the object of 
his younger brother’s laughter (αἰσχρὸν… γελᾶσθαι). Again, he evokes the 
image of Eteocles laughing in triumph over him and presents it as an argument 
for the military expedition against Thebes. Once more the language of laughter 
is used in relation to the antagonism between Polynices and Eteocles.790 As we 
can see, both references to laughter in OC 1339 and OC 1423 reflect Polynices’ 
view of his brother’s shameful mistreatment of him, which has not only broken 
their bonds of familial φιλία, but has also turned them into political enemies. 
 
 
 
                                               
789 Cf. Miralles (2000) 409. 
790 Cf. Arnould (1990) 39. 
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4.2.7.4. Kin 
The idea of triumphant laughter caused by the betrayal of φιλία 
amongst kin is traceable in the Oedipus Rex. Abhorred with the discovery about 
his accidental murder of his father Laius and life in incest with his mother 
Jocasta, the king of Thebes blinds himself out of shame (OR 1267-76). After the 
kommos scene, in which Oedipus laments upon his miserable fate (OR 1297-
1366), the Chorus informs him about Creon coming his way (OR 1416-23): 
Χο.  Ἀλλ' ὧν ἐπαιτεῖς ἐς δέον πάρεσθ' ὅδε  
Κρέων τὸ πράσσειν καὶ τὸ βουλεύειν, ἐπεὶ  
χώρας λέλειπται μοῦνος ἀντὶ σοῦ φύλαξ.  
Οι.  Οἴμοι, τί δῆτα λέξομεν πρὸς τόνδ' ἔπος;  
τίς μοι φανεῖται πίστις ἔνδικος; τὰ γὰρ  
πάρος πρὸς αὐτὸν πάντ' ἐφεύρημαι κακός.  
Κρ.  Οὔθ' ὡς γελαστής, Οἰδίπους, ἐλήλυθα,  
οὔθ' ὡς ὀνειδιῶν τι τῶν πάρος κακῶν. 
Chorus: Here Creon comes in fit time to perform 
or give advice in what you ask of us. 
Creon is left sole ruler in your stead. 
Oedipus: Creon! Creon! What shall I say to him? 
 How can I justly hope that he will trust me? 
 In what is past I have been proved toward him 
 an utter liar. 
Creon:      Oedipus, I’ve come 
not so that I might laugh at you nor taunt you  
with evil of the past.791 
In this passage, Oedipus anticipates an unfavourable reaction from his brother-
in-law, who, as a result of the king’s ruin, has become the new ruler of Thebes. 
Yet, in the very first words addressed to his sister’s husband, Creon explains 
that he comes not ‘as a laugher’ (ὡς γελαστής, OR 1422).792 Here, we find the 
rare noun γελαστής, meaning ‘laugher’ or simply ‘he who laughs’793, used in 
the context of mockery.794 Creon, therefore, upon meeting the ruined king, 
                                               
791 Translation in Grene (2010) 137. However, other English passages of the Oedipus the King are 
quoted in the translation of Lloyd-Jones (1994a). 
792 Cf. the translations of line 1422 in Jebb (1908) 185: ‘I have not come in mockery, Oedipus’; 
Lloyd-Jones (1994a) 473: ‘I have not come to mock you, Oedipus’.  
793 The female form is γελάστρια, cf. chapter II, section 2.1.1.5. 
794 OR 1422 is the only preserved instance of the literary use of γελαστής.  
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stresses the fact that he is not going to laugh at his kin’s misfortunes, although 
he is in the position to do so (OR 1423). 
The reason for Oedipus’ apprehension of meeting his brother-in-law lies 
in the fact of the hostility that has earlier arisen between them. In the second 
episode of the play, before discovering the truth about Laius’ murder and its 
horrible consequences, Oedipus charges Creon with plotting against him (OR 
512-648). The ruler of Thebes has come to such a belief that his kin desires the 
throne, after his interrogation of the seer Teiresias, from whom he received the 
incredulous news of himself being the killer of Laius (‘I say that you are the 
murderer of the man whose murderer you are searching for!’, Φονέα σέ φημι 
τἀνδρὸς οὗ ζητεῖς κυρεῖν, OR 362). Incapable, at the time, of believing in the 
truth, Oedipus comes to his own, seemingly plausible conclusions and publicly 
expresses his accusations against the brother-in-law (‘Is it Creon, or who, that 
has made these discoveries?’, Κρέοντος ἢ σοῦ ταῦτα τἀξευρήματα; OR 378). 
Upon hearing this, Creon comes to the king and expresses his indignation 
about being rendered a traitor in political, personal and familial terms (‘a traitor 
to the city and a traitor in your eyes and in those of my friends’, κακὸς μὲν ἐν 
πόλει / κακὸς δὲ πρὸς σοῦ καὶ φίλων, OR 521-2).795 In general, Creon considers 
such accusation to be ‘a damage to himself’ (ἡ ζημία μοι, OR 520), however, 
Oedipus reaffirms his charges (OR 537, 541-2) and calls his kin a ‘bitter enemy’ 
(δυσμενῆ γὰρ καὶ βαρύν, OR 546). Regardless of the fact that Creon refutes 
these allegations with reasonable arguments (OR 583-615), the angered king 
remains implacable and, at one point, even demands that his brother-in-law 
should pay the highest price for his alleged crime (‘I want death for you’, 
θνῄσκειν… σε βούλομαι, OR 623). When the dialogue between the two 
kinsmen increases in emotionality, Jocasta appears and brings their quarrel to 
an end (OR 634-48). However, she does not manage to reconcile the opposed 
                                               
795 Creon alludes to the complexity of the allegations with Οὐ γὰρ εἰς ἁπλοῦν in OR 519, cf. 
Dawe (1982) 146. 
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men. Although Oedipus reluctantly allows his wife’s brother to go free, 
nevertheless he sustains his outright hatred at him (‘he, wherever he ism shall 
be loathed!’, οὗτος δ' ἔνθ' ἂν ᾖ στυγήσεται, OR 672). Creon leaves, recognizing 
this enmity, but not understanding the reasons for it (OR 673-5, 676-7). 
As we can see, according to Oedipus, Jocasta’s brother has betrayed their 
bonds of φιλία as kinsmen. The king particularly refers to this fact when he 
accuses Creon of plotting against him (‘If you believe that you can harm a 
kinsman and not pay the penalty, you are unwise’, Εἴ τοι νομίζεις ἄνδρα 
συγγενῆ κακῶς / δρῶν οὐχ ὑφέξειν τὴν δίκην, οὐκ εὖ φρονεῖς, OR 551-2). 
Noticeably, before the false allegations, the ruler of Thebes was in considerably 
good terms with his brother-in-law; as shown in the beginning of the play, 
Oedipus relied on the assistance of Creon (OR 68-146), emphasized the kinship 
between them (ἐμαυτοῦ γαμβρόν, OR 70; ἐμὸν κήδευμα, OR 85) and 
considered him to be an old friend (οὑξ ἀρχῆς φίλος, OR 385). In spite of this, 
as well of the fact of the lack of evidence for any plots against the king, Oedipus 
believes in his false conclusions, and, hence blames Creon for turning out to be 
a traitorous friend (κακὸς φαίνῃ φίλος, OR 582). Thus, in view of the king his 
kin has done him wrong. 
Yet, after discovering the horrible truth about his identity, Oedipus 
recognizes his earlier unjust abuse of Creon. Only then he becomes aware of the 
fact that it was he, not Creon, who betrayed the ties of φιλία with his 
accusations of disloyalty, angry insults and even vehement desire to punish his 
kin with death. Oedipus, hence, may anticipate enmity from his former φίλος, 
since they both parted earlier as enemies. 
Creon, however, acts magnanimously towards the ruined king and 
refuses to gloat over Oedipus in his misfortunes. With this unexpected act, the 
new ruler of Thebes is a unique example of ceasing the opportunity to laugh at 
an enemy for injuries sustained. In this respect, we may see that the pitiful sight 
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of his blinded kinsman,796 who has come upon great misfortune and suffering, 
has Creon give up his right to express his hostility towards Oedipus, provoked 
by the latter’s blind violation of their bond of φιλία. By ceasing from laughter, 
Creon ceases from being an outright ἐχθρός. With this said, it becomes clear 
that the single reference to laughter found in the Oedipus Rex pertains, albeit 
through negation, to the idea of triumph.  
Creon behaves in a less magnanimous way towards the perceived 
betrayal of φιλία by his niece, the title character in the Antigone. From the 
outset of the play, Antigone explicitly states her hostility towards her uncle and 
ruler of Thebes, who has officially forbidden the burial of Polynices (Ant. 7-10). 
However, the princess defies the king’s orders and is later caught performing 
funerary rites upon the body of her brother (Ant. 407-440). In the third episode, 
when she is interrogated by the king about her crime, she proudly admits of 
having performed her act willingly (‘I say that I did it and I do not deny it’, Καὶ 
φημὶ δρᾶσαι κοὐκ ἀπαρνοῦμαι τὸ μή, Ant. 443) and in full awareness of its 
illegitimacy (‘I knew it; of course I knew it. It was known to all’, Ἤιδη· τί δ' οὐκ 
ἔμελλον; ἐμφανῆ γὰρ ἦν, Ant. 448). Moreover, Antigone treats her uncle in a 
discernibly derisive manner,797 as she dismisses the king’s law as ‘an arrogant 
design of some man’ (ἀνδρὸς οὐδενὸς / φρόνημα, Ant. 458-9) and calls him a 
fool should he perceive her actions to be foolish (Ant. 469-70).798 Creon reacts to 
Antigone’s boldness with indignation (Ant. 480-89):  
Κρ.  Αὕτη δ' ὑβρίζειν μὲν τότ' ἐξηπίστατο  
νόμους ὑπερβαίνουσα τοὺς προκειμένους·  
ὕβρις δ', ἐπεὶ δέδρακεν, ἥδε δευτέρα,  
τούτοις ἐπαυχεῖν καὶ δεδρακυῖαν γελᾶν.  
Ἦ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἀνήρ, αὕτη δ' ἀνήρ,  
εἰ ταῦτ' ἀνατὶ τῇδε κείσεται κράτη.  
                                               
796 Cf. the Messenger’s words about Oedipus’ appearance in OR 1295-6: ‘you shall soon see such 
a sight as would drive to pity even one who hates him’ (θέαμα δ' εἰσόψει τάχα / τοιοῦτον οἷον 
καὶ στυγοῦντ' ἐποικτίσαι ). 
797 Cf. Chodkowski (2012) 239 n. 64. 
798 Griffith (1999) 204 n. 469-70 alludes to the distinguishable sarcasm which arouses a strong 
emotional response in Creon. 
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Ἀλλ' εἴτ' ἀδελφῆς εἴθ' ὁμαιμονεστέρα  
τοῦ παντὸς ἡμῖν Ζηνὸς Ἑρκείου κυρεῖ,  
αὐτή τε χἠ ξύναιμος οὐκ ἀλύξετον  
μόρου κακίστου· 
 Creon:  This girl knew how to be insolent then, transgressing the 
established laws; and after her action, this was a second 
insolence, to exult in this and to laugh at the thought of 
having done it. Indeed, now I am no man, but she is a man, if 
she is to enjoy such power as this with impunity. But whether 
she is my sister’s child or closer in affinity that our whole 
family linked by Zeus of the hearth, she and her sister shall 
not escape a dreadful death! 
Not surprisingly, the king is infuriated with his niece’s arrogant words and self-
righteous behaviour. In this passage, Creon specifically calls attention to two 
acts he regards as an insolence (ὕβρις) on Antigone’s behalf: 1) breaking his 
ordained law (νόμους ὑπερβαίνουσα τοὺς προκειμένους, Ant. 481), and 2) 
laughing at the thought of having committed her crime (δεδρακυῖαν γελᾶν, 
Ant. 483). Evidently, Creon considers the girl’s audacious deed to be an act of 
defiance against him as the king of Thebes. Such understanding is particularly 
discernible from his double use of the words related to insult: ὑβρίζειν, ‘to 
commit an offence’ (Ant. 480) and ὕβρις, ‘insolence’, ‘violence’, ‘lawlessness’ 
(Ant. 482). With these two terms Creon defines Antigone’s act as a ‘wilful and 
criminal disregard’ of his rights as king.799 By committing her crime, but also by 
not feeling any remorse about it, the girl has defied the official authority of the 
city, hence has placed herself in the position of its enemy. As a result, any 
familial bonds between the uncle and niece lose their significance, for, as Creon 
mentions further in his speech, an enemy of the king must be suitably punished 
(Ant. 486-89). Indeed, since treacherous actions turn φίλοι into ἐχθροί, it is 
evident that Antigone’s act of defiance against Creon fully disrupted their 
bonds of familial φιλία. 
Regarding Antigone’s laughter, mentioned by her uncle in line 483, it is 
clearly evoked in connection with the idea of triumph. Noticeably, Creon is 
                                               
799 Brown (1987) 163 n. 480. 
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appalled by the fact of being defied and disparaged by a woman, who, in his 
view, is challenging his authority with her bold words and arrogance (‘For 
sure, I am no man, and she is the man, if, with impunity, victory and control in 
these things are to reside with her’, Ἦ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἀνήρ, αὕτη δ' ἀνήρ, εἰ 
ταῦτ' ἀνατὶ τῇδε κείσεται κράτη, Ant. 484-5).800 The king explicitly refers to 
this by viewing Antigone as usurping ταῦτ'… κράτη, ‘such power’, or in 
Griffith’s translation, ‘victory and control’. Hence, we may recognize that Creon 
perceives Antigone’s self-righteous superiority as damaging to his position as 
king. It is, therefore, evident that he refers to his niece’s audacious behaviour 
towards him as her triumphant laughter over him. In the end, Creon condemns 
Antigone to join her family in the underworld not only for her crime, but also 
for her arrogant defiance of her kinsman (‘Then go below and love those 
friends, if you must love them! But while I live a woman shall not rule!’, Κάτω 
νυν ἐλθοῦσ', εἰ φιλητέον, φίλει / κείνους· ἐμοῦ δὲ ζῶντος οὐκ ἄρξει γυνή, 
Ant. 524-5). Creon, therefore, sentences his niece to death as punishment for her 
crime, but also, as it seems, for her feeling and expressing her superiority over 
the king, who views her behaviour in terms of triumphant laughter. 
The final reference to laughter of triumph in the context of betrayal of 
φιλία amongst kin may be found in the Oedipus at Colonus, in the passage, in 
which Theseus expresses his anxiety at causing laughter in his guest, should he 
fail to bring the abducted girls back (OC 902). I have already discussed this 
reference in relation to the idea of mockery.801 However, another interpretation 
of Athenian king’s words is possible, as shown in the 2005 translation of 
Grennan and Kitzinger (OC 897-903): 
Θη. οὔκουν τις ὡς τάχιστα προσπόλων μολὼν  
πρὸς τούσδε βωμούς, πάντ᾽ ἀναγκάσει λεὼν  
ἄνιππον ἱππότην τε θυμάτων ἄπο  
σπεύδειν ἀπὸ ῥυτῆρος, ἔνθα δίστομοι  
                                               
800 Translation in Griffith (1999) 206 n. 484-5. 
801 Cf. section 4.2.5. above. 
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μάλιστα συμβάλλουσιν ἐμπόρων ὁδοί,  
ὡς μὴ παρέλθωσ᾽ αἱ κόραι, γέλως δ᾽ ἐγὼ  
ξένῳ γένωμαι τῷδε, χειρωθεὶς βίᾳ. 
Theseus:  Let one of my men run to the altar 
with all speed. Tell all who are there 
to race from the sacrifice on horseback or on foot 
straight for the place where the two highways meet, 
so those girls may go no further 
and I, bested by this brutish deed of his, 
not become a mockery to this stranger.802 
In particular, the word ξένος, accepts two basic meanings: ‘guest’, but also 
‘stranger’.803 The fact that Theseus is referring to a person in his presence 
becomes evident with the demonstrative pronoun τῷδε to ξένῳ (in the dative) 
signifying ‘the guest/stranger who is near, who is seen’. However, we must 
keep in mind the fact that Creon, after having his men leave with Antigone (OC 
847), remained to seize Oedipus as well. Therefore, apart from Oedipus, the 
other Theban is also present when Theseus gives his orders to rescue the 
kidnapped girls. For this reason, it is permissible to consider the demonstrative 
pronoun to be used to indicate Creon and not the blind ex-king of Thebes. As a 
result, the different meaning of ξένος in line 903 not only significantly changes 
the agent to γέλως in line 902, but also the interpretation of the idea of laughter 
in this reference. Consequently, Theseus, instead of fearing the derision of his 
guest, i.e. Oedipus, provoked by a failed attempt to help, would in fact be 
expressing his anxiety at incurring triumphant laughter in the stranger, i.e. 
Creon, should he disgrace the Athenian king by carrying out his violent act 
successfully (γέλως δ᾽ ἐγὼ / ξένῳ γένωμαι τῷδε, χειρωθεὶς βίᾳ, OC 902-3). 
Interestingly, such understanding of lines 902-3 may be found in many modern 
translations of the play.804 What is more, we may notice that the Theban’s use of 
                                               
802 Translation in Grennan and Kitzinger (2005) 73. 
803 Cf. LSJ s.v. ξένος. 
804 Cf the translations of lines 902-3 in Jebb (1900) 147: ‘…lest the maidens pass, and I become a 
mockery to this stranger, as one spoiled by force’; Lloyd-Jones (1994b) 519: ‘…so that the girls 
do not pass through first, and I am made to look foolish by this stranger, being worsted by 
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force against one who is under the official protection of the local ruler turns 
into an act of violence against the city of Athens itself. In other words, by 
attacking Oedipus and his family, Creon violates the already tattered bonds of 
φιλία with his kin, but also simultaneously becomes an enemy of Theseus.805 
Since the Athenian king is concerned with the possibility of his antagonist 
laughing at him after being ‘conquered by an act of force’ (χειρωθεὶς βίᾳ), it is 
acceptable to interpret γέλως in OC 902 as triumphant laughter, that which is 
elicited with the defeat of one’s opponent.806 Therefore, Theseus acts 
immediately to retaliate the wrong done to his new φίλος, Oedipus, but also to 
avert the dreaded dishonour of becoming the object of an enemy’s laughter of 
triumph. It is obvious that the reference to laughter in line 902 denotes directly 
the antagonistic rapport between Creon and Theseus, however their hostility 
has come to being through the betrayal of φιλία between the Theban kinsmen. 
4.2.7.5. Allies 
Acts of treachery may antagonize people bonded by political alliances. In 
two of his surviving tragedies, the Philoctetes and the Ajax, Sophocles exploits 
the idea of triumphant laughter in connection with the wilful betrayal of φιλία 
amongst the Greek allies during the Trojan War.  
In the Philoctetes, I have distinguished three references to laughter, in 
which the Greek leaders, i.e. the Atreidae and Odysseus, are imagined by the 
title protagonist as laughing triumphantly at his misfortune.  
Neoptolemus and Odysseus arrive at the island of Lemnos in order to 
persuade Philoctetes into accompanying them to Troy. Ten years have passed, 
since the Greeks left their former φίλος on the deserted island because of the 
                                                                                                                                         
violence’; Slavitt (2007) 189: ‘They should be able to get there first. If not, / this stranger will 
have me look like a fool!’. 
805 Cf. Miralles (2000) 409: ‘Au moment où il envisage la possibilité que Créon le raille, Thésée le 
tient déjà pour un ennemi’.  
806 Cf. the translation of Fagles (1982) 324: ‘… before the girls are past the point / and I’m a 
mockery to my enemy here, / easy game for the first rough hand’. 
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unpleasantness of his physical disability (Ph. 1-5).807 Yet, according to a recent 
prophecy, the Greek army will not win the war against the Trojans without the 
bow of Heracles, bestowed by the hero upon Philoctetes. Odysseus, therefore, 
plots a scheme together with Neoptolemus, in order to divest the abandoned 
ally of his weapon (Ph. 101-34). Also, the king of Ithaca is in need of extra aid to 
carry out the plan, for it was he himself who persuaded the Atreidae to 
abandon the wounded hero in treacherous manner (Ph. 46-7; 75-6).808 Because of 
this, Odysseus is fully aware of the hatred Philoctetes may feel towards him. 
Later, his predictions are confirmed in the speech the title character delivers 
upon meeting Neoptolemus, who pretends not to know the identity of the 
encountered islander (Ph. 254-84): 
Φι.  Ὦ πόλλ' ἐγὼ μοχθηρός, ὦ πικρὸς θεοῖς,  
οὗ μηδὲ κληδὼν ὧδ' ἔχοντος οἴκαδε  
μηδ' Ἑλλάδος γῆς μηδαμοῦ διῆλθέ που,  
ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἐκβαλόντες ἀνοσίως ἐμὲ  
γελῶσι σῖγ' ἔχοντες, ἡ δ' ἐμὴ νόσος  
ἀεὶ τέθηλε κἀπὶ μεῖζον ἔρχεται.  
Ὦ τέκνον, ὦ παῖ πατρὸς ἐξ Ἀχιλλέως,  
ὅδ' εἴμ' ἐγώ σοι κεῖνος, ὃν κλύεις ἴσως  
τῶν Ἡρακλείων ὄντα δεσπότην ὅπλων,  
ὁ τοῦ Ποίαντος παῖς Φιλοκτήτης, ὃν οἱ  
δισσοὶ στρατηγοὶ χὠ Κεφαλλήνων ἄναξ  
ἔρριψαν αἰσχρῶς ὧδ' ἔρημον, ἀγρίᾳ  
νόσῳ καταφθίνοντα, τῇδ', ἀνδροφθόρου  
πληγέντ' ἐχίδνης ἀγρίῳ χαράγματι,  
ξὺν ᾗ μ' ἐκεῖνοι, παῖ, προθέντες ἐνθάδε  
ᾤχοντ' ἔρημον, ἡνίκ' ἐκ τῆς ποντίας  
Χρύσης κατέσχον δεῦρο ναυβάτῃ στόλῳ.  
Τότ' ἄσμενοί μ' ὡς εἶδον ἐκ πολλοῦ σάλου  
εὕδοντ' ἐπ' ἀκτῆς ἐν κατηρεφεῖ πέτρῳ,  
ῥάκη προθέντες βαιὰ καί τι καὶ βορᾶς 
λιπόντες ᾤχονθ', οἷα φωτὶ δυσμόρῳ  
ἐπωφέλημα σμικρόν· οἷ' αὐτοῖς τύχοι.  
Philoctetes:       O wretched indeed that I am, I abhorred of heaven, that 
no word of this my plight should have won its way to my 
home, or to any home of Greeks! No, the men who wickedly 
                                               
807 This was due to the stench of the festering wound from a snakebite on Philoctetes’ foot as 
well as his annoying cries of agony. 
808 Cf. Blundell (1989) 184-6. 
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cast me out keep their secret and laugh, while my plague still 
rejoices in its strength, and grows to more! 
O my son, O boy whose father was Achilles, behold, I am 
he of whom haply thou hast heard as lord of the bow of 
Heracles, - I am the son of Poeas, Philoctetes, whom the 
chieftains and the Cephallenian king foully cast upon this 
solitude, when I was wasting with a fierce disease, stricken 
down by the furious bite of destroying serpent; with that 
plague for sole companion, O my son, those men put me out 
here, and were gone, - when from sea-girt Chrysè they 
touched at this coast with their fleet. Glad, then, when they 
saw me asleep – after much tossing on the waves- in the 
shelter of a cave upon the shore, they abandoned me, - first 
putting out a few rags, - good enough for such a wretch, - and 
a scanty dole of food withal: - may Heaven give them the 
like!809 
Upon learning that his person and fate is commonly unknown in the Greek 
world, Philoctetes expresses his resentment at the Atreidae and Odysseus 
(δισσοὶ στρατηγοὶ χὠ Κεφαλλήνων ἄναξ, Ph. 264), for having abandoned him 
on Lemnos in a ‘despicable manner’ (ἀνοσίως, Ph. 257) and being pleased with 
this (ἄσμενοί, Ph. 271).810 As it emerges from the first lines of his speech, 
Philoctetes is especially angered at his former φίλοι for concealing their 
mistreatment of him, as he says ‘the men who wickedly cast me out keep their 
secret and laugh’ (οἱ μὲν ἐκβαλόντες ἀνοσίως ἐμὲ / γελῶσι σῖγ' ἔχοντες, Ph. 
258). Enraged with the Greeks damnatio memoriae of him, he evokes the image of 
his enemies laughing with delight at their disgraceful behaviour (γελῶσι σῖγ' 
ἔχοντες, Ph. 258).811 At first, it seems that this reference to laughter pertains to 
the idea of derision, as it has been rendered in many modern translations.812 
However, a closer look at the nature of Philoctetes’ hostility enables an 
additional interpretation for the imagined laughter of the Greeks. 
                                               
809 Translation in Jebb (1908) 51-53. 
810 Cf. Blundell (1989) 196. 
811 Kamerbeek (1980) 60 n. 257-58: ‘not quite “laugh in their sleeve”, “but laugh <at my fate> 
while they keep silent about it”’. Similarly Jebb (1908) 51 n. 258: ‘saying nothing about Ph.’s 
fate, but allowing it to pass out of men’s mind’. 
812 Cf. Lloyd-Jones (1994b) 283: ‘But those who threw me out in unholy fashion quietly mock 
me’; Phillips (2003) 43: ‘they mock me in silence’; Interesting is the attempt to reflect hostile 
mockery by evoking also the audible aspect of laughter in Meineck and Woodruff (2007) 201: 
‘Those depraved men who marooned me here / cackle at each other – their secret safe‘.  
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In his speech to Neoptolemus, Philoctetes emphasizes the fact of his 
being the victim of the Greeks’ wrongdoing. For the last ten years, apart from 
the excruciating pain from the incurable wound, the hero also had to suffer 
hunger (Ph. 287-92), live in dire conditions (Ph. 292-99), face solitude (Ph. 300-
304) and remain in total separation from the Greek world (Ph. 310-11). In 
addition to this, his life as an outcast on a deserted island stripped him of the 
chance of achieving fame at the Trojan War. In this regard, it comes as no 
surprise that he is infuriated with the news of his miserable fate being 
concealed from the general public, as Neoptolemus has lead him to believe (Ph. 
254-9). It is at this point of his speech that the hero juxtaposes two images: one 
of his enemies laughing (γελῶσι, Ph. 258) with that of him enduring the 
physical pain from the incurable wound (‘my plague still rejoices in its 
strength, and grows to more!’, ἡ δ' ἐμὴ νόσος / ἀεὶ τέθηλε κἀπὶ μεῖζον 
ἔρχεται, Ph. 258-9). Due to the fact that as a warrior Philoctetes has been 
deprived of the glories of taking part in a war, whereas Odysseus and the 
Atreidae have been not, it is clear that the hero views his loss to be his enemies’ 
gain. Philoctetes, therefore, distinguishes the Greeks as those superior in 
comparison to his miserable situation and, hence, imagines them laughing 
triumphantly at his loss.813 
The second reference to laughter in connection with the enemies’ 
triumph over the title protagonist is found in the third episode of the play. 
Neoptolemus, ashamed of deceiving the disabled hero with his seemingly 
unselfish aid, reveals to him the real reason for his arrival to Lemnos (Ph. 915-
16).814 As the two are having a furious discussion, Odysseus arrives with his 
men and seizes Philoctetes (Ph. 974). Deceived again by the king of Ithaca, the 
hero speaks to his enemy with words full of hatred (Ph. 1019-28): 
                                               
813 Miralles (2000) 408. 
814 For a discussion on the matter of Neoptolemus’ shame, see Cairns (1993) 250-63. 
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Φι. ὄλοιο· καί σοι πολλάκις τόδ᾽ ηὐξάμην.  
ἀλλ᾽ οὐ γὰρ οὐδὲν θεοὶ νέμουσιν ἡδύ μοι,  
σὺ μὲν γέγηθας ζῶν, ἐγὼ δ᾽ ἀλγύνομαι 
τοῦτ᾽ αὔθ᾽, ὅτι ζῶ σὺν κακοῖς πολλοῖς τάλας,  
γελώμενος πρὸς σοῦ τε καὶ τῶν Ἀτρέως  
διπλῶν στρατηγῶν, οἷς σὺ ταῦθ᾽ ὑπηρετεῖς. 
Καίτοι σὺ μὲν κλοπῇ τε κἀνάγκῃ ζυγεὶς  
ἔπλεις ἅμ' αὐτοῖς, ἐμὲ δὲ τὸν πανάθλιον,  
ἑκόντα πλεύσανθ' ἑπτὰ ναυσὶ ναυβάτην,  
ἄτιμον ἔβαλον, ὡς σὺ φῄς, κεῖνοι δὲ σέ.  
Philoctetes:  Alas! May you perish! Yet I have often prayed for this; but 
since the gods never grant me any pleasure, you are alive and 
happy, and I feel pain at the very thought that I am alive with 
many troubles, mocked by you and by the two generals, sons 
of Atreus, whom you are serving in this matter. Yet, you 
sailed with them after being kidnapped and compelled, and I, 
the unfortunate one, had sailed of my own free will with 
seven ships before them, as you say, but as they say you, 
threw me out, dishonoured.815 
Philoctetes curses Odysseus and expresses his indignation at the man who 
caused him a decade of suffering. Similarly to his words in 258-9, the hero 
again juxtaposes two images: one of his former φίλος leading a happy life (σὺ 
μὲν γέγηθας ζῶν, Ph. 1021) with that of his own existence filled with misery 
and adversities (ἐγὼ δ᾽ ἀλγύνομαι / τοῦτ᾽ αὔθ᾽, ὅτι ζῶ σὺν κακοῖς πολλοῖς 
τάλας, Ph. 1021-2). Also, he mentions the fact that the awareness of him being 
mocked by Odysseus and the Atreidae only added to his suffering (γελώμενος 
πρὸς σοῦ τε καὶ τῶν Ἀτρέως / διπλῶν στρατηγῶν, Ph. 1023-4).816 Here, the 
passive participle γελώμενος ‘laughed at’ denotes the fact of Philoctetes’ 
viewing himself as the victim of his enemies’ laughter. 
Despite the hero’s curses at Odysseus and pleas to the gods for justice, 
the Greeks deprived him of his bow and abandon on the island once more (Ph. 
1080). Philoctetes, then, raises a lament with the Chorus at his misfortune (Ph. 
1081-1217). In strophe β of the second kommos of the play, the hero deplores 
the loss of his weapon (Ph. 1123-39):  
                                               
815 Translation in Lloyd-Jones (1994b) 359. 
816 Blundell (1989) 194: ‘His [i.e. Philoctetes’] grievance… is their [i.e. Odysseus and the 
Atreidae] ingratitude towards a loyal friend’. 
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Φι.  Οἴμοι μοι, καί που πολιᾶς  
πόντου θινὸς ἐφήμενος,  
γελᾷ μου, χερὶ πάλλων  
τὰν ἐμὰν μελέου τροφάν,  
τὰν οὐδείς ποτ' ἐβάστασεν. 
Ὦ τόξον φίλον, ὦ φίλων  
χειρῶν ἐκβεβιασμένον,  
ἦ που ἐλεινὸν ὁρᾷς, φρένας εἴ τινας  
ἔχεις, τὸν Ἡράκλειον  
ἄθλιον ὧδέ σοι  
οὐκέτι χρησόμενον τὸ μεθύστερον,  
ἄλλου δ' ἐν μεταλλαγᾷ  
πολυμηχάνου ἀνδρὸς ἐρέσσῃ,  
ὁρῶν μὲν αἰσχρὰς ἀπάτας,  
στυγνόν τε φῶτ' ἐχθοδοπόν,  
μυρί' ἀπ' αἰσχρῶν ἀνατέλλονθ' ὅσ' ἐφ' ἡ- 
μῖν κάκ' ἐμήσατ' οὐδείς.   
Philoctetes:  Why me? Me? He’s out there 
Sitting by the surging gray sea, 
Laughing at me, flaunting my bow, 
Which no other mortal man has owned. 
Oh, beloved bow, my friend, 
Ripped from my loving hands, 
If you could only feel, 
You’d look with pity 
On this follower of Heracles 
Who’ll never hold you again. 
You have passed into the hands 
Of a new master now; 
A tactician manipulates you. 
And you’ll see such blatant deceit 
In the face of my most hated enemy 
And infinite lies devised against me.817 
In his cries over the much-beloved weapon, a gift from his friend Heracles, 
Philoctetes envisions Odysseus laughing at him (γελᾷ μου, Ph. 1125) while 
brandishing the bow in his hand (χερὶ πάλλων, Ph. 1125). Certainly, this 
reference to laughter evokes the idea of mockery directed at the hero by the 
enemy after outsmarting him of his precious possession.818 Yet, it is obvious 
                                               
817 Translation in Meineck and Woodruff (2007) 236. 
818 The general translation of γελᾷ μου is ‘he mocks me’, cf. the translations of Lloyd-Jones 
(1994b) 367; Phillips (2003) 82. The meaning of derision becomes apparent with the direct object 
appearing in the genitive (μου). Although scholars indicate this as the only example of γελάω 
governing this case, however, the genitive is used with other verbs denoting scorn or 
belittlement, e.g. καταγελάω, ‘laugh at, mock’; καταφρονέω, ‘think slightly of’; 
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that the vivid image of Odysseus’ ostentatious exhibition of his glee over 
Philoctetes pertains to the behaviour typical of a victor over a vanquished foe. 
In light of the fact that the hero has been recently mistreated (again) by his 
‘most hated enemy’ (στυγνόν τε φῶτ' ἐχθοδοπόν, Ph. 1138), it becomes 
evident that Philoctetes imagines his offender as exulting over his enemy’s 
discomfiture.819 In other words, he imagines Odysseus laughing in triumph 
over him. 
As we have seen, the title character of the Philoctetes makes all three 
references to laughter in regard of the undeserved maltreatment he has 
received from his former φίλοι. In particular, the first image of his enemies 
laughing at him appears with his dismay at the Greeks for concealing the news 
of his disgraceful fate (Ph. 258); the second occurs after him finding out about 
Odysseus’ scheme against him (Ph. 1023); and the third takes place after losing 
his bow to his arch-enemy (Ph. 1125). In all three situations, Philoctetes sustains 
new injuries from his enemies: damnatio memoriae, deception and finally 
deprivation, and in all three cases he evokes the image of their hostile laughter. 
Thus, it becomes apparent that the language of laughter not only denotes 
Philoctetes’ vying hostility against his wrongdoers, the Atreidae, and especially 
Odysseus,820 but also reflects his perception of their rapport in terms of 
victors/victims. Noticeably, such understanding is in accordance to the part of 
the moral code of ‘harming one’s enemies’, which regards victors laughing in 
triumph at their defeated foes. It is obvious that Philoctetes considers himself to 
be the victim of the treacherous actions of his former φίλοι, and, to his sorrow, 
he remains incapable of retaliation.821 In general, it is apparent that the image of 
                                                                                                                                         
ὀλιγωρἐω,’esteem little’, cf. Kamerbeek (1980) 155 n. 1125; Schein (2013) 295 n. 1125. Curiously, 
Jebb (1908) 177 n. 1025 emendates γελᾷ μου with ἐγγελᾷ. 
819 Cf. Arnould (1990) 38. 
820 Cf. Dillon (1991) 345-6. 
821 Noticeably, the hero’s imagining of his enemies’ laughing in triumph only adds to his mental 
pain of one of a disgracefully deserted φίλος. Such understainding of laughter corresponds 
with the tragedy’s theme of suffering, cf. Maślanka-Soro (1991) 98; Chodkowski (2009) 289. 
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laughter in the Philoctetes is evoked in relation to the perceived triumph of the 
protagonist’s enemies, his former political allies.  
Triumphant laughter is a discernible theme in the Ajax. This tragedy 
unfolds the consequences of the title character’s failure to take revenge on the 
Greek commanders for awarding Odysseus with Achilles’ arms. Since Ajax 
was, generally, acknowledged to be the second greatest warrior at Troy after 
the son of Peleus, he considered himself to be more entitled to the prize. As a 
result, he viewed the allocation of the armour to the son of Laertes as a personal 
dishonour as well as a betrayal of φιλία on behalf of the Greeks.822 To Ajax, 
then, such unjust mistreatment marked the beginning of the hostile rapport 
between him and the allies. Consequently, the hero’s wrath and enmity led him 
to the decision of taking revenge for his disgrace on the Atreidae and Odysseus. 
However, the planned murder of his new, in his opinion, ἐχθροί misfired 
because of Athena’s intervention. In particular, the stroke of divinely inspired 
madness had Ajax slaughter some sheep and cattle which, in his delusion, he 
took for the detested Greek leaders. In effect, the hero failed in his attempt to 
execute vengeance and restore his honour. 
Ashamed with his utter humiliation, Ajax is of the opinion that his 
enemies, the Atreidae and Odysseus, not only take delight in his misfortune but 
exult in their success against him. As I will demonstrate below, this conviction 
manifests itself in the hero’s obsession with the idea of his enemies laughing in 
triumph at him.823  
The notion that it is justifiable to laugh at the misfortunes of an enemy is 
expressed in the prologue of the play. Athena confirms Odysseus’ suspicions 
about Ajax having slaughtered the sheep and cattle at night and explains that 
she has prevented the hero from killing the Greek leaders (Ai. 39-65). She then 
                                               
822 Blundell (1989) 69-70: ‘He is filled with hostile wrath towards the erstwhile friends who have 
violated the law of friendship… and craves the vengeance sanctioned by the talio’. 
823 Halliwell (2008) 138 n. 89. 
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summons the hero from his tent, in order to expose his madness (Ai. 66-72). 
However, the son of Laertus vehemently objects to the idea (Ai. 74-82): 
Οδ.   Τί δρᾷς, Ἀθάνα; μηδαμῶς σφ' ἔξω κάλει.  
Αθ.   Οὐ σῖγ' ἀνέξῃ, μηδὲ δειλίαν ἀρῇ;  
Οδ.   Μή, πρὸς θεῶν· ἀλλ' ἔνδον ἀρκείτω μένων.  
Αθ.   Τί μὴ γένηται; πρόσθεν οὐκ ἀνὴρ ὅδ' ἦν;    
Οδ.   Ἐχθρός γε τῷδε τἀνδρὶ καὶ τανῦν ἔτι.  
Αθ.  Οὔκουν γέλως ἥδιστος εἰς ἐχθροὺς γελᾶν; 
Οδ.   Ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀρκεῖ τοῦτον ἐν δόμοις μένειν.  
Αθ.   Μεμηνότ' ἄνδρα περιφανῶς ὀκνεῖς ἰδεῖν;  
Οδ.   Φρονοῦντα γάρ νιν οὐκ ἂν ἐξέστην ὄκνῳ.  
Odysseus: What are you doing, Athena? On no account summon him 
outside. 
Athena: Won’t you face him quietly and avoid the charge of 
cowardice? 
Odysseus: Please no; be content that he should stay indoors. 
Athena: In case what may happen? Was he not a amn before? 
Odysseus: Yes he was my enemy before and still he is. 
Athena:  Why, is it not the sweetest laughter to laugh at one’s 
enemies? 
Odysseus: I am content that he should stay in house. 
Athena: Do you shrink from seeing a madman in full view? 
Odysseus: Yes, if he had been sane I should not have kept out of his way 
or shrunk from him. 
Observably, Odysseus protests to be near the maddened warrior, whose actions 
may be unpredictable and dangerous. The goddess, however, wishes to display 
Ajax’s humiliation by showing him in an inglorious state of frenzy that 
thwarted the hero’s plan of taking vengeance on the Greek leaders. In other 
words, Athena invites the reluctant Odysseus to exult over the fall of his 
spiteful enemy.824 In line 79, she, particularly, encourages him to gloat over the 
fallen Ajax, when she poses the rhetorical question ‘is it not the sweetest 
laughter to laugh at one’s enemies?’ (Οὔκουν γέλως ἥδιστος εἰς ἐχθροὺς 
γελᾶν;). The goddess gives Odysseus the opportunity to laugh triumphantly 
                                               
824 Stanford (1963) 67 n. 79 refers to such behaviour as ‘the normal heroic attitude’; Garvie (1998) 
131 n. 79: ‘Athena’s question is in keeping with the code of helping friends and harming 
enemies’. 
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over an enemy (literally ‘enemies’ εἰς ἐχθροὺς γελᾶν825), which she regards to 
be the most pleasant form of laughter (γέλως ἥδιστος826). Interestingly, 
although the son of Laertes acknowledges the hostile rapport between Ajax and 
himself, nevertheless he still refuses to indulge in such pleasure (Ai. 80) and 
maintains his stance even after seeing the deluded hero (‘… but I pity him in his 
wretchedness nonetheless, although he is my enemy, because he has been 
harnessed to an evil delusion…’, ἐποικτίρω δέ νιν / δύστηνον ἔμπας, καίπερ 
ὄντα δυσμενῆ, / ὁθούνεκ' ἄτῃ συγκατέζευκται κακῇ, Ai. 121-3). In doing so, 
Odysseus is one of the few Sophoclean characters who ceases from laughing at 
the misfortunes of an enemy.827 However, we must keep in mind the fact that, 
although the son of Laertes does not comply with Athena’s wishes to express 
triumph over his disgraced enemy, nevertheless he does not deny the general 
idea of employing such behaviour. In general, Athena’s gnomic remark in line 
79 opens the discernible theme of triumphant laughter in the Ajax. 
The next reference to a laugh of triumph is found in the parodos (Ai. 134-
200). The Chorus of Salaminian Sailors, who accompanied the title hero to Troy, 
expresses its indignation with the news Odysseus has been spreading amongst 
the Greeks about Ajax’s dishonourable nocturnal actions (Ai. 148-50). Appalled 
with the fact that the Atreidae give credence to the ‘evil rumour’ (κακὰν… 
φάτιν, Ai. 186) and repeat it to others (Ai. 187-9), the Sailors summon their 
master to abandon his tent and put an end to such slanderous talk (Ai. 192-200): 
Χο.  Ἀλλ' ἄνα ἐξ ἑδράνων  
ὅπου μακραίωνι 
στηρίζῃ ποτὲ τᾷδ' ἀγωνίῳ σχολᾷ  
ἄταν οὐρανίαν φλέγων.  
ἐχθρῶν δ' ὕβρις ὧδ' ἀτάρβητα 
ὁρμᾶται ἐν εὐανέμοις βάσσαις, 
πάντων καχαζόντων  
                                               
825 Kamerbeek (1953) 34 n. 79 indicates that the hostile intentions of laughing are stressed with 
the preposition εἰς, ‘at’, which here accepts the meaning ‘in the face of’. 
826 On the epic expression γέλως ἡδύς, ‘sweet laughter’, see Finglass (2011) 161 n. 79 with 
references; also Arnould (1990) 164-6.  
827 The other example is Creon in OR 1422 discussed in section 4.2.7.4. above. 
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γλώσσαις βαρυάλγητα· 
ἐμοὶ δ' ἄχος ἕστακεν. 828 
Chorus:  Now rise up! 
  You’ve sat in there far too long! 
  No more brooding, missing battle, 
  Fanning the flames of your ruin up to heaven! 
  Your enemies’ insolence knows no fear; 
  It sweeps on, howling across the plain. 
  They’re all laughing at you, 
  Mouthing your misery! 
  I can hardly bear the pain!829 
Noticeably, the Chorus compares the hero’s inactivity to an ‘idleness in a battle’ 
(τᾷδ' ἀγωνίῳ σχολᾷ, Ai. 194), when ‘flames of ruin blaze up to the sky’ (ἄταν 
οὐρανίαν φλέγων, Ai. 195). In particular, the adversaries of this conflict are 
visioned as spreading their insolence (ὕβρις, Ai. 196) fearlessly as well as far 
and wide. Without any doubt, the Salaminian Sailors use the the word 
‘enemies’ (ἐχθρῶν, Ai. 196) chiefly in reference to Odysseus and the Atreidae, 
who distribute the shameful rumour amongst the other warriors. Moreover, 
they are also presented, in the literal translation, as ‘all laughing loudly with 
their tongues in a painful to us [i.e. the Chorus] manner’ (πάντων καχαζόντων 
/ γλώσσαις βαρυάλγητα, Ai. 199-200).830 In this phrase, we find the laughter-
word καχάζω, which originally means ‘laugh aloud’, however, here it is used 
in the context of derision.831 The way the men are imagined to dispense such 
mockery is by the means of their ‘tongues’ (γλώσσαις), a possible metonymy 
for the act of speaking the earlier mentioned ‘evil rumour’ (κακὰν φάτιν, Ai. 
186; 191). Finally, with the adverb βαρυάλγητα, ‘in a very painful way’, the 
Sailors call attention to their distress upon hearing Ajax’s enemies speak about 
                                               
828 Greek text from the edition of Finglass (2011) 86. 
829 Translation in Meineck and Woodruff (2007) 13. 
830 In his 2011 edition of the text, Finglass accepts at Ai. 199 Dindorf’s conjecture of 
καχαζόντων, instead of the transmitted καγχαζόντων, and argues convincingly for such 
choice in detail in Finglass (2009) 221-2. Other editors, e.g. Stanford (1963) as well as Lloyd-
Jones and Wilson (1990) prefer the variant βακχαζόντων, ‘while they revel like Bacchants’, 
which omits any reference to laughter, cf. the criticism in Garvie (1998) 145-6 n. 198-9, who 
reads καγχαζόντων. For the transmission of the text of the play, see the Preface to Lloyd-Jones 
and Wilson (1990) vii-xiii; Finglass (2011) 59-69. 
831 Cf. Arnould (1990) 161-3; see also chapter II, section 2.1.2. 
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him in such an insulting manner. Their pain is even greater, since they are fully 
aware of the fact that the insolent words distributed by Odysseus have elicited 
malicious pleasure amongst the Greeks (‘For he now speaks plausibly about 
you, and everyone who hears it, even more than the speaker, enjoys arrogantly 
mocking your distress’, περὶ γὰρ σοῦ νῦν / εὔπειστα λέγει, καὶ πᾶς ὁ κλύων / 
τοῦ λέξαντος χαίρει μᾶλλον / τοῖς σοῖς ἄχεσιν καθυβρίζων, Ai. 150-3). The 
Chorus, therefore, presents Ajax’s disrupted relations with the Greeks, 
especially with Odysseus and the Atreidae, in terms of a combat, in which the 
enemies use malign words against the hero and laugh triumphantly at their 
adversary’s misfortunes.832  
Tecmessa, instead of Ajax, hears the Chorus’ call and comes out of the 
tent to confirm the truth of the rumour concerning her husband (Ai. 201-7). The 
woman, then, provides the Salaminian Sailors with a detailed account about 
Ajax’s mad actions (Ai. 284-330), when suddenly the hero begins to bewail from 
within the tent (Ai. 333; 336) and call upon his family (Ai. 339; 341-2). 
Apparently, Ajax, after returning to sanity, recognized the disgraceful actions 
he performed in a fit of madness, i.e. the slaughter of the Greeks’ sheep and 
cattle. In the following amoibaion scene, the hero appears on stage and laments 
upon his misfortune in the presence of his friends, Tecmessa and the Chorus 
(Ai. 348-429). Firstly, he deplores the disgraceful deed he has committed in his 
frenzy (Ai. 364-7): 
Αι. ὁρᾷς τὸν θρασύν, τὸν εὐκάρδιον,  
τὸν ἐν δαΐοις ἄτρεστον μάχαις,  
ἐν ἀφόβοις με θηρσὶ δεινὸν χέρας;  
ὤμοι γέλωτος, οἷον ὑβρίσθην ἄρα. 
Ajax:  Do you see the bold man, the stout-hearted man, the one who 
was fearless in battle among the foe, do you see me so terrible 
in might among unfearing beasts? Alas for the laughter! 
What insults then have I suffered! 
                                               
832 Cf. Finglass (2011) 201 n. 199-200 renders καχάζω, ‘triumphant or insulting laughter’. 
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Noticeably, Ajax is particularly ashamed of the fact of slaughtering helpless 
animals, an act he considers unworthy of a glorious hero. He emphasizes this 
fact by the juxtaposition of two images: 1) one of him as fearless amidst 
destructive battles (ἐν δαΐοις ἄτρεστον μάχαις, Ai. 365), and 2) the other, 
however, of him being terrible amidst unfearing animals (ἐν ἀφόβοις με θηρσὶ 
δεινὸν, Ai. 366). As a result of his maddened conduct, Ajax is convinced to have 
become a laughing-stock amidst his enemies, as he exclaims in line 367: ‘Alas 
for their laughter! What an outrage, it seems, I have suffered!’ (ὤμοι γέλωτος, 
οἷον ὑβρίσθην ἄρα).833 The hero specifies the agent of this imagined laughter a 
little further in his lamentation (Ai. 379-83):  
Αι. ἰὼ πάνθ᾽ ὁρῶν ἁπάντων τ᾽ ἀεὶ  
κακῶν ὄργανον, τέκνον Λαρτίου,  
κακοπινέστατόν τ᾽ ἄλημα στρατοῦ,  
ἦ που πολὺν γέλωθ᾽ ὑφ᾽ ἡδονῆς ἄγεις. 
Ajax:  Ah, you who see all things and hear all things, instrument of 
every crime, son of Laertes, filthiest trickster of the army, how 
you must be laughing in your delight!834 
Ajax is certain that the son of Laertes takes malicious pleasure in his enemy’s 
disgrace and expresses his delight with laughter (πολὺν γέλωθ᾽ ὑφ᾽ ἡδονῆς 
ἄγεις, Ai. 383).835 In order to recognize the chief idea connected with the images 
of laughter evoked in these two examples, it is necessary distinguish the source 
of the hero’s shame, which is not the fact of having slaughtered some animals 
in a divinely inspired fit of frenzy, but the fact of having failed in the nightly 
assault.836 Ajax explicitly speaks of this in lines 372-3, as he regrets having the 
detested Greeks avoid punishment from his hands (‘Oh, unhappy that I am, 
who from these hands let go the accursed men’, Ὢ δύσμορος, ὃς χερὶ μὲν / 
μεθῆκα τοὺς ἀλάστορας). It becomes, then, evident that the hero’s disgrace 
                                               
833 Translation in Finglass (2011) 246 n. 367. 
834 Translation in Lloyd-Jones (1994a) 67. 
835 Stanford (1963) 111 n. 379-82 suggests the translation ‘Surely you laugh loud and long in 
your delight <at my disgrace>.’ For the idea of sound in this example, see section 4.2.1. above.  
836 Garvie (1998) 160 n. 364-7. 
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origins in the failure to execute vengeance on his enemies. Further in the second 
part of the first episode, Ajax himself gives the Greeks’ escape from his revenge 
as the reason for their triumphant laughter at him (Ai. 441-59): 
Αι.  Καίτοι τοσοῦτόν γ' ἐξεπίστασθαι δοκῶ·  
εἰ ζῶν Ἀχιλλεὺς τῶν ὅπλων τῶν ὧν πέρι  
κρίνειν ἔμελλε κράτος ἀριστείας τινί,  
οὐκ ἄν τις αὔτ' ἔμαρψεν ἄλλος ἀντ' ἐμοῦ.  
Νῦν δ' αὔτ' Ἀτρεῖδαι φωτὶ παντουργῷ φρένας  
ἔπραξαν, ἀνδρὸς τοῦδ' ἀπώσαντες κράτη·  
κεἰ μὴ τόδ' ὄμμα καὶ φρένες διάστροφοι  
γνώμης ἀπῇξαν τῆς ἐμῆς, οὐκ ἄν ποτε  
δίκην κατ' ἄλλου φωτὸς ὧδ' ἐψήφισαν. 
νῦν δ᾽ ἡ Διὸς γοργῶπις ἀδάματος θεὰ  
ἤδη μ᾽ ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς χεῖρ᾽ ἐπεντύνοντ᾽ ἐμὴν  
ἔσφηλεν, ἐμβαλοῦσα λυσσώδη νόσον,  
ὥστ᾽ ἐν τοιοῖσδε χεῖρας αἱμάξαι βοτοῖς:  
κεῖνοι δ᾽ ἐπεγγελῶσιν ἐκπεφευγότες,  
ἐμοῦ μὲν οὐχ ἑκόντος: εἰ δέ τις θεῶν  
βλάπτοι, φύγοι τἂν χὠ κακὸς τὸν κρείσσονα. 
Καὶ νῦν τί χρὴ δρᾶν; ὅστις ἐμφανῶς θεοῖς  
ἐχθαίρομαι, μισεῖ δέ μ' Ἑλλήνων στρατός,  
ἔχθει δὲ Τροία πᾶσα καὶ πεδία τάδε.  
Ajax: And yet this much at least I think I understand: if Achilles 
had been alive and was to assign to anyone the victory for 
excellence in the matter of his own arms, no one else would 
have seized them instead of me. But now the sons of Atreus 
have procured them for a man who is at heart a villain, and 
have thrust aside my triumphs. If these eyes and mind had 
not been distorted and parted company from my intention, 
they would never have procured by voting such a decision 
against another man. But as things are, while I was already 
directing my hand against them, the daughter of Zeus, the 
Gorgon-eyed unconquerable goddess, inflicted on me the 
disease of madness and tripped me up, so that it was on 
animals like these that I bloodied my hands; and they laugh 
at me because they have escaped, not with my consent; but, if 
some god were to ruin one, even the coward might escape the 
better man. 
 And now what should I do? I who am clearly hated by the 
gods, while the Greek army loathes me, and the whole of 
Troy and these plains hate me. 
In this passage, Ajax briefly presents his impressions on the circumstances that 
have led to his dishonour amongst the Greeks and has incurred their laughter: 
the violation of his right to claim Achilles’ arms (Ai. 442-4); the Atreidae’s 
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unjust voting (Ai. 445-6); Athena’s casting the stroke of madness on him (Ai. 
447-53); and finally, the Greeks’ having escaped the assault (Ai. 454-5). In line 
454, Ajax refers to his enemies outrageaous behaviour at him with the rare 
compound ἐπεγγελάω, ‘laugh at, exult over’.837 In light of the evident mutual 
hostility between the title protagonist and the Greek leaders (Ai. 457-9) as well 
as the fact of his failure in avenging his earlier loss in the competition for the 
arms, we may notice that the hero applies this particular laughter-word in the 
meaning ‘laugh in triumph’.838 In the hero’s view, his loss of honour becomes 
his enemies’ victory. 
In the fourth episode, Ajax commits suicide to restore his honour, (Ai. 
815-65).839 In his final words, he calls for vengeance at the Atreidae as well as 
the whole Greek army (Ai. 835-44): 
Αι.  Καλῶ δ' ἀρωγοὺς τὰς ἀεί τε παρθένους  
ἀεί θ' ὁρώσας πάντα τἀν βροτοῖς πάθη,  
σεμνὰς Ἐρινῦς τανύποδας μαθεῖν ἐμὲ  
πρὸς τῶν Ἀτρειδῶν ὡς διόλλυμαι τάλας.  
Καί σφας κακοὺς κάκιστα καὶ πανωλέθρους  
ξυναρπάσειαν, ὥσπερ εἰσορῶσ' ἐμὲ  
αὐτοσφαγῆ πίπτοντα, τὼς αὐτοσφαγεῖς  
πρὸς τῶν φιλίστων ἐκγόνων ὀλοίατο.  
Ἴτ', ὦ ταχεῖαι ποίνιμοί τ' Ἐρινύες,  
γεύεσθε, μὴ φείδεσθε πανδήμου στρατοῦ.  
Ajax: And I summon as helpers the everlasting virgins, who for 
ever observe all human suffering, the holy Furies with their 
long strides, to learn how in my wretchedness I am being 
destroyed by the sons of Atreus. [And may they snatch them 
away the wretches in utter wretchedness and total 
destruction, even as they look upon me falling at my own 
hands; so may they perish at the henads of their closes 
                                               
837 Cf. chapter II, section 2.1.1.7. Interestingly, in Greek drama, only Sophocles employs this 
compound three times in the Ajax. 
838 Miralles (2000) 408. 
839 This is the only known example in Greek tragedy for a character to take his life on stage. For 
a discussion on the matter of staging the suicide, see Garvie (1998) 203-4 n. 815-65. 
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descendants.] Come, you swift avenging Furies, devour them, 
spare not the whole body of the army.840 
Here, it is noticeable that Ajax’s enmity against the Greeks does not lessen even 
when facing death, since he calls on the Erinyes, goddesses of vengeance, to 
punish his enemies. The hero particularly holds the sons of Atreus, i.e. 
Agamemnon and Menelaus, responsible for his utter destruction (τῶν 
Ἀτρειδῶν ὡς διόλλυμαι τάλας, Ai. 838). In addition to this, he includes the 
Greek army in his curse (Ἴτ', ὦ ταχεῖαι ποίνιμοί τ' Ἐρινύες, / γεύεσθε, μὴ 
φείδεσθε πανδήμου στρατοῦ, Ai. 843-4), which must, in his opinion, share 
their leaders’ hostility towards the hero after learning about the planned 
assault.841 Clearly, Ajax’s failed act of aggression has not only disgraced him as 
a warrior, but also has antagonized him with all of the Greeks at Troy. As a 
result, he and his φίλοι (Tecmessa, the Salaminian Sailors ect.) have become the 
ἐχθροί to the Greek leaders and their troops.842 Although Ajax kills himself out 
of shame (Ai. 864-5), nevertheless his death does not alter the hostility between 
his friends and his enemies. As it will emerge below, despite the hero’s death, 
his friends still anticipate his enemies malicious laughter of triumph. 
Ajax’s body is discovered by Tecmessa (Ai. 891), who together with the 
Chorus laments over the hero’s death (Ai. 894-972). At one point of the kommos 
scene, the grieving woman holds Athena responsible for her husband’s ruin 
and blames the goddess for doing so to the benefit of the son of Laertes (‘Yes, 
such is the pain that Pallas, the terrible daughter of Zeus, produces to please 
Odysseus’, Τοιόνδε μέντοι Ζηνὸς ἡ δεινὴ θεὸς / Παλλὰς φυτεύει πῆμ' 
                                               
840 Garvie puts the translation of lines 839-42 in brackets in order to identify those parts of the 
texts considered to be an interpolation; cf. Garvie (1998) 206 n. 839-42; Finglass (2011) 384 n. 
839-42. 
841 Cf. Ajax’s awareness of the army’s hatred towards him in Ai. 458: ‘the Greek army loathes 
me’ (μισεῖ δέ μ' Ἑλλήνων στρατός).  
842 The third episode begins with the Messenger given an account on the hostile reaction of the 
Greek soldiers towards Teucer, who threaten to stone him because of his brother’s attempted 
assault, cf. Ai. 721-32. Cf. Garvie (1998) 197 n. 728: ‘The treatment proposed for Teucer shows 
how Ajax himself is now regarded by the army’. 
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Ὀδυσσέως χάριν, Ai. 953-4). The Chorus shares Tecmessa’s opinion about the 
hostile disposition of the king of Ithaca (Ai. 955-60): 
Χο.  ἦ ῥα κελαινώπαν θυμὸν ἐφυβρίζει  
πολύτλας ἀνήρ,  
γελᾷ δὲ τοῖσδε μαινομένοις ἄχεσιν  
πολὺν γέλωτα, φεῦ φεῦ,  
ξύν τε διπλοῖ βασιλῆς  
κλύοντες Ἀτρεῖδαι. 
Chorus: No doubt he grows insolent in his black heart, the much-
enduring man, and laughs with much laughter at Ajax’s 
frenzied sorrows, alas alas, and with him the two kings, the 
sons of Atreus, when they hear of them. 
Noticeably, the Salaminian Sailors are convinced that the news of their master’s 
disaster brings malicious delight to Odysseus as well as to the Atreidae. In 
particular, they imagine the son of Laertes as one who ‘laughs with much 
laughter at the frenzied sorrows’ (γελᾷ δὲ τοῖσδε μαινομένοις ἄχεσιν / πολὺν 
γέλωτα, Ai. 957-8). Here, the image of the laughing enemy is evoked by two 
laughter-words: the verb γελάω, ‘laugh’, and the expression πολὺς γέλως, 
‘loud laughter’. Although some critics interpret the latter reference in 
connection to the concept of sound,843 however, the context strongly suggests 
the association with the idea of triumph. Firstly, the Chorus provides the reason 
for Odysseus’ laughter, which is caused by Ajax’s ‘frenzied sufferings’ (τοῖσδε 
μαινομένοις ἄχεσιν, Ai. 957). Secundly, the enemy’s glee over the hero’s 
misfortunes is emphasized in line 955, as the Chorus points to the fact that ‘he 
grows insolent in his black heart’ (ῥα κελαινώπαν θυμὸν ἐφυβρίζει). Here, the 
word ἐφυβρίζει indicates Odysseus’ malicious exultation over the fallen 
hero.844 In this respect, we may recognize that by applying the two laughter-
words in lines 957-8 in close proximity, the Salaminian Sailors stress the fact of 
the immensity of Odysseus’ triumphant laughter at the death of their master. 
Although the expression πολὺς γέλως very often appears in connection with 
                                               
843 Cf. section 4.2.1. above. 
844 LSJ s.v. ἐφυβρίζω. Cf. the translation of the line in Finglass (2011) 412 n. 954/5-956: ‘Indeed, 
he makes mockery in his dark soul’. 
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the audible aspect of the phenomenon, nevertheless the context favours its 
interpretation of triumphant laughter. 
Tecmessa immediately answers the Chorus, in which she continues the 
expressed thought about their enemies laughing with glee at the hero’s disaster 
(Ai. 961-73): 
Τε. οἱ δ᾽ οὖν γελώντων κἀπιχαιρόντων κακοῖς  
τοῖς τοῦδ᾽: ἴσως τοι, κεἰ βλέποντα μὴ 'πόθουν,  
θανόντ᾽ ἂν οἰμώξειαν ἐν χρείᾳ δορός.  
οἱ γὰρ κακοὶ γνώμαισι τἀγαθὸν χεροῖν  
ἔχοντες οὐκ ἴσασι, πρίν τις ἐκβάλῃ.  
ἐμοὶ πικρὸς τέθνηκεν ἢ κείνοις γλυκύς,  
αὑτῷ δὲ τερπνός: ὧν γὰρ ἠράσθη τυχεῖν  
ἐκτήσαθ᾽ αὑτῷ, θάνατον ὅνπερ ἤθελεν.  
τί δῆτα τοῦδ᾽ ἐπεγγελῷεν ἂν κάτα; 
Θεοῖς τέθνηκεν οὗτος, οὐ κείνοισιν, οὔ. 
Πρὸς ταῦτ' Ὀδυσσεὺς ἐν κενοῖς ὑβριζέτω·  
Αἴας γὰρ αὐτοῖς οὐκέτ' ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ  
λιπὼν ἀνίας καὶ γόους διοίχεται. 
Tecmessa:  Then let them laugh and rejoice over this man’s misfortunes; 
even if they did not miss him while he was alive, they may 
perhaps lament his death when they turn out to need his 
spear. For people of poor judgement do not realize the 
advantages that they have in their hands until they are 
thrown away. His death is as painful to me as it is sweet to 
them, and pleasant for himself; for he has got for himself 
what he longed to obtain, the death which he wanted. Why 
then should they laugh at him? It is for the gods that he has 
died, no not for them. Therefore let Odysseus display his 
futile insolence. For them Ajax no longer lives, but in his 
passing he has left me with sorrows and lamentation. 
In this passage, Tecmessa also evokes the image of Ajax’s enemies laughing at 
him (γελώντων κἀπιχαιρόντων κακοῖς / τοῖς τοῦδ’, Ai. 961-2). Here, the 
triumphant aspect of their laughter is clear, since the woman points to the fact 
of the Greek leaders rejoicing over her husband’s misfortunes (κἀπιχαιρόντων 
κακοῖς); also, in line 966 she stresses the fact of the hero’s death being pleasant 
(literally ‘sweet’) to the enemies (τέθνηκεν ἢ κείνοις γλυκύς). Clearly, we can 
see that Tecmessa recognizes the fact of Odysseus and the Atreidae exulting 
over Ajax’s fall. Noticeably, she is of the opinion that their laughter will not last 
long, in contrast to her grief. She explicitly refers to this in line 969 when she 
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poses the question ‘Why then should they laugh at him?’ (τί δῆτα τοῦδ᾽ 
ἐπεγγελῷεν ἂν κάτα). Here, the compound ἐπεγγελάω, ‘laugh at, exult over’, 
corresponds with the idea of the hero’s enemies laughing with glee at his death. 
Yet, in line 971 she ironically asserts that the laughter of Odysseus is pointless 
(‘Therefore let Odysseus display his futile insolence’, Πρὸς ταῦτ' Ὀδυσσεὺς ἐν 
κενοῖς ὑβριζέτω). Despite her assertions of the enemies’ exultation at her 
husband’s ruin being shortwhile, she is, nevertheless, fully aware of the fact of 
their laughter being that of triumph. 
Tecmessa’s notion of Ajax’s enemies laughing triumphantly after his 
death is shared by Teucer, in the fifth episode. On learning about the hero’s 
suicide, his half-brother raises a lament and expresses his fear about Ajax 
becoming the object of public scorn (Ai. 988-9): 
Τευ.     τοῖς θανοῦσί τοι  
φιλοῦσι πάντες κειμένοις ἐπεγγελᾶν. 
Teucer:  It is true that all men are accustomed to laugh at the dead 
when they are down. 
In this notion expressed in a discernibly sententious tone, Teucer reveals his 
anxiety at the outrageous behaviour Ajax’s friends may expect from the hero’s 
enemies, who take pleasure (literally ‘love’, φιλοῦσι) in laughing at the dead 
(ἐπεγγελᾶν). Here, the compound ἐπεγγελάω clearly denotes triumphant 
laughter, which manifests the agent’s satisfaction with the fall of an enemy.845 
Therefore, in line 989 again we find that the idea of laughter is evoked in 
connection with expressing one’s triumph over the ruin of an opponent. 
Once Teucer delivers his grievous speech over his brother’s body, the 
Chorus notices one of the Greek commanders coming in their direction (Ai. 
1040-3): 
Χο.  Μὴ τεῖνε μακράν, ἀλλ' ὅπως κρύψεις τάφῳ  
                                               
845 Finglass (2011) 421 n. 988-9: ‘All men love to mock the dead as they lie’. A similar idea is 
found in Soph. fr. 210, which I discuss in section 4.3.4. below. 
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φράζου τὸν ἄνδρα χὤ τι μυθήσῃ τάχα. 
βλέπω γὰρ ἐχθρὸν φῶτα, καὶ τάχ' ἂν κακοῖς  
γελῶν ἃ δὴ κακοῦργος ἐξίκοιτ' ἀνήρ. 
Leader:  Do not prolong your speech, but consider how you are going 
to hide the man in a grave, and what you will soon say. For I 
see an enemy coming, and perhaps when he arrives he will 
be laughing, as a scoundrel would, at our misfortunes. 
Apparently, the Salaminian Sailors recognize one of their master’s enemies in 
the person approaching (βλέπω γὰρ ἐχθρὸν φῶτα, Ai. 1042). In result, they 
fear the confrontation with a possibly evil man (κακοῦργος), who has come to 
laugh at the misfortunes of others (ἂν κακοῖς γελῶν). Therefore, in line 1043, 
the Chorus uses the language of laughter to denote their antagonistic rapport 
with Ajax’s enemies. Their expressed fears of dealing with an adversary are 
soon confirmed when the man turns out to be Menelaus, coming to forbid the 
burial of the hero’s body (‘You there, I call on you not to put your hand to 
burial-arrangements for this corpse, but to leave it as it is’, Οὗτος, σὲ φωνῶ, 
τόνδε τὸν νεκρὸν χεροῖν / μὴ συγκομίζειν, ἀλλ' ἐᾶν ὅπως ἔχει, Ai. 1047-8). 
From this point on, the antagonism between the hero’s φίλοι (Teucer, Chorus) 
and his resentful ἐχθροί (the Atreidae) will be explicit, as both sides will argue 
over the burial of Ajax. Although the play ends with the hero’s friends 
receiving the consent from the Greek commanders to have Ajax buried, 
nevertheless, their mutual hatred does not cease. Indeed, once enmity is 
declared, it never ceases to exist, even after the death of an enemy. 
Without any doubt, triumphant laughter becomes an important theme in 
the Ajax. In comparison to other Sophoclean extant plays, this drama exceeds in 
the number of references to laughter with the total sum of 15 references, of 
which only one does not appear in direct or indirect connection with the idea of 
triumph.846 In general, the language of laughter is applied to denote the 
antagonistic relationship between the title character and his former political 
                                               
846 This is the single example of Telamon’s inability to laugh with joy in face of good fortune in 
Ai. 1011, cf. section 4.2.3. An indirect connection with triumph is discernible in Ajax’s laughter 
of madness, discussed in section 4.2.4. above. 
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φίλοι, which has risen between them since the contest for the armour of 
Achilles. It is clear that Ajax becomes obsessed with the idea of his enemies 
laughing at him in his disgrace and it is this conviction that leads him to the 
decision of commiting suicide. Therefore, the motif of laughter also plays a role 
in the title character’s decision-making. 
 
From the discussion above it becomes evident that triumphant laughter 
occurs as a recurring theme in most of the extant tragedies. Interestingly, we 
have seen that the phenomenon in connection with the idea of triumph, i.e. the 
exultation over the misfortune of ruin of an enemy, is evoked in the context of 
the betrayal of φιλία amongst family members (wives and husbands, parents 
and children, siblings, relatives) or allies. All these examples share two features 
in common: 1) the antagonistic rapport is occasioned by a single act of violence 
or harm inflicted by one φίλος (or φίλοι) onto another; and 2) the image of 
laughter is generally evoked by the victim to denote his perception of the 
superior position of the violator of φιλία. This laughter is not heared onstage, 
but only talked about by other characters. Sophocles, therefore, uses the 
language of laughter in metaphorical manner to denote the antagonistic rapport 
between his characters, who not only hate each other, but are also inclined to 
inflict harm on each other. Thus, triumphant laughter is ascribed to those who 
succeed in harming their enemies.  
 
In the first part of this chapter, I have analyzed the understandings of 
laughter discernible in the surviving Sophoclean tragedies. On the basis of my 
analysis above, I have distinguished three main ideas connected to the evoked 
image of laughter in terms of 1) body language (sound and facial expression), 2) 
expression of emotions (joy) or mental states (madness), and 3) the 
manifestation of one’s disposition towards another (mockery, hostility, 
triumph). In similar vein to Aechylus, also Sophocles appears to be aware of the 
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complexity of the phenomenon of laughter and makes many references to its 
various aspects. 
4.3. Laughter-words in the fragments 
Sophocles is assumed to have composed approximately 120 dramas. 
Apart from the extant 7 tragedies, we are in the possession of many fragments 
of lost plays. Out of these fragments only 4 are concerned with the idea of 
laughter. These lexemes are enlisted in table 13 below.847 
Fragment Lexeme Form in text Grammar 
Ich. 369 γελοῖος γέλοια Nom. pl. (n) 
fr. 210 v. 48 γέλως γέλωτα (ἔχω) Ind. pr. act. 3rd sg.  
fr. 160 γέλως γέλως (σαρδόνιος) Nom. sg. (m) 
fr. 171 διαγελάω  διαγελῶν Part. pr. act. Nom. sg. 
Ich. 353 ἐγχάσκω ἐγχάσκοντα Acc. sg. (m) 
fr. 210 v. 49 ἐπεγχάσκω ἐπε̣γχανεῖν Inf. aor. act. 
Ich. 298 προσγελάω προσγελᾷ Ind. pr. act. 3rd sg. 
Table 13. List of Greek laughter-words in the fragments of Sophocles. 
Six of these references to laughter are found in attributed fragments: 
three instances belong to the satyr play the Searchers (Ich. 369; 353; 298); two 
come from the tragedy Eurypylus (fr. 210 v. 48, fr. 210. v. 49), whereas one 
appears in a fragment of the satyr play entitled Little Dionysus (fr. 171). The 
source of fr. 160 remains unknown as well as it occurs only in the form of a 
two-word expression. Here, I will pay more attention to the general 
understanding of the saying σαρδόνιος γέλως.  
From the seven instances of laughter-words in the Sophoclean 
fragments, six appear in a broader context. I will discuss these references to 
laughter in relation to such general concepts: 1) signal of amiability, 2) derision, 
3) Schadenfreude, 4) triumph and finally 5) Sardonic laughter. 
                                               
847 The fragments of Sophocles are numbered according to the edition of Radt in TrGF IV with 
the exception of fr. 314, which I quote with the abbreviation Ich. from the drama’s Latin title 
Ichneutae. 
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4.3.1. Signal of amiability 
The image of friendly laughter is evoked in fr. 171 of the lost Little 
Dionysus. It is certain that this play was a satyr drama and its plot revolved 
around the childhood of baby Dionysus amongst the satyrs.848 In the passage, 
Silenus describes the behaviour of the child-god towards him:  
ὅταν γὰρ αὐτῷ προσφέρω βρῶσιν διδούς,  
τὴν ῥῖνά μ' εὐθὺς ψηλαφᾷ κἄνω φέρει  
τὴν χεῖρα πρὸς <τὸ> φαλακρὸν ἡδὺ διαγελῶν 
Whenever I bring him food and give it to him, he immediately feels my nose 
and brings his hands up to my bald head, laughing sweetly.849  
The baby reacts lively to the father of the satyrs as he comes to feed him: the 
little one touches his nose (τὴν ῥῖνά μ'… ψηλαφᾷ) and tries to grasp his bald 
head (κἄνω φέρει / τὴν χεῖρα πρὸς <τὸ> φαλακρὸν). Noticeably, Dionysus 
responds to Silenus in a positive manner, for he is said to make his vivid 
movements ‘as he laughs sweetly’ (ἡδὺ διαγελῶν). In this respect, it is clear 
that the chief idea behind the word διαγελῶν is the baby’s friendliness signaled 
to Silenus. Even in those translations which render the laughter-word ‘smile’, 
the concept of signaling amiability remains the same.850 The laughter of baby-
Dionysus, therefore, expresses his liking of Silenus, as well as of his nose and 
bald head.851 
Without any doubt, the Sophoclean fr. 171 resembles the Aeschylean 
fragment of the Net-Haulers, which describes a similar positive reaction of baby-
Perseus to Silenus (Aes. fr. 47a).852 What is more, in both examples the image of 
                                               
848 As indicated in the diminutive form of the title Διονυσίσκος, i.e. ‘Little Dionysus’, or ‘The 
Wee Dionysus’, cf. Hahnemann (2012) 171. Other sources pass down the information that the 
play presented the invention of wine, see Zalewska-Jura (2006) 68.  
849 Translation in Shaw (2014) 74. 
850 E.g. Lloyd-Jones (1996) 67: ‘For when I offer him the drink I’m giving him, at once he tickles 
my nose, and brings up his hand to the smooth surface, smiling sweetly’. 
851 Zalewska-Jura (2006) 67-8 discusses the similarities of the god’s description in fr. 171 to that 
in eclogue III of the Latin poet Nemesianus, in which baby-Dionysus also laughs and touches 
Silenus’ nose and bald head. 
852 Cf. chapter III, section 3.3.1.1. 
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laughter is evoked in order to create a humorous effect, as both infants are 
described as laughing at Silenus’ ‘bald head’. I have already discussed the 
possible sexual overtone of the term φαλακρὸν in my analysis of Aes. fr. 47a.853 
Therefore, it is likely that Sophocles, like Aeschylus, may have employed a 
baby’s sweet laughter towards a character’s membrum virile for comic purposes 
of his play.854  
Another example of the idea of communicative laughter is found in the 
Searchers, the largest preserved fragment of a Sophoclean satyr drama (fr. 314 
Radt), which presented the story of a group of satyrs searching for the stolen 
cattle of Apollo.855 Following the cows’ tracks, the search party reaches a cave 
on Mount Cyllene from which a strange noise emanates (Ich. 131ff.). Fearing the 
source of the unusual sounds, never heard by them before (Ich. 142-4), Silenus 
and his children make such commotion at the entrance to the cave that the 
nymph Cyllene emerges from it (Ich. 221ff.). She, then, explains to the satyrs 
about her taking care of baby Hermes, the newborn son of Zeus, who is 
growing very fast and has even recently made a new instrument (Ich. 284-6). 
The end of her speech, however, as well as the Chorus’ response is missing (Ich. 
287-97), but then the dialogue resumes (Ich. 298-300): 
Κυ. μὴ νῦν ἀπίστει· πιστὰ γάρ σε προσγελᾷ θεᾶς ἔπη. 
Χο.   καὶ πῶς πίθωμαι τοῦ θανόντος φθέγμα τοιοῦτον βρέμειν;  
Κυ.   πιθοῦ· θανὼν γὰρ ἔσχε φωνήν, ζῶν δ' ἄναυδος ἦν ὁ θήρ.  
Cyllene: Now don’t be so disbelieving! When the words of a goddess 
smile their greeting, they may be believed!  
Chorus:  And how am I to believe that such a voice resounds from the 
dead (creature)? 
                                               
853 Cf. previous note above. 
854 Shaw (2014) 74: ‘Although the primary reading of these verses is humorous without any 
sexual interpretation, and although the fragmentary state of the Dionysiskos makes it impossible 
to verify these double entendres, the nature of satyrs and satyr drama would obviously invite 
instances of such innuendo’. 
855 On the myth of Hermes’ cattle-theft in other Greek literature, see Zalewska-Jura (2006) 97-
109; for the latest discussion on the relationship of the Ichneutae with the Homeric Hymn to 
Hermes, see Vergados (2013) 79-86. 
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Cyllenes: Believe it! In death the creature obtained a voice, while in life it 
was voiceless.856 
Apparently, before line 298 the satyrs must have expressed their disbelief in the 
nymph’s words about the device Hermes uses for producing the scary sound. 
This idea is confirmed in line 299, in which the Chorus sustains its incredulity 
in the fact that such noise may be produced by a dead creature. In this regard, 
we may notice that in line 298, Cyllene admonishes the doubtful satyrs to give 
credence to her ‘words of a goddess deserving belief’ (πιστὰ… θεᾶς ἔπη) 
which ‘smile their greeting to them [i.e. the satyrs]’ (σε προσγελᾷ). In other 
words, one should not doubt the contents of a god’s clarification. 
As we can see, line 298 contains the verb προσγελάω, which semantics I 
have discussed before in regard of a similar instance in the Eumenides.857 Hence, 
it suffices to reiterate that the informative aspect of the concept of laughter 
forms the basic meaning of this particular laughter-word. Moreover, in both 
examples, προσγελάω appears as the verb to a non-human, but also inanimate 
subject: in Aeschylus this was ‘the scent of human blood’ (ὀσμὴ βροτείων 
αἱμάτων, Eum. 254), in Sophocles these are ‘words worthy of credit’ (πιστὰ 
ἔπη, Ich. 298). This fact, thus, suggests that the verb occurs in a figurative and 
not literal meaning, thus, is used in order to lay emphasis on the aspect of 
communication.858 Therefore, in line 298 προσγελᾷ primarily stresses the fact of 
the goddess directing her words to the satyrs.859  
However, the obvious semantic connection of this verb with the idea of 
laughter may also regard the manner in which Cyllene considers her providing 
the Chorus with explanations. In her 2006 study on satyr drama, Hanna 
Zalewska-Jura calls attention to the satyrs’ courteous behaviour towards the 
                                               
856 Translation in O’Sullivan and Collard (2013) 367. 
857 Aes. Eu. 254, cf. chapter III, section 3.2.3.2.  
858 As reflected in the translation of Lloyd-Jones (1996) 167: ‘Don’t be so disbelieving, when a 
goddess greets you with words that you can trust!’ 
859 Such understanding of the verb is clearly evoked in the translations of Walker (1919) 473: ‘Be 
no longer faithless, for with faithful words a goddess speaketh graciously unto thee’. 
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nymph and their attempts at speaking to her in quasi-epic fashion.860 Such 
gallant and seemingly respectful manners provoke Cyllene’s amiability 
towards them, that she even confides in them the secret about Hermes’ birth 
(Ich. 262-76), his miraculous growth (Ich. 277-83) and invention of the lyre (Ich. 
284ff.). In view of this, it is evident that with προσγελᾷ in line 298 the nymph 
may be referring to her amiableness or at least indulgence towards the satyrs.861 
In this example, therefore, the language of laughter appears in reference to a 
goddess’ surprise at the disbelief her words have caused amongst a bunch of 
wild creatures, to whom she has so graciously spoken. As it will emerge from 
my analysis of the next reference to laughter found in the same play, Cyllene’s 
amiability will give way to her irritation with the satyrs, which is caused by 
their ridiculous, in her opinion, accusations against Hermes. With this said, I 
would like to pay some attention to the example of laughter in the Searchers 
which pertains to the idea of derision. 
4.3.2. Derision 
References to derisive laughter are found in another preserved passage 
of the Searchers, in which Cyllene expresses her indignation with the satyrs. 
After their initial discussion about the instrument invented by the child-god, 
the Chorus comes to the conclusion that it must have been Hermes who has 
stolen Apollo’s herd of cattle (‘You must know, lady, that whoever the god may 
be who invented this, none other than he is the thief, you may be sure!, ἴσθι τὸν 
δαίμον' ὅστις ποθ' ὃς / ταῦτ' ἐτεχνάσατ', οὐκ ἄλλος ἐστὶν κλ̣[οπεὺς / ἀντ' 
ἐκείνου, γύναι, σάφ' ἴσθι, Ich. 332-4).862 Upon hearing such incredulous 
accusations towards her nursling, the nymph vehemently refutes them. In the 
                                               
860 Zalewska-Jura (2006) 138 points out the comic effect of the satyrs’ quasi-Homeric language. 
861 Halliwell (2008) 524 brings the meaning of the verb down to ‘a metaphorically reassuring 
look’, however, with no references to the goddess’ appearance or face, but only on her 
utterances, I find such interpretation unconvincing.  
862 Translation in Lloyd-Jones (1996) 171. Hereon, I adduce other quotes from the Searchers in 
this translation. 
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next few lines, both sides exchange their opposite opinions, however the satyrs 
begin to treat Cyllene with noticeable irony (Ich. 338-43).863 At one point, the 
nymph makes an angry speech (Ich. 352-70): 
Κυ.   (about 11 letters)] ἄρτι μανθάνω χρόνῳ,  
πονηρέ, σ’ ἐγχ]άσκοντα τᾐμῇ μωρίᾳ. 
δρᾷς δ’ ὑγιὲς ο]ὐδέν, ἀλλὰ παιδιᾶς χάριν. 
σὺ δ’ οὖν τὸ λοιπὸ]ν εἰς ἔμ' εὐδίαν ἔχων  
εἴ σοι φέρει χάρ]μ' ἤ τι κερδαίνειν δοκεῖς  
ὅπως θέλεις κά]χαζε καὶ τέρπου φρένα· 
τὸν παῖδα δ’ ὄ]ντα τοῦ Διὸς σαφεῖ λόγῳ  
μὴ βλάπτε κιν]ῶν ἐν νέῳ νέον λόγον·  
οὗτος γὰρ οὔτε] π̣ρὸς πατρὸς κλέπτης ἔφυ  
οὔτ’ ἐγγενὴς μ]ήτρωσιν ἡ κλοπὴ κρατεῖ.  
σὺ δ’ ἄλλοσ’, εἴ τ]ίς ἐστι, τὸν κλέπτην σκόπει  
σκοπὴν ἄ]καρπον· τοῦδε δ' †οὑπανᾷ† δόμος   
δείξ]ει γένος πρόσαπτε τὴν πονηρίαν  
πρὸς] ὅντιν' ἥκει· τῷδε δ' οὐχ οὕτω πρέπει.  
ἀλλ' αἰὲν εἶ σὺ παῖς· νέος γὰρ ὢν ἀνὴρ  
πώγωνι θάλλων ὡς τράγος κνήκῳ χλιδᾷς·  
παύου τὸ λεῖον φαλακρὸν ἡδονῇ πιτνάς.  
οὐκ ἐκ θεῶν τὰ μῶρα καὶ γέλοια χρὴ  
χ]ανόντα κλαίειν ὕστερ', ὡς ἐγὼ γελῶ.864 
Cyllene: … At last I understand, you villain, that you are simply 
grinning at me for an idiot! You’re up to no good, but all you 
do you do for the sake of fun! Well, for the future, if it gives 
you any pleasure or any hope of profit, laugh at me to your 
heart’s content, enjoy yourselves at your ease so far as I’m 
concerned! Only don’t slander a child who can prove that his 
father is Zeus; stop inventing new charges against a newborn 
child! He was not born a thief on his father’s side, and theft 
does not prevail among his mother’s relatives. Look 
somewhere else for your thief, if there is one, in your fruitless 
search; the ancestry of this child will be revealed by the halls 
above! Fix the crime where it belongs; to fix it upon him is not 
proper! You have always been a child; grown male as you are, 
with your yellow beard, you are as lascivious as a goat. Cease 
to expand your smooth phallus with delight! You should not 
make silly jokes and chatter, so that the gods will make you 
shed tears to make me laugh. 
Cyllene’s indignation with the satyrs is apparent. In particular, she finds fault 
with their treatment of her, as she blames them of jeering at her foolishness 
(ἐγχ]άσκοντα τᾐμῇ μωρίᾳ, Ich. 352) and doing everything merely for the sake 
                                               
863 Zalewska-Jura (2006) 140. 
864 Text with supplements of lines comes from the edition of Lloyd-Jones (1996) 172. 
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of fun (ἀλλὰ παιδιᾶς χάριν, Ich. 353). The nymph, then, tells the Chorus to 
laugh at her to its heart desire (κάχαζε καὶ τέρπου φρένα, Ich. 357), but not 
verbally abuse the divine child of Zeus (τὸν παῖδα δ’ ὄ]ντα τοῦ Διὸς σαφεῖ 
λόγῳ / μὴ βλάπτε κιν]ῶν ἐν νέῳ νέον λόγον, Ich. 358-9). After providing 
arguments for Hermes’ innocence (Ich. 359-64), Cyllene criticizes the satyrs 
again for acting like children despite their mature age (ἀλλ' αἰὲν εἶ σὺ παῖς· 
νέος γὰρ ὢν ἀνὴρ, Ich. 366) as well as speaking ridiculous and foolish opinions 
(τὰ μῶρα καὶ γέλοια… χ]ανόντα, Ich. 368-9), with which they may incur the 
gods’ punishment. The latter, as she remarks, would especially come to her 
liking (ὡς ἐγὼ γελῶ, Ich. 370). 
In this passage, there are three distinguishable references to laughter 
connected with the idea of derision. The first two, ἐγχ]άσκοντα (Ich. 353) and 
κάχαζε (Ich. 357) explicitly regard the mocking laughter Cyllene perceives as 
directed at her from the satyrs. Evidently, she is displeased with this fact, 
nevertheless she, prefers her being the object of the satyrs’ mockery than the 
divine baby in her care. Although it is only highly probable that these two 
laughter-words appear in the text, since they require supplementation, 
however, we may notice that the meanings of these two words correspond with 
the nymph’s angry tone and criticism towards the satyrs’. The third reference to 
laughter appears with the term γέλοια (Ich. 368), with which the nymph 
denotes the ridiculousness of the satyrs expressed opinions. In her view, the 
ideas presented by the Chorus about little Hermes being the thief of Apollo’s 
cattle are stupid (μῶρα) and absurd (γέλοια). Cyllene, therefore, derisively 
rejects them.865 
As we can see, the satyrs’ accusations appear to the nymph as 
incredulous, hence worthy or derision. It is her disbelief in the possibility of a 
                                               
865 Cf. Halliwell (2008) 19 n. 42. 
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child-god committing such a crime at such a young age which causes her to 
spurn the satyrs’ charges.  
Cyllene makes one more reference to laughter in Ich. 370, which, 
although related to derision, discernibly pertains to the idea of expressing 
emotions. I will, then, analyze this last instance in connection with the feeling 
denoted as Schadenfreude. 
4.3.3. Schadenfreude 
Malice is the emotion of delight caused by perceiving the misfortune of 
others. In lines 369-70 of the Searchers, Cyllene admonishes the satyrs not to 
express such ridiculous and foolish ideas about the baby Hermes, unless they 
wish to suffer the wrath of the gods. The nymph then ends her reprimand 
pointing out the fact that should the satyrs be punished for such behaviour, 
their tears would make her laugh (ὡς ἐγὼ γελῶ, Ich. 370). Here, it ia clear that 
these words denote Cyllene’s anger and irritation with the arrogant satyrs to 
the degree that she would take delight in their suffering, should they be 
punished by the gods. Without any doubt, the nymph evokes the image of 
laughter understood as the expression of malice at the possible misfortune of 
the satyrs. Cyllene, then, takes delight in the idea of having the annoyingly 
foul-mouthed creatures suffer. In other words, her imagined laughter would be 
the expression of her Schadenfreude. 
4.3.4. Triumph 
A reference to laughter in the context of triumph is discernible in fr. 210 
of the lost Eurypylus.866 From the scant information we possess about this 
tragedy, we know that it revolved around the story of the hero Eurypylus, who 
was killed at Troy by Neoptolemus, the son of Achilles.867 Fr. 210, the largest 
                                               
866 Soph. frr. 206-222 preserved in the Oxyrhynchus Papyri 1175 + 2081 (b). 
867 Cf. Lloyd-Jones (1996) 82-5; Sommerstein (2010) 265-6. 
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preserved fragment of this play, contains the dialogue of a Messenger reporting 
about the hero’s death to his mother, Astyoche. Upon hearing the news of her 
son’s killing in combat, the woman asks about the state of his body868 (fr. 210 v. 
47-9): 
Ας.   ἦ κἀμβε̣βᾶσι το<ῖ>ν νεκρο<ῖ>ν πρὸς τῷ κακῷ  
γέλωτ' ἔ̣χον̣τες α<ἰν>ὸν Ἀργεῖοι βίᾳ;  
Αγ. οὐκ ἐς τ̣οσοῦτ̣ον ἦλθ̣ον ὥστ' ἐπεγ̣χανεῖν… 
Αstyoche: Did the Argives trample on the corpses with violence, laughing 
with a dire laughter, to crown this evil? 
Messenger: They did not get so far as to insult them.  
Noticeably, Astyoche’s question reflects her fear about Eurypylus’ corpse being 
maltreated by the enemy, whom she envisages committing such a disgraceful 
act ‘laughing with a dire laughter’.869 She, therefore, imagines the victorious 
Greeks as capable of expressing their triumphant glee by mistreating the bodies 
of their vanquished foes. Clearly, such hostile act would only add to the 
mother’s misery over her son’s death, as indicated in the expression πρὸς τῷ 
κακῷ, meaning ‘in addition to this evil’. In this respect, we may recognize that 
in line 48, Astyoche uses the expression γέλωτ' ἔχοντες αἰνὸν (literally ‘having 
a horrible laugh’) in reference to the Greeks’ laughter of triumph. 
 The Messenger, however, denies such act to have taken place and points 
out the fact that the Greeks did not reach the corpses ‘as to insult them’ (ὥστ' 
ἐπεγχανεῖν, v. 49). Here, he uses the rare compound ἐπεγχάσκω, which 
Lloyd-Jones renders ‘insult’. We may notice that in this translation the 
compound, generally, regards the shamefulness of the Greeks’ behaviour over 
their defeated opponents. However, modern lexica explain ἐπεγχάσκω with 
                                               
868 In line 47, Radt has τον νεκρον in the accusative singular, however, Lloyd-Jones suggests 
το<ῖ>ν νεκρο<ῖ>ν in the dualis in regard of two bodies: Eurypylus and his companion Helicaon, 
see Lloyd-Jones (1996) 91 n. a. 
869 The famous example of such mistreatment is that of Hector’s body by Achilles in the Iliad, cf. 
Hom. Il. 22.395-405; 24.14-54. 
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‘make mouths at another’,870 in which the compound prefix ἐπεν- indicates the 
fact of directing one’s act of ‘gaping’ (the basic meaning of χάσκω) in the 
direction of another. As discussed in chapter II, the verb ἐπεγχάσκω mainly 
regards mockery reflected in one’s facial expression.871 In my opinion, this 
understanding of the verb applies to its use in a fragment of Aelian, which has 
been quoted by Byzantine lexicographers.872 However, the preserved context in 
fr. 210 suggests a broader meaning for ἐπεγχάσκω than only ‘make mouths at’, 
for it seems incredible that after a successful battle the Greeks would confine 
themselves to jumping over the enemies’ bodies and merely making faces at 
them, albeit in derisive manner. Due to the fact that the expression ὥστ' 
ἐπεγχανεῖν (v. 49) occurs as a direct answer to Astyoche’s fear of the Argives 
γέλωτ' ἔχοντες αἰνὸν (v. 48), we may recognize a connection with triumphant 
laughter in the former expression, as well. Since the word refers to an act of 
manifesting one’s triumph with disgraceful behaviour as well as may imply 
possible bouts of mocking laughter, I would suggest the meaning of ‘laugh at in 
triumph’ or ‘mock in triumph’ for the instance of ἐπεγχάσκω in this 
Sophoclean fragment. In short, fr. 210 evokes (albeit through negation) the 
image of enemies laughing in triumph as they maltreat the bodies of their 
vanquished foes. 
4.3.5. Sardonic laughter  
The last Sophoclean reference to laughter concerns the Greek proverbial 
expression σαρδόνιος γέλως, ‘Sardonic laughter’. In the scholia on Plato’s 
Republic, the commentator presents an extensive account on the origins and 
                                               
870 LSJ s.v. ἐπεγχάσκω; Abramowiczówna (1958-65) s.v. ἐπεγχάσκω: ‘robić szydercze miny, 
stroić grymasy’. 
871 Cf. chapter II, section 2.1.3. n. 331.  
872 Ael. fr. 69: ‘Avenging justice did not allow the insolent and haughty boy to make mouths at 
the death of Meletus’, οὐ μὴν ἡ τιμωρὸς δίκη τὸν ὑβριστὴν παῖδα καὶ ὑπερόπτην εἴασεν 
ἐπεγχανεῖν τῷ τοῦ Μελήτου θανάτῳ, (my translation). 
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semantics of the lexeme σαρδάνιον used by the philosopher in Res. 337a.873 At 
one point, the scholiast adduces the term’s explanation given by the poet 
Simonides (Sch. Pl. Res. 337a 22-26): 
        Σιμωνίδης δὲ ἀπὸ Τάλω τοῦ  
χαλκοῦ, ὃν Ἥφαιστος ἐδημιούργησε Μίνῳ φύλακα τῆς νήσου ποιήσα- 
σθαι, ἔμψυχον ὄν, τοὺς πελάζοντάς φησι κατακαῖον ἀνῄρει· ὅθεν ἀπὸ 
τοῦ σεσηρέναι διὰ τὴν φλόγα τὸν σαρδάνιόν φησι λεχθῆναι γέλωτα. 
ὁμοίως καὶ Σοφοκλῆς ἐν Δαιδάλῳ.  
According to Simonides the origin of the expression is the story of Talos, the 
bronze figure which Hephaestus crafted for Minos to establish as guardian 
of the island. It was alive, he says, and destroyed those who approached by 
burning them up. This was the origin, he says, of the term ‘sardonic 
laughter’, because they grimaced in the flames. Similarly Sophocles in his 
Daedalus.874 
Noticeably, the quoted passage does not contain an explicit fragment of a work 
by Sophocles, only a mere notion of the poet having had employed the 
traditional expression in his play entitled Daedalus. Nevertheless, this remark 
has entered the list of Sophoclean fragments under the number 160 Radt. Little 
is known about the mentioned drama.875 Scholars, generally, suppose it was a 
satyr play,876 and from fr. 160 infer that it must have regarded something about 
the bronze giant Talos, guardian of the island of Crete.877 According to Hanna 
Zalewska-Jura, it is possible that in this play Sophocles had Daedalus, the 
famous craftsman who left Athens for Crete, create the giant for king Minos.878 
Regarding the phrase sardonic laughter, we may notice that Simonides derives 
the adjective σαρδόνιος from the verb σαίρω, meaning ‘grin’ (σεσηρέναι, Sch. 
                                               
873 Cf. chapter II, section 2.1.1.3. n. 149. 
874 Translation in Campbell (1991) 455. 
875 The TrGF IV adduces only eight short (sometimes consisting on a single word) fragments (fr. 
158-164a). 
876 Lloyd-Jones (1996) 64. 
877 Similar information in Soph. fr. 161: ὁ Τάλως ἐπὶ τοῦ σφυροῦ σύριγγα εἶχεν ὑμένι 
περιεχομένην. σύριγξ δὲ λέγεται ἡ περόνη, ἧς ῥαγείσης εἵμαρτο αὐτῷ ἁλῶναι. ὅτι δὲ 
εἵμαρτο αὐτῷ τελευτῆσαι, λέγει καὶ Σοφοκλῆς ἐν Δαιδάλῳ, “Talos had a hole on his ankle 
covered with a thin plate of metal. In the hole was a pin, after which removal he would be 
conquered. He was then due to die; also mentioned by Sophocles in his Daedalus’ (my 
translation). 
878 Zalewska-Jura (2006) 70. 
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Pl. Res. 337 a 25).879 This was one of the two popular in antiquity explanations 
for the word’s origin, the other referring to a plant growing in Sardinia, which 
consumption resulted in death with a wide grimace on one’s face.880 In lack of 
other evidence, we may only presume that Sophocles employed this phrase 
σαρδόνιος γέλως in connection with the faces of the victims of the bronze 
guardian of Crete.  
 
In this part of the chapter, I have examined the Greek vocabulary of 
laughter as well as its interpretations within the fragments of Sophocles. In 
particular, I have distinguished such ideas of laughter reflected in vocabulary 
found in the fragments: 1) the communication of one’s amiability towards 
another (fr. 171; Ich. 298), 2) derision (Ich. 352, 357, 368), 3) the experience of 
malicious delight (Ich. 370), 4) triumph (fr. 210 v. 48-9), and 5) sardonic laughter 
(fr. 160). Therefore, despite their small number, Sophoclean fragments contain a 
variety of understandings of the phenomenon of laughter. 
4.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have analyzed the Greek laughter-words employed by 
Sophocles in six of his surviving dramas and in four fragments. My 
examination included a total of 41 references, from which 34 are found in the 
surviving tragedies, whereas 7 in the fragments. As it has emerged from my 
discussion in this chapter, it is evident that the poet recognizes the complexity 
of the phenomenon and conjures its image in various connotations. 
 The first main idea of laughter in Sophocles is that related to bodily 
phenomena, i.e. sound and a specific facial expression. Considering the former, 
the analysis of passages has shown that loud laughter is mostly imagined and 
spoken of by the characters (Ai. 382, Ai. 957-8). Only in one case the reference to 
                                               
879 LSJ s.v. σαίρω: ‘part the lips and show the closed teeth’, ‘grin’. Cf. Halliwell (2008) 93 n. 100. 
880 Cf. chapter II, section 2.1.1.3. n. 148. See also Pearson (1917) 112-13 n. 160. 
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laughter may be regarded as a possible stage direction (Ai. 303), suggesting that 
an actor might had laughed in an earlier scene of the play. Apart from this 
single example, other references do not denote laughter occurring onstage. In 
regard of laughter connected with the face, it is also merely talked about by the 
characters and only in relation to future events (El. 1310). Therefore, Sophocles 
evokes laughter in its primary meanings connected to the human body. 
The second main understanding of laughter is in relation to the 
expression of emotions. Accordingly, the poet applies the language of laughter 
in order to describe his characters’ internal experiences of various emotions, 
such as joy (El. 1300; El. 1310; Ai. 383; Ai. 1011), Schadenfreude (Ich. 370), and 
also abnormal states of mind, such as madness (Ai. 303).  
The third discernible chief understanding of laughter is related to the 
manifestation of one’s disposition towards another. For instance, some 
examples conjure laughter as a mean of communicating positive feelings 
towards another like amiability (fr. 171; Ich. 298). However, the largest number 
of references clearly appear in connection with manifesting a negative 
disposition: derisive (3 examples), hostile (1 example), but especially 
antagonistic (24 examples). Sophocles, therefore, very often refers to the 
expressive function of laughter. 
Two main conclusions emerge on the nature of Sophoclean laughter 
from my analysis in this chapter. First, the general image of laughter in the 
tragedies and fragments of Sophocles seems to be quite negative. Only two out 
of the forty-one instances explicitly regard benign laughter: the friendly 
laughter of baby-Dionysus in fr. 171 and the gracious greeting sent by Cyllene 
to the satyrs in Ich. 298. However, these instances appear only in satyr plays, in 
similar fashion to what I have demonstrated in the previous chapter concerning 
Aeschyles.881 Moreover, it seems that benevolent laughter occurs only amongst 
                                               
881 Cf. chapter III, section 3.4. 
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immortals, for in both examples the agent who laughs is of divine origin 
(Dionysus, Cyllene). In fact, Sophocles clearly states that pleasant laughter lies 
within the province of the gods, on whom it entirely depends whether mortals 
may laugh in such joyful manner (Ai. 383). Nevertheless, the only two examples 
regarding laughter in a positive sense refer to the actions of the gods presented 
in satyric drama. 
In relation to human laughter, only two characters are mentioned in 
association with joy: Electra and Teucer. Yet, the laughter of the former appears 
to be chiefly innapropriate, for it is either ill-timed (El. 1300), or in need of being 
concealed (El. 1310); the latter character, however, is described as a person 
incapable of feeling and expressing joy, hence, unable to laugh pleasantly (Ai. 
1011). These two examples show that Sophocles seldom refers to laughter as the 
expression of pleasant as well as benign emotions. 882 
The second observation on the general nature of laughter in the dramas 
of Sophocles is its discernible sociality. It is evident that most of the references 
to laughter (27 examples) regard interpersonal relations between the characters, 
and, as it has emerged, basically of hostile quality. This comes as no surprise 
since Sophocles usually presents his main characters in opposition to others, 
due to a conflict of values.883 What often leads to such discord as well as 
antagonism between the characters is one’s earlier actions perceived by another 
as an act of injustice: mistreatment (Electra, Creon, Oedipus), treachery 
(Philoctetes), murder of a parent (Electra, Orestes), murder of a child 
(Clytaemestra), banishment (Polynices), or even losing a contest for arms 
(Ajax). Noticeably, Sophocles especially presents such conflicts taking place 
amongst people bonded with ties of familial or political φιλία: 1) spouses 
(Agamemnon vs. Clytaemestra), 2) parents and children (Electra and Orestes 
                                               
882 Also, the fact that Electra’s joy regards the anticipated killing of her mother adds a negative 
undertone to her positive emotional experience. 
883 de Romilly (1994) 79. 
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vs. their mother; Haemon vs. his father), 3) siblings (Polynices vs. Eteocles), 4) 
kin (Oedipus vs. his brother-in-law; Creon vs. Antigone), 5) allies (Philoctetes 
and Ajax, vs. Odysseus and the Atreidae). As a consequence of a single act of 
betrayal, φίλοι become antagonists, who not only feel hatred towards each 
other, but also contend with each other in inflicting harm. Sophoclean laughter, 
hence, is basically about relationships disrupted by an act of betrayal. 
It is this discernible sociality which may increase the negative impression 
of Sophoclean laughter, due to the fact that the majority of references relate to 
the experience, expression and communication of malevolent sentiments by one 
character towards another. However, these reactions result from the fact that 
Sophoclean characters follow the traditional moral code of ‘helping friends and 
harming enemies’ and expect to receive the worst from declared adversaries (or 
those whom they consider to be their antagonists). As shown in this chapter, 
this morality governs the world of Sophoclean heroes, for whom failure in 
inflicting harm on an enemy is dishonourable and may bring upon shame, 
disgrace or even utter ruin.884 Hence, for people living according to such moral 
standards laughter becomes a socially potent mean of communication, which 
conveys the message of another’s disrespect, contempt or even superiority. As 
it has emerged, Sophocles uses the language of laughter to denote those 
moments when his characters fear or recognize the social damage of their 
reputation or status. This, in effect, has others treat them without appropriate 
respect. 
In accordance to the words of the Pilot of the Little Prince, quoted in the 
epigraph to this chapter, Sophoclean characters do not react well when others 
no longer treat them seriously and dare to laugh at their misfortunes. 
 
                                               
884 For an account on the general characteristics of the Sophoclean hero, see Knox (1964) 1-61; 
Winnington-Ingram (1980) 304-29. For the distinction of the ‘shame-culture’ noticeable in the 
world of Sophocles, see Dodds (1956) 28-63. 
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Chapter V 
 
Laughter in Euripidean drama 
 
 
 
 
Laughter is the closest distance between two people. 
 Victor Borge885 
 
 
In the fifth and last chapter of this thesis, I examine the laughter-words 
found in the surviving works of Euripides. Similarly to the previous chapters, I 
have divided the analysis into two parts; first, I discuss the ideas on the 
phenomenon found in the extant dramas (the tragedies and the only surviving 
satyr play Cyclops); next, I analyse the lexemes for laughter discernible in 
Euripidean fragments. The aim of this chapter is to specify the understandings 
of laughter applied by the youngest of the three classical tragedians.  
5.1. Laughter-words in the extant dramas 
In the fifteen surviving dramas of Euripides, I have counted a total of 
forty three instances of Greek laughter-words. These terms, however, are 
distributed unevenly: the largest number of references (10 instances) is found in 
Bacchae, followed by Medea (9 terms); few laughter-words appear in other plays: 
4 instances in Trojan Women; 3 examples in Madness of Heracles, Ion and 
Iphigeneia in Tauris each; 2 occurrences in Alcestis and Iphigeneia in Aulis, 
whereas the dramas Children of Heracles, Cyclops, Helen, Hippolytus, Orestes, 
                                               
885 Quoted in Kleiser (2005) 118. 
284 
 
Rhesus886 and Suppliant Women contain but a single laughter-word each. The 
forms and the Euripidean passages are listed in the table below.887 
Verse Lexeme Form in text Grammatic form 
 
Tr. 332 ἀναγελάω ἀναγέλασον Imp. aor. act. 2nd sg. 
Ba. 380 γελάω γελάσαι Inf. aor. act. 
Ba. 439 γελάω γελῶν  Part. pr. act. Nom. sg. 
Ba. 1021 γελάω γελῶντι (προσώπῳ) Part. pr. act. Dat. sg. 
Cyc. 687 γελάω γελῶμαι Ind. pr. m./p. 1st sg. 
Hl. 1349 γελάω γέλασεν  Ind. aor. act. 3rd sg. 
IA 912 γελάω γελᾷ Ind. pr. act. 3rd sg. 
IT 276 γελάω ἐγέλασεν  Ind. aor. act. 3rd sg. 
IT 502 γελάω γελώιμεθα  Ind. pr. m./p. 1st pl. 
IT 1274 γελάω γέλασε  Ind. aor. act. 3rd sg. 
Md. 797 γελάω γελᾶσθαι  Inf. pr. m./p. 
Tr. 406 γελάω γελᾷς  Ind. pr. act. 2nd sg. 
Al. 804 γέλως γέλωτος (ἄξια) Gen. sg. 
Ba. 250 γέλως γέλων (ὁρῶ) Acc. sg. 
Ba. 854 γέλως γέλωτα (ὀφλεῖν) Acc. sg. 
Ba. 1081 γέλως γέλων (τιθέμενον) Acc. sg. 
HF. 285 γέλως γέλων (διδόντας) Acc. sg. 
Hcld. 507  γέλως γέλωτος (ἄξια) Gen. sg. 
HF. 935 γέλως γέλωτι  Dat. sg. 
HF. 950 γέλως γέλως  Nom. sg. 
Io. 528 γέλως γέλως  Nom. sg. 
Io. 600 γέλως γέλωτα (λήψομαι) Acc. sg. 
Io. 1172 γέλως γέλων (ἔθηκε) Acc. sg. 
Md. 383 γέλως γέλων (θήσω) Acc. sg. 
Md. 404 γέλως γέλωτα (ὀφλεῖν) Acc. sg. 
Md. 1041 γέλως γέλων (προσγελᾶτε) Acc. sg. 
Md. 1049 γέλως γέλωτα (ὀφλεῖν) Acc. sg. 
Or. 1560 γέλως γέλως Nom. sg. 
Su. 846 γέλως γέλωτα (ὀφλεῖν) Acc. sg. 
Tr. 983 γέλως γέλως  Nom. sg. 
Ba. 272 διαγελάω διαγελᾷς Ind. pr. act. 2nd sg. 
Ba. 286 διαγελάω διαγελᾷς  Ind. pr. act. 2nd sg. 
                                               
886 In our analysis, I include this drama classically attributed to Euripides, despite its dubious 
authorship. For a discussion on the authenticity of the Rhesus, cf. Liapis (2012) lxvii-lxxv; Fries 
(2014) 22-47. 
887 See the concordance of Allen and Italie (1954). 
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Ba. 322 διαγελάω διαγελᾷς Ind. pr. act. 2nd sg.  
Hipp. 1000 ἐγγελαστής ἐγγελαστὴς  Nom. sg. 
Al. 724 ἐγγελάω ἐγγελᾷς  Ind. pr. act. 2nd sg. 
Ba. 842 ἐγγελάω ἐγγελᾶν  Inf. pr. act. 
Md. 1355 ἐγγελάω ἐγγελῶν  Part. pr. act. Nom. sg. 
Md. 1362 ἐγγελάω  ἐγγελᾷς Ind. pr. act. 2nd sg. 
Rhes. 815 ἐγγελάω ἐγγελῶντες Part. pr. act. Nom. pl. 
Tr. 1176 ἐκγελάω ἐκγελᾷ  Ind. pr. act. 3rd sg. 
IA 372 καταγελάω καταγελῶντας  Part. pr. act. Acc. pl. 
Md. 1041 προσγελάω προσγελᾶτε  Ind. pr. act. 2nd pl. 
Md. 1162 προσγελάω προσγελῶσα  Part. pr. act. Nom. sg. 
Table 14. List of Greek words on laughter present in the extant tragedies of Euripides. 
As we may notice from the table above, Euripides, generally, employs 
nine laughter-words: the verbs ἀναγελάω, γελάω, διαγελάω, ἐγγελάω, 
ἐκγελάω, καταγελάω, and προσγελάω; also nouns, such as γέλως and 
ἐγγελαστής. 
A half of the occurrences contains of verbal forms (24 examples). 
Although many personal forms appear in the present tense, Euripides applies 
also the aorist tense, as, for instance, in the forms: ἀναγέλασον ‘laugh loud!’ 
(Tr. 332), γέλασε ‘he laughed’ (IT 1274), ἐγέλασεν ‘he laughed’ (IT 276), 
γέλασεν ‘she laughed’ (Hl. 1349), and γελάσαι ‘to laugh’ (Ba. 380). In relation 
to the latter instance, we may already notice that the tense only refers to the 
completeness of the action regarded in the infinitive mode (i.e. to fulfill the act 
of laughing); similarly ἀναγέλασον, in which the tense intensifies the 
imperative (‘laugh out loud!’). As for the other three instances, we may assume 
that the aorist tense is used in accounts of past events. The analyses of these 
terms within the context will inform us if the characters refer to past events 
within the play or not.  
Considering the persons of the verbal forms, in Euripidean plays we 
may recognize seven instances with the verb in the second person (‘you laugh 
at’ in all six instances: Al. 724, Ba. 272, Ba. 286, Ba. 322, Md. 1362, Tr. 406; and 
one in the plural: Md. 1041). Furthermore, in the extant dramas we find no self 
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reference of a character laughing, and only one instance of the verb in third 
person singular (Tr. 1176). Also, we may observe a wider range of participles 
employed by Euripides, in a total amount of six occurrences (γελῶν ‘laughing’, 
Ba. 439; προσώπῳ γελῶντι ‘with a laughing face’, Ba. 1021; καταγελῶντας 
‘them laughing at’, IA 372; προσγελῶσα ‘her laughing in the direction of’, Md. 
1162; ἐγγελῶν ‘laughing at’, Md. 1355; ἐγγελῶντες ‘laughing at’, Rhes. 815). 
Since all these participles appear in the present tense, we may recognize that 
Euripides regards a character laughing alongside another action. As for the 
passive voice, wy may find three forms of γελάω, such as γελῶμαι ‘I am 
laughed’ (Cyc. 687), γελώιμεθα ‘we are laughed’ (IT 502) and γελᾶσθαι ‘to be 
laughed’ (Md. 797).  
In regard of nouns, γέλως appears twelve times in different cases, i.e. 
nominative (HF. 950; Io. 528; Or. 1560), genitive (γέλωτος ἄξια ‘worthy of 
laughter’, in both Al. 804 and Hcld. 507), dative (γέλωτι ‘with laughter’, HF 
935), and accusative as a direct object of such verbs as ὁρᾶν, ‘to see’ (Ba. 250), 
ὀφλεῖν, ‘to incur’ (Ba. 854; Md. 404; Md. 1049; Su. 846), διδόναι, ‘to give’ (Hcld. 
285), λαμβάνειν, ‘to take’ (Io. 600) and τιθέναι, ‘to dispose’ (Io. 600; Io. 1172; Md. 
383). Here, Euripides also uses other tenses than only present (used in Ba. 250, 
Ba. 854, Ba. 1081, HF 285, Md. 404, Md. 1049), such as future (γέλωτα λήψομαι 
‘I will receive laughter’, Io. 600; γέλων θήσω ‘I will cause laughter’, Md. 383) 
and aorist (γέλων ἔθηκε ‘he/she caused laughter’, Io. 1172). Lastly, the other 
noun applied by Euripides is ἐγγελαστής ‘mocker’, which appears only once 
(Hipp. 1000). 
This short grammatical analysis of the Euripidean vocabulary of laughter 
provides us with such preliminary information. Firstly, the poet favours 
applying different derivatives of γελάω extended with such prefixes: ἀνα-, δια-
, ἐν-, ἐκ-, κατα- and προσ-. This suggests that in the following section we will 
see references to various aspects of the discussed phenomenon specified by the 
attached prefix. Secondly, although we recognize the predominance of the 
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present tense of these verbal forms, nevertheless we also find many examples of 
laughter-words in relation to past and future events. This diversity of tenses 
may suggest a broader temporal dimension of laughter in the works of 
Euripides. Let us, then, turn to our analysis of Euripidean laughter. 
5.2. Ideas of laughter in Euripidean dramas 
Greek laughter-words are traceable in fifteen surviving plays of 
Euripides. In this section, we will see that the poet is aware of the complexity of 
the phenomenon, as he evokes the idea of laughter in many of its aspects.  
5.2.1. Sound 
Laughter is, basically, an audible phenomenon. In the surviving dramas 
of Euripides, we may find instances of the terms γελάω and γέλως used in 
their basic meaning regarding sound.  
The first example of a character presented as laughing appears in the 
choral ode devoted to Apollo in the third stasimon of Iphigenia in Tauris (IT 
1234-1281). In a set of fifty lines the Chorus of Greek Slave Women narrates the 
story of the god’s birth (IT 1234-1248) as well as his early actions as a child: the 
killing of the guardian dragon in Delphi (IT 1249-1251) and acquiring the 
sacred precinct for his own cult (IT 1251-1257). At one point, Apollo comes to 
Zeus on Mount Olympus in order ‘to beg removal of the earth-goddess’s wrath 
from his Pythian home’ (Πυθίων δόμων χθονίαν ἀφελεῖν μῆνιν θεᾶς, IT 
1272).888 Gaia, enraged by the god’s illegitimate claiming of the Delphic oracle 
which previously belonged to her daughter Themis, decided to debunk 
Apollo’s exclusiveness in prophecy and began to send prophetic dreams to 
mortals (IT 1263-1267). In face of losing his honours as the main god of 
divination (IT 1267-1269), Apollo decides to immediately act and seek remedy 
                                               
888 Translation in Cropp (2000) 153-5. Hereon, I quote other English passages from this edition 
of the Iphigenia in Tauris. 
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from Zeus. In lines 1274-1276, the Chorus describes the father’s reaction to his 
son’s plea for help: 
Χο.   γέλασε δ' ὅτι τέκος ἄφαρ ἔβα  
πολύχρυσα θέλων λατρεύματα σχεῖν· 
ἐπὶ δ' ἔσεισεν κόμαν παῦσαι νυχίους ἐνοπάς 
Chorus:  Zeus laughed, that his son had come so quick 
In his eagerness to own the gold-rich offerings.  
With a shake of his hair he ended the nocturnal declarations 
Noticeably, Zeus expresses his consent in physical form: first, with a burst of 
loud laughter (γέλασε, IT 1274), and then with the shaking of his hair (ἔσεισεν 
κόμαν, IT 1275).889 Although some translators render γέλασε in line 1274 with 
‘he smiled’,890 nevertheless, comparative material suggests the word’s 
interpretation in relation to sound. For instance, in the Homeric Hymn to Hermes, 
we find an analogous scene in which Zeus bursts out with loud laughter (Ζεὺς 
δὲ μέγ' ἐξεγέλασσεν) in reaction to the cunning demeanour of his baby son 
Hermes.891 Here, the audible aspect is indicated not only by the prefix ἐξ- 
attached to the γελάω form892 but is also additionally emphasized by the 
                                               
889 Cf. Cropp (2000) n. 1276. Zeus’ nod is considered to be a traditional form for indicating 
agreement and approval, cf. Hom. Il. 524-7 (quoted in the translation in Fagles (1998) 95): 
Look. I will bow my head (κεφαλῇ κατανεύσομαι) if that will satisfy you. 
That, I remind you, that among the immortal gods 
is the strongest, truest sign (μέγιστον τέκμωρ) that I can give. 
No word or work of mine – nothing can be revoked, 
there is no treachery, nothing left unfinished 
once I bow my head (ὅ τί κεν κεφαλῇ κατανεύσω) to say it shall be done. 
According to Càssola (1975) 465, the nod of Zeus must have become a regular motif in poetry, 
and as such may have been used by any poet (‘il cenno di Zeus doveva essere un tema abituale 
del repertorio epico, e qualunque rapsodo poteva usarlo’).  
890 E.g. Coleridge (1891) 381: ‘and Zeus smiled to see his son come straight to him, because he 
would keep his worship, rich in precious gifts’; Way (1912) 393: ‘Smiled Zeus, that his son, for 
the costly oblations / of his worshippers jealous, so swiftly had come’; Meagher (2002) 449: 
‘Then Zeus smiled on his beloved son, / Amused at his frenzy and his haste / In claiming the 
golden spoils of piety’.  
891 Hom. Hymn. 4. 389-90: Ζεὺς δὲ μέγ' ἐξεγέλασσεν ἰδὼν κακομηδέα παῖδα / εὖ καὶ 
ἐπισταμένως ἀρνεύμενον ἀμφὶ βόεσσιν’, ‘Loud was the laughter of Zeus when he saw the 
roguish child / Denying about the cattle in fine and skillful speech’; translation in Crudden 
(2002) 57. 
892 For the meaning of ἐκγελάω , see chapter II, section 2.1.1.6. 
 289 
 
adverb μέγα ‘greatly’.893 Furthermore, in the Hymn to Artemis, Callimachus 
depicts a similar picture of Zeus reacting with laughter and nodding in 
approval (πατὴρ δ' ἐπένευσε γελάσσας, Call. Dian. 28) to the wishes of his 
child daughter Artemis (παῖς ἔτι κουρίζουσα, Call. Dian. 5). The similarities of 
these scenes are striking, for in all three examples we have the same parent 
confronted with a young progeny making its claim in a most adult manner.894 
On the basis of comparison, we may notice that Zeus, at first, emits a laugh 
before responding to the words of his young, yet behaving in mature fashion 
children. In this respect, it is apparent that the term γέλασε in the Euripidean 
passage quoted above chiefly refers to a laugh emitted by the Father of the 
Gods and men. 
Apart from Zeus, Euripides depicts other Greek gods as laughing. In the 
second stasimon of Helen, the Chorus reveals the story of Demeter, the goddess 
of harvest, grieving after the abduction of her daughter (Hl. 1301-68). As a 
consequence of the her sorrow, the earth becomes bare, which soon results in a 
shortage of food for both gods and men (Hl. 1327-38). In order to convert the 
dire situation, Zeus sends a team of deities to console Demeter with song and 
dance (Hl. 1341-52):  
Χο. βᾶτε, σεμναὶ Χάριτες,  
ἴτε, τᾷ περὶ παρθένῳ  
Δηοῖ θυμωσαμένᾳ  
λύπαν ἐξαλλάξατ᾽ ἀλαλᾷ,  
Μοῦσαί θ᾽ ὕμνοισι χορῶν.  
χαλκοῦ δ᾽ αὐδὰν χθονίαν  
τύπανά τ᾽ ἔλαβε βυρσοτενῆ  
καλλίστα τότε πρῶτα μακά  
ρων Κύπρις: γέλασεν δὲ θεὰ 
δέξατό τ’ ἐς χέρας 
βαρύβρομον αὐλὸν  
τερφθεῖσ’ ἀλαλαγμῷ. 
                                               
893 Cf. chapter II, section 2.1.1.2.1. 
894 The baby Hermes refutes the accusations of stealing Apollo’s cattle with sensible arguments 
worthy of an adult (Hom. Hymn. 4. 368-86), whereas the child Artemis, in a set of 19 lines, asks 
her father for bestowing upon her the honours and powers she deserves as a goddess (Call. 
Dian. 6-25). 
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Chorus:  “Go, you august Graces, 
go and from the heart 
of Deo angered for her daughter 
drive the grief by loud cries, 
and you, Muses, by dance and song.” 
It was then that Cypris, loveliest of the blessed ones, 
first took up the rumbling voice of bronze 
and the drums of stretched hide. 
The goddess laughed 
and took into her hand 
the deep-sounding pipe, 
delighting in its loud cry.895 
The divine revelry carries off Zeus’ plan successfully as their music makes 
Demeter laugh (γέλασεν δὲ θεὰ, Hl. 1349) and join in the festivities. A closer 
look at this passage shows us that it contains of many musical references. First, 
we hear of Zeus asking the Graces and Muses to lift Demeter’s spirits with their 
music: the former are to achieve this literally ‘with an ἀλαλή’ (Hl. 1344), 
whereas the latter with ‘hymns of choral dances’ (ὕμνοισι χορῶν, Hl. 1345). 
Therefore, the son of Cronos requires both groups of goddesses to appease the 
saddened Demeter, particularly, with their singing. Moreover, the succeeding 
lines 1346-47 regard the musical instruments used by Aphrodite, who also 
participates in the divine delegation; these are 1) cymbals,896 metaphorically 
described as ‘the earth-born voice of bronze’ (χαλκοῦ δ᾽ αὐδὰν χθονίαν, Hl. 
1346), and 2) the drums covered with stretched hide (τύπανά… βυρσοτενῆ, Hl. 
1347). In result, divine song is accompanied with the sound of music. This 
combination of voices and instruments (as well as dance) proves to be a 
success, for the appeased goddess joins in the merry crowd with ‘the deep-
noised pipe’ (βαρύβρομον αὐλὸν, Hl. 1351) and allows herself to ‘take delight 
in the joyful sounds’ (τερφθεῖσ’ ἀλαλαγμῷ, Hl. 1352). Finally, the description 
of the divine revelry is marked by two onomatopoeic lexemes regarding the 
                                               
895 Translation in Kovacs (2002) 163-5. Hereon, I adduce other English quotes from this edition 
of the Helen. 
896 Barker (1984) 76 n. 93 considers this a metaphor to κρόταλα than κύμβαλα, whereas Allen 
(2008) 305 n. 1346 includes the possibility of the instrument being a bronze gong. 
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emission of sounds: ἀλαλή (Hl. 1344), i.e. loud cries of ‘ἀλαλαί’897, to which 
Zeus exhorts the Muses to express in front of Demeter; and ἀλαλαγμός (Hl. 
1352), i.e. the sound of ritual instruments898, in this case the pipe (αὐλός). In 
light of the many acoustic references traceable in lines 1341-52, it becomes 
evident that the notion of sound occurs as an important theme in the quoted 
passage.  
In this respect, the interpretation of Demeter’s reaction in line 1349 seems 
to raise little doubt: upon seeing and hearing the divine revelry the goddes 
raises a laugh (γέλασεν δὲ θεὰ, Hl. 1349).899 Here, γελάω primarily regards the 
concept of sound, which corresponds to the acoustic theme discernable in the 
passage. 
Loud laughter accompanies Bacchic revelries, as well. In the first 
stasimon of the Bacchae, the Chorus specifies the powers of Dionysus (Ba. 378-
85): 
Χο.   ὃς τάδ᾽ ἔχει,  
θιασεύειν τε χοροῖς  
μετά τ᾽ αὐλοῦ γελάσαι  
ἀποπαῦσαί τε μερίμνας,  
ὁπόταν βότρυος ἔλθῃ  
γάνος ἐν δαιτὶ θεῶν, κισ-  
σοφόροις δ᾽ ἐν θαλίαις ἀν-  
δράσι κρατὴρ ὕπνον ἀμ-  
φιβάλλῃ. 
Chorus:  The god whose province is to participate in the dances of the 
thiasos, and to laugh with the pipe, and to put a stop to 
anxieties, whenever the bright joy of the grape-cluster comes 
                                               
897 LSJ s.v. ἀλαλή: ‘loud cry’; differentiated meanings in DGE s.v. 1. ‘war-cry’ (‘grito de guerra’); 
2. ‘orgiastic shriek’ (‘alarido orgiástico’); 3. ‘cry of pain’ (‘grito de dolor’); 4. ‘festive-cry’ (‘grito 
festivo’). In extant classical drama, the interjection ἀλαλαί appears thrice in Aristphanes (Ar. 
Av. 952; 1763; Lys. 1291) as an expression of triumphant excitement, cf. Nordgren (2012) 223. 
898 DGE s.v. ἀλαλαγμός 2: ‘estrépito de instrumentos rituales’. Cf. Eur. Cyc. 65: τυμπάνων 
ἀλαλαγμοί, ‘the noise of drums’ (my translation). 
899 In contrast the translation of Way (1916) 583: ‘Then Demeter smiled, and forgat her grieving’; 
also Peter Burian renders γέλασεν with ‘smile’ in Burian and Shapiro (2011) 315: ‘The Mother 
smiled at last’. Demeter’s smiling (μειδῆσαι) is differentiated from laughing (γελάσαι) in Hom. 
Hymn. 2. 204. On the idea of ‘smile’ in the semantics of γελάω, see chapter II, section 2.1.1.2.2. 
For the connection of Demeter’s laughter in Hl. 1349 with the expression of emotions, see 
section 5.2.3.2 below. 
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in the feast of the gods, and in the ivy-bearing festivities the 
mixing-bowl throws sleep around males.900 
In particular, we may distinguish three crucial characteristics of the rites held in 
honour of the god of wine: 1) revels with dances (θιασεύειν χοροῖς, Ba. 379), 2) 
laughter with the sound of the pipe (μετά τ᾽ αὐλοῦ γελάσαι, Ba. 380) and 3) 
dispersion of worries (ἀποπαῦσαί τε μερίμνας, Ba. 381). As we can see, 
Dionysiac practices engage the worshippers on three levels: corporal, through 
dancing, vocal, through laughing, and mental by the release of cares. According 
to the Bacchants, therefore, loud laughter also appears to be a form of 
worshipping Dionysus.901  
Interestingly, the god of wine who seems to require bursts of laughter in 
his honour is also described as laughing himself in the second episode of the 
Bacchae. Enraged with the spreading of the new Dionysian cult I nhis kingdom, 
king Pentheus orders to capture the Lydian stranger (Ba. 352-57) he has heard 
of being the leader of the Bacchants (Ba. 233-38). Once the ruler’s men arrive 
with the bound priest, one of them reports how easily they fulfilled their 
master’s orders (Ba. 434-40): 
Θε. Πενθεῦ, πάρεσμεν τήνδ' ἄγραν ἠγρευκότες 
ἐφ' ἣν ἔπεμψας, οὐδ' ἄκρανθ' ὡρμήσαμεν. 
ὁ θὴρ δ᾽ ὅδ᾽ ἡμῖν πρᾶος οὐδ᾽ ὑπέσπασεν  
φυγῇ πόδ᾽, ἀλλ᾽ ἔδωκεν οὐκ ἄκων χέρας  
οὐδ᾽ ὠχρός, οὐδ᾽ ἤλλαξεν οἰνωπὸν γένυν,  
γελῶν δὲ καὶ δεῖν κἀπάγειν ἐφίετο  
ἔμενέ τε, τοὐμὸν εὐτρεπὲς ποιούμενος. 
Servant:  Pentheus, here we are, having hunted down this prey, against 
whom you sent us, and our setting was not in vain. This 
beast, we found, was gentile, and did not pull back his foot in 
flight, but gave us not unwillingly his hands, (he was) not 
pale, nor did he change (the colour of) his wine-coloured 
                                               
900 Translation in Seaford (1996) 87-9. Hereon, I quote other English passages from this edition 
of the Bacchae, unless stated otherwise.  
901 The body of literature on Dionysus and his cult is vast and evergrowing. For a concise 
account, see Seaford (2006) esp. 152-4 with references to the most important studies on the 
matter. For a recent and exhaustive discussion, see Rybowska (2014) with references. 
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cheeks, but laughing he told us both to bind him and to lead 
him off, and he waited, making my task easy.902 
According to the Servant, the Stranger (who was, in fact, the god himself in 
human guise) willingly gave himself to the guards. Curiously, in doing this, the 
man is said to have been laughing (γελῶν, Ba. 439). In the past, scholars 
favoured the interpretation of ‘smile’ for the laughter-word in this passage.903 
However, as discussed in chapter II, the basic sense of the verb γελάω is 
‘laugh’ and only occasionally does it accept the meaning ‘smile’.904 In his 
commentary to the play, Seaford acknowledges that the latter interpretation for 
γελῶν in Ba. 439 may have been influenced by the similarities of the scene of 
capturing the Stranger with that described in the Homeric Hymn to Dionysus, in 
which the son of Zeus is said to be smiling (μειδιάων) while being captured by 
pirates (Hom. Hymn. 7. 14).905 The difference, however, between the Euripidean 
and epic scenes lies in the fact that the author of the latter uses not γελάω, but 
the term μειδιάω, denoting ‘smile’, without any doubt. Furthermore, in the 
Bacchae, the guard gives us no reason to reject the interpretation of ‘laugh’. In 
fact, such sense of the word corresponds with the Stranger’s other unexpected 
physical reactions observed by the reporting guard: no attempt to escape (οὐδ' 
ὑπέσπασεν, Ba. 436), no change of colour of the skin (οὐκ ὠχρός, οὐδ' ἤλλαξεν 
οἰνωπὸν γένυν, Ba. 439), willingly holding out the hands (ἔδωκεν οὐκ ἄκων 
χέρας, Ba. 437), and remaining still (ἔμενέ, Ba. 440). In this respect, the form 
γελῶν in the present participle indicates that the act of laughing occured 
simultaneously with the action expressed by the verb ἐφίημι, which in the 
middle voice accepts the meaning ‘allow’ or ‘permit’. It is, thus, possible to 
imagine the Stranger emitting a laugh while he allowed the guards to take him 
                                               
902 Translation in Seaford (1996) 91.  
903 Cf. the translation of line 439 in Way (1912b) 37: ‘But smiling bade us bind and lead him 
thence’; similarly Kirk (1979) 61: ‘but smiling he invited me both to bind him and take him 
away’. For the interpretation of γελῶν in line 439 as a reference to the actor’s mask see my 
discussion in section 5.2.1.2. below. 
904 Cf. chapter II, section 2.1.1.2.2. 
905 Seaford (1996) 186 n. 439. See also, Halliwell (2008) 136 n. 86. 
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away (γελῶν δὲ καὶ δεῖν κἀπάγειν ἐφίετο, Ba. 439). Hence, we may agree that 
the term γελῶν in line 439 evokes the idea of sound. Although we only hear of 
the Stranger’s laughter, which, according to the guard, came as an unexpected 
reaction from a person who was about to be imprisoned, nevertheless, the only 
mention of it adds only to the oddity of the mysterious Stranger.  
Few Euripidean examples regard mortals laughing out loud. In the 
Madness of Heracles, the Messenger speaks of Heracles as laughing in his 
account on the hero’s fall into insanity (HF 931-35): 
Εξ.     ὁ δ᾽ οὐκέθ᾽ αὑτὸς ἦν,  
ἀλλ᾽ ἐν στροφαῖσιν ὀμμάτων ἐφθαρμένος  
ῥίζας τ᾽ ἐν ὄσσοις αἱματῶπας ἐκβαλὼν  
ἀφρὸν κατέσταζ᾽ εὐτρίχου γενειάδος.  
ἔλεξε δ᾽ ἅμα γέλωτι παραπεπληγμένῳ 
Messenger:  and he was no longer himself, 
But diseased in the rolling of his eyes 
And after sprouting bloodshot veins in his eyes 
He was dripping down froth from his thick beard 
And he spoke with deranged laughter…906 
The Messenger then quotes the hero’s aberrant speech, in which he 
unexpectantly expresses a desire to kill Eurystheus and leave immediately for 
Mycenae (HF 936-46). What is of our particular interest is the fact that Heracles 
is sadi to have made his insane speech along ‘with a deranged laugh’ (ἅμα 
γέλωτι παραπεπληγμένῳ, HF 935). As discussed in chapter II, the basic idea 
encapsulated in the expression ἅμα γέλωτι is sound.907 On the basis of line 935 
we may assume that the Messenger witnessed the hero speaking nonsense and 
laughing intermittently in a ‘maniacal’ (παραπεπληγμένῳ) manner.908 
Heracles, therefore, laughs loud in his maddened state.  
                                               
906 Translation in Halleran (1988) 52-3. Hereon, I quote other English passages from this edition 
of Madness of Heracles, unless stated otherwise. 
907 Cf. chapter II, section 2.1.1.3. 
908 I will discuss this example in relation to ‘mad laughter’ in more detail in section 5.2.2.3. 
below.  
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Laughter also befits a symposium. In the Ion, a servant of Creusa relates 
to the Chorus about his mistress’ attempt at killing her husband’s newly 
discovered son (Ion 1122-1228). Accordingly, the Athenian queen had the Old 
Tutor to sneak into a banquet hosted by Ion and poison the young man (Ion 
978-1047). In lines 1170-1176, the servant describes the manner in which the 
killer tried to assassinate his victim: 
Θε.    ὡς δ᾽ ἀνεῖσαν ἡδονήν,  
— παρελθὼν πρέσβυς ἐς μέσον πέδον  
ἔστη, γέλων δ᾽ ἔθηκε συνδείπνοις πολύν,  
πρόθυμα πράσσων· ἔκ τε γὰρ κρωσσῶν ὕδωρ  
 χεροῖν ἔπεμπε νίπτρα κἀξεθυμία  
 σμύρνης ἱδρῶτα χρυσέων τ' ἐκπωμάτων  
 ἦρχ', αὐτὸς αὑτῶι τόνδε προστάξας πόνον. 
Servant:  When they had satisfied their desire <for food>, an old man 
came forward and took his place in the middle of the floor, 
and he caused much laughter among the feasters by his eager 
bustling. From the water jars he kept bringing water for the 
guests to wash their hands, burned myrrh resin as incense, 
and had charge of the golden drinking cups, having assigned 
this duty to himself.909 
In order to have easy access to the pouring of wine, the Old Man assumed the 
role of a cup-bearer. Moreover, to avoid any suspicion he ingratiated with the 
banqueters by having them laugh (γέλων δ᾽ ἔθηκε συνδείπνοις πολύν, Ion 
1172) at his zealous actions (πρόθυμα πράσσων, Ion 1173).910 In this example, 
the interpretation of γέλων δ᾽ ἔθηκε πολύν ‘he caused much laughter’ raises 
little doubt. The idea of sound is evoked in the verbal construction of τίθημι 
γέλων ‘cause laughter’, whereas the addition of the adjective πολύς to the 
object γέλων emphasizes the high sonority of this laugh. In short, loud laughter 
befits a feast, though it may be, at times, evoked and abused by those with non-
benign intentions. 
 My final example in which a reference to laughter primarily pertains to 
the audible aspect of the phenomenon may be found in the first episode of the 
                                               
909 Translation in Kovacs (1999) 457-9. 
910 Owen (1939) 148 n. 1173. 
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Trojan Women. After the siege of Troy, the fate of its’ women lies in the hands of 
the Greeks. Hecuba receives the news from the victors’ herald Talthybius that 
her daughter, Cassandra, is to become Agamemnon’s concubine (Tr. 249). The 
princess, then, enters the stage holding torches in her hands, dancing in an 
ecstatic manner and singing about her forthcoming ‘nuptials’ with the Greek 
commander (Tr. 307-341).911 In her frenzy, Cassandra exhorts the Trojan Women 
to rejoice at her future union (Tr. 325-41): 
Κα.        πάλλε πόδα. 
αἰθέριον ἄναγε χορόν· εὐἅν εὐοἵ · 
ὡς ἐπὶ πατρὸς ἐμοῦ  
μακαριωτάταις  
τύχαις· ὁ χορὸς ὅσιος.  
ἄγε σύ, Φοῖβε, νῦν· κατὰ σὸν ἐν δάφναις  
ἀνάκτορον θυηπολῶ,  
Ὑμήν, ὦ Ὑμέναι', Ὑμήν. 
χόρευε, μᾶτερ, ἀναγέλασον· 
ἕλισσε τᾷδ' ἐκεῖσε μετ' ἐμέθεν ποδῶν  
      φέρουσα φιλτάταν βάσιν.  
      βόασαθ’ Ὑμέναιον, ὤ, 
      μακαρίαις ἀοιδαῖς  
      ἰαχαῖς τε νύμφαν.  
ἴτ', ὦ καλλίπεπλοι Φρυγῶν  
κόραι, μέλπετ' ἐμῶν γάμων  
      τὸν πεπρωμένον εὐνᾷ  
πόσιν ἐμέθεν.912  
Cassandra:  Let your feet dance, rippling the air; let the chorus go, 
as when my father’s fate went in blessedness. 
O sacred circle of dance. 
Lead now, Phoebus Apollo: I wear your laurel, 
I tend your temple, 
Hymen, O Hymenaeus! 
Dance, Mother, dance, laugh; lead; let your feet 
wind in the shifting pattern and follow mine, 
keep the sweet step with me, 
cry out the name Hymenaeus 
and the bride’s name in the shrill 
and the blessed incantation. 
O you daughters of Phrygia robed in splendour, 
dance for my wedding 
for the husband fate appointed to lie beside me.913 
                                               
911 For a fuller discussion on the Cassandra scene (Tr. 294-461), see Papadopoulou (2000); 
Rutherford (2014a) 126-33.  
912 Greek text in Murray (1913).  
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Cassandra especially summons her mother, Hecuba, to sing, dance, and 
even laugh at her daughter’s so-called ‘wedding’.914 Without any doubt, the 
form ἀναγέλασον (Tr. 332) in the aorist imperative regards the audible aspect 
of laughter.915 It is, however, crucial to point to the fact that such interpretation 
is possible only if we accept the occurrence of this laughter-word in line 332, 
which only few scholars have been inclined to.916 Most editors, however, reject 
ἀναγέλασον in favour of ἄναγε, πόδα σὸν.917 As a result, the reading of line 
332 slightly changes, for the latter lesson makes no reference to laughter but 
includes an invitation to lead the dance.918 Scholars present various reasons for 
their rejection of ἀναγέλασον.919 For example, Barlow points to metrical 
discrepancies this lesson produces, although she admits that a reference to 
laughter would make Cassandra’s invitation to rejoice ‘much bolder’.920 On the 
other hand, Lee completely rejects the laughter-word for it, generally, ‘makes 
poor sense’ on the basis that ‘an invitation to <laugh aloud> is out of place’.921 
As problems with the metrics of line 332 give ground for calling the lesson into 
                                                                                                                                         
913 Translation in Lattimore (2013b) 94. 
914 For the language of Cassandra’s monody, see Barlow (1986) 173-4 n. 308-340; Shapiro and 
Burian (2009) 85 n. 341-90 / 308-340. 
915 For the basic meaning of ἀναγελάω regarding sound, cf. chapter II, section 2.1.1.6. 
916 E.g. Murray (1913); Biehl (1970) ad loc. In general, ἀναγελάω is seldom found in extant Greek 
texts. 
917 Cf. ad loc. in Nauck (1884), Parmentier (1948), Lee (1976), Diggle (1981) and Barlow (1986). In 
this respect, the imperative ἄναγε summons to lead, whereas πόδα σὸν becomes the object to 
ἕλισσε, hence the meaning ‘move your foot’. Curiously, in their concordance, Allen and Italie 
(1954) s.v. ἀναγέλασον, consider the opposite: ‘ἄναγε, πόδα σὸν ἕλισσε P. lect. dub.’ 
918 Cf. the translation by Barlow (1986) 81: ‘ Dance, mother, lead the dance, join in most gladly’; 
Kovacs (1999) 49: ‘Dance, mother, dance / lead off and whirl your foot this way’; Shapiro (2009) 
42: ‘And you, mother, / You, too, lead the dance, join in it / Joyously’.  
919 The discrepancy rises from three medieval manuscripts, which stand the principal sources of 
the text: 1) V = Codex Vaticanus Graecus 909 (XIII century); 2) P = Codex Vaticanus Palatinus 
Graecus 287 (early XIV century), and 3) Q = Codex Harleianus 5743 in the British Museum, 
London (late XV century). V. contains ‘χόρευε, μᾶτερ, ἀναγέλασον’, whereas PQ has ‘χόρευε, 
μᾶτερ, χορευε (-ευ’ P), ἄναγε, πόδα σὸν’. Since no manuscript is of superior credibility, the 
choice of the lessons depends on the editors’ judgement. For a general account on the 
transmission of Euripidean plays, see. Zuntz (1955) 249-88; on the history of the text of the 
Trojan Women, see Biehl (1970) v-xvii; Diggle (1981) v-xiv. 
920 Barlow (1986) 175, n. 332. 
921 Lee (1976) 131, n. 332.  
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question, Lee’s interpretative argument, however, against ἀναγέλασον proves 
ineffective. In fact, Cassandra’s seemingly nonsensical summon to laugh 
corresponds with her frenzy, i.e. a mental state of ‘normality gone wrong’.922 To 
the maddened princess, who sings a frenzied wedding hymn, a reference to 
celebratory laughter would not be inappropriate. Nonetheless, a noticeable 
discrepancy arises from the fact that the summon to laugh in joy is expressed at 
a time of the Trojan Women’s greatest misery. Yet, Biehl sees this as a conscious 
act on behalf of Euripides who, in his opinion, juxtaposes the image of laughter 
with the image of the visibly grieving Hecuba.923 In general, we may notice that 
Cassandra’s nuptial references, albeit distorted, form a sharp contrast between 
her mention of a joyous event (which, in other circumstances, would occasion 
her mother to celebrate with song, dance as well as loud cries of laughter) and 
the brutal reality she and her companions suffer. The effect of her parodic 
wedding-song is horrific, for its main role is to emphasize the tragic fate of the 
Trojan Women, a fate which gives no causes for rejoicing or laughter. For this 
reason, on an interpretative basis, the lesson ἀναγέλασον in line 332 is 
permissible, since it is clear that an exhortation to laugh in this scene would 
serve tragic purposes. 
 Euripides evokes laughter in the understanding of a sound in seven 
instances. In particular, different persons are mentioned as laughing out loud: 
the gods Zeus (IT 1274), Demeter (Hl. 1349), Dionysus (Ba. 439); the hero 
Heracles (HF 946) as well as groups of people, like banqueters (Ion 1172) and 
Bacchic worshipers (Ba. 380). Noticeably, some of these laughing subjects are 
characters appearing in the plays (Dionysus, Heracles, Bacchants), others, 
however are not (Zeus, Demeter, banqueters). At this point it must be noted 
that these examples are found in the songs of the chorus (IT 1274; Hl. 1349; Ba 
                                               
922 Barlow (1986) 173 n. 308-340. 
923 Biehl (1989) 181, n. 332: ‘Kassandras outrierte Aufforderung an die Mutter, sie sole ‘laut 
auflachen’, bildet den krassesten Gegensatz zu Hekabes tränenreicher Klage, die Kassandra 
soeben noch in bewegten Worten beschrieben hat (315-317)’. 
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380) or in reports of events delivered by messengers (Ba. 439; HF 946; Ion 1172). 
Except for Ba. 380 which presents acts of laughing aloud as part of Dionysiac 
rites, we may observe that laughter understood as sound is, mainly, evoked in 
relation to former events, be it recent (as in the reports of offstage events) or 
unidentified (in as the choral odes). Euripides only has his dramatis personae 
speak of loud laughter. Thus, we only hear about persons laughing, but do not 
hear laughter itself from the stage. Although we have but one example of a 
character’s exhortation to laugh (Cassandra in Tr. 332), nevertheless it is left 
with no response. The sound of laughter, therefore, does not resonate in 
Euripidean drama.  
5.2.2. Facial expression 
In the extant dramas, Euripides makes but a single explicit evocation of 
the idea of laughter in connection with the face. Such example is found in the 
choral ode in the fourth stasimon of the Bacchae. After Dionysus leaves with the 
maddened Pentheus to spy on the Bacchants on Mount Cithaeron (Ba. 976ff.), 
the Chorus sings an angry ode, in which it urges the god to punish the ‘godless, 
lawless, unjust earth-born offspring of Echion’ (τὸν ἄθεον ἄνομον ἄδικον 
Ἐχίονος / γόνον γηγενῆ, Ba. 1015-16) for his insolence (Ba. 977-1023). At the 
end of their song, the Bacchants summon Dionysus to come in person and hunt 
down Pentheus (Ba. 1020-3): 
Χο. ἴθ᾽, ὦ Βάκχε, θηραγρευτᾷ βακχᾶν 
γελῶντι προσώπῳ περίβαλε βρόχον  
θανάσιμον ὑπ᾽ ἀγέλαν πεσόν- 
τι τὰν μαινάδων. 
Chorus:  Go, o Bachus, beast, with laughing face throw around the 
hunter of bacchants the deadly noose as he falls under the 
herd of maenads. 
Apparently, the Bacchae invoke the god of wine to appear in animal form and 
punish ‘with a laughing face’ (γελῶντι προσώπῳ, Ba. 1021) the impious ruler 
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of Thebes. Due to the fact that the image of laughter is explicitly evoked in 
connection with the face, as specified by the noun πρόσωπον, translators tend 
to render the participle γελῶντι ‘smiling’.924 Also, this interpretation is 
favoured by some scholars who recognize the expression γελῶντι προσώπῳ as 
a reference to the original mask worn by the actor playing the character of the 
Stranger.925 However, the context in which the present participle of γελάω 
appears provides no reasons for rejecting the basic meaning of ‘laugh’ for the 
verb, since, in this passage, we do not see the character of Dionysus on stage 
nor hear him. All we possess is the Chorus’ enigmatic remark about the god’s 
face, which makes it difficult to determine whether the idea evoked in this 
reference pertains only to that of smiling.  
At this point it is important to repeat that the basic function of any 
physical manifestation of laughter (including the facial expression) is nonverbal 
communication.926 With this in mind, we may notice that the reference to 
laughter in Ba. 1021 may concern not only the physical appearance of the god’s 
countenance (laughing or smiling), but also the manifestation of his feelings. 
Such interpretation is possible due to the set of various connotations of the verb 
γελάω, which I have examined in chapter II.927 In this respect, Seaford’s 
translation of γελῶντι προσώπῳ, ‘with laughing face’, reflects best, in my 
opinion, the semantic complexity of the laughter-word, and allows its 
additional interpretation. This, then, leaves us with the question what does 
Dionysus’ laughing face, particularly, express? The answer, I hope, will be 
                                               
924 Cf. the translation ‘with smiling face’ included by Kirk (1979) 109 and Kovacs (2002) 113.  
925 Dodds (1960) 131 n. 439: ‘the actor who played the Stranger no doubt wore a smiling mask 
throughout’; Foley (1980) 127: ‘this figure [i.e. Stranger] with a smiling mask (smiling as we 
know from lines 439 and 1021)’; Segal (1982) 249: ‘The prosōpon in this choral prayer is possibly 
a reference to the “mask” as well as the “visage” of the smiling Stranger in the early scenes of 
the play’ (original emphasis). Yet, the evidence is limited only to two references in the play: 
γελῶντι προσώπῳ (Ba. 1021) and γελῶν (Ba. 439). For doubts on the theatrical hypothesis, see 
Halliwell (2008) 136-7, 546. For a full discussion on the god’s mask in the context of cult, see 
Rybowska (2014) 85-9. 
926 Cf. chapter I, section 1.3.3. 
927 Cf. chapter II, section 2.1.1.2. 
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provided in section 5.2.11. below, in which I analyze Euripidean references to 
laughter in connection with the idea of expressing one’s disposition towards 
another. 
5.2.3. Humour 
Laughter and humour are two phenomena universally associated with 
each other.928 In the extant dramas of Euripides, we may find few examples of 
Greek laughter-words which evoke the idea of laughter in connection with 
incongruity and the feeling of amusement. 
Few passages of Euripidean tragedy regard laughter in relation to the 
feeling of pleasure at perceiving something considered to be humorous. The 
first example we find is Zeus’ reaction to Apollo’s claim for Delphi described 
by the Chorus in the third stasimon of the Iphigenia in Tauris (IT 1234-1281). As I 
have argued in section 5.2.1., the Father of the Gods and men initially bursts out 
laughing upon hearing his son’s plea for help (γέλασε, IT. 1274). However, the 
passage we have discussed above also distinguishes the cause for the god’s 
outburst, i.e. ‘that his son had come so quick / in his eagerness to own the gold-
rich offerings’ (δ' ὅτι τέκος ἄφαρ ἔβα / πολύχρυσα θέλων λατρεύματα σχεῖν, 
IT 1274-75). As we may notice, the reason for Zeus’ laughter is not Apollo’s 
request, as Dillon states,929 but the fact that the deity who vies for the monopoly 
in prophetic functions is still a child (τέκος). Moreover, this child god pursues 
the recognition of his divinity in a mature as well as clever way, namely, by 
taking over the oracle in Delphi, a rich precinct filled with luxurious offerings 
(πολύχρυσα λατρεύματα).930 The incongruity of these two facts, namely, the 
god’s very young age with his very mature actions, may appeal to Zeus as 
                                               
928 Cf. chapter I, section 1.1.2. 
929 Dillon (1991) 351. 
930 Kyriakou (2006) n. 1273-75: ‘Zeus laughs because Apollo is a wonderboy, very young and 
already very determined, but also because the honors the child asks to have restored to him 
include an extremely lucrative cult.’ 
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amusing, thus result in his burst of laughter.931 Such humorous interpretation of 
the word γέλασε in line 1274 may be supported by the appearance of the 
adverb ἄφαρ ‘quickly’, ‘immediately’ which refers to the haste932 Zeus 
recognizes in his son’s arrival and desire to claim full honours as a god. The 
divine father, then, laughs with amusement at the determination and cleverness 
his progeny shows in fulfilling his young godly desires.933 
 The feeling of amusement provoking laughter may be hinted at in the 
Ion. As the Servant relates to Creusa the failed attempt of poisoning Ion at the 
banquet (Ion 1122-1228), he describes the manner in which the assassinator 
behaved in order not the attract suspicion: this was having the banqueters burst 
out laughing at his zealous actions (γέλων δ᾽ ἔθηκε συνδείπνοις πολύν, 
πρόθυμα πράσσων, Ion 1172-3).934 Thus, to the banqueters the man’s 
unexpected or unusual eagerness in his assumed role as a cup-bearer must 
have appeared as amusing, since it made them laugh. We may, therefore, 
presume that the assassinator must have behaved in a funny way. 
Another reference to laughter in relation to the feeling of amusement is 
found in the tragedy Madness of Heracles. After his account of the hero’s first 
symptoms of frenzy and aberrant speech (HF 931-46), the Messenger gives a 
detailed description of Heracles’ abnormal conduct. In his delusion, the hero 
believes he is travelling to Mycenae on a mounted chariot to kill his enemy 
Eurystheus (HF 947-49), however, in reality, he is running around the main hall 
                                               
931 Zeus reacts in a similar way after listening to the claims of his other children: the infant 
Hermes (Hom. Hym. 4. 389-90) and the young Artemis (Call. Dian. 28). Cf. n. 12 above. 
932 Apollo’s speediness has been already indicated a few lines earlier during his ascent to 
Olympus in the adjective ταχύπους ‘swift-footed’ (IT 1270). Cf. the translations of Murray 
(1911) 79: ‘Zeus laughed to see the babe, I trow, / So swift to claim his golden rite; / He laughed 
and bowed his head, in vow / To still those voices of the night’. 
933 Such interpretation also favours the translation of γέλασε as ‘laughs’ instead of ‘smiles’, 
which appears in older translations, cf. Potter (1938): ‘Zeus smiled, that the child so quickly 
came/ to ask for worship that pays in gold’; Way (1958) ‘Smiled Zeus, that his son, for the costly 
oblations of his worshippers jealous, so swiftly had come.’ 
934 Owen (1939) 148 n. 1173. 
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of the palace in Thebes. The Messenger, then, mentions the reaction of those 
who witnessed the odd behaviour of the great hero (HF. 950-2): 
Εξ.    διπλοῦς δ' ὀπαδοῖς ἦν γέλως φόβος θ' ὁμοῦ, 
καί τις τόδ’ εἶπεν, ἄλλος εἰς ἄλλον δρακών· 
Παίζει πρὸς ἡμᾶς δεσπότης ἢ μαίνεται; 
Messenger: The servants felt both fear and laughter together,  
And looking at one another they said, 
“Is our master teasing us or is he mad?” 
In this passage, we may notice that the servants were not certain how to react to 
their master’s strange actions. This is, particularly, emphasized in line 950 in 
which the Messenger describes the twofold (διπλοῦς) emotional response they 
experience at the same time (ὁμοῦ) while perceiving Heracles’ conduct, i.e. 
laughter (γέλως) and fear (φόβος). With this juxtaposition, we may clearly 
recognize that the applied laughter-word refers to the experience of a pleasant 
emotion which could result in a burst of laughter. Since this feeling, which rises 
in the servants in reaction to the hero’s unexpected and abnormal behaviour, 
makes them wonder in line 952 whether their master ‘is playing a game’ with 
them (παίζει), it becomes apparent that the emotion indicated by γέλως is 
amusement.935 However, the simultaneously felt anxiety (φόβος) leaves the 
servants uncertain in their reaction and even has them doubt in the hero’s 
sanity (μαίνεται, HF 952). The result of their ambiguous emotional experience 
is confusion in whether they are witnessing a humorous sight or not; hence, the 
question posed in line 952.936  
As the Messenger then describes, the servants’ uncertainty dispersed 
once the delusional Heracles aimed with his bow and arrows at his own 
children (HF 967-71). By then, the feeling of fear overcame all witnesses of the 
hero’s insanity and manifested itself in a shriek of horror (βοᾷ δὲ … οἰκετῶν τ' 
                                               
935 Both Way (1912b) 205 and Kovacs (1998) 401 render γέλως with ‘mirth’.  
936 Cf. Papadopoulou (2005) 67-8: ‘the by-standers wonder in turn whether they should laugh at 
Heracles’ joke or tremble at what was a manifestation of madness’. 
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ὄχλος, HF 978. Although at first tragic madness may seem funny, in the end 
gives it leaves no space for laughter to occur. 
In the analyzed examples we may observe that Euripides acknowledges 
the concept of laughter connected with humour. As we have seen, the 
references to laughter appear with the perception of an incongruity: Zeus sees 
the unexpected eagerness of his progeny to receive divine honours despite a 
very young age; the baqueters perceive one’s unusually eager actions at a feast, 
whereas the servants of Heracles witness their master’s odd conduct. In the first 
two case, the used laughter-words refer to the expression of amusement 
(γέλασε, IT 1274; γέλων δ᾽ ἔθηκε… πολύν, Ion 1172), wheras in the third, it 
denotes this feeling itself (γέλως, HF 950). Again, we only hear about the 
characters’ amused laughter (expressed outwardly or only felt inwardly), 
however, do not witness it on stage. 
5.2.4. Delight 
One’s laughter may express a high degree of pleasure. The image of a 
person laughing in delight is evoked in the sixth episode of the Medea. Jason’s 
servant brings Medea news of the death of Creon and his daughter (Md. 
1122ff.). In lines 1134-1230, the Messenger gives a detailed account of the 
disaster brought on the Corinthian royals by the barbarian woman, who had 
sent poisoned wedding robes as a gift to Jason’s bride (Md. 956-8). According to 
the servant, the princess was first displeased with seeing Medea’s children 
bringing the present (‘Then she veiled her eyes and turned her white cheek 
away, disgusted at seeing the children come in’, ἔπειτα μέντοι προυκαλύψατ' 
ὄμματα / λευκήν τ' ἀπέστρεψ' ἔμπαλιν παρηίδα, / παίδων μυσαχθεῖσ' 
εἰσόδους, Md. 1147-9).937 However, Jason’s prompting (Md. 1151-55) as well as 
the sight of the finery before her (ὡς ἐσεῖδε κόσμον, Md. 1156) made the young 
                                               
937 Translation in Kovacs (1994) 401. Hereon, I adduce other English passages from this edition 
of the Medea, unless stated otherwise. 
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girl change her mind and accept the gift. The Messenger, then, describes the 
princess’ adorning of the new garments (Md. 1157-66): 
Αγ.    καὶ πρὶν ἐκ δόμων 
μακρὰν ἀπεῖναι πατέρα καὶ παῖδας σέθεν 
λαβοῦσα πέπλους ποικίλους ἠμπέσχετο, 
χρυσοῦν τε θεῖσα στέφανον ἀμφὶ βοστρύχοις 
λαμπρῷ κατόπτρῳ σχηματίζεται κόμην, 
ἄψυχον εἰκὼ προσγελῶσα σώματος. 
κἄπειτ' ἀναστᾶσ' ἐκ θρόνων διέρχεται  
στέγας, ἁβρὸν βαίνουσα παλλεύκῳ ποδί,  
δώροις ὑπερχαίρουσα, πολλὰ πολλάκις  
τένοντ' ἐς ὀρθὸν ὄμμασι σκοπουμένη.  
Messenger:  So eager was she to wear the treasures, 
even before Jason and the boys had reached 
the road, she put on the colorful dress, 
set the gold crown on her head, 
and in a bright mirror arranged her hair. 
She laughed with pleasure at the beautiful 
but lifeless image. Then as if the gifts 
had cast a spell, she stood up, dancing 
through her rooms, giddy with the feel of the gown 
twirling so she could see repeatedly 
her shapely feet and pointed toes.938 
The fact that the princess reacts positively to the gifts is noticeable in her lively 
conduct: as soon as Jason leaves with his children the girl dresses the gown 
(πέπλους ἠμπέσχετο, Md. 1159), adorns the golden crown (θεῖσα στέφανον. 
Md. 1160), parades through her chambers (διέρχεται στέγας, ἁβρὸν βαίνουσα, 
Md. 1163-4) and looks many-a-times at herself (πολλὰ πολλάκις… ὄμμασι 
σκοπουμένη, Md. 1165-6). According to the Messenger, she did all this is in 
high spirits, as she took extreme pleasure in the gifts from Medea (δώροις 
ὑπερχαίρουσα, Md. 1165). At one point, the servant mentions how the girl, 
having got dressed in the garments from Medea, stood in front of a mirror and 
‘laughed with pleasure at the beautiful but lifeless image’ (ἄψυχον εἰκὼ 
προσγελῶσα σώματος, Md. 1162). Due to the fact of the princess’ visible 
delight in her new clothing, we may recognize that the interpretation of the 
laughter-word προσγελῶσα in line 1162 may exceed the commonly accepted 
                                               
938 Translation in Collier (2011) 189-90. 
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meaning of ‘smile’, favoured by the LSJ as well as many translators of this 
play.939 I have already argued in the previous part of my thesis on the semantic 
complexity of the verb προσγελάω, calling attention to the fact that it is 
impossible to clearly specify which concept, whether that related to laughter or 
to smiles, is specifically evoked by the lexeme in its non-figurative use.940 In 
reference to the instance in Md. 1162, it is possible that the Messenger describes 
the dressed up princess not only as smiling to herself in the mirror, but also as 
laughing with pleasure at her beautiful image.941 Such an expressive behaviour 
as laughter not only would emphasize the emotional shift that has taken place 
in her from the initial disgust with Jason’s children (μυσαχθεῖσ', Md. 1149) to 
the extreme delight in their mother’s gift (ὑπερχαίρουσα, Md. 1165), but it 
would also correspond with her lively reaction to the robes.942 For it is 
important to keep in mind the fact of the very young age of Creon’s daughter, 
whose vivid behaviour described in lines 1157-66 appears typical for a young 
teenage girl pleased to receive a pretty new dress.943 Since the princess’ gaiety is 
                                               
939 LSJ s.v. προσγελάω 1: ‘smile at’ with reference to Eur. Md. 1162. For the translations, see, e.g. 
Way (1946) 375: ‘She took the rich-wrought robes and clad herself, / Circling her ringlets with 
the golden crown, / And by a shining mirros ranged her tresses, / Smiling at her own phantom 
image there’; Kovacs (1994) 401: ‘she took the many-coloured gown and put it on, and setting 
the gold crown abort her lock, she arranged her hair in a bright mirror, smiling at the lifeless 
image of her body’; Arnson Svarlien (2007) 108: ‘she took the intricate / embroided robe and 
wrapped it round her body, / and set the golden crown upon her curls, and smiled at her bright 
image – her lifeless double’. 
940 Cf. chapter II, section 2.1.1.6. 
941 This ambiguity in the semantics of προσγελάω is given in the translation of Blondell (1999) 
206: ‘…[she] took a bright mirror and arranged her hair, smiling and laughing (προσγελῶσα) 
at her body’s lifeless image there’. 
942 Halliwell (2008) 524 points to the Messenger’s emphasis on the ‘physically excited joy’ of the 
princess. 
943 According to Roisman (2014) 118, lines 1147-66 illustrate the princess as ‘vain and self-
absorbed’. Similar notion in Torrance (2007) 289: ‘The beautiful poisoned robe and crown… are 
particularly appropriate in that they appeal to the vanity and material greed of the princess, 
who immediately succumbs to their charms (1156-66)’. Stuttard presents a similar non-flattering 
description of Jason’s bride in his translation cf. Stuttard (2014) 196: ‘And when she saw the 
beauty of your gifts, well, she could not resist. No. She agreed to everything her husband asked. 
And as soon as Jason and his sons had left her rooms, she took the dress, so shimmering, so 
fine, and wrapped it round her. And she set the golden crown upon her head and took a mirror 
in her hand and in its brightness bunched her curls and laughed to look upon the ghostly 
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evident, we may, thus, accept the interpretion of her reaction described with 
προσγελῶσα as ‘laughing with delight’. 
At this point it should be added that scholars have pointed to the 
importance of line 1162 in building up the tension in the Messenger’s narration. 
In their editions of the play, commentators concurrently perceive the 
expression ἄψυχον εἰκὼ, ‘lifeless image’, as anticipating the horrible 
consequences of Jason’s bride accepting the gift from Medea.944 From line 1167 
it is clear that the girl’s fate is irreversible, as the Messenger narrates in 
meticulous detail her excrutiating death in flames from to the poisoned robes 
(‘But then there was a terrible sight to behold’, τοὐνθένδε μέντοι δεινὸν ἦν 
θέαμ' ἰδεῖν, Md. 1167ff.). We may, thus, agree that the mention of the princess’ 
‘lifeless image of the body’ impends her doom. However, we may also notice 
that line 1162 simultaneously presents two images of the princess: 1) one alive, 
who laughs and takes delight in her looks, and 2) the other dead, in reference to 
a lifeless corpse. It is in this opposition of the two images that the tension of the 
Messenger’s speech is created, i.e. by setting the contrast of the princess’ future 
‘lifeless body’ with her present ‘gaily laughter’.945 Line 1162, thus, contains the 
juxtaposition of two ideas, i.e. the idea of death evoked in the words ἄψυχον 
εἰκὼ… σώματος, with the idea of life evoked by the word προσγελῶσα. The 
invocation of the pleasant connotations of the princess’ laughter, whilst alive, 
increases the horroric effect of the account of her death. Euripides, therefore, 
uses the language of laughter for his own tragic purposes. 
Another example of a laughter-word evoking the idea of experiencing 
delight is found in the Helen. In the choral ode in the second stasimon, to which 
                                                                                                                                         
spectre of her face reflected there. She stood up from the chair she sat on, and she walked from 
room to room, treading softly, airily on milk-white feet, enraptured by your gifts, and many 
times she’d arch her back and gaze in admiration at her loveliness’.  
944 Elliott (1969) 96 n. 1162: ‘Glauce’s reflection grimply anticipates the sequel: it has no psyche, 
and soon she will lose hers’; Mastronarde (2002) 354 n. 1162: ‘ἄψυχον εἰκὼ: the ‘lifeless 
likeness’ is an ominous portent of her impending death’. 
945 Dillon (1991) 351 points to the irony of the scene, in which the princess’ innocent laughter is 
undercut by the audience’s superior knowledge of her upcoming fate. 
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I paid attention in section 5.2.1. above, I have recognized the fact that the divine 
revelers sent by Zeus to appease Demeter achieved their goal. With song and 
dance, the gods managed to lift the grieving mother’s spirits to the point that 
the she joined in the merry-making. Lines 1349-52, particularly, regard the 
moment of the goddess’ solace: 
Χο.    γέλασεν δὲ θεὰ 
δέξατό τ’ ἐς χέρας 
βαρύβρομον αὐλὸν  
τερφθεῖσ’ ἀλαλαγμῷ. 
Chorus:  The goddess laughed 
and took into her hand 
the deep-sounding pipe, 
delighting in its loud cry. 
Apparently, the gods’ singing and dancing must have been to Demeter’s liking, 
since it resulted in her outburst of laughter and participation in the divine 
revelry. In line 1349, we may notice that the word γέλασεν, ‘she laughed’, 
indicates not only the goddess’ vocalization of laughter, for which 
interpretation I have argued above, but it also signals her shift in mood from 
the feeling of deep grief to that of a more pleasant nature. Here, the laughter-
word γελάω clearly describes the outward manifestation of Demeter’s 
emotional process.  
 The goddess’ laughter in Hl. 1349 recalls the same reaction described in 
the Homeric Hymn to Demeter,946 however, we may distinguish certain 
differences in the two version’s of Demeter’s appeasement. In the hymn, the 
goddess is cheered up by the joking and prancing of the maid Iambe (‘knowing 
Iambe jested with her and / mocking with many a joke moved the holy goddess 
/ to smile and laugh and keep a gracious heart’, χλεύῃς μιν Ἰάμβη κέδν' εἰδυῖα 
/ πολλὰ παρασκώπτουσ' ἐτρέψατο πότνιαν ἁγνὴν / μειδῆσαι γελάσαι τε καὶ 
                                               
946 Cf. chapter II, section 2.1.1.2.2. 
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ἵλαον σχεῖν θυμόν, Hom. Hymn. 2. 202- 4),947 whereas in the Helen, it is the 
singing and dancing of the gods’ that prompts her change of mood. Therefore, 
two different stimuli make the goddess laugh: in the hymn it’s the power of 
words, in the drama it is the power of music. As a consequence, Demeter’s 
behaviour after her emotional shift also differs: the goddess in the hymn 
remains seated in the company of other women and receives the barley-drink 
κυκεών (‘she bid them mix barley / and water with soft mint and give her to 
drink. / Metaneira made and gave the drink to the goddess as she bid’, ἄνωγε 
δ' ἄρ' ἄλφι καὶ ὕδωρ / δοῦναι μίξασαν πιέμεν γλήχωνι τερείνῃ. / ἡ δὲ κυκεῶ 
τεύξασα θεᾷ πόρεν ὡς ἐκέλευε, Hom. Hym. 2. 208-10); whereas the Euripidean 
Demeter is prompted to participate in the divine revelry by playing the pipe 
(Hl. 1350-2). In the first case, the goddess’ static, if not calm reaction agrees with 
the grandiose style of the hymn aimed at presenting an aetiological narrative 
for the Eleusian Mysteries held in honour of the goddess;948 in the second, 
however, the more active response corresponds with the musical character of 
the whole choral ode.949 We may, thus, see that Demeter’s behaviour after her 
burst of laughter depends on the function of the genre presenting the myth: the 
Homeric Hymn describes her actions with reverence for it was composed to 
celebrate the goddess, whereas the Chorus in the Helen presents a more lively 
response from Demeter to suit the chiefly entertaining function of the second 
choral ode.950 Euripides, therefore, evokes the image of a goddess laughing in 
                                               
947 All English quotes of the Homeric Hymn to Demeter come from the translation of Foley (1994). 
For a discussion on Iambe’s mockery of Demeter, see Rosen (2007) 47-55. 
948 Cf. Richardson (1974) 13-30; Foley (1994) 84-97, 169-75. For a discussion on the hymn in 
connection with ritual laughter, see Halliwell (2008) 161-66. 
949 On the importance of the musical aspect of the second choral ode, see Marshall (2014) 115-22. 
950 This has been the traditional approach of scholars who view the ode as a mere ἐμβόλιμον, 
i.e. a choral interlude which is not related to the subject of the play (cf. Arist. Poet. 1456 29a); see 
Dale (1967) 147 n. 1301-68: ‘The ode is in fact introduced for its own sake’. For the discussion on 
the relevance of the ode in understanding a metaphorical function of the Helen, see Foley (1992); 
Swift (2009).  
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delight in that part of his drama, which main purpose is to delight the 
audience.  
5.2.5. Joy 
Laughter befits festivity. In section 5.2.1., we have seen that it becomes 
an important part of ecstatic cults along with music, song, cries, and loud 
exclamation. Regarding the mention of laughter in the first choral ode of the 
Bacchae, which I have already discussed in relation to the phenomenon’s 
audible aspect (Ba. 378-85), we may also recognize that the used laughter-word 
γελάσαι may also evoke the idea of a positive emotional experience. Such 
interpretation is suggested by Dodds in his commentary to the play, who 
translates line 380 μετά τ᾽ αὐλοῦ γελάσαι with ‘to be gay with the music of the 
pipes’.951 In particular, the connection of gaiety with the Dionysiac cult is 
explicitly mentioned by the Chorus in their description of the god’s rites (Ba. 
135-66): 
Χο.  ἡδὺς ἐν ὄρεσσιν ὅταν  
ἐκ θιάσων δρομαίων  
πέσηι πεδόσε, νεβρίδος ἔχων  
ἱερὸν ἐνδυτόν, ἀγρεύων  
αἷμα τραγοκτόνον, ὠμοφάγον χάριν,  
ἱέμενος εἰς ὄρεα Φρύγια Λύδι'  
†ὁ δ' ἔξαρχος† Βρόμιος·  
εὖοἷ.  
ῥεῖ δὲ γάλακτι πέδον, ῥεῖ δ' οἴνωι,  
ῥεῖ δὲ μελισσᾶν νέκταρι.  
Συρίας δ' ὡς λιβάνου κα- 
πνὸν ὁ Βακχεὺς ἀνέχων  
πυρσώδη φλόγα πεύκας  
ἐκ νάρθηκος ἀίσσει  
δρόμωι καὶ χοροῖσιν  
πλανάτας ἐρεθίζων  
ἰαχαῖς τ' ἀναπάλλων   
τρυφερόν <τε> πλόκαμον εἰς αἰθέρα ῥίπτων.  
†ἅμα δ' ἐπ' εὐάσμασιν ἐπιβρέμει τοιάδ'·†  
Ὦ ἴτε βάκχαι,  
ὦ ἴτε βάκχαι,  
                                               
951 Dodds (1960) 120 n. 378-81. 
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Τμώλου χρυσορόου χλιδά,  
μέλπετε τὸν Διόνυσον  
βαρυβρόμων ὑπὸ τυμπάνων,  
εὔια τὸν εὔιον ἀγαλλόμεναι θεὸν  
ἐν Φρυγίαισι βοαῖς ἐνοπαῖσί τε,  
λωτὸς ὅταν εὐκέλαδος  
ἱερὸς ἱερὰ παίγματα βρέμηι σύνοχα  
φοιτάσιν εἰς ὄρος εἰς ὄρος· ἡδομέ- 
να δ' ἄρα πῶλος ὅπως ἅμα ματέρι  
φορβάδι κῶλον ἄγει ταχύπουν σκιρτήμασι βάκχα. 
Chorus: He is welcome in the mountains, when from the running 
thiasoi he falls to the ground, wearing the sacred garment of a 
fawnskin, hunting goat-killing bloodshed, joy in eating raw 
flesh, rushing to the mountains of Phrygia, of Lydia. The 
leader is Bromios. Euoi. The ground flows with milk, it flows 
with wine, it flows with the nectar of bees. The Bacchic(god), 
holding up the blazing flame of the pine torch, like the smoke 
of Syrian frankincense, rushes with the fennel rod, with 
running and dances arousing the wanderers and agitating 
them with cries (of joy) and tossing his delicate locks into the 
air of heaven. Along with the joyful cries he roars these 
things: ‘O onward bacchants, O onward bacchants, pride of 
gold-flowing Tmolos, celebrate in song Dionysus to the deep-
booming drums, exalting with joyful cries the god of joyful 
cries among the Phrygian shouts and calls, when the well-
sounding sacred pipe booms its sacred playings that 
accompany movement to the mountain, to tha mountain.’ 
Joyfully then, like a foal with its grazing mother, the bacchant 
moves her swif-footed limbs in her leapings. 
In this passage, we may distinguish specific words which allude to the 
joyfulness of the Dionysiac experience. Firstly, the adjective ἡδὺς, ‘sweet’, 
‘pleasant’ (Ba. 135) used in reference to the god of wine himself indicates the 
Bacchants’ delight in his presence at his rites.952 Their elation becomes then 
explicit with their cry εὖοἷ (Ba. 141), a traditional Bacchic exclamation used to 
express the state of religious joy.953 Next, the Chorus describes Dionysus as 
agitating the Bacchae with ‘shouts of joy’ (ἰαχαῖς, Ba. 149), delivering his 
speech to his worshippers ‘amidst joyful cries’ (ἐπ' εὐάσμασιν, Ba. 151), whom 
he regards as ‘exulting with joyful cries the god of joyful cries’ (εὔια τὸν εὔιον 
                                               
952 Dodds (1960) 85 n. 135. See also Susanetti (2010) 172 n. 135 for a discussion on the alternative 
meanings of the adjective. 
953 Nordgren (2012) 156-8, esp. 158: ‘it seems that εὐοἷ is a cry primarilly associated with the cult 
of Dionysus… uttered in a state of excitement, a kind of positive, joy-related emotion’. 
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ἀγαλλόμεναι θεὸν, Ba. 157). The Chorus ends it song by noticing the joy a 
Bacchant feels (ἡδομένα, Ba. 164-5) while she actively participates in these 
rites.954 
 The above discussion demonstrates that the ecstatic form of 
worshipping Dionysus is described by the Chorus as a joyful experience. In this 
respect, it becomes apparent that the reference to laughter in Ba. 380 may also 
evoke the idea of joy, since the passage in Ba. 378-85 refers to specifics of the 
Bacchic cults. Therefore, loud, but also joyful laughter is one of the ways of 
honouring the god of wine. 
5.2.6. Madness 
Another ancient Greek form of experiencing the powers of a god within 
oneself is madness. Out of the four main maddened characters found in the 
extant dramas of Euripides, only one is refered to as laughing; this is the title 
hero of the Madness of Heracles.955 In the fourth episode, the Messenger gives a 
detailed account on the catastrophic consequences of the the hero’s temporary 
loss of senses.956 Accordingly, the first symptoms of Heracles being ‘no longer 
himself’ (οὐκέθ᾽ αὑτὸς ἦν, HF 931) became visible in his appearance: his eyes 
turned red with bloodshot streaks (HF 933), which he rolled around in a frenzy 
manner (HF 932); also foam came out of his mouth and was dripping down his 
beard (HF 934).957 The hero, then, unexpectedly expressed his decision to leave 
for Myceanae and kill his enemy Eurystheus (HF 935-46): 
                                               
954 Similar description of a Bacchant moving with delight compared to a fawn escaping a hunter 
in Eur. Ba. 873-76: ‘it bounds, storm-swift with the fast-running efforts, to the pplain by the 
river, rejoicing (ἡδομένα) in thw ilderness without mortals and the shoots of the shady-leaved 
forest’. Translation in Seaford (1996) 113-15. 
955 The other three are: Agave in the Bacchae, Cassandra in the Trojan Women, and the title 
character of Orestes. 
956 For a detailed discussion on the narrative of this messenger-speech, see de Jong (1991) 165-
71. 
957 Czerwińska (2005a) 173 alludes to the fact of the hero’s madness manifesting itself as an 
illness (νόσος). Bond (1981) 309 n. 930-1009 considers these features as based on genuine 
epileptic symptoms, thus he refers to the hero’s laughter as ‘hysterical’. For a broader 
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Εξ. ἔλεξε δ᾽ ἅμα γέλωτι παραπεπληγμένῳ 
Πάτερ, τί θύω πρὶν κτανεῖν Εὐρυσθέα  
καθάρσιον πῦρ καὶ πόνους διπλοῦς ἔχω; 
  ἔργον μιᾶς μοι χειρὸς εὖ θέσθαι τάδε.  
   ὅταν δ' ἐνέγκω δεῦρο κρᾶτ' Εὐρυσθέως  
ἐπὶ τοῖσι νῦν θανοῦσιν ἁγνιῶ χέρας.  
ἐκχεῖτε πηγάς, ῥίπτετ' ἐκ χειρῶν κανᾶ.  
τίς μοι δίδωσι τόξα; τίς <δ'> ὅπλον χερός;  
πρὸς τὰς Μυκήνας εἶμι· λάζυσθαι χρεὼν  
μοχλοὺς δικέλλας θ' ὥστε Κυκλώπων βάθρα  
φοίνικι κανόνι καὶ τύκοις ἡρμοσμένα  
στρεπτῶι σιδήρωι συντριαινῶσαι πάλιν. 
Messenger:  And he spoke with deranged laughter, 
“Father, why do I sacrifice with purifying fire 
Before killing Eurystheus, and have twice the trouble? 
To set these things right is the work of a single blow of my 
hand. 
And when I bring here Eurystheus’ head 
I’ll purify my hands of the present murder. 
Pour out the libations, throw the baskets from your hands. 
Who’ll give me my bow and arrows? Who my hand’s 
weapon? 
I’ll go to Mycenae; I must seize 
Crowbars and axes to totally shatter with iron tools 
The Cyclopean foundations, fitted together 
With lines marked in red and with chisels.” 
In line 935, the Messenger reports that Heracles delivered his aberrant speech 
‘with deranged laughter’ (ἅμα γέλωτι παραπεπληγμένῳ). In general, we may 
discern two main ideas included in this expression. Firstly, as I have argued 
before, this reference to laughter evokes the idea of sound, for we may imagine 
the hero speaking his insane words with intermittent laughter.958 Secondly, in 
similar vein to my discussion on Ajax’ loud laugh in Soph. Ai. 303, we may 
notice that Heracles’ laughter appears as one of the physical symptoms of his 
madness. The Messenger explicitly refers to this by describing the hero’s γέλως 
with the word παραπεπληγμένος, ‘maniacal’, ‘deranged’. The hero’s laughter, 
then, manifests his abnormal mind. 
                                                                                                                                         
discussion of Heracles’ physical signs of frenzy, see Papadopoulou (2005) 63-66. For 
pathological laughter, see chapter I, section 1.1.3.2. 
958 Cf. section 5.2.1.1. above. 
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A closer look at the word παραπεπληγμένος in 935 may shed some 
light on the nature of Heracles’ madness and with it of his laughter. In her 1995 
study, Whom Gods Destroy: Elements of Greek and Tragic Madness, Padel discusses 
various lexemes used in fifth-century tragedy to denote insanity.959 A 
significant number of these are compounds formed with the prefixes παρα- 
‘aside’, ‘beside’, and ἐκ- ‘out of’.960 The adjective παραπεπληγμένος is, in fact, 
the passive participle of the verb παραπλήσσω (παραπλήττω, in Attic) 
denoting ‘strike at the side’.961 Curiously, only in the passive voice does the 
lexeme establish a semantic connection with pathological states of mind and, 
thus accept the meaning ‘be deranged’. In relation to the compounds formed 
with παρα-, the sense of madness appears in different forms of verbs meaning 
‘strike’ and ‘hit’.962 Padel, therefore, argues that the Greek terminology for 
insanity reflects the concept of an external source for the derangement of mind, 
which occurs as a sudden ‘strike’ or ‘hit’ from outside.963 To the Greeks, such 
external agent is often a god, who strikes a mortal’s mind (φρήν) with madness. 
Divine intervention, or rather imposition, is obvious in the Madness of Heracles, 
since Euripides presents Lyssa, the personification of frenzy, as a character in 
this play, sent by Hera to punish the hero (HF 815-74).964 She achieves this by 
sending to ‘fits of madness, disturbances of mind to kill his children’ (μανίας τ' 
ἐπ' ἀνδρὶ τῶιδε καὶ παιδοκτόνους / φρενῶν ταραγμοὺς, HF 835-6). Here, 
Lyssa uses μανία to change the hero’s perception, which will lead him to the 
commiting of disastrous acts. Similarly to the Sophoclean Ajax, also Heracles 
                                               
959 Padel (1995) 13-22 for various Greek words for madness; 23-33 for a discussion on the verb 
μαίνομαι. 
960 Ibid. 120-3. 
961 LSJ s.v. παραπλήσσω. 
962 Ibid. 121. Padel lists with references: παρακόπτω, ‘strike falsely’, παράκοπος, ‘frenzied’; 
παραπαίω, ‘strike on the side’; παρακρούω, ‘strike aside’, παράκρουσις, ‘striking falsely‘; 
παραπλήξ, ‘stricken sideways’. 
963 Ibid. 105: ‘the grammar comes down more heavily in favor of madness caused from outside’. 
964 Lyssa appears in the company of Iris, Hera’s Messenger. Their physical presence, according 
to Hartigan (1987) 127: ‘emphasizes the external nature of Herakles’ punishment’. 
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experiences a sudden disturbance of mind that alters his vision and thinking.965 
As a result, the hero sees what is not real and reacts according to his 
hallucinations.966 His delusions last long enough for him to commit the 
disgraceful deed of murdering his wife and children, whom he takes for his 
enemies. As we can see, it is divinely inspired misperception that forms the 
basis of Heracles’ madness. 
Having said this, it is evident that the hero’s ‘maniacal laughter’ emitted 
during his first speech delivered in derangement (HF 936-460) expresses the 
emotional load of his mistaken thoughts, namely, the malicious delight in 
killing Eurystheus and his family. Alike the maddened Ajax, who laughs 
believing he has punished the Greek commandors, the deranged Heracles finds 
himself in ‘a state of wild joy’ from his upcoming revenge.967 In his deranged 
mind, the hero is rejoicing his planned victory over Eurystheus. We later hear 
in the Messenger’s report that Heracles once again expresses his malicious glee 
after shooting his first victim (HF 981-3): 
Εξ.  ὁ δ' ἠλάλαξε κἀπεκόμπασεν τάδε·  
Εἷς μὲν νεοσσὸς ὅδε θανὼν Εὐρυσθέως  
ἔχθραν πατρώιαν ἐκτίνων πέπτωκέ μοι. 
Messenger:  But his father raised a shout and added this boast: 
‘This one dead nestling of Eurystheus 
Has fallen at my hands, paying fully for his father’s hatred.’ 
As we can see, the hero’s murderous plans earlier unfolded with a malicious 
laugh (ἅμα γέλωτι παραπεπληγμένῳ, HF 935), later turn into his victorious 
boasts accompanied with a triumphant cry (ἠλάλαξε, HF 981).968 It is, thus, 
evident that both expressions of Heracles’ emotions, the malicious anticipation 
                                               
965 Cf. chapter IV, section 4.2.2.4. 
966 As noticed by Barlow (1981) 121: ‘belief is unshakeable in delusion’. Hence, no one can talk 
sense to Heracles following mad logic, as seen in the futile attempts of Amphitryon (HF 965-7) 
and Megara (HF 975-6).  
967 Papadopoulou (2005) 67. 
968 Bond (1981) 317 n. 981. 
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of future joys and a feeling of triumph, reflect his misperception of his deeds.969 
Only after gaining back his senses does he recognize the horror of his erroneous 
actions (from HF 1089). Therefore, Heracles’ γέλως παραπεπληγμένος 
functions not only as an expression of his maddened state, but also as a signal 
of his forthcoming misery. 
 Unlike Sophocles in the Ajax, Euripides does not have his audience see 
the maddened Heracles on stage, nor hear his deranged laughter. Nonetheless, 
the Messenger’s meticulous narrative does not allow any detail of the hero’s 
divinely inspired loss of mind, not even the slightest odd behaviour like 
laughter escape the attention of his listeners. 
Without any doubt, Euripides is aware of laughter’s association with the 
sphere of human psychology. As we have seen, the poet uses the discussed 
Greek terminology in relation to feelings or mental states. From the analysis in 
this section it has emerged that both men and gods may express their emotions, 
like delight (Jason’s bride in Md. 1162, Demeter in Hl. 1349) or joy (Bacchic 
revelers in Ba. 380) through laughter. Only in once case does the emission of 
loud laughter manifest one’s abnormal state of mind (Heracles in HF 946). Yet, 
again, Euripides only has his characters speak of others expressive laughs and 
not have his audience hear it. 
5.2.7. Communication 
Laughter may play an informative role in signalling to others one’s 
feelings or state of mind. In Euripidean drama, I find only two instances in 
which the communicative aspect of laughter seems to be evoked. 
The first example is a possible, albeit questioned, reference to laughter in 
the third episode of Iphigenia at Aulis. Clytaemestra and her eldest daughter 
have been summoned by Agamemnon to Aulis as to have Iphigenia marry 
                                               
969 Cf. de Jong (1991) 171: ‘to him [i.e. Heracles] this delusion appears real, justified, and even 
attractive’. 
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Achilles. However, after reaching their destination, the women find out that the 
Argive princess is to be sacrificed to Artemis, who in her anger has prevented 
the Greeks from sailing to Troy. Aware that her husband supports the idea of 
having Iphigenia killed, Clytaemestra pleas Achilles for help, arguing that she 
has no one else to turn to (IA 912-13): 
Κλ. οὐδὲ φίλος οὐδεὶς γελᾷ μοι: τὰ δ᾽ Ἀγαμέμνονος 
κλύεις, ὠμὰ καὶ πάντολμ᾽: 
Clytaemestra: Not a single friendly smile to greet me! My husband, 
a bloodthirsty, unbridled villain!970 
The queen of Argos knows well that the Greek troops will back the decision of 
their leaders, Menelaus and Agamemnon, to appease the angered goddess with 
Iphigenia’s sacrifice. Clytaemestra, thus, finds herself alone in her attempt to 
save her child and, particularly, refers to this fact with the words οὐδὲ φίλος 
οὐδεὶς γελᾷ μοι, ‘not a single friend laughs (smiles) to me’ (IA 912). With this 
observation the desperate mother is referring to the cruel intentions of her 
husband and his companions towards her and Iphigenia. Therefore, the 
expression accepts a figurative meaning as it regards Clytaemestra’s 
recognition of no one showing any willingness to help prevent her daughter 
from being sacrificed.971 We may notice that the verb γελάω does not describe 
an explicit act of laughing or smiling, but should be interpreted 
metaphorically.972 In this respect, the idea evoked by γελᾷ μοι would be 
communication in which laughter becomes not necessarily a signal of 
amiability, but a sign of perceived support in having the life of Iphigenia 
spared.  
                                               
970 Greek text and English translation in England (1891) 92. 
971 Clytaemestra expresses these words in the company of Achilles and the Chorus, hence, does 
not refer to any visible, physical reaction of the Greek army or its leaders. 
972 Hinted, though with the concept of shining, by England (1891) 92 n. 912 : ‘Perhaps γελᾷ here 
means literally looks bright as in the Epic passages where it is used of inanimate things’. 
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It is an interesting fact that the laughter-word γελᾷ, transmitted in the 
two main manuscripts of the text,973 has given rise to doubts. As a result, the 
eighteenth century English scholar Jeremiah Markland emendated this word 
with the adverb πέλας, ‘near, nearby’. The emendation in οὐδὲ φίλος οὐδεὶς 
πέλας μοι slightly modifies the meaning into ‘not a single friend by my side’.974 
Nevertheless, we may recognize that the general idea of this sentence remains 
the same for it indicates Clytaemestra’s perception of being alone in her will to 
save Iphigenia. This is chiefly due to the fact that Markland’s emendation 
πέλας μοι functions in a figurative manner similar to the lesson γελᾷ μοι. In 
this case, since both lexemes γελᾷ and πέλας regard the same meaning in 
metaphorical manner, it seems that the only reason for proposing such an 
emendation might have been the discrepancies between the semantics of the 
English term ‘laugh’ and its Greek equivalent.975 Other ancient texts do give 
examples in which the semantics of γελάω contain the idea of sending a 
message a favourability.976 In spite of this, Markland’s rejection of the language 
of laughter has, consequently, divided scholars between those who accept the 
emendation and those who do not.977 However, it is clear that regardless of the 
choice of the preferred lesson, be it not having anyone at one’s side (πέλας) or 
anyone signalling his support (γελᾷ), the general idea expressed in line 912 is 
communication.  
                                               
973 These are the codex Laurentianus XXIII, 2 (L) and the codex Palatinus 287 (P). 
974 Markland’s emendation is based on the similarity of IA 912 with Alc. 79 : ἀλλ' οὐδὲ φίλων 
πέλας <ἔστ'> οὐδείς. 
975 Cf chapter II, section 2.1.1.2. 
976 Cf. Philem. fr. 110: ‘whenever fate laughs favourably to men (ὅταν πότ' ἀνθρώποισιν ἡ τύχη 
γελᾷ)’, my translation. More often the communicative aspect of laughter is stressed by the use 
of prefixes ἐπι- and προσ- (cf. chapter II, section 2.1.1.6.); e.g. Ar. Th. 977-80: ‘And I ask Hermes 
the Shepherd / and Pan and his dear Nymphs / to enjoy these dances of ours / and smile 
generously (ἐπιγελάσαι προθύμως) upon them!’, translation in Henderson (2000) 579. Also 
Soph. Ich. 298 discussed in chapter IV, section 4.3.1.1.  
977 For editions with γελᾷ, e.g. England (1891), Murray (1913/1943), Günther (1988), Stockert 
(1992a); with πέλας e.g. Way (1946), Jouan (1983), Diggle (1994), Kovacs (2002). 
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Euripides also employs the idea of communicative laughter in the fifth 
episode of the Medea. The children have been spared a life of exile, after 
successfully placating the princess with the gift from their mother (Md. 1002-4). 
Medea, however, receives the news with cries of woe (Md. 1007; 1009) and tears 
(Md. 1005; 1012) to the surprise of her children’s Tutor (‘This is not in tune with 
my tidings’, τάδ' οὐ ξυνωιδὰ τοῖσιν ἐξηγγελμένοις, Md. 1008). She is aware 
that with the upcoming death of the princess, her plan to kill Jason’s children 
becomes irrevocable.978 Her first emotional reaction, therefore, signals the 
emergence of her maternal feelings. Once the Tutor leaves the scene, the title 
character is left alone with her two boys (Md. 1020) and begins her famous 
monologue, in which she deliberates with herself upon fulfiling her horrific 
plan (Md. 1021-80). Medea opens her speech with a lament over the loss of her 
children (Md. 1021-39). In a set of 19 lines, she speaks of the vanity of her toils 
in giving birth to her sons as well as having hopes for their future, since, in the 
end, they are going to be separated from their mother. Papadopolou alludes to 
the ambiguous sense of these lines, which at first may seem to be the 
complaints of a parent banished from the life of her children, however, they are 
also typical utterances for a woman in mourning.979 This ambiguity is most 
noticeable at the end of her lament: ‘you will no longer see your mother with 
loving eyes but pass into another manner of life’, ὑμεῖς δὲ μητέρ' οὐκέτ' 
ὄμμασιν φίλοις / ὄψεσθ', ἐς ἄλλο σχῆμ' ἀποστάντες βίου, Md. 1039).980 
Indeed, the first lines of Medea’s great monologue illustrate her maternal 
feelings for her children, but, at the same time, they reflect her acceptance, 
albeit painful, of the awaiting infanticide. 
                                               
978 Papadopoulou (1997) 645. 
979 Papadopoulou (ibid.) states that ‘in her [i.e. Medea’s] mind and at the time that she utters 
these words the children are already dead’. Cf. the lament of Hecuba over the corpse of her 
grandson in Tr. 1197-88. 
980 Cf. Mastronarde (2002) 336 n. 1039. 
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This acceptance, however, becomes suddenly disturbed, once Medea 
takes a look at her children’s countenances (Md. 1040-48): 
Μη.  φεῦ φεῦ· τί προσδέρκεσθέ μ' ὄμμασιν, τέκνα;  
τί προσγελᾶτε τὸν πανύστατον γέλων;  
αἰαῖ· τί δράσω; καρδία γὰρ οἴχεται, 
γυναῖκες, ὄμμα φαιδρὸν ὡς εἶδον τέκνων.  
οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην· χαιρέτω βουλεύματα  
τὰ πρόσθεν· ἄξω παῖδας ἐκ γαίας ἐμούς. 
τί δεῖ με πατέρα τῶνδε τοῖς τούτων κακοῖς  
λυποῦσαν αὐτὴν δὶς τόσα κτᾶσθαι κακά;  
οὐ δῆτ' ἔγωγε· χαιρέτω βουλεύματα. 
Medea:  Alas! Why do you turn your eyes’ gaze upon me, children? 
Why do you laugh that final laugh? Oh god, what shall I do? 
My strength is gone, women – it left when I saw my 
childrens’ shining glance. I couldn’t do it. Farewell to my 
previous plans – I shall take my children with me from this 
land. Why, by hurting their father through their suffering, 
should I have to bring twice the pain on myself? No, I won’t 
do it! Farewell, my plans!981 
The sight of her sons has a great effect on Medea. Upon seeing her children’s 
faces, her mood rapidly shifts from determination in carrying out the revenge, 
to hesitation (‘What shall I do?’, τί δράσω; Md. 1042), and finally to the double 
renouncement of her designs (‘Farewell, my plans!’, χαιρέτω βουλεύματα, Md. 
1044, 1048). The previous certainty in her plans has been ruined by the sudden 
emotional disturbance.982 As we can see, this uncontrolled outburst of maternal 
affection comes as the result of Medea’s perception of her children’s bodily 
expression. 
Medea’s agitation is triggered by her taking notice of two specific 
features in her sons: their shining eyes (τί προσδέρκεσθέ μ' ὄμμασιν, Md. 1040; 
ὄμμα φαιδρὸν… τέκνων, Md. 1043) and laughter (τί προσγελᾶτε τὸν 
πανύστατον γέλων, Md. 1041). In regard of the latter, two laughter-words are 
employed, προσγελάω and γέλως. Since these lexemes appear in proximity to 
the reference to the children’s eyes, scholars, generally, render both verb and 
                                               
981 Translation in McDermott (1999) 54.  
982 This agitation is reflected in her exclamations φεῦ φεῦ (Md. 1040) and αἰαῖ (Md. 1042) as well 
as in the spasmodic structure of her speech in lines 1040-48. 
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noun in line 1041 with ‘smile’.983 However, as I have argued before, the 
semantics of both προσγελάω and γέλως are complex, thus, cannot be limited 
only to the concept of ‘smile’.984 Considering προσγελᾶτε in Md. 1041, 
Halliwell presents the same arguments as in reference to προσγελῶσα in Md. 
1162, pointing out the difficulty in discerning a single meaning for the lexeme; 
he says: ‘the children, blithely ignorant of what Medea is contemplating, can be 
easily pictured chuckling as smiling’.985 Therefore, in terms of semantics, both 
προσγελάω and γέλως may evoke the idea of laughter as well as that of 
smile.986 
Despite the difficulties in choosing between the concepts of laughter and 
smiles for the children’s behaviour in front of their mother, it is clear that the 
word προσγελάω specifies the communicative role of the children’s 
πανύστατος γέλως. The informative aspect of the verb gains prominence, due 
to the alteration of the semantics of γελάω by the attachement of the prefix 
προσ-, meaning ‘in the direction of‘. As I have already discussed in chapter II, 
the compound προσγελάω indicates the fact of conveying a message towards 
others with one’s laughter/smile.987 In this regard, we may observe that in line 
1041 Medea recognizes her sons’ πανύστατον γέλων as signaled to her. 
However, their ‘final laughter’ does not transmit to their mother the typical 
information about their own feelings,988 but rather reflects Medea’s own 
interpretation of their γέλως, which she describes as being their last, 
                                               
983 E.g. Way (1946) 365 : ‘Why smile to me the latest smile of all?’; Kovacs (1994) 391: ‘Why do 
you smile at me this last smile of yours?’; Svarlien (2007) 104: ‘Why do smile, my children, your 
very last smile?’. Blondell (1999) 203: ‘Why smile at me this final laughing smile?’. 
984 For γέλως, cf. chapter II, section 2.1.1.3., also in reference to section 2.1.1.2.2. For 
προσγελάω, see chapter II, section 2.1.1.6. 
985 Halliwell (2008) 524. 
986 Since line 1041 does not explicitly refer to the children’s faces, but only implies it, I exclude 
this example from my discussion on the connection of laughter with the face in section 5.2.1.2. 
987 See chapter II, section 2.1.1.6. 
988 We find no mention of the children’s emotions in the text. In general, it is accepted that 
throughout the play Medea’s sons, unaware of their mother’s intentions, remain in a state of 
childish ignorance; cf. Yoon (2012) 36 n. 108: ‘they remain innocent of her [i.e. Medea’s] distress 
as well as her intentions throughout’. 
322 
 
πανύστατος.989 In other words, the children’s final laughter conveys to the 
heroine the message of the irrevocability of her horrific decision. It is the 
sudden awareness of this fact that strikes her after line 1039, once she has 
looked closely at her boys’ innocent faces. Perplexed with the emotional impact 
of her children’s bright eyes and laughter, Medea spontaneously decides to 
give up on her revenge and go with her boys into exile. In this respect, we may 
see that the children’s laughter has brought out the mother in Medea. In other 
words, through her son’s laughter Medea gets the message about what exactly 
she is planning to do. 
Yet, this outburst of maternal affection does not last long. In the 
following lines of her monologue, we witness Medea’s current of thought and 
emotional struggle that leads her to the rejection of the idea of ceasing her 
revenge; she also refers to her sudden hesitation as a momentary softness of 
character (‘No, it is mere weakness in me even to admit such tender words into 
my heart’, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐμῆς κάκης, / τὸ καὶ προσέσθαι μαλθακοὺς λόγους 
φρενί, Md. 1051-2). She ends her speech emphasizing the pain she suffers as a 
mother, but also reaffirming her determination in carrying out her horrible 
designs (‘And I know well what pain I am about to undergo, but my wrath 
overbears my calculation, wrath that brings mortal men their gravest hurt’, καὶ 
μανθάνω μὲν οἷα δρᾶν μέλλω κακά, / θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων τῶν ἐμῶν 
βουλευμάτων, / ὅσπερ μεγίστων αἴτιος κακῶν βροτοῖς, Md. 1078-80).990 
Medea’s reference to her children’s laughter serves the same dramatic 
purpose as her whole interior monologue, i.e. to secure the audience’s support 
of the heroine by unveiling her human side despite her inhuman actions. We 
must keep in mind the fact that Euripides presented a drastically modified 
version of the myth by having Jason’s sons die from the hand of their mother 
                                               
989 Mastronarde (2002) 336 n. 1041 alludes to the common use of this adjective in tragedy in 
connection with death.  
990 For a discussion on the authenticity of the last 24 lines of Medea’s speech, see Kovacs (1986); 
Mastronarde (2002) 388-97. 
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and not from the Corinthians’ in avengence for the death of their king.991 
Therefore, Medea’s infanticide was not a common motif as it is considered 
today. Since the title character of this tragedy was to commit such a horrible 
crime, it’s author needed to find a way in eliciting sympathy towards the child-
murderess. For this reason, Euripides introduced Medea’s monologue in 1021-
80, portraying her patterns of thinking as well as emotional distress, in order to 
have the audience sympathize with her. Without any doubt, one of the most 
intensive parts of this speech are lines 1040-48, in which the cunning barbarian 
woman reveals herself, at least temporarily, as an affectionate mother touched 
by the laughing appearance of her sons. For a moment, we may witness her 
reaction to the awareness of the irrevocability of her children’s death that struck 
her in their ‘final laughter’, which is the vehement protest of a loving mother. 
As a result, the communicative role of the boys’ πανύστατος γέλως is doubled, 
since the audience should be ready to protest together with Medea against her 
heinous plans, just like the playwright intended. 
5.2.8. Playfulness 
Playfulness is, generally, the experience of the feeling of non-
seriousness.992 The ancient Greeks provided various culturally ordained 
circumstances for its participants to suspend serious conduct, spend time in 
convivial playfulness, and, most importantly, share a laugh or two together. A 
well-known occasion for playful laughter to occur was a drinking party, 
namely, the symposium. 993  
Euripides makes a reference to laughter in connection with playfulness 
in a sympotic context in the fourth episode of Alcestis. Heracles arrives to 
Pherae to visit his old friend Admetus. He is welcomed and received as a guest 
                                               
991 Mastronarde (2002) 50-52. 
992 Cf. chapter I, section 1.3.5.1. 
993 Cf. Halliwell (1991) 290, who lists also the κῶμος and civic festivals as conventional 
occasions for playful laughter to occur. 
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by the Thessalian king, despite the fact of the kingdom being in mourning for 
the death of its queen Alcestis. Unaware of this, the hero indulges himself in 
feasting and revelry to the dismay of the household servants. In lines 747-72, a 
manservant expresses his outrage at the guest’s shameful behaviour consisting 
of excessive eating (Alc. 753-55), drinking unmixed wine (Alc. 756-59) as well as 
singing loud and out of tune (Alc. 759-60).994 The moment the servant ends his 
aggrieved speech, the slightly intoxicated Heracles approaches him. The hero 
thinks that the butler is excessively grieving the death of someone insignificant 
to the royal household, as he’s been earlier persuaded to believe by Admetus 
(Alc. 536-50), and, thus, scolds the servant for his sad appearance (Alc. 773-78): 
Ηρ.  οὗτος, τί σεμνὸν καὶ πεφροντικὸς βλέπεις;  
οὐ χρὴ σκυθρωπὸν τοῖς ξένοις τὸν πρόσπολον  
εἶναι, δέχεσθαι δ' εὐπροσηγόρωι φρενί.  
σὺ δ' ἄνδρ' ἑταῖρον δεσπότου παρόνθ' ὁρῶν  
στυγνῷ προσώπῳ καὶ συνωφρυωμένῳ  
δέχῃ θυραίου πήματος σπουδὴν ἔχων.  
Heracles: You, there, why are you looking so solemn and worried? 
Servants shouldn’t scowl at guests but should rather receive 
them with a courteous air. But you, though it’s a man who’s 
companion of your master’s you’re looking at, you show him 
an unfriendly, frowning countenance, just because you’re 
mourning for someone not even in the family.995 
Heracles continues his speech on the inevitability of death among the race of 
mortal men (Alc. 779-86) and urges the butler to dispel his sorrow and concerns 
by drinking wine (Alc. 787-98): 
Ηρ.  ταῦτ' οὖν ἀκούσας καὶ μαθὼν ἐμοῦ πάρα  
εὔφραινε σαυτόν, πῖνε, τὸν καθ' ἡμέραν  
βίον λογίζου σόν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα τῆς τύχης.  
τίμα δὲ καὶ τὴν πλεῖστον ἡδίστην θεῶν  
Κύπριν βροτοῖσιν· εὐμενὴς γὰρ ἡ θεός. 
τὰ δ' ἄλλ' ἔασον πάντα καὶ πιθοῦ λόγοις  
ἐμοῖσιν, εἴπερ ὀρθά σοι δοκῶ λέγειν.  
                                               
994 Scholars call attention to the parallels between the hero’s one-man wine-drinking with that of 
Polyphemus in the satyr drama Cyclops, cf. Seaford (1984) 185 n. 425-6; Parker (2007) 204 n. 760; 
O’Sullivan and Collard (2013) 184 n. 425-6. 
995 Translation in Conacher (1988) 123 (original emphasis). Hereon, I quote other English 
passages from this edition of the Alcestis. 
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οἶμαι μέν. οὔκουν τὴν ἄγαν λύπην ἀφεὶς  
πίηι μεθ' ἡμῶν [τάσδ' ὑπερβαλὼν τύχας,  
στεφάνοις πυκασθείς]; καὶ σάφ' οἶδ' ὁθούνεκα  
τοῦ νῦν σκυθρωποῦ καὶ ξυνεστῶτος φρενῶν  
μεθορμιεῖ σε πίτυλος ἐμπεσὼν σκύφου.  
Heracles: Well, then, now that you’ve heard and learned all this from me, 
cheer up, drink up, reckon life from day to day your own, the 
rest as fortune’s! Honour Aphrodite as absolutely the sweetest 
of all the gods for mortals. For that goddess is indeed most 
kindly. Forget all else and just heed my advice – if indeed I 
seem to you to have got things right at all! I think I have. Then 
won’t you dispel excessive grief and drink with us, [decking 
yourself with wreaths and overcoming these misfortunes]? For 
well I know that the mad fit of the wine – cup, when it has 
assailed you, will soon unmoor you from your sullen and 
clotted state of mind. 
The hero’s philosophical message baring resemblance to the idea expressed in 
the saying carpe diem,996 i.e. to enjoy the present day and not worry about the 
future, is not well received by the servant who sternly refuses the invitation to 
join in the merriment (Alc. 803-4): 
Θε.   ἐπιστάμεσθα ταῦτα· νῦν δὲ πράσσομεν  
οὐχ οἷα κώμου καὶ γέλωτος ἄξια. 
Servant: We know all about that. But just now our misfortunes are such 
that neither feasting nor laughter is suitable. 
What is of our particular interest is the reference to laughter in the butler’s 
response to Heracles in line 804, in which he indicates that the situation of the 
household is ‘not suitable for merry-making and laughter’ (οὐχ οἷα κώμου καὶ 
γέλωτος ἄξια). Here, Euripides uses the expression γέλωτος ἄξιος to describe 
an object which is, in literal sense, not ‘worthy of laughter’.997 Thus, we may 
recognize that through the negated form of γέλωτος ἄξια, the servant speaks 
of the inappropriateness of laughter in the royal palace given the sad 
circumstances.998 In this regard, the interpretation of γέλως seems clear; since 
                                               
996 Conacher (1988) 185 n. 773-802. 
997 Euripides applies the same expression γέλωτος ἄξια in Hcld. 507, albeit in a different 
meaning, see section 5.2.5.2.2. below. 
998 Parker (2007) 212 n. 803-4. Cf the translation of Kovacs (1994) 241: ‘But our present 
circumstances do not call for carousing and laughter’. 
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the lexeme appears along with the term κῶμος, ‘revel, merry-making’, it is 
likely to signify bursts of loud laughter as a sign of rejoicing or merriment, 
common to occur among revelers at a symposium.999  
 Nonetheless, the context of the servant’s encounter with the ignorant 
guest may suggest another meaning for γέλως in line 804 in regard of 
playfulness. We have to keep in mind the fact that by the orders of the king, the 
hero was guested in a remote part of the royal palace, secluded from the rest of 
the household (Alc. 546-50). As a result, Heracles’ feasting was absolutely 
solitary.1000 Although a single-man banquet may occasionally take place,1001 
however, it stands in contradiction to the primary sense of the Greek term for 
‘drinking party’, συμπόσιον, which is based on the verb συμπίνω meaning 
‘drink together’. Community, therefore, is at the essence of a symposium. 
However, at the house of Admetus, Heracles is deprived of any company. Since 
the only people around the lonely guest are the attending servants, it comes as 
no surprise that the hero pays more attention to the butler himself, than he 
would if he were amongst other drinking companions. In his complaints 
expressed in line 773, we may notice that Heracles is rebuking the servant’s 
gravity and haggardness (‘why are you looking so solemn and worried?’, τί 
σεμνὸν καὶ πεφροντικὸς βλέπεις; Alc. 773), which are quite the opposite to his 
own feelings of non-seriousness and carelessness.1002 Heracles is in a 
distinguishably non-serious, i.e. playful mood,1003 and thus in need of a 
companion to share the sympotic fun. However, the only person available is a 
                                               
999 For the association of laughter and revelry with wine-drinking, cf. Phil. Imag. 1.25.3: 
‘Dionysus also sails to the revels of Andros… He leads Laughter (Γέλωτά) and Revel (Κῶμον), 
two spirits most gay (ἱλαρωτάτω) and most fond of the drinking-bout (ξυμποτικωτάτω)’. 
Translation in Fairbanks (1931) 99. 
1000 Halliwell (2008) 132. 
1001 Cf. the example of Polyphemus’ drinking wine in Cyc. 416-26. For a discussion of the 
sympotic context in the Cyclops, see Halliwell (2008) 127- 130. 
1002 Due to the visible contrast between the jovial guest and the grieving servant, some 
scholars have credited this scene with comic potential, cf. Grube (1961) 141.  
1003 Conacher (1988) 185 n. 773-802 defines this mood as ‘roystering’. 
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servant who attends him not ‘with an easily approachable mind’ 
(εὐπροσηγόρωι φρενί, Alc. 775), as the hero notices, but ‘with a hostile and 
frowning face’ (στυγνῷ προσώπῳ καὶ συνωφρυωμένῳ, Alc. 777).1004 In this 
regard, lines 773-78 contain the hero’s recognition of the butler’s non-
favourable disposition towards him. Heracles speaks to the servant in a 
superior but ‘matey tone’, as Parker identifies it, in order to have the servant 
alleviate his seriousness and join in the wine drinking (‘For well I know that the 
mad fit of the wine – cup, when it has assailed you, will soon unmoor you from 
your sullen and clotted state of mind’, καὶ σάφ' οἶδ' ὁθούνεκα / τοῦ νῦν 
σκυθρωποῦ καὶ ξυνεστῶτος φρενῶν / μεθορμιεῖ σε πίτυλος ἐμπεσὼν 
σκύφου, Alc. 796-8). Heracles, thus, delivers his speech in reaction to the 
servant’s mood unfitting a symposium, but also to the perceived unfriendly 
disposition towards himself.  
In light of the discussion above it becomes clear that another 
interpretation for γέλως in line 804 seems possible, one which would apply to 
the hero’s reproach of the butler’s seriousness. In particular, the servant’s 
remark about the unsuitable circumstances for revelry and laughter (οὐχ οἷα 
κώμου καὶ γέλωτος ἄξια) may include the inappropriateness for him in 
accepting a non-serious, i.e. playful mood, the hero was urging him to do in his 
speech (‘cheer up and drink up’, εὔφραινε σαυτόν, πῖνε, Alc. 788). Although 
the manservant expresses this argument in the first person plural, as if speaking 
in name of the whole royal household, however it is clear that he is referring 
first and foremost to himself. In this reagrd, the evoked image of laughter 
would pertain to the idea of playfulness in relation to an atmosphere devoid of 
any concerns or feelings of seriousness. Such interpretation seems permissible.  
The manservant later reveals to the ignorant guest the reason for the 
inappropriateness of wine drinking and laughter due to fact of the queen’s 
                                               
1004 Translations in Parker (2008) 206 n. 775 and 777. 
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passing (Alc. 821). Upon learning the truth of his host’s misfortune, Heracles 
suspends feasting (Alc. 831-2) and attempts to help his friend in need (Alc. 840-
2). Only then it becomes obvious to him that one in mourning is incapable of 
suspending one’s seriousness. Indeed, the experience of grief leaves no room 
for playfulness nor laughter. 
5.2.9. Mockery  
Ridicule, derision, scorn and mockery refer to the act of laughing or 
treating another in a disrespectful manner. Contrary to laughter elicited by 
humorous stimuli, which manifests the feeling of pleasure or amusement, 
derision is the purposeful act of showing one’s disdain or contempt towards 
another.1005 In this section, I analyse Euripidean examples of mockery according 
to the object of ridicule; this can be 1) one’s words, 2) one’s appearance, or 3) 
one’s actions. 
The first discernable object regarded by Euripidean characters as 
ridiculous are words and opinions. In the Ion, we may distinguish a passage in 
which the expressed statement of one character appear ridiculous to another. 
Xuthus meets Ion outside the Delphic oracle he came to consult about his 
childlessness (Ion 517). Upon seeing the young man, the old king attempts to 
embrace him (Ion 519). Surprised and displeased with Xuthus’ affectionate 
reaction, Ion reproaches him (Ion 520-29): 
Ιων  εὖ φρονεῖς μέν; ἤ σ' ἔμηνεν θεοῦ τις, ὦ ξένε, βλάβη;  
Ξο.   οὐ φρονῶ, τὰ φίλταθ' εὑρὼν εἰ φιλεῖν ἐφίεμαι;  
Ιων   παῦε, μὴ ψαύσας τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ στέμματα ῥήξηις χερί.  
Ξο.  ἅψομαι· κοὐ ῥυσιάζω, τἀμὰ δ' εὑρίσκω φίλα.  
Ιων   οὐκ ἀπαλλάξηι, πρὶν εἴσω τόξα πλευμόνων λαβεῖν;  
Ξο.   ὡς τί δὴ φεύγεις με σαυτοῦ γνωρίσαι τὰ φίλτατα;  
Ιων   οὐ φιλῶ φρενοῦν ἀμούσους καὶ μεμηνότας ξένους.  
Ξο.   κτεῖνε καὶ πίμπρη· πατρὸς γάρ, ἢν κτάνηις, ἔσηι φονεύς.  
Ιων   ποῦ δέ μοι πατὴρ σύ; ταῦτ' οὖν οὐ γέλως κλύειν ἐμοί;  
Ξο.  οὔ· τρέχων ὁ μῦθος ἄν σοι τἀμὰ σημήνειεν ἄν.  
                                               
1005 Cf. chapter I, section 1.3.5.4. 
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Ion: Are you quite sane? Or has some god-sent derangement 
afflicted you? 
Xuthus: Am I not sane if having found my heart’s desire I am eager to 
touch him? 
Ion: Stop! If you touch the god’s fillets you may break them with 
your hand! 
Xuthus: I shall put my hands on them: I am no robber but am finding 
one I love. 
Ion:  Get away before you get an arrow in your chest. 
Xuthus: Why do you shrink from seeing in me what you hold dearest? 
Ion:  I do not like to admonish mad and ill-bred strangers. 
Xuthus: Kill and burn me! Then you will be your father’s murderer! 
Ion:   How can you be my father? Is that not a laughable story? 
Xuthus: No: as the tale proceeds it will make plain what I am 
saying.1006 
Xuthus then reveals to Ion the fact that he has received from Apollo 
information about finding his son within the first young man he sees after 
leaving the god’s precinct (Ion 530-38). In result, the two men discuss the events 
of their pasts which could have led to this situation and, in the end, accept the 
possibility of this fact (Ion 539-62). However, in the passage quoted above Ion is 
appalled with the unexpected affection Xuthus has suddenly shown towards 
him. When the young man, in line 525 points to the fact the he is dealing with 
the deranged behaviour of a stranger, the old king reveals the news that he is 
his father (Ion 526). Ion reacts with disbelief and considers this idea to be 
ridiculous (γέλως, Ion 528). Here, the word ‘laughter’ indicates the fact of the 
young man perceiving the news of Xuthus being his father as absurd, hence, 
worthy of ridicule. As we may see, disbelief may occasion mockery.  
A similar example of incredibility giving rise to ridicule is noticeable in 
the Orestes. Pylades convinces the title character and his sister Electra to murder 
Helen, in order to avoid the Spartans’ hostile plans of having them executed 
(‘Let us kill Helen – a bitter pain for Menelaus’, Ἑλένην κτάνωμεν, Μενέλεωι 
λύπην πικράν, Or. 1105).1007 However, their efforts are in vain, for once they 
reach the royal palace, it turns out that the queen of Sparta has miraculously 
                                               
1006 Translation in Kovacs (1999) 381-83. 
1007 Translation in West (1987) 135. Hereon, I quote other English passages from this edition of 
the Orestes. 
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disappeared (‘but she from the chambers had vanished out through the house’, 
ἁ δ' ἐκ θαλάμων / ἐγένετο διαπρὸ δωμάτων ἄφαντος Or. 1494-5). They 
capture, then, Helen’s daughter, Hermione, instead, and lock themselves within 
the palace (Or. 1536). Menelaus later arrives and charges at the palace door to 
retrieve his child (‘I bid my attendants press through the doors here, so we may 
at least rescue my daughter from murderers’ hands’, προσπόλοις λέγω / ὠθεῖν 
πύλας τάσδ', ὡς ἂν ἀλλὰ παῖδ' ἐμὴν / ῥυσώμεθ' ἀνδρῶν ἐκ χερῶν 
μιαιφόνων, Or. 1561-3). He has heard the rumour about his wife’s miraculous 
disappearance, but gives it no credit (Or. 1556-60): 
Με.  ἤκουσα γὰρ δὴ τὴν ἐμὴν ξυνάορον  
ὡς οὐ τέθνηκεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἄφαντος οἴχεται —  
κενὴν ἀκούσας βάξιν, ἣν φόβῳ σφαλεὶς  
ἤγγειλέ μοί τις. ἀλλὰ τοῦ μητροκτόνου  
τεχνάσματ᾽ ἐστὶ ταῦτα καὶ πολὺς γέλως.  
Menelaus:  What I have heard is that my consort is - not dead, but 
vanished away: an empty rumour that someone deluded by 
terror told me. No, this is the matricide’s trickery, quite 
ridiculous. 
The king of Sparta is convinced that Orestes and his accomplice have slain 
Helen (Or. 1557).1008 Consequently, not only does he express his disbelief in the 
news, but he considers it to be a trickery (τεχνάσματα, Or. 1560) on Orestes’ 
behalf. Moreover, he rebuffs the idea entirely by using the expression γέλως 
πολύς, ‘great laughter’ (Or. 1560). As argued by Arnould, the expression γέλως 
πολύς may designate: 1) loud laughter that lasts long, 2) an object perceived to 
incur much laughter, or 3) derision.1009 In the example from the Orestes, the 
third meaning is evident, since the idiom is used by a character who 
vehemently rejects the words or opinions of others.1010 Thus, we may recognize 
the fact that the vocabulary of laughter signifies Menelaus’ ridicule at the idea 
                                               
1008 West (1987) 287 n. 1557. 
1009 Arnould (1990) 167.  
1010 Ibid. 182. 
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of Helen having vanished in a miraculous way.1011 Again, we see that disbelief 
may lead to a scornful rejection of an idea. 
Repudiation may give rise to derision, as well. In the third episode of the 
Trojan Women, Helen attempts to save her life by explaining to her husband 
Menelaos the reasons for her departure to Troy (Tr. 914-65). First, she blames 
Hecuba for bearing Paris himself (Tr. 919-20). Next, she accuses the old man 
who failed to abandon the infant prince in the woods, but raised his as his own 
child instead (Tr. 920-22). Furthermore, Helen argues that she herself was 
treated as an object ‘sold for her beauty’ (εὐμορφίαι πραθεῖσα, Tr. 936) by 
Aphrodite to Paris at the wedding of Peleus and Thetis. And finally, she places 
responsibility for her weakness on the goddess of love herself, who, in Helen’s 
view, accompanied Paris on his visit to Sparta (‘He arrived with no 
insignificant goddess on his side, this man’, ἦλθ' οὐχὶ μικρὰν θεὸν ἔχων 
αὑτοῦ μέτα, Tr. 940).1012 The arguments are heard by Hecuba, who in lines 969-
1032 refutes them. At one point, she refers to Helen’s remark about the goddess 
Aphrodite assisting Paris in Sparta (Tr. 982-88): 
Εκ.   Κύπριν δ' ἔλεξας (ταῦτα γὰρ γέλως πολύς)  
ἐλθεῖν ἐμῶι ξὺν παιδὶ Μενέλεω δόμους. 
οὐκ ἂν μένουσ' ἂν ἥσυχός σ' ἐν οὐρανῶι  
αὐταῖς Ἀμύκλαις ἤγαγεν πρὸς Ἴλιον;  
ἦν οὑμὸς υἱὸς κάλλος ἐκπρεπέστατος,  
ὁ σὸς δ' ἰδών νιν νοῦς ἐποιήθη Κύπρις·  
Hecuba: You said that Cyprys came to Menelaus’ house with my son 
(that is a ridiculous suggestion). Could she not have 
transported you, and all of Amyclae too, to Troy by just 
remaining quietly in heaven? No, my son was outstandingly 
handsome, and your mind, on seeing him, transformed itself 
into Cypris. 
                                               
1011 Arnoud (1990) 183, considering γέλως πολύς as the equivalent of ‘that’s a laugh!’ (‘laissez-
moi rire’) or ‘that’s a joke!’ (‘la bonne blague’). However, Willink (1986) 340 n. 1556-60 finds the 
expression discordant to the disposition of Menelaus who ‘could scarcely be further from 
’laughter’’. 
1012 Translation in Barlow (1986) 127. Hereon, other English quotes of Trojan Women come from 
this edition. 
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According to the Trojan queen, full responsibility for Menelaus’ wife leaving 
Sparta lies not on the goddess of love, but only on Helen herself. Hecuba 
repudiates this idea with the expression ταῦτα γὰρ γέλως πολύς which 
literally translates into ‘this is a great laugh’. Again, we find the same 
expression used to denote derision as in the previous example in the Orestes, for 
γέλως πολύς signifies the ridiculessness of Helen’s argument. In the Trojan 
Women, therefore, it is evident that Hecuba finds Helen’s blaming Aphrodite for 
the whole situation to be only worthy of scorn.  
 Another example of one’s mockery being provoked by another’s 
expressed opinion is found the Iphigenia in Tauris. At the temple of Artemis, a 
Taurion herdsman brings to the priestess Iphigenia news about capturing 
Greek strangers at the seaside. In lines 260-339, the herdsman gives a detailed 
report about how the two foreigners were seized. A group of cattlemen was 
resting at the seaside when one of them spotted the two young men and 
pointed them to his fellows. However, he took the Greeks for some gods (‘there 
are deities sitting here’, δαίμονές τινες, / θάσσουσιν οἵδε, IT. 268-7), and being 
a pious man (θεοσεβής), he spoke a prayer to maritime divinities in order to 
reverse any evil.1013 Upon hearing this, another fellow reacted in a less pious 
manner (IT 275-8): 
Βο.  ἄλλος δέ τις μάταιος, ἀνομίᾳ θρασύς,  
ἐγέλασεν εὐχαῖς, ναυτίλους δ᾽ ἐφθαρμένους  
θάσσειν φάραγγ᾽ ἔφασκε τοῦ νόμου φόβῳ,  
κλύοντας ὡς θύοιμεν ἐνθάδε ξένους.  
Herdsman: But another man, foolish and bold in his irreverence laughed 
at these prayers and declared it was shipwrecked sailors 
sitting in the crevice for fear of our usual custom, since they 
had heard we sacrificed strangers here. 
Here, the idea of laughter appears in regard of the disdainful reaction of one 
herdsman to the prayers of his fellow which he ridicules (ἐγέλασεν εὐχαῖς, IT. 
276). Although the herdsman reporting the events to Iphigenia, considers the 
                                               
1013 Kyriakou (2006) 116 n. 267-69, explains this by the sudden appearance of the two strangers. 
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scoffer to be ‘foolish’ (μάταιος) and ‘arrogant with irreverence’ (ἀνομίᾳ 
θρασύς, IT 275),1014 nevertheless, he was right in recognizing the two young 
men to be strangers from afar. In the end, it was the observation of the mocker, 
not of the extremely pious man, which seemed convincing to the rest of the 
herdsmen who, then, captured the two Greeks. Again we may see that one’s 
idea is refuted derisively by another. In this case, the idea of the supernatural is 
rejected by a rational explanation, or, in other words, reason ridicules 
irrationality.1015 
One’s incredulous opinions may be regarded as mockery, as well. In the 
Trojan Women, the maddened Cassandra presents arguments for the grief-
stricken Trojan Women to view their defeat in war in positive terms (Tr. 353-
405). According to the deranged princess, the recently ruined Trojans should be 
regarded as more fortunate than the victorious Greeks (‘this city of ours is more 
blessed than the Greeks are’, πόλιν δὲ δείξω τήνδε μακαριωτέραν / ἢ τοὺς 
Ἀχαιούς, Tr. 365-6). In particular, Cassandra argues for acknowledging the 
many misfortunes of the Trojans as blessings:1016 the men had a chance to die for 
their country (Tr. 386-7); the Trojans were lucky to be buried by their loved-
ones (Tr. 387-90 ); those remaining alive still could have enjoyed the company 
of their families (Tr. 391-3); also, Hector’s death for his country has brought him 
eternal fame (Tr. 394-7); and finally Paris gained fame for marrying Helen, the 
daughter of Zeus (Tr. 398-9). Cassandra ends this list by telling her mother not 
to be sad with the outcome of war as well as with her daughter’s union with 
Agamemnon, for it will bring destruction on their enemies (‘With my marriage 
I shall destroy those you and I hate the most’, τοὺς γὰρ ἐχθίστους ἐμοὶ / καὶ 
                                               
1014 Scholars consider ἀνομία as ‘rejection of traditional beliefs and practices’, cf. Cropp (2000) 
193 n. 275;  
1015 We should not, however, consider the scoffing herdsman to be completely impious, for he 
follows his fellowmen in capturing the two strangers in order to have tchem sacrificed to the 
goddess, cf. Kyriakou (2006) 118 n. 275-8. 
1016 For a discussion on Cassandra’s argumentation, see Papadopoulou (2000) 523-25. 
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σοὶ γάμοισι τοῖς ἐμοῖς διαφθερῶ, Tr. 404-5). After hearing these words, the 
Chorus comments as follows (Tr. 405-6): 
Χο.   ὡς ἡδέως κακοῖσιν οἰκείοις γελᾶις  
μέλπεις θ' ἃ μέλπουσ' οὐ σαφῆ δείξεις ἴσως. 
Chorus:  You laugh with gladness at your own misfortunes and you 
sing things which your song perhaps leaves obscure. 
Obviously, the Trojan women give no credence to Cassandra’s distorted 
rhetoric, which they consider to be a form of showing disdain at hers as well 
their misfortunes (κακοῖσιν οἰκείοις, Tr. 405). Although they are well aware of 
the girl’s derangement,1017 nevertheless they regard her behaviour as ‘laughing 
with delight’, as stressed by the adverb ἡδέως ‘sweetly’.1018 It is the princess’ 
curse cast on her by Apollo that no one believes in her prophecies. However, 
we may also notice that her words stand in sharp contrast to the Trojans’ recent 
tragic experiences. Hence, for these two reasons, the Chorus cannot accept 
Cassandra’s argumentation, and, as a result, considers it as mockery on her 
behalf. Again, we find an example in which the idea of derision is evoked in 
connection with a character’s disbelief in another’s opinion. 
Apart from words, also one’s odd appearance may incur derisive 
laughter. In the first episode of the Bacchae, Cadmus, the former king of the 
Thebans as well as the diviner Teiresias prepare themselves for honouring 
Dionysus in his rites (Ba. 170-209).1019 Once they have adorned the traditional 
Bacchic garments and are ready to leave for the celebrations, they encounter 
Pentheus, the present ruler of Thebes, who opposes the newly introduced 
Dionysiac cult (Ba. 248-54): 
                                               
1017 In line 341, the Chorus calls her βακχεύουσαν, ‘raving’. Later, Talthybius refers to her as a 
maenad (Tr. 415), who was struck out of her wits by Apollo (σ' Ἀπόλλων ἐξεβάκχευσεν 
φρένας, Tr. 408); cf. Rybowska (2004) 47-9. On the Bacchic vocabulary for madness, cf. Padel 
(1995) 28. 
1018 Cf. the translation of Kovacs (1999) 55: ‘How happily you smile at your own misfortunes 
and prophesy, and yet perhaps you will show that your prophecies are unreliable’.  
1019 For a comic reading of the old men’s dressing scene, see Seidensticker (1978). In contrast, 
Seaford (1996) 167, who stresses that the mood of the scene is not comic, but festive ‘like the 
festivals it prefigures’. 
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Πε. ἀτὰρ τόδ᾽ ἄλλο θαῦμα, τὸν τερασκόπον  
ἐν ποικίλαισι νεβρίσι Τειρεσίαν ὁρῶ  
πατέρα τε μητρὸς τῆς ἐμῆσ—πολὺν γέλων—  
νάρθηκι βακχεύοντ᾽· ἀναίνομαι, πάτερ,  
τὸ γῆρας ὑμῶν εἰσορῶν νοῦν οὐκ ἔχον.  
οὐκ ἀποτινάξεις κισσόν; οὐκ ἐλευθέραν  
θύρσου μεθήσεις χεῖρ', ἐμῆς μητρὸς πάτερ;  
Pentheus:  But here’s another strange business: I see the diviner Teiresias 
dressed in dappled fawnskin, and my mother’s father – a 
ridiculous sight – playing the bacchant with a wand. It pains 
me, old sir, to see your gray head acting so foolishly. Shake 
off that ivy, grandfather, and free your hand of that wand!.1020 
Apparently, the sight of the two old men dressed as Bacchants comes as a 
surprise to the young man, but also as an oddity worthy of laughter. This 
becomes explicit through the expression πολὺν γέλων, ‘a ridiculous sight’ (Ba. 
250), which Pentheus uses in relation to the Bacchic appearance of Teiresias and 
Cadmus (τὸν τερασκόπον… Τειρεσίαν ὁρῶ πατέρα τε μητρὸς τῆς ἐμῆς, 
πολὺν γέλων, Ba. 248-50). However, Pentheus’ reaction to the perceived 
incongruity is far from that connected to humour, for instead of enjoying the 
strange sight, he plainly rejects it (ἀναίνομαι, Ba. 251).1021 This is especially 
noticeable in regard of his grandfather who, in his view, acts in a foolish 
manner unsuitable for his old age (τὸ γῆρας ὑμῶν εἰσορῶν νοῦν οὐκ ἔχον, Ba. 
252). This incongruity, therefore, is perceived by Pentheus as shameful rathen 
than comic, for it does not elicit his amusement, but only a desire to put an end 
to it.1022 As a result, Pentheus orders Cadmus to get rid of the ivy and thyrsus 
(Ba 253-4). However, after a vehement exchange of words with Teiresias, the 
two old men do not submit to the ruler’s command (Ba. 322-25): 
                                               
1020 Translation in Kovacs (2002b) 33. 
1021 Cf. the three reactions to incongruity enlisted by Morreall (1989) 6-10, which are: 1) negative 
emotion, 2) puzzlement, and 3) amusement. See chapter I, section 1.2.2.2. above. 
1022 This complies with Morreall’s observations on the outcome of the negative emotions elicited 
by a perceived incongruity (see note above). Hence, I cannot agree with Seidensticker (1978) 
314-15, who considers Pentheus as the ‘eyewitness commentator’ and ‘first interpretator’of the 
comicality of the scene. Although I acknowledge some comic potential of the dressing scene of 
two old men’s in Ba. 170-209, nevertheless I cannot recognize Pentheus’ laughter as a response 
to the comic. Similar criticism in Halliwell (2008) 134 n. 82. 
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Τε.  ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν καὶ Κάδμος, ὃν σὺ διαγελᾷς,  
κισσῷ τ᾽ ἐρεψόμεσθα καὶ χορεύσομεν,  
πολιὰ ξυνωρίς, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως χορευτέον,  
κοὐ θεομαχήσω σῶν λόγων πεισθεὶς ὕπο. 
Teiresias:  I shall crown my head with ivy and join the dance, and so will 
Cadmus,whom you mock. We are a pair of grey heads, but 
still we must dance. Your words will not persuade me to fight 
against a god.1023 
As we can see, the diviner identifies Pentheus’ earlier reaction to Cadmus as 
derisive, indicated by the laughter-word διαγελᾷς (Ba. 322), which signifies 
outright mockery.1024 In this respect, we may recognize that the reference to 
laughter in the expression πολὺν γέλων (Ba. 250) denotes, primarily, Pentheus’ 
disdain at his grandfather dressed up aptly to honour Dionysus. Thus, the 
Bacchic appearance of an old man attracts the young king’s scorn. 1025 
In the tragedies of Euripides, we may recognize that actions, generally, 
considered to be ignoble may attract mockery. This idea is traceable in the 
Children of Heracles, in which the title hero’s progenies are pursued by their 
father’s enemy, Eurystheus of Argos. After wandering through Greece for 
many years, the Heraclidae take refuge at the altar of the temple of Zeus at 
Marathon. However, their persecutor finds them and threatens their 
supporters, the Athenians, with war. The children of Heracles receive an oracle 
that Athens will defeat the Argive army only if a maiden of noble family will be 
sacrificed (‘to rout the enemy and save the city, they bid me sacrifice to 
Demeter’s daughter a virgin born of a noble father’, σφάξαι κελεύουσίν με 
παρθένον κόρηι / Δήμητρος, ἥτις ἐστὶ πατρὸς εὐγενοῦς, / τροπαῖά τ' ἐχθρῶν 
καὶ πόλει σωτηρίαν, Hcld. 408-9 and 402).1026 After hearing this, one of the 
                                               
1023 Translation in Kovacs (2002b) 39. 
1024 Cf. chapter II, section 2.1.1.6. 
1025 Czerwińska (1999) 202. Seaford (1996) 167 points out that πολὺν γέλων in line 250 expresses 
Pentheus’ ‘hostility of the uninitiated’. For the prince’s enmity towards Dionysus and his cult, 
see section 5.2.5.3.2. 
1026 Editors e.g. Kovacs (1995), follow Diggles (1984) transposition of line 402 right after 409. 
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hero’s daughters1027 offers her life to have her siblings spared. Iolaus, a kinsman 
to Heracles and his children’s guardian, objects to her decision, but she argues 
for it with full determination (Hcld. 501-19): 
Πα.   ἐγὼ γὰρ αὐτὴ πρὶν κελευσθῆναι, γέρον,  
θνήισκειν ἑτοίμη καὶ παρίστασθαι σφαγῆι.  
τί φήσομεν γάρ, εἰ πόλις μὲν ἀξιοῖ  
κίνδυνον ἡμῶν οὕνεκ' αἴρεσθαι μέγαν,  
αὐτοὶ δὲ προστιθέντες ἄλλοισιν πόνους,  
παρόν σφε σῶσαι, φευξόμεσθα μὴ θανεῖν; 
οὐ δῆτ᾽, ἐπεί τοι καὶ γέλωτος ἄξια, 
στένειν μὲν ἱκέτας δαιμόνων καθημένους, 
πατρὸς δ᾽ ἐκείνου φύντας οὗ πεφύκαμεν 
κακοὺς ὁρᾶσθαι: ποῦ τάδ' ἐν χρηστοῖς πρέπει; 
κάλλιον, οἶμαι, τῆσδ' – ὃ μὴ τύχοι ποτέ –  
πόλεως ἁλούσης χεῖρας εἰς ἐχθρῶν πεσεῖν  
κἄπειτ' ἄτιμα πατρὸς οὖσαν εὐγενοῦς  
παθοῦσαν Ἅιδην μηδὲν ἧσσον εἰσιδεῖν.  
ἀλλ' ἐκπεσοῦσα τῆσδ' ἀλητεύσω χθονός;  
κοὐκ αἰσχυνοῦμαι δῆτ', ἐὰν δή τις λέγηι  
Τί δεῦρ' ἀφίκεσθ' ἱκεσίοισι σὺν κλάδοις  
αὐτοὶ φιλοψυχοῦντες; ἔξιτε χθονός·  
κακοῖς γὰρ ἡμεῖς οὐ προσωφελήσομεν.  
Maiden:  I am ready, old man, of my own accord and unbidden, to 
appear for sacrifice and be killed. For what shall we say if this 
city is willing to run great risks on our behalf, and yet we, 
who lay toil and struggle on others, run away from death 
when it lies in our power to rescue them? It must not be so, 
for it deserves nothing but mockery if we sit and groan as 
suppliants of the gods and yet, though we are descended 
from that great man who is our father, show ourselves to be 
cowards. How can this be fitting in the eyes of men of 
nobility? Much finer, I suppose, if this city were to be 
captured (God forbid!) and I were to fall into the hands of the 
enemy! Then when I, daughter of a noble father, have 
suffered dishonor, I shall go to my death all the same! But 
shall I then accept exile from this land and be a wanderer? 
Shall I not feel shame if someone thereafter asks, “Why do 
you come here with your suppliant branches when you 
yourselves lack courage? Leave this land: for we do not give 
help to the base”?’1028 
                                               
1027 Later tradition attributes her with the name Macaria, which has been transmitted in the 
manuscripts. However, the girl is not named in the text, thus many editors refer to her as 
ΠΑΡΘΕΝΟΣ , ‘maiden’, cf. Wilkins (1993) 111 474. 
1028 Translation in Kovacs (1995) 57. 
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Observably, the maiden’s motivation to accept death voluntarily is based on a 
strong awareness of her noble status as a progeny of the hero Heracles. This 
notion of inherited nobility impels her to avoid disgraceful conduct, which 
would be showing cowardice, instead of facing the enemy with honour. It is at 
this point that Heracles’ daughter mentions the possible social consequences 
she and her siblings would have to experience, i.e. scornful laughter, in case 
they continue freighting and fleeing for their lives (‘though we are descended 
from that great man who is our father, show ourselves to be cowards’, πατρὸς 
δ᾽ ἐκείνου φύντας οὗ πεφύκαμεν / κακοὺς ὁρᾶσθαι, Hcld. 509-10). In this 
respect, the maiden uses the expression γέλωτος ἄξια ‘worthy of laughter’ 
(Hcld. 507) to describe the general mockery the Heraclidae would incur among 
other Greeks if they were to continue to coward before their enemy.1029 A child 
of Heracles, therefore, is fully aware that the shameful actions of noble men 
may receive scorn from the general Greek public. 
Fear of being ridiculed by others for one’s conduct is also discernible in 
the Ion. Xuthus wants the title character to join him to Athens and engage in the 
affairs of his rediscovered father (‘leave the god’s precincts and your homeless 
life, join the puroposes with your father, and come to Athens’, ἐκλιπὼν θεοῦ 
δάπεδ' ἀλητείαν τε σὴν /ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας στεῖχε κοινόφρων πατρί, Ion 576-7). 
Ion does not react with enthusiasm to the idea, thus explains to Xuthus his fear 
of the Athenians not accepting foreigners well in their city (‘They say that the 
famous Athenians, born from the soil, are no immigrant race’, εἶναί φασι τὰς 
αὐτόχθονας / κλεινὰς Ἀθήνας οὐκ ἐπείσακτον γένος, Ion. 589-90). The young 
man then envisages the people’s reaction towards him, should he move to 
Athens (Ion 595-606): 
Ιω.  ἢν δ' ἐς τὸ πρῶτον πόλεος ὁρμηθεὶς ζυγὸν  
                                               
1029 Although the girl does not explicitly acknowledge who should deride the children of 
Heracles, however, since their father’s fame reached the whole Greek world, we may presume 
that she implies the same. 
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ζητῶ τις εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ἀδυνάτων ὕπο  
μισησόμεσθα· λυπρὰ γὰρ τὰ κρείσσονα. 
ὅσοι δέ, χρηστοὶ δυνάμενοί τ᾽ εἶναι σοφοί,  
σιγῶσι κοὐ σπεύδουσιν ἐς τὰ πράγματα,  
γέλωτ᾽ ἐν αὐτοῖς μωρίαν τε λήψομαι  
οὐχ ἡσυχάζων ἐν πόλει φόβου πλέᾳ. 
τῶν δ' †αὖ λογίων τε† χρωμένων τε τῆι πόλει  
ἐς ἀξίωμα βὰς πλέον φρουρήσομαι  
ψήφοισιν. οὕτω γὰρ τάδ', ὦ πάτερ, φιλεῖ·  
οἳ τὰς πόλεις ἔχουσι κἀξιώματα  
τοῖς ἀνθαμίλλοις εἰσὶ πολεμιώτατοι.  
Ion:  If I attempt to be somebody by aspiring to the city’s helm, I 
shall be hated by the powerless: men always hate what is 
above them. As for all those who are of good character and 
hale an aptitude for wisdom but live quietly and do not exert 
themselves in public affairs, they will think I am laughably 
foolish not to keep quiet in a city full of fear. But if I invade 
the prestige of those who speak in public and engage in 
politics, by their votes I will be kept in check even more. That 
is the way things usually happen, father. Those who hold 
office in their cities are always most hostile to their 
competitors.1030 
Ion distinguishes three groups of Athenian citizens: 1) those with no political 
power, 2) those who could engage in politics but choose not to, and 3) those 
who go into politics.1031 Accordingly, all three groups of people would not 
accept Xuthus’s foreign and bastard son in the public life of Athens: the first 
group would hate him (τῶν μὲν ἀδυνάτων ὕπο μισησόμεσθα), the second 
would find him foolish to engage in unpleasant affairs (μωρίαν τε λήψομαι), 
whereas the third would keep checking his every action (φρουρήσομαι 
ψήφοισιν).1032 What is of our particular interest is the reference to laughter 
which occurs in line 600 regarding the disdainful reaction of the second group 
of those who refrain from politics. Here, Ion fears that by getting involved with 
public affairs he ‘will attract ridicule and be accused of folly’ (γέλωτ᾽ ἐν αὐτοῖς 
μωρίαν τε λήψομαι). He then explains the reason for this, for such people, 
whom he considers to be good and wise (χρηστοὶ δυνάμενοί τ᾽ εἶναι σοφοί), 
                                               
1030 Translation in Kovacs (1999) 397. 
1031 Cf. Lee (1997) 227 n. 595-606. 
1032 Owen (1939) 113 n. 603. 
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are aware of the vanity of trying to do something useful in politics. In this 
example, therefore, we may see that the evoked idea of laughter pertains to 
derision, or, more precisely, to the fear of attracting ridicule from others. This 
fear of public mockery, therefore, is one of the reasons for Ion’s hesitance to 
come to Athens with Xuthus. 
The last example of a person’s conduct incurring scorn is found in the 
fourth episode of the Suppliant Women. Theseus, the king of Athens, has 
managed to retrieve from Creon the bodies of the six warriors who died in their 
attack on Thebes. He then brings the corpses to the mothers of the deceased and 
asks Adrastus, king of Argos, to deliver a funeral speech (Su. 840-56): 
Θη.   νῦν δ',Ἄδραστ',ἀνιστορῶ·  
  πόθεν ποθ’ οἵδε διαπρεπεῖς εὐψυχίᾳ 
θνητῶν ἔφυσαν; εἰπὲ δ’ὡς σοφώτερος 
843 νέοισιν ἀστῶν τῶνδε· ἐπιστήμων γὰρ εἶ. 
846 ἓν δ’ οὐκ ἐρήσομαί σε, μὴ γέλωτ᾽ ὄφλω 
ὅτῳ ξυνέστη τῶνδ’ ἕκαστος ἐν μάχῃ 
ἢ τραῦμα λόγχης πολεμίων ἐδέξατο. 
κενοὶ γὰρ οὗτοι τῶν τ' ἀκουόντων λόγοι  
καὶ τοῦ λέγοντος, ὅστις ἐν μάχηι βεβὼς  
λόγχης ἰούσης πρόσθεν ὀμμάτων πυκνῆς  
σαφῶς ἀπήγγειλ' ὅστις ἐστὶν ἁγαθός.  
οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην οὔτ' ἐρωτῆσαι τάδε  
οὔτ' αὖ πιθέσθαι τοῖσι τολμῶσιν λέγειν·  
μόλις γὰρ ἄν τις αὐτὰ τἀναγκαῖ' ὁρᾶν  
δύναιτ' ἂν ἑστὼς πολεμίοις ἐναντίος.  
Theseus:  …now I ask you, Adrastus: how did it happen that these men 
were so superior to other men in bravery? Tell the young sons 
of these citizens, since you are wiser and have the requisite 
skill. One thing I will not ask or I’d be laughed at: whom each 
of these men stood facing in the battle and by what foeman he 
was wounded. Such a recital wastes the time of both hearers 
and speaker: can a man stand in battle as the spears fly thick 
and fast before his eyes and tell us clearly who was brave? I 
could not ask for such a report nor believe anyone who 
ventured to give it. When a man stands face to face with the 
enemy, he is barely able to see what he needs to see.1033 
In his request to Adrastus, we may notice that Theseus does not wish a full 
account about how the warriors fought in war unless he should attract laughter 
                                               
1033 Translation in Kovacs (1998) 99. 
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(μὴ γέλωτ᾽ ὄφλω, Su. 846). The Athenian king is of the opinion that such a 
detailed report is a waste of time for both listeners as well as the speaker (κενοὶ 
γὰρ οὗτοι τῶν τ' ἀκουόντων λόγοι / καὶ τοῦ λέγοντος, Su. 849-50). The reason 
for such a view is the fact that he finds it incredible for a person being capable 
of carefully observing the deeds of warriors amidst battle (ὅστις ἐν μάχηι 
βεβὼς / λόγχης ἰούσης πρόσθεν ὀμμάτων πυκνῆς / σαφῶς ἀπήγγειλ' ὅστις 
ἐστὶν ἁγαθός, Su. 850-52). It appears, then, that Theseus regards such detailed 
accounts of the events from battlefields to be useless, for they lack credibility 
(οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην οὔτ' ἐρωτῆσαι τάδε / οὔτ' αὖ πιθέσθαι τοῖσι τολμῶσιν 
λέγειν, Su. 853-54). It, therefore, does not befit the Athenian king to ask 
Adrastus for such an account, due to the fact that such narratives appear to be 
ridiculous.  
 The reference to laughter in line 846 of the Suppliant Women has received 
extra attention from scholars who regard it to be more than just a dramatic 
character’s fear of attracting ridicule. In fact, as Christopher Collard argues in 
his commentary, the set of lines 846-56 have been commonly acknowledged to 
be the poet’s ‘sneer at the conventions of simulated realism in messenger-
speeches’.1034 Accordingly, Theseus’ criticism could be, in fact, Euripides’ 
derision at the tragic convention of having a character present a very detailed 
account of off-stage events. In effect, scholars have suggested that in lines 846-
56 the poet could be making a direct allusion to the lengthy speech the 
character of Adrastus was supposed to give in the Aeschylean tragedy 
Eleusinians, now lost to us.1035 It remains in the sphere of possibility that 
Euripides may have made a derisive remark to the meticulousness of the 
messenger-speech of which Aeschylus was famous for.1036 The object of ridicule, 
then, would be the poetic style of a rival playwright. This way the discernable 
                                               
1034 Collard (1975) 321 n. 846-56. 
1035 On the connection of the Suppliants with the Aeschylean Eleusinians, see Zuntz (1955) 22-25. 
1036 For this reason, some editors found Su. 846-56 incongruous and, hence, deleted them from 
their editions, cf. Collard (1975) 321 n. 846-56. 
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in line 846 idea of derision becomes ambiguous as it simultaneously would 
regard two dimensions: the tragic world of the Suppliant Women as well as the 
tragedian’s world of the fifth century. 
 
On the basis of the examples discussed above, it becomes apparent that 
the views expressed by Euripidean characters, their appearance or conduct in 
certain situations may incur mockery. As we have seen, those opinions are 
considered to be ridiculous, which contain an idea pertaining to the miraculous: 
a god’s prophecy (Ion 520-29), heavenly intervention (Or. 1556-60; Tr. 982-88), 
or divine epiphany (IT 275-8). Mockery, thus, seems to be a character’s first 
inclination upon hearing from others about the manifestation of the 
supernatural. Also, one’s unusual appearance may attract derision (Ba. 248-54). 
Furthermore, we may distinguish a discernable fear in Euripidean characters of 
becoming the object of others’ ridicule. Noticeably, this anxiety rises from an 
awareness of one acting in a manner non-fitting to one’s social status, be it one 
of noble birth (Hcld. 501-19; Su. 840-56) or of foreign origin (Ion 595-606). Here, 
the anticipated subject dispensing mockery is a group, usually the Athenians or 
the wide public of the Greek world. In general, Euripides uses the language of 
laughter in order to describe the characters’ disdain at others’ opinions, 
appearances or behaviours. 
5.2.10. Hostility 
The dramas of Euripides consist of many references to hostile laughter 
occurring between people in conflict. In general, we may distinguish four main 
contexts leading to the antagonization of Euripidean characters: 1) betrayal of 
φιλία,1037 2) military context, 3) enslavement, and 4) power struggle. 
 
                                               
1037 On the Greek understanding of φιλία, see chapter IV, section 4.2.6. 
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5.2.10.1. Betrayal of φιλία 
Traitorous actions turn φίλοι into ἐχθροί. In the Hippolytus, Euripides 
evokes the idea of mockery in the context of the betrayal of φιλία amongst 
relations. In the agon-scene between Theseus and his son (Hipp. 902-1103),1038 
the former accuses the latter of having raped queen Phaedra (‘Look at this man! 
He was born from my loins, and yet he disgraced my bed and is clearly 
convicted of utter baseness by the dead woman here!’ σκέψασθε δ' ἐς τόνδ', 
ὅστις ἐξ ἐμοῦ γεγὼς / ἤισχυνε τἀμὰ λέκτρα κἀξελέγχεται / πρὸς τῆς 
θανούσης ἐμφανῶς κάκιστος ὤν, Hipp. 943-45).1039 To the hero, Hippolytus is 
no longer a φίλος (Hipp. 925-31) not because he violated a women, but because 
he committed a crime on his father’s wife, thus acted against his own parent.1040 
Theseus’ outrage is even greater, for his son is commonly known to be a pious 
person and pure (‘You consort with the gods as a superior man? You are 
virtuous and pure of evils? I couldn’t be persuaded by your boasts’, σὺ δὴ 
θεοῖσιν ὡς περισσὸς ὢν ἀνὴρ / ξύνει; σὺ σώφρων καὶ κακῶν ἀκήρατος; / οὐκ 
ἂν πιθοίμην τοῖσι σοῖς κόμποις ἐγὼ , Hipp. 948-50). In light of the lack of 
evidence and witnesses to call upon, Hippolytus is but left with refuting his 
father’s charges with words (Hipp. 993-1003): 
Ιπ.    εἰσορᾶις φάος τόδε 
καὶ γαῖαν· ἐν τοῖσδ' οὐκ ἔνεστ' ἀνὴρ ἐμοῦ,  
οὐδ' ἢν σὺ μὴ φῆις, σωφρονέστερος γεγώς.  
ἐπίσταμαι γὰρ πρῶτα μὲν θεοὺς σέβειν  
φίλοις τε χρῆσθαι μὴ ἀδικεῖν πειρωμένοις  
ἀλλ' οἷσιν αἰδὼς μήτ' ἐπαγγέλλειν κακὰ  
μήτ' ἀνθυπουργεῖν αἰσχρὰ τοῖσι χρωμένοις,  
οὐκ ἐγγελαστὴς τῶν ὁμιλούντων, πάτερ,  
ἀλλ' αὑτὸς οὐ παροῦσι κἀγγὺς ὢν φίλοις. 
ἑνὸς δ' ἄθικτος, ὧι με νῦν ἔχειν δοκεῖς·  
λέχους γὰρ ἐς τόδ' ἡμέρας ἁγνὸν δέμας.  
                                               
1038 For a discussion on the agon in Hippolytus, see Lloyd (1992) 43-51. 
1039 Translation in Halleran (1995) 115. Hereon, other English quotes come from this edition of 
the Hippolytus. 
1040 On the problem of the different understandings of the concept of φίλος by the characters of 
the Hippolytus, see Goff (1990) 47-8. 
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Hippolytus:  You see this light and earth; in these there is no man – even if 
you should deny it – more inherently virtuous than me. For I 
know first of all how to revere the gods and to associate with 
friends who do not attempt wrong but who would be 
ashamed either to give evil commands to their friends or to 
repay disgraceful deeds in kind; I am not someone who 
laughs at his companions, father, but the same to them when 
they’re away as when nearby. And by one thing I am 
untouched, the thing by which you now think you have me: 
to this very moment my body is pure of sex. 
In his defense, Hippolytus lists such qualities of his character which correspond 
to a person described as σώφρων ‘virtuous’: 1) piety (ἐπίσταμαι… θεοὺς 
σέβειν, Hipp. 996), 2) companions with similar morals (φίλοις… μὴ ἀδικεῖν 
πειρωμένοις…, Hipp. 997-9), 3) loyalty to friends and family (οὐκ ἐγγελαστὴς 
τῶν ὁμιλούντων, Hipp. 1000), and most importantly, 4) chastity (λέχους… 
ἁγνὸν δέμας, Hipp. 1003). Here, Hippolytus attempts to convince Theseus of 
his son’s innate σωφροσύνη, i.e. ‘soundness of mind, ‘moderation’, ‘self-
control’ or ‘temperance’, which would not allow him to commit such an 
heinous crime he has been accused of.1041 A characteristic feature of such moral 
self-control is a constant and loyal disposition towards those reckoned as φίλοι, 
i.e. friends and family, to which the young man alludes in line 1000: ‘I am not 
someone who laughs at his companions, father’, (οὐκ ἐγγελαστὴς τῶν 
ὁμιλούντων, πάτερ). By denying the fact of being an ἐγγελαστής, i.e. an 
explicit mocker1042, Hippolytus argues that not only would he dare to violate 
the bond of φιλία between him and his father, but also secretly exult for having 
done so.1043 In the Hippolytus, therefore, the title character rejects the possibility 
of laughing with scorn at his kin, since such conduct would be, in his opinion, a 
                                               
1041 LSJ s.v. σωφροσύνη 1; 2. For a general discussion on the complex semantics of the term, see 
Rademaker (2005) 7-14, and 163-73 in regard of the Hippolytus. 
1042 Both Way (1946) 241, and Kovacs (1995) 221, translate the lexeme with ‘mocker’. 
1043 Barrett (1964) 350 n. 1000-1: ‘laughter at the discomfiture of someone you have injured’. See 
also, Halleran (1995) 235 n. 1000-1; Roisman (1999) 143.  
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sign of one’s loss of self-control, hence, would not befit a person regarded to be 
σώφρων.1044  
A similar image of a son mocking his parent is evoked in the fourth 
episode of the Alcestis in the famous agon-scene between Admetus and 
Pheres.1045 During the queen’s funeral, the son blames his senile father for 
refusing to sacrifice himself to save his child’s life (‘When I was in danger of 
perishing, then was the time you ought to have shown your sympathy. But no! 
You kept out of the way and, old man though you are, let another person, a 
young (orig. itals.) one, do the dying’, τότε ξυναλγεῖν χρῆν σ' ὅτ' ὠλλύμην 
ἐγώ· / σὺ δ' ἐκποδὼν στὰς καὶ παρεὶς ἄλλωι θανεῖν / νέωι γέρων ὢν τόνδ' 
ἀποιμώξηι νεκρόν; Alc. 633-35).1046 As we may notice, the king’s accusations 
towards his parent rely on two concepts: old age and φιλία.1047 Although family 
members, generally, were required to provide each other with mutual services 
and favours,1048 however, Admetus finds it mandatory for a φίλος to give up 
his life for another. For this reason, he considers both of his parents’ refusal to 
die in his stead as a betrayal of family φιλία.1049 
In his fury, Admetus accusses the old man with outright 
faintheartedness in failing to die for him (‘you most certainly surpass everyone 
in cowardice’, ἦ τἄρα πάντων διαπρέπεις ἀψυχίαι, Alc. 642), and, hence, 
denies any relationship with his father (‘For I’m dead, as far as you’re 
concerned!’, τέθνηκα γὰρ δὴ τοὐπὶ σ', Alc. 666). Consequently, Pheres finds his 
son’s insolence outrageous (‘Your insults go too far and you’ll not get away 
with hurling these brash taunts at me’, ἄγαν ὑβρίζεις καὶ νεανίας λόγους / 
                                               
1044 Cf. Halliwell (2008) 126 n. 69. 
1045 For a discussion on the agon in Alcestis, see Lloyd (1992) 37-41; Czerwińska (1995) 98-101. 
1046 Translation in Conacher (1988) 113. Hereon, I adduce other English quotes from this edition 
of the Alcestis. 
1047 Mastronarde (2010) 228. 
1048 Blundell (1989) 40-3. 
1049 In Alc. 338-9, Admetus speaks to his dying wife about the hatred he will keep towards his 
mother (στυγῶν μὲν ἥ μ' ἔτικτεν) as well as his father (ἐχθαίρων δ' ἐμὸν πατέρα) who, ih his 
opinion, turned out to be φίλοι in words (λόγῶ) but not in deeds (οὐκ ἔργῶ). 
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ῥίπτων ἐς ἡμᾶς οὐ βαλὼν οὕτως ἄπει, Alc. 679-80) and refutes the accusation 
by stating the fact that a parent need not die for his child (‘For I’ve received no 
ancestral mandate, nor any Greek law either, that fathers are to die for sons’, οὐ 
γὰρ πατρῶιον τόνδ' ἐδεξάμην νόμον, / παίδων προθνήισκειν πατέρας, οὐδ' 
Ἑλληνικόν, Alc. 683-4).1050 He, then, points out Admetus’ selfishness for 
allowing a woman give her life for his own (‘you talk about my (orig. itals.) 
cowardice, when you, most base of all, were bested in courage by your wife, 
who died for you, the fine young husband!’, ἐμὴν ἀψυχίαν / λέγεις, γυναικός, 
ὦ κάκισθ', ἡσσημένος, / ἣ τοῦ καλοῦ σοῦ προύθανεν νεανίου; Alc. 696-8). 
After Pheres’ tirade, the callous debate transforms into an angry exchange of 
mutual revilement (Alc. 711-30):  
Αδ.  ταὐτὸν γὰρ ἡβῶντ' ἄνδρα καὶ πρέσβυν θανεῖν;  
Φε.   ψυχῆι μιᾶι ζῆν, οὐ δυοῖν, ὀφείλομεν.  
Αδ.   καὶ μὴν Διός γε μείζονα ζώηις χρόνον.  
Φε.   ἀρᾶι γονεῦσιν οὐδὲν ἔκδικον παθών;  
Αδ.   μακροῦ βίου γὰρ ἠισθόμην ἐρῶντά σε.  
Φε.   ἀλλ' οὐ σὺ νεκρὸν ἀντὶ σοῦ τόνδ' ἐκφέρεις;  
Αδ.   σημεῖα τῆς σῆς γ', ὦ κάκιστ', ἀψυχίας.  
Φε.   οὔτοι πρὸς ἡμῶν γ' ὤλετ'· οὐκ ἐρεῖς τόδε.  
Αδ.   φεῦ·  
εἴθ' ἀνδρὸς ἔλθοις τοῦδέ γ' ἐς χρείαν ποτέ.  
Φε.   μνήστευε πολλάς, ὡς θάνωσι πλείονες.  
Αδ.   σοὶ τοῦτ' ὄνειδος· οὐ γὰρ ἤθελες θανεῖν.  
Φε.   φίλον τὸ φέγγος τοῦτο τοῦ θεοῦ, φίλον.  
Αδ.   κακὸν τὸ λῆμα κοὐκ ἐν ἀνδράσιν τὸ σόν.  
Φε.   οὐκ ἐγγελᾷς γέροντα βαστάζων νεκρόν.  
Αδ.   θανῆι γε μέντοι δυσκλεής, ὅταν θάνηις.  
Φε.   κακῶς ἀκούειν οὐ μέλει θανόντι μοι.  
Αδ.   φεῦ φεῦ· τὸ γῆρας ὡς ἀναιδείας πλέων.  
Φε.   ἥδ' οὐκ ἀναιδής· τήνδ' ἐφηῦρες ἄφρονα.  
Αδ.   ἄπελθε κἀμὲ τόνδ' ἔα θάψαι νεκρόν.  
Φε.   ἄπειμι· θάψεις δ' αὐτὸς ὢν αὐτῆς φονεύς, 
Admetus: Is it then the same thing for a young man and for an old man 
to die? 
Pheres: Our due is one life’s span, not two. 
Admetus:  Then may you live a longer life than even Zeus! 
                                               
1050 Mastronarde (2010) 229 calls attention to the complexity of the issue, which also depends on 
external circumstances, e.g. a father is obliged to die at war in defence of his family, including 
his children. 
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Pheres: You’d make this blasphemous prayer for your parents, when 
you’ve suffered no injustice from them? 
Admetus: Yes, for I’ve noticed your eagerness for lengthy days. 
Pheres: But aren’t you having this corpse carried out in place of 
yourself? 
Admetus: That is, rather, a proof of your cowardice, you wretch! 
Pheres: It was not because of us, at least, that she perished. You won’t 
have the audacity to say that! 
Admetus: Hah! I hope that some day you’ll have need of help from me! 
Pheres: Go on and marry more wives, so that more may die! 
Admetus: It’s just this matter of dying that’s a reproach to you: for you 
were unwilling to die. 
Pheres: Sweet, most sweet, it is to look upon this light of day! 
Admetus: Base is your spirit and not worthy of a man! 
Pheres:  At least you’ll not be mocking an old man as you  
carry out the corpse. 
Admetus:  You’ll die at length, dishonoured when you die! 
Pheres: Evil report won’t hurt me when I’m dead! 
Admetus: Alas! How full of shamelessness, old age! 
Pheres: This one wasn’t ‘shameless.’ But you found her somewhat 
lacking in good sense. 
Admetus: Be off! And let me bury this corpse alone! 
Pheres: All right, I’m going. You’ll bury her then, being the very one 
who slew her… 
In these lines, we may recognize that Euripides applies the technique of 
stichomythia, in order to increase the emotional aspect of the dialogue between 
father and son.1051 Such passionate outburst, in effect, emphasizes the tense 
atmosphere of the whole agon-scene. Both men speak to each other in a 
discernibly vituperative manner; they do this not to convince the other to one’s 
ideas, but only to express their indignation; the son uses sarcasm (Alc. 713, 715), 
he repeats the accusation of his parent’s cowardice (Alc. 717, 723), considers his 
father as morally worthless (ὦ κάκιστε, Alc. 717; 723) as well as shameless (Alc. 
727), and, finally, threatens him with a bad reputation after his death (Alc. 725). 
Pheres, on the other hand, justifies his decision in a sentential tone (Alc. 712, 
722), regards his son’s words as cursing (Alc. 714), uses sarcasm (Alc. 720), 
expresses disdain at the young man (Alc. 724, 726) and even calls him an 
explicit murderer (φονεύς, Alc. 730). Without any doubt, the invective tone of 
                                               
1051 Czerwińska (1995) 100. 
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this dialogue reflects the disruption of the familial relationship between father 
and son. 
It is in this passionate part of the agon that Pheres evokes the image of 
Admetus mocking his old father. He, particularly, speaks of this in line 724 as 
he says to his son ‘you are not laughing scornfully (οὐκ ἐγγελᾷς) as you carry 
out an old man dead’.1052 Here, the lexeme ἐγγελάω denotes outright scorn the 
angry parent imagines his son will perform at his father’s funeral. Certainly, 
this statement expresses Pheres’ indignation with Admetus, however, it also 
reflects the antagonism between him and his son, whose vitriolic verbal attack 
and denial of familial relationship has violated the parent-child φιλία.1053 As a 
consequence of this violation, Pheres may consider his son being capable of 
performing other offensive acts against him, such as dispensing mockery. In the 
Alcestis, therefore, we find the example of the image of laughter used to 
describe the hostile relations of a father and son. 
The laughter of enemies in connection with the betrayal of φιλία is a 
discernible theme in the Medea. This tragedy unfolds the consequences of 
Jason’s repudiation of his wife and mother of two sons. In order to marry 
Creon’s daughter and, hence, enter into an alliance with the Corinthian royals, 
Medea’s husband officially rejects his family. With this act, he betrays his 
previously given marriage vows. As it is stated in the prologue, this treachery 
has transformed the once close relationship between Jason and his former wife 
into that of outright hostility (‘But now all is enmity, and love’s bonds are 
diseased’, νῦν δ' ἐχθρὰ πάντα καὶ νοσεῖ τὰ φίλτατα, Md. 16).1054 Medea’s 
                                               
1052 Translation in Parker (2007) 195 n. 724. 
1053 Schein (1988) 196: ‘This is a radical rejection of what Greek convention and Attic law held 
that a son owes to his parents, a total rupture of the bond of family φιλία’. 
1054 Sicking (1998) 66: ‘A rephrasing of the words spoken by the nurse would then yield the 
following: as Jason’s benefactress (rather than as his wife), Medea claims the right to be treated 
as φίλη by him, a right he himself has recognized by the promises he made to her under oath. 
His leaving her, therefore, is a case of ἀδικία: he deprives her of the ἀμοιβή she is entitled to, 
and in line with his own standards ipso facto turns into her ἐχθρός’. Cf. also Belfiore (2000) 131-
2. 
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anger, therefore, as well as her revenge is, chiefly, caused by Jason’s violation of 
their φιλία-relationship.1055  
Insulted by her husband’s betrayal, Medea is of the opinion that Jason 
and his new family take delight in her disgrace. As I will demonstrate below, 
this conviction manifests itself in her obsession with the idea of her enemies 
laughing at her.1056  
Medea already mentions the hostile laughter directed at her in the first 
episode of the play. Creon, the king of Corinth has come to inform her of his 
decision to banish her and the children from the kingdom (Md. 271-6). He fears 
that she might want to take revenge on his family because of his alliance with 
Jason (Md. 282-91). Medea pleads to postpone her banishment for one day and 
the king hesitantly grants her wish (Md. 348-56). Once he departs, Medea 
reveals to the Chorus her decision to kill the king, his daughter and Jason as 
well (‘I shall make corpses of three of my enemies, the father, his daughter, and 
my husband’, τρεῖς τῶν ἐμῶν ἐχθρῶν νεκροὺς / θήσω, πατέρα τε καὶ κόρην 
πόσιν τ' ἐμόν, Md. 374-5). At first, she deliberates murdering her enemies in the 
royal palace, however soon rejects the idea due to the high risk of being caught 
(Md. 381-3): 
Μη. ἀλλ᾽ ἕν τί μοι πρόσαντες: εἰ ληφθήσομαι 
δόμους ὑπερβαίνουσα καὶ τεχνωμένη, 
θανοῦσα θήσω τοῖς ἐμοῖς ἐχθροῖς γέλων. 
κράτιστα τὴν εὐθεῖαν, ἧι πεφύκαμεν  
σοφοὶ μάλιστα, φαρμάκοις αὐτοὺς ἑλεῖν.  
Medea:  There’s just one threat. It I am apprehended 
 entering the house, my ruse discovered, 
 I’ll be put to death; my enemies 
 will laugh at me. The best way is the most 
 direct, to use the skills I have by nature 
 and poison them, destroy them with my drugs.1057 
                                               
1055 Schein (1990) 60; Czerwińska (1999) 164; Sluiter (2008) 12-3. 
1056 Halliwell (2008) 138 n. 89. 
1057 Translation in Arnson Svarlien (2007) 76. 
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As we can see, the reason for her giving up on the idea of sneaking into Creon’s 
palace is the fact that, should she fail at her attempt, she would become the 
object of her enemies’ laughter (θανοῦσα θήσω τοῖς ἐμοῖς ἐχθροῖς γέλων, Md. 
383). Medea imagines Jason, his bride and father-in-law as enjoying her 
possible failure.1058 Ιn her view, such outcome is unacceptable.1059  
It is a curious fact that the image of the enemies’ laughing in scorn 
appears only after her encounter with the Corinthian king. Before this, Medea’s 
outrage was directed merely at Jason, the only person she primarily intended to 
punish.1060 However, we may recognize that with the decision to have her 
banished from Corinth, Creon has officially proclaimed his solidarity with 
Jason, and, hence, his hostility against the barbarian woman. As a result, Medea 
includes him and his daughter into her vengeful scheme. This becomes evident 
in the next reference to her enemies’ mocking laughter (Md. 395-406): 
Μη.  οὐ γὰρ μὰ τὴν δέσποιναν ἣν ἐγὼ σέβω  
μάλιστα πάντων καὶ ξυνεργὸν εἱλόμην,  
Ἑκάτην, μυχοῖς ναίουσαν ἑστίας ἐμῆς,  
χαίρων τις αὐτῶν τοὐμὸν ἀλγυνεῖ κέαρ.  
πικροὺς δ' ἐγώ σφιν καὶ λυγροὺς θήσω γάμους,  
πικρὸν δὲ κῆδος καὶ φυγὰς ἐμὰς χθονός.  
   ἀλλ' εἶα φείδου μηδὲν ὧν ἐπίστασαι,  
Μήδεια, βουλεύουσα καὶ τεχνωμένη·  
    ἕρπ' ἐς τὸ δεινόν· νῦν ἀγὼν εὐψυχίας.  
ὁρᾷς ἃ πάσχεις; οὐ γέλωτα δεῖ σ᾽ ὀφλεῖν 
τοῖς Σισυφείοις τοῖσδ᾽ Ἰάσονος γάμοις, 
γεγῶσαν ἐσθλοῦ πατρὸς Ἡλίου τ᾽ ἄπο. 
Medea:  For by my mistress Hekate, whom I revere 
above all other gods, she whom I choose as my 
accomplice, dwelling in the recess of my hearth, 
not one of them shall grieve my heart and then rejoice! 
I’ll make their marriage bitter and lamentable, 
bitter their new ties and my exile from this land 
                                               
1058 As is it stressed in the translation of Kovacs (1994) 331: ‘If I am caught entering the house 
and plotting its destruction, I will be killed and bring joy to my foes’. 
1059 Sicking (1998) 68. 
1060 In lines 259-63, Medea asks the Chorus to keep the information of her scheming against her 
husband a secret. Line 262 with a reference to Creon and his daughter is commonly considered 
to be an interpolation, as in the edition of Diggle (1984) ad loc.; see also Page (1938) 91 n. 262; 
Kovacs (1994) 319 n. 262; Mastronarde (2002) 215-16 n. 262. 
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Come now! Spare non of all the strategems you know, 
Medea. Weave your plans, concoct your crafty schemes. 
Move towards this awful thing. You must not incur 
laughter from Jason’s Sisyphean marriage-bond. 
Your father’s noble; your grandfather’s Helios;1061 
Apparently, Jason’s new φίλοι have become Medea’s new ἐχθροί. In an oath to 
the goddess Hecate, she resolves not to let any of the three enemies (τις αὐτῶν, 
Md. 398) get away with taking delight in making her heart grieve (χαίρων τις 
αὐτῶν τοὐμὸν ἀλγυνεῖ κέαρ, Md. 398).1062 What is more, she regards the new 
antagonism as occurring between two family lines: the house of Sisyphus, from 
whom Creon and his daughter originate, and to which Jason has married into 
(τοῖς Σισυφείοις τοῖσδ᾽ Ἰάσονος γάμοις, Md. 405), in opposition to the 
bloodline of Helius, the god of the sun, from whom the Colchidian princess 
descends (γεγῶσαν ἐσθλοῦ πατρὸς Ἡλίου τ᾽ ἄπο, Md. 406). These two last 
lines add an extra dimension to Medeas’s motivation for revenge, for she 
indicates the proclaimed hostility between a royal, albeit mortal, family with 
that of divine origin.1063 As we can see, the first episode of the play identifies the 
two sides of the antagonism, which has occurred as a result of Jason’s betrayal 
of his relationship with Medea. 
The title protagonist makes the next reference to her enemies’ laughter in 
the third episode. As a consequence of her two encounters with Jason and 
Aegeus, in which the former denies his responsibility for Medea’s exile (Md. 
446-626),1064 whereas the latter promises to grant her asylum in Athens (Md. 
663-758), Medea modifies her vengeful plans. As punishment for her 
humiliation, she intends to have Creon’s daughter die through poisoning along 
                                               
1061 Translation in Blondell (1999) 384. 
1062 Cf. Mastronarde (2002) 236 n. 398. 
1063 Cf. Burnett (1973) 14: ‘The honor of the Sun’s line has to be defended against the disrespect 
of upstarts (406), and he provides the gift that baits the murder trap (954), and then the escape 
that makes his granddaughter’s vengeance perfect in the end’. 
1064 For a general discussion of the agon between Medea and Jason, see Czerwińska (1998); for 
its analysis in the context of betrayal of φιλία, see Sicking (1998) 70-1; Mueller (2001) 473-86. 
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with ‘anyone who touches her’ (κακῶς ὀλεῖται πᾶς θ' ὃς ἂν θίγηι κόρης, Md. 
788). Yet, she also decides to kill her own children (Md. 791-97): 
Μη.  ὤιμωξα δ' οἷον ἔργον ἔστ' ἐργαστέον  
τοὐντεῦθεν ἡμῖν· τέκνα γὰρ κατακτενῶ  
τἄμ'· οὔτις ἔστιν ὅστις ἐξαιρήσεται·  
δόμον τε πάντα συγχέασ' Ἰάσονος  
ἔξειμι γαίας, φιλτάτων παίδων φόνον  
φεύγουσα καὶ τλᾶσ' ἔργον ἀνοσιώτατον. 
οὐ γὰρ γελᾶσθαι τλητὸν ἐξ ἐχθρῶν, φίλαι. 
Medea:  Ah me, I groan at what a deed I must do next! I shall kill my 
children: there is no one who can rescue them. When I have 
utterly confounded the whole house of Jason, I shall leave the 
land, in flight from the murder of my own dear sons, having 
committed a most unholy deed. The laughter of one’s 
enemies is unendurable, my friends. Let that be as it will. 
Here, Medea explicitly gives the reason for commiting such a heinous crime, 
which is the idea of enemies mocking her in her misfortune. As we can see, she 
decides to take vengeance on her former husband by ‘confounding the whole 
house of Jason’ (δόμον τε πάντα συγχέασ' Ἰάσονος, Md. 794), and with divine 
help (σὺν θεῶι, Md. 802) she will deprive the perpetrator of his children as well 
as any future progeny (‘He shall never from this day see his children by me 
alive, nor will he have children by his new bride since that wretch must die a 
wretched death by my poisons’, οὔτ' ἐξ ἐμοῦ γὰρ παῖδας ὄψεταί ποτε / 
ζῶντας τὸ λοιπὸν οὔτε τῆς νεοζύγου / νύμφης τεκνώσει παῖδ', ἐπεὶ κακὴν 
κακῶς / θανεῖν σφ' ἀνάγκη τοῖς ἐμοῖσι φαρμάκοις, Md. 803-6). Although 
Medea is aware that such form of punishment will also inflict on her great pain, 
nevertheless she declares that ‘it is the way to hurt my husband the most’ (οὕτω 
γὰρ ἂν μάλιστα δηχθείη πόσις, Md. 817). In her view, the murder of her 
children will prevent her from becoming the object of her enemies laughter 
(γελᾶσθαι ἐξ ἐχθρῶν, Md. 797). Yet, first, she will have to deal with her own 
feelings as a mother, in order to fulfil such an ‘unholy act’(ἔργον ἀνοσιώτατον, 
Md. 797). 
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The struggle between maternal affection and passion for revenge forms 
the basis of Medea’s great monologue in the fifth episode.1065 As discussed in 
section 5.2.7., the perception of her children’s laughter emotionally overwhelms 
Medea to such a degree that she temporarily relinquishes her scheme (Md. 
1040-8). However, just after bidding farewell to her plans (χαιρέτω 
βουλεύματα, Md. 1048 ), Medea suddenly shifts back to her previous 
determination in punishing her enemies (Md. 1049-52): 
Μη.  καίτοι τί πάσχω; βούλομαι γέλωτ᾽ ὀφλεῖν 
ἐχθροὺς μεθεῖσα τοὺς ἐμοὺς ἀζημίους; 
τολμητέον τάδ᾽; · ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐμῆς κάκης,  
τὸ καὶ προσέσθαι μαλθακοὺς λόγους φρενί.  
Medea:  But what is coming over me? Do I wish to suffer mockery, 
letting my enemies go unpunished? Must I put up with that? 
No, it is mere weakness in me even to admit such tender 
words into my heart. 
Again, we can see that the idea of enemies laughing at Medea’s misery 
motivates her to fulfil the horrible scheme.1066 It is in lines 1049-50 with the 
reference to hostile laughter, as Sicking calls attention to, that indicate the 
values she is operating on.1067 Despite the pain suffered as a mother, she 
acknowledges her anger at her foes to be greater (‘And I know well what pain I 
am about to undergo, but my wrath overbears my calculation’, καὶ μανθάνω 
μὲν οἷα δρᾶν μέλλω κακά / θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων, Md. 
1078-9). It becomes evident from her great monologue that what infuses this 
                                               
1065 Burnett (1973) 22: ‘she [i.e. Medea] finds herself caught between a pair of passionate 
imperatives: “Kill the children because you hate their father,” and “Do not kill them because 
you love them as their mother.” … Psychologically speaking it is a struggle between Medea’s 
masculine, honor-oriented self and her feminine, hearth-oriented self.’ Similar interpretation in 
Knox (1979) 300: ‘In this great scene the grim heroic resolve triumphs not over an outside 
adversary or adviser but over the deepest maternal feelings of the hero herself’. For the 
interpretation of Medea’s struggle as the conflict between her masculine and feminine aspects 
of her identity, see Foley (1989). 
1066 Cf. Czerwińska (1999) 136: ‘The awareness of the fact that by relinquishing her murderous 
plans she will incur, in her opinion, the enemies’ mockery, who would go feeling unpunished, 
brings an end to her hesitation’ (my translation). 
1067 Sicking (1998) 73. Cf. Elliott (1969) 94 n. 1049-50: ‘Here, as in 797, Medea is concerned not so 
much that her treatment has been unjust, but that her enemies may have the chance to laugh at 
her. Moral principle plays no part in her revenge’. 
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‘wrath’ (θυμός) is the idea of Jason, Creon and his daughter mocking her 
miserable life in exile.1068 
The Colchidian princess successfully carries out her murderous plans. 
From the messenger we hear of the scorched deaths of Creon and his daughter 
as an effect of Medea’s poisonous gifts (Md. 1136-1220). As a result, Jason comes 
to his former house concerned about his children, who may pay for their 
mother’s crime and be punished by Creon’s kin (Md. 1301-5). To his horror, he 
finds out about his sons’ killing by the hand of their mother (παῖδες τεθνᾶσι 
χειρὶ μητρώιαι σέθεν, Md. 1309). Outraged and in want of justice he tries to 
open the doors to the house, when suddenly Medea appears aloft in a winged 
chariot, which was a gift from her grandfather Helius (after Md. 1316).1069 The 
former husband and wife exchange words of resentment and hatred towards 
each other. One of the first things that Medea points to is the fact of depriving 
Jason and his Corinthian family of the pleasure of mocking her in exile (Md. 
1354-7): 
Μη. σὺ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔμελλες τἄμ᾽ ἀτιμάσας λέχη 
τερπνὸν διάξειν βίοτον ἐγγελῶν ἐμοὶ 
οὐδ᾽ ἡ τύραννος, οὐδ᾽ ὅ σοι προσθεὶς γάμους 
Κρέων ἀνατεὶ τῆσδέ μ᾽ ἐκβαλεῖν χθονός. 
Medea:  You were not going to cast aside my bed and then spend a 
pleasant life laughing at me, no, nor the princess either, nor 
was Creon, who offered you his daughter, going to exile me 
with impunity! 
                                               
1068 Czerwińska (1999) 128 points out that θυμός denotes Medea’s agitation caused by her 
slighted pride and her husband’s rejection. 
1069 The sudden appearance of Medea ex machina has caused much debate on her superhuman 
transformation: some see her as a ‘demon of vengeance’, e.g. Lesky (2006) 353; others as a ‘god’, 
e.g. Knox (1979) 304: ‘Medea is presented to us not only as a hero, but also, at the end of the 
play, by her language, action, and situation, as a theos or at least something more than human’; 
in contrast Rutherford (2014b) 96: ‘Medea’s apotheosis… is no such thing’. For the discussion 
on her suprahuman features, see Luschnig (2007) 63-84, esp. 84: ‘There is in Medea something 
not human’; Hall (2014) 139-46, esp. 145: ‘Medea is not exactly a goddess, but neither is she 
susceptible to most of the constraints of mortality – she can physically escape what, for a mortal 
woman, would now be certain death at the hands of Jason and the Corinthians, and she can fly 
in a supernatural vehicle; what is more, there is no ancient tradtition, in any Greek or Roman 
author, that she ever died’. 
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Again, the avengeress evokes the image of her three enemies laughing in 
delight at her misfortune. However, it is evident that the main recipient of her 
revenge was, chiefly, Jason, the perpetrator of their marital vows. For this 
violation, she had his new φίλοι killed, but also deprived him of any 
descendents. Jason tries to appeal to Medea’s sufferings as a mother, but she 
regards the pain satisfactory (Md. 1361-2). 
Ια.   καὐτή γε λυπῇ καὶ κακῶν κοινωνὸς εἶ. 
Μη.   σάφ' ἴσθι· λύει δ' ἄλγος, ἢν σὺ μὴ 'γγελᾶις. 
Jason: Yes, and you also have grief and are a sharer in my 
misfortune. 
Medea:  Of course, but the pain is worthwhile if you cannot mock me. 
Medea violently denunciates Jason and exults over his misfortune. Their angry 
dialogue ends with her triumphant flight on the winged chariot carrying away 
the bodies of the children. In doing so, she adds the final touch to Jason’s 
misfortunes by depriving him the possibility of burying his children. 
Hostile mockery becomes an important motif in the Medea. Apparently, 
it plays a crucial role in the protagonist’s motivation and decision making.1070 
According to Czerwińska, apart from a desire for revenge, the second main 
reason for Medea’s infanticide is the obsessive idea of her enemies’ derisive 
laughter aimed at her.1071 This obsession becomes evident due to the fact that 
she is the only character in the play to evoke the image of enemies laughing in 
delight.1072 In particular, Medea uses the language of laughter in two respects: 1) 
in relation to her fear of becoming the object of Jason’s and his new family’s 
laughter (Md. 383; 404; 797; 1049), and 2) to express her own delight at 
preventing her enemies from dispensing mockery (Md. 1355, 1362). In Medea, 
therefore, the references to laughter stress the hostile rapport between the title 
                                               
1070 Arnould (1990) 40; on the complexity of her motives, see Mastronarde (2002) 15-22.  
1071 Czerwińska (1999) 151. 
1072 On the basis of her discernible sensitivity to laughter, a strong feeling of pride and fear of 
losing her reputation, scholars have pointed to the similarities between Medea and tragic 
heroes, especially those presented by Sophocles, cf. Arnould (1990) 40; Mastronarde (2002) 234 
n. 383; some even have considered her as a ‘heroic character’, cf. Knox (1979) 297-301. 
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character and her ἐχθροί, who came to being due to Jason’s disloyalty towards 
his old φίλοι. 
5.2.10.2. Military context 
Enmity between people is evident when one side of a confict prepares a 
military expedition against the other. In the tragedy Iphigenia at Aulis, the 
Greeks must sacrifice Agamemnon’s daughter, if they wish to set sail against 
Troy. Menelaus, however, discovers his brother’s attempt at preventing 
Iphigenia’s arrival to Aulis. Enraged by the deception, the Spartan king 
furiously reproaches his brother for doing ill to his fellowmen (IA 370-2): 
Με.  Ἑλλάδος μάλιστ᾽ ἔγωγε τῆς ταλαιπώρου στένω,  
ἣ θέλουσα δρᾶν τι κεδνόν, βαρβάρους τοὺς οὐδένας  
καταγελῶντας ἐξανήσει διὰ σὲ καὶ τὴν σὴν κόρην. 
Menelaus:  I lament most for poor Hellad! Though she wanted to 
accomplish something good, now, because of you and your 
daughter she will let the worthless barbarians go, barbarians 
who are mocking us.1073 
In particular, Menelaus is blaming Agamemnon as well as his daughter for 
impeding Greece’s chance in accomplishing something ‘valuable’, or ‘good’1074 
(τι κεδνόν, IA 371), which is the invasion of Troy. As a consequence of this, 
their enemies, whom he refers to as ‘the worthless barbarians’ (βαρβάρους 
τοὺς οὐδένας) already ‘mocking’ the Greeks (καταγελῶντας, IA 372), will 
avoid punishment for their actions, i.e. the abduction of Helen by Paris, the 
Trojan prince. Although, in the quoted translation, Kovacs indicates ‘us’ as the 
object of the Phrygians mockery, however, the Greek text does not give the 
direct object to καταγελῶντας. This omission, thus, leaves room for different 
interpretations of the addressee of the barbaric laughter. Firstly, it may refer to 
the Greeks, at whom the Trojans would be dispensing ridicule for their failure 
expedition to retrieve Helen. Secondly, it may include both the Atreidae, the 
                                               
1073 Translation in Kovacs (2002b) 203. 
1074 Cf. Stockert (1992b) 304 n. 370-72. 
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Greek commanders for their ineffectiveness in carrying out such an expedition. 
And finally, it may regard Menelaus himself for losing his wife in such a 
disgraceful manner to another man, nota bene, a Trojan. All three 
interpretations remain permissible, for all three possible objects of mockery 
have good reasons to be in a hostile rapport with the Trojans. In any of these 
cases, the mention of the Trojans’ laughter alludes to the Greeks hostility 
towards them, occasioned by various reasons: personal, fraternal or national. 
War is a state of armed hostilities between two groups of people. 
Without any doubt, in the tragedy Rhesus1075, the rapport between the Trojans 
and their aggressors, the Greeks is of hostile character. This is apparent not only 
in the military actions of the two sides of the conflict, but also in their manner 
of speech. In the fifth episode, Hector refers to the enmity between him and the 
Greeks by evoking the idea of hostile mockery. One night, Odysseus and 
Diomedes manage to sneak into to Trojan camp, kill Rhesus, the Thracian king, 
and steal his prized horses.1076 After hearing the news, Hector expresses his 
outrage to the Chorus of Trojan sentinels (Rh. 808-19):  
Εκ.  πῶς, ὦ μέγιστα πήματ' ἐξειργασμένοι,  
μολόντες ὑμᾶς πολεμίων κατάσκοποι  
  λήθουσιν αἰσχρῶς καὶ κατεσφάγη στρατός,  
κοὔτ' εἰσιόντας στρατόπεδ' ἐξαπώσατε  
οὔτ' ἐξιόντας; τῶνδε τίς τείσει δίκην  
πλὴν σοῦ; σὲ γὰρ δὴ φύλακά φημ' εἶναι στρατοῦ.  
  φροῦδοι δ' ἄπληκτοι, τῆι Φρυγῶν κακανδρίαι  
  πόλλ' ἐγγελῶντες τῶι στρατηλάτηι τ' ἐμοί.  
εὖ νυν τόδ' ἴστε – Ζεὺς ὀμώμοται πατήρ –  
ἤτοι μάραγνά γ' ἢ καρανιστὴς μόρος  
μένει σε δρῶντα τοιάδ', ἢ τὸν Ἕκτορα  
τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι καὶ κακὸν νομίζετε.  
Hector:  Workers of great ruin, how could enemy spies have slipped 
past you to your disgrace, and the army have been put to the 
sword, and you raised no cry either when they entered the 
camp or left it? Who is going to be punished for this but you? 
For you, I maintain, are the men guarding the army. They 
have got away without a scratch, laughing loudly at the 
                                               
1075 For the discussion on the authorship, see n. 2 above. 
1076 The story is narrated also by Homer in the 10th book of the Iliad. 
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Phrygian’s cowardice and at me as general. You may be quite 
sure – Father Zeus be my witness – that the lash or the 
headsman’s ax awaits you for doing this, or you may consider 
Hector a cipher and a coward.1077  
As we may observe, the matter of honour is of greater importance to Hector 
than the loss of an ally.1078 According to the Trojan commander, the Greeks’ 
successful night expedition is a disgrace to the Trojans (πολεμίων κατάσκοποι 
λήθουσιν αἰσχρῶς, Rh. 809-10). As a result of his feeling of shame, Hector 
imagines his enemies laughing in derision (ἐγγελῶντες) at the Trojans for their 
cowardice (τῆι Φρυγῶν κακανδρίαι) but also at himself as well (πόλλ' 
ἐγγελῶντες τῶι στρατηλάτηι τ' ἐμοί, Rh. 815). Clearly, the idea of hostile 
mockery is evoked, in which the derisive aspect is not only indicated by the 
prefix ἐν attached to the form of γελάω,1079 but also emphasized by the word 
πολλὰ ‘greatly’. In his translation, Kovacs also includes the audible aspect of 
laughter by rendering πόλλ' ἐγγελῶντες ‘laughing loudly’. However, the 
adverb πολλὰ may as well indicate the degree of the Greeks’ mockery Hector 
imagines to be directed not only at the Trojans, but also at himself.1080 We may 
notice that his reaction bears similarities to that of Menelaus in Iphigenia at 
Aulis, i.e. in face of a sudden misfortune from the hands of one’s enemy, one 
uses the language of laughter to describe the hostile rapport between 
opponents. 
                                               
1077 Translation in Kovacs (2002b) 437. Hereon, all English quotes of Rhesus come from this 
edition. 
1078 Cf. Rosivach (1978) 68: ‘Hector expresses no grief at the deaths of his allies, and he is 
concerned only with the mockery to which these deaths will subject the Trojans in general and 
himself in particular’. Cf. Fries (2014) 418 n. 808-19. This approach is already recognizable in his 
words expressed in Rh. 102-4: ‘The god has handed our enemies (θεοῦ διδόντος πολεμίους) to 
us, and it is a disgrace (αἰσχρὸν) to us, and a mischief (πρὸς αἰσχύνηι κακόν) as well, to let 
them run away without giving them battle, considering the great harm they have done us’.  
1079 Cf. chapter II, section 2.1.1.6. 
1080 Cf. the translation of lines 814-15 in Way (1916) 227: ‘They are gone, unsmitten! – gone, with 
many a scoff / at Phrygian cowardice and me, your chief!’; Liapis (2012) 288 n. 814-15: ‘now they 
have disappeared unwounded, laughing mightily both at the Phrygians’ cowardice and at me, 
the commander-in-chief’; (my emphasis).  
 359 
 
Euripidean characters dread the possibility of having their enemy laugh 
at them even after death. In the tragedy Madness of Heracles, while the title hero 
is away fulfilling his labours, his family residing in Thebes finds itself in peril. 
Lycus usurps the throne and decides to murder Amphitryon, Megara and her 
children. The play opens with Heracles’ father, wife and children taking refuge 
at the altar of Zeus the Saviour. The usurper king approaches them and points 
to the vanity of their hope of surviving, since Heracles is presumably dead, 
hence, there is no one who will come to their rescue (‘For how long do you seek 
to prolong your life? What hope of defense do you perceive to avert death? Do 
you believe that their father, who lies dead in Hades, / Will come back?’, τίν' ἐς 
χρόνον ζητεῖτε μηκῦναι βίον; / τίν' ἐλπίδ' ἀλκήν τ' εἰσορᾶτε μὴ θανεῖν; / ἦ 
τὸν παρ' Ἅιδηι πατέρα τῶνδε κείμενον / πιστεύεθ' ἥξειν; HF 143-46). Since the 
suppliants refuse to abandon their position, Lycus commands to set the whole 
altar on fire and have Heracles’ family burnt alive (HF 240-46). Upon hearing 
this, Megara persuades Amphitryon to surrender to the king (HF 284-92): 
Με.  ἡμᾶς δ᾽, ἐπειδὴ δεῖ θανεῖν, θνῄσκειν χρεὼν  
μὴ πυρὶ καταξανθέντας, ἐχθροῖσιν γέλων  
διδόντας, οὑμοὶ τοῦ θανεῖν μεῖζον κακόν. 
ὀφείλομεν γὰρ πολλὰ δώμασιν καλά·  
σὲ μὲν δόκησις ἔλαβεν εὐκλεὴς δορός,  
ὥστ' οὐκ ἀνεκτὸν δειλίας θανεῖν σ' ὕπο,  
οὑμὸς δ' ἀμαρτύρητος εὐκλεὴς πόσις,  
ὃς τούσδε παῖδας οὐκ ἂν ἐκσῶσαι θέλοι  
δόξαν κακὴν λαβόντας· οἱ γὰρ εὐγενεῖς 
κάμνουσι τοῖς αἰσχροῖσι τῶν τέκνων ὕπερ· 
Megara:  But we, since we must die, ought to die 
 Not wasted by fire, giving laughter 
To our enemies, which to my mind is a greater ill than death. 
We owe many fine things to our house: 
you got an illustrious reputation for combat 
So that’s intolerable for you to die through cowardice, 
While my husband needs no witnesses for his glory, 
And he would be unwilling to save these children 
At the price of their getting a bad reputation. For the noble 
Are distressed at their children’s disgraces; 
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Apparently, Megara has lost all hope for her husband to return, therefore, she 
prefers to end her life willingly and in a manner suitable of her noble status.1081 
In her view, to perish in a fire as a suppliant would be commonly perceived as 
a sign of cowardice. In result, this would be a disgrace totally unworthy of 
Heracles’ family.1082 Moreover, as she stresses in lines 285-6, such cowardly 
death would also ‘provide laughter to enemies’ (ἐχθροῖσιν γέλων διδόντας, 
HF 285-6). Such particular image of a foe mocking his/her deceased opponent 
is, in Megara’s opinion, ‘an evil greater than death’ (οὑμοὶ τοῦ θανεῖν μεῖζον 
κακόν, HF 286).  
We may notice that Megara’s words resemble those expressed by the 
Maiden in the Children of Heracles, which I have discussed in section 5.2.9. Also, 
the circumstances leading the hero’s wife and daughter to face death willingly 
bear similarities: 1) both are pursued by an enemy, who 2) threatens to murder 
them, therefore 3) they seek refuge at a religious precinct. Most importantly, 
their motivation to accept death voluntarily is based on a strong awareness of 
their noble status deriving from Heracles’ glory. The only difference between 
the two women is the person they refer to as the possible mocker: in case of the 
hero’s daughter, these are the citizens of other Greek cities, who would 
disrespect the Heraclidae for their acts of cowardice; in Megara’s case, however, 
the dreaded laughter would come from the enemy Lycus and his men. 
It becomes, then, evident, that one’s death does not bring hostility to an 
end. On the contrary, once people are defined as enemies, their hostile 
relationship does not change and, as we may recognize from the words of 
Orestes or Megara, it even transcends the boundaries of existence. In short, the 
                                               
1081 Bond (1981) 135 n. 284. 
1082 As the daughter of Creon, the former legal ruler of Thebes, Megara is of royal descent. 
However, in her appeal she derives her nobility from the heroic deeds of her husband (οὑμὸς δ' 
ἀμαρτύρητος εὐκλεὴς πόσις, HF 290) and his father (σὲ μὲν δόκησις ἔλαβεν εὐκλεὴς δορός, 
HF 288). 
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laughter of an enemy, be it experienced, dreaded or even expressed in the 
future, will always reflect this once established hostility. 
5.2.10.3. Enslavement 
People may regard each other with hostility in those situations, in which 
one side imposes unwanted authority on the other. In the ancient world, such 
an oppressor usually gained and sustained his control over another by force. In 
the Iphigenia in Tauris, the fear of having one’s oppressor laugh at one, even 
after death, motivates Orestes not to reveal his identity to the savage Taurian 
priestess who is about to sacrifice him and his companion to the goddess 
Artemis. However, before fulfilling the ritual she interrogates him about his 
identity (IT 502-4): 
Ορ. 504 τὸ σῶμα θύσεις τοὐμόν, οὐχὶ τοὔνομα. 
Ιφ. 503 τί δὲ φθονεῖς τοῦτ'; ἦ φρονεῖς οὕτω μέγα; 
Ορ.  502 ἀνώνυμοι θανόντες οὐ γελώιμεθ' ἄν. 
Orestes: It’s my body you’ll be sacrificing, not my name. 
Iphigenia: But why do you grudge me this? Are you so proud? 
Orestes:  If I die unnamed I shall remain unmocked. 
In his refusal, we may recognize in Orestes an importance of maintaining one’s 
reputation even after death. At this point of the play, the Argive prince is 
unaware of the fact that he is speaking to his sister, Iphigenia, whose life has 
been spared in Aulis by the goddess Artemis and has since lived among the 
Taurians. In lines 502-4, it is apparent that the young man considers the 
inquisitive priestess to be nothing more but a barbarian with unfriendly 
intentions. To Orestes, therefore, their rapport is clearly antagonistic. Only by 
concealing his true identity may the Greek prince deprive one he regards a 
barbaric enemy of the possibility to mock his name after death.1083 Without any 
doubt, with the words οὐ γελώιμεθ' ἄν, ‘I will not be laughed at’, Orestes 
refers to the feared mockery from the Taurians, who were commonly known 
                                               
1083 For a discussion on the character of Orestes, see Czerwińska (2013) 297-310. 
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for their declared hostility and aggressiveness towards any foreigner who 
would arrive at their land.1084  
In the satyr drama Cyclops, enmity characterizes the rapport between the 
title one-eyed giant and the Chorus of satyrs. As we hear in the prologue, these 
traditional companions of Dionysus have been captured and enslaved by the 
Cyclops1085 (‘We were caught and are slaves in the house of one of them. They 
call the master we serve Polyphemus. And instead of Bacchic revels we tend 
the flocks of a godless Cyclops’1086, τούτων ἑνὸς ληφθέντες ἐσμὲν ἐν δόμοις / 
δοῦλοι· καλοῦσι δ’ αὐτὸν ὧι λατρεύομεν / Πολύφημον· ἀντὶ δ’ εὐίων 
βακχευμάτων / ποίμνας Κύκλωπος ἀνοσίου ποιμαίνομεν, Cyc. 23-6). The 
satyrs are unhappy with their lot, since they are forced to labour for the 
oppressor who has deprived them of the joyful life in the company of the god 
of wine (Cyc. 63-75). Later in the play, when Polyphemus seizes the astrayed 
Odysseus with his men and plans to eat them, the Chorus expresses its disgust 
with such cruel practice and yearns for a chance to abandon the Cyclops’ house 
(‘Let me be rid of this dwelling! / Let me be rid of this / godless †sacrifice† of 
victims, / †which† the Cyclops of Etna †conducts†, as he rejoices in / the meat 
from his guests for food’, χαιρέτω μὲν αὖλις ἅδε, / χαιρέτω δὲ θυμάτων / 
ἀποβώμιος †ἃν ἔχει θυσίαν† / Κύκλωψ Αἰτναῖος ξενικῶν / κρεῶν 
κεχαρμένος βορᾶι, Cyc. 363-7). Once the opportunity to escape appears with 
Odysseus presenting a plan of blinding the drunken Polyphemus, the satyrs 
                                               
1084 Cf. IT 403-406: ἔβασαν ἄμεικτον αἶαν, ἔνθα κούραι / δίαι τέγγει / βωμοὺς καὶ περικίονας 
/ ναοὺς αἷμα βρότειον; ‘[they] come to this unwelcoming land, where / for Zeus’s maiden 
daughter / altars and columned temples / are soakd with human blood’. For a discussion on the 
Taurians, see Cropp (2000) 47-50, esp. 49: ‘the Taurians… show no sign of commerce with other 
peoples, or the laws of hospitality, see strangers as victims to be haunted down for sacrifice, 
and mutilate human bodies’. 
1085 Silenus refers to the Cyclops as δεσπότης, ‘master, lord’ (Cyc. 34, 90, 163, and 267 with the 
diminutive δεσποτίσκε, ‘o little master’ ), whereas to himself and the satyrs as δοῦλοι, ‘slaves’ 
(Cyc. 24, 79). Zalewska-Jura (2006) 182 indicates Polyphemus as a slave owner, whose captives 
take care of his sheep and household, when he himself spends time on hunting. For a 
discussion on the tyrannical features of Polyphemus, see O’Sullivan (2005) 128-134. 
1086 Translation in O’Sullivan and Collard (2013) 77. Hereon, I adduce other quotes from the 
Cyclops from this edition. 
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agree without hesitation (‘Wow! Wow! I;m happy, we’re crazy about what 
you’ve come up with’, ἰοὺ ἰού· / γέγηθα μαινόμεσθα τοῖς εὑρήμασιν’, Cyc. 
464-5). Moreover, they wish to actively ‘take part in this bloodshed’ (Cyc. 471) 
and ‘smoke out – like a nest of wasps – the eye of the damned Cyclops’ (Cyc. 
474-5), however, in the end, their assistance comes down to merely urging 
Odysseus, while he punishes their detested master (Cyc. 656-62 ).1087 As we can 
see, the disposition of the enslaved satyrs towards Polyphemus is, noticeably, 
the opposite of amiability.1088 
Happy with their oppressor’s misfortune, the Chorus of satyrs taunt the 
blinded Cyclops just before abandoning him (Cyc. 663-88): 
Κυ.   ὤμοι, κατηνθρακώμεθ’ ὀφθαλμοῦ σέλας.  
Χο.   καλός γ’ ὁ παιάν· μέλπε μοι τόνδ’ αὖ, Κύκλωψ.  
Κυ.   ὤμοι μάλ’, ὡς ὑβρίσμεθ’, ὡς ὀλώλαμεν.  
ἀλλ’ οὔτι μὴ φύγητε τῆσδ’ ἔξω πέτρας  
   χαίροντες, οὐδὲν ὄντες· ἐν πύλαισι γὰρ  
   σταθεὶς φάραγγος τῆσδ’ ἐναρμόσω χέρας.  
Χο.  τί χρῆμ’ ἀυτεῖς, ὦ Κύκλωψ;  
Κυ.       ἀπωλόμην.  
Χο.  αἰσχρός γε φαίνηι.  
Κυ.     κἀπὶ τοῖσδέ γ’ ἄθλιος.  
Χο.  μεθύων κατέπεσες ἐς μέσους τοὺς ἄνθρακας;  
Κυ.  Οὖτίς μ’ ἀπώλεσ’.  
Χο.     οὐκ ἄρ’ οὐδείς <σ’> ἠδίκει.  
Κυ.  Οὖτίς με τυφλοῖ βλέφαρον.  
Χο.      οὐκ ἄρ’ εἶ τυφλός.  
Κυ.  πῶς φῂς σύ;  
Χο.    καὶ πῶς σ’ οὔτις ἂν θείη τυφλόν;  
Κυ.  σκώπτεις. ὁ δ’ Οὖτις ποῦ ‘στιν;  
Χο.      οὐδαμοῦ, Κύκλωψ.  
Κυ.  ὁ ξένος ἵν’ ὀρθῶς ἐκμάθηις μ’ ἀπώλεσεν,  
   ὁ μιαρός, ὅς μοι δοὺς τὸ πῶμα κατέκλυσεν.  
Χο.  δεινὸς γὰρ οἷνος καὶ παλαίεσθαι βαρύς.  
Κυ.  πρὸς θεῶν, πεφεύγασ’ ἢ μένουσ’ ἔσω δόμων;  
Χο.  οὗτοι σιωπῆι τὴν πέτραν ἐπήλυγα  
   λαβόντες ἑστήκασι. 
Κυ.     ποτέρας τῆς χέρος;  
Χο.  ἐν δεξιᾶι σου. 
Κυ.    ποῦ; 
Χο.     πρὸς αὐτῆι τῆι πέτραι.  
                                               
1087 On the cowardice of satyrs as a dramatic stock joke, cf. Seaford (1984) 191 n. 469-75. 
1088 O’Sullivan (2005) 146: ‘the chorus of satyrs look forward to the demise of Polyphemos’. 
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   ἔχεις;  
Κυ.  κακόν γε πρὸς κακῶι· τὸ κρανίον  
   παίσας κατέαγα.  
Χο.     καί σε διαφεύγουσί γε.  
Κυ.  οὐ τῆιδέ πηι, τῆιδ’ εἶπας; 
Χο.     οὔ· ταύτηι λέγω.  
Κυ.  πῆι γάρ; 
Χο.   περιάγου κεῖσε, πρὸς τἀριστερά.  
Κυ.  οἴμοι γελῶμαι· κερτομεῖτέ μ’ ἐν κακοῖς. 
Χο.  ἀλλ’ οὐκέτ’, ἀλλὰ πρόσθεν οὗτός ἐστι σοῦ. 
Polyphemus shouts from within. 
Cyclops: Ah! Ah! The light of my eye has been burnt to charcoal! 
Chorus: A beautiful song of triumph! Sing it for me again, Cyclops. 
Polyphemus comes to the mouth of the cave. 
Cyclops: Ah! Ah! Look how I’ve been assaulted! How I’ve been 
destroyed! But you will never escape from this cave without 
paying, you nonentities! Because I’m going to stand in the 
cleft’s opening here and block it with my hands. 
Chorus:  Why are you shouting, Cyclops? 
Cyclops:       I am destroyed! 
Chorus: Well, yes, you do look ugly. 
Cyclops:     And I’m in a pitiful state on 
top of all this. 
Chorus: Did you stumble into the middle of the coals while you were 
drunk? 
Cyclops: Nobody has destroyed me. 
Chorus:     So no one has wronged you. 
Cyclops: Nobody has blinded my eye. 
Chorus:     So you are not blind. 
Cyclops: How do you mean? 
Chorus:         And how could nobody make you blind? 
Cyclops: You are laughing at me. But Nobody, where is he? 
Chorus:      Nowhere, Cyclops. 
Cyclops: The stranger destroyed me – so you may understand correctly 
– that bastard who gave me the drink and drowned me in it. 
Chorus: Yes, for wine is powerful and hard to wrestle with. 
Cyclops: By the gods, have they fled or are they staying in the cave? 
Chorus: They’re standing here in silence occupying an overhanging 
rock. 
Cyclops:  On which side of me? 
Chorus: On your right. 
Cyclops:   Where? 
Chorus:    Just near the rock itself.  
  Have you got them? 
The Cyclops hits his head on the rock. 
Cyclops: I’ve got worse on worse! Now that I’ve banished my skull and 
I’m broken. 
Chorus:             Yes – and now they’re getting away from you. 
Cyclops: Did you say, here somewhere, here? 
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Chorus:               No. I said, right here. 
Cyclops: Where exactly? 
Chorus:   Turn around that way, to your left. 
Cyclops: Ah! I am being laughed at! You’re taunting me in my misery. 
Chorus: But not any more. Anyway, here he is in front of you. 
In this passage, we may observe how the Chorus dispenses mockery at their 
vanquished oppressor. They rejoice at his painful cries, considering them to be 
‘a song of triumph’ (παιάν, Cyc. 664), then, joke at his addressing Odysseus as 
‘Nobody’(Cyc. 672-5) and, finally, misguide him round the cave entrance (Cyc. 
682-6).1089 Polyphemus complains at the satyrs’ derisive mistreatment of him, as 
we may discern from his references to their behaviour with the words: 
σκώπτεις, ‘you are making fun’1090 (Cyc. 675), κερτομεῖτέ μ, ‘you (plural) are 
sneering at me’ (Cyc. 687), and γελῶμαι, ‘I am laughed at’1091 (Cyc. 687). Here, 
we may notice that with the latter, preceded with the tragic interjection οἴμοι, 
the Cyclops signals his awareness of being the object of the Chorus’ hostile 
laughter.1092 Without any doubt, Polyphemus himself gave enough reason for 
receiving such an unfriendly reaction from the Chorus, whom he enslaved, 
abused and, most importantly, deprived of the drinking of wine. Thus, just 
before sailing off with Odysseus, the satyrs take the last opportunity to express 
their long conceiled enmity and laugh at their former master. Indeed, he laughs 
best, who laughs last. 
                                               
1089 On the slapstick comicality of the scene, see Zalewska-Jura (2006) 206, 246-7. 
1090 LSJ explains the verb σκώπτω with ‘mock, jeer, scoff at’. In Cyc. 675, the Cyclops uses the 
verb in reference to the scornful quality of the Chorus’ joking and play on the word οὖτίς. For 
similar responses beginning with the reproof σκώπτεις in the second person singular, cf. the 
Old Woman’s answer to Chremylus’ derisive implication of her drinking in Ar. Pl. 973: ‘You’re 
making fun of me (σκώπτεις), but I am all banged up, poor woman!’, translation in Henderson 
(2002) 563; the answer of Sostratus to his gofer’s ridiculous question of planning to fall in love 
once leaving the house, in Men. Dysc. 54: ‘You’re making fun of me, Chaireas, for I am in a bad 
shape’, σκώπτεις· ἐγὼ δὲ, Χαιρέα, κακῶς ἔχω (my translation).  
1091 The other dramatic instances of γελῶμαι are the examples of Aes. Eum. 789 and 819 (cf. 
chapter III, section 3.2.4.), as well as Soph. Ant. 839 (cf. chapter IV, section 4.2.4.) 
1092 Cf. Zalewska-Jura (2006) 191;  O’Sullivan and Collard (2013) 222 n. 687: ‘the laughter of one’s 
enemies was a serious concern for heroic figures and was to be avoided virtually at all costs... 
Here such laughter contributes in no small way to Polyphemus’ torment’. For the paratragic 
effect of οἴμοι, see Seaford (1984) 223 n. 687. 
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5.2.10.4. Power struggle 
Hostility may occur between two sides fighting for power. At times, such 
competition may accept even violent form. In the Bacchae, Pentheus’ struggle 
for maintaining his power and violent resistance to the newly introduced cult 
of Dionysus is clear from the beginning of the play. Already in the prologue, 
the god himself recognizes the Theban king’s antagonism towards him (‘[i.e. 
he] fights against deity in his treatment of my cult, and rejects me from 
libations and has no concern for me nowhere in his prayers’, θεομαχεῖ τὰ κατ' 
ἐμὲ καὶ σπονδῶν ἄπο / ὠθεῖ μ' ἐν εὐχαῖς τ' οὐδαμοῦ μνείαν ἔχει, Ba. 45-6).1093 
Also, it is hinted by Teiresias who speaks of the Thebans lacking sense in 
resisting the new god (μόνοι γὰρ εὖ φρονοῦμεν, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι κακῶς, Ba. 196).1094 
When the ruler of Thebes finally enters (Ba. 215ff.), he explicitly expresses his 
contempt towards the new god and his cult: he considers the introduced rites 
as spreading ‘new evils in the city’ (νεοχμὰ τήνδ' ἀνὰ πτόλιν κακά, Ba. 216), 
he decides to stop the Theban women from honouring the god (‘I will fasten 
then in iron nets and soon put an end to their pernicious bacchic revelry’, καί 
σφας σιδηραῖς ἁρμόσας ἐν ἄρκυσιν / παύσω κακούργου τῆσδε βακχείας 
τάχα, Ba. 231-2), he threatens to seize a stranger follower of Dionysus (‘But if I 
capture him within this land, I will stop him beating his thyrsus and tossing his 
hair, cutting his neck from his body’, εἰ δ' αὐτὸν εἴσω τῆσδε λήψομαι χθονός, / 
παύσω κτυποῦντα θύρσον ἀνασείοντά τε / κόμας, τράχηλον σώματος χωρὶς 
τεμών, Ba. 239-41), and he regards the origins of the god as a lie (‘He [i.e. the 
Stranger] says that Dionysus is a god, he (says that D.) was once sewn in the 
thigh of Zeus, Dionysus, who was with his mother burnt up by the flame of the 
thunderbolt, because she lied about sex with him’, ἐκεῖνος εἶναί φησι 
Διόνυσον θεόν / ἐκεῖνος ἐν μηρῶι ποτ' ἐρράφθαι Διός· / ὃς ἐκπυροῦται 
                                               
1093 Unless stated otherwise, I adduce the English quotes of the Bacchae from the translation in 
Seaford (1996). 
1094 Cf. Seaford (1996) 169 n. 195-6: ‘The thought is of male members of the polis’. This includes 
the city’s ruler, too. 
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λαμπάσιν κεραυνίαις / σὺν μητρί, Δίους ὅτι γάμους ἐψεύσατο, Ba. 242-5). In 
his view, all these things are outrageous, hence, should be brought to an end, 
even by force (‘Are these things not terrible and deserving of strangling, 
performing these outrages, whoever the stranger is?’, ταῦτ' οὐχὶ δεινὰ 
κἀγχόνης ἔστ' ἄξια / ὕβρεις ὑβρίζειν, ὅστις ἔστιν ὁ ξένος; Ba. 247-8). From his 
very first speech (Ba. 215-62) it becomes evident that Pentheus establishes 
himself as an enemy of Dionysus.1095 
The language of laughter is used to denote the king’s hostility.1096 In 
particular, Pentheus first directs his anger at the imposition of the new god at 
the Bacchic worshippers. As we have seen in my analysis of the passage Ba. 
248-54, Pentheus disdainfully treats Cadmus and derisively refers to his Bacchic 
appearance as ‘a big laugh’ (πολὺς γέλως).1097 What is more, in the same speech 
he also treats with contempt the diviner Teiresias, whom he blames for 
‘introducing pernicious initiation rituals’ (τελετὰς πονηρὰς εἰσάγων, Ba. 260). 
In effect, the blind seer responds to Pentheus’accusations in a set of 60 lines (Ba. 
266-327), attempting to refute the erroneous opinions about Dionysus and his 
cult (‘you have a fluent tongue as if possessed of understanding, yet in your 
words there is no sense’, σὺ δ' εὔτροχον μὲν γλῶσσαν ὡς φρονῶν ἔχεις, / ἐν 
τοῖς λόγοισι δ' οὐκ ἔνεισί σοι φρένες, Ba. 268-9).1098 Firstly, Teiresias refers to 
the king’s denial of the divine powers of Dionysus (Ba. 272-4) 
Τε. οὗτος δ᾽ ὁ δαίμων ὁ νέος, ὃν σὺ διαγελᾷς,  
οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην μέγεθος ἐξειπεῖν ὅσος  
καθ᾽ Ἑλλάδ᾽ ἔσται. 
Teiresias:  This new divinity you are laughing to scorn – I could not 
fully express how great he will be in Greece.1099 
                                               
1095 Czerwińska (1999) 207. 
1096 For the thematisation of laughter in the Bacchae, see Halliwell (2008) 133-9. 
1097 See section 5.2.5.2. above.  
1098 Seaford (1996) 174 n. 266-327 views the scene of Teiresias responding to Pentheus’ 
accusations against the god as resembling an agon. Cf. Lloyd (1992) 10, who finds this 
resemblance superficial. 
1099 Translation in Kovacs (2002b) 35. 
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He explains the god’s greatness, emphasizing his benevolence towards humans 
alongside the goddess Demeter (Ba. 276-85). Next, the seer answers Pentheus’ 
disbelief in the divine birth of Dionysus (Ba. 286-7):1100 
Τε. καὶ καταγελᾷς νιν, ὡς ἐνερράφη Διὸς  
μηρῷ; διδάξω σ᾽ ὡς καλῶς ἔχει τόδε. 
Teiresias:  Another point: you laugh at him and the story of his being 
sewn into Zeus’ thigh? I will teach you how subtle this really 
is.1101 
After a thorough clarification on the matter (Ba. 288-97), Teiresias explains the 
god’s prophetic province in madness (Ba. 298-305) and urges the king to accept 
the new deity in Thebes (Ba. 312-13). As we may notice, in his response, the 
diviner uses twice words denoting Pentheus’ outright mockery: διαγελᾷς, ‘you 
laugh to scorn’ (Ba. 272) and καταγελᾷς, ‘you laugh at’ (Ba. 286). With these 
two references to laughter, Teiresias alludes to Pentheus’ non-favourable 
disposition towards Dionysus.1102 The seer, then, concludes his speech by 
pointing to the fact that everyone in power, both gods and men, like to be 
revered and treated with respect (Ba. 319-5): 
Τε.  ὁρᾶις; σὺ χαίρεις, ὅταν ἐφεστῶσιν πύλαις  
πολλοί, τὸ Πενθέως δ' ὄνομα μεγαλύνηι πόλις·  
κἀκεῖνος, οἶμαι, τέρπεται τιμώμενος. 
ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν καὶ Κάδμος, ὃν σὺ διαγελᾷς,  
κισσῷ τ᾽ ἐρεψόμεσθα καὶ χορεύσομεν,  
πολιὰ ξυνωρίς, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως χορευτέον,  
κοὐ θεομαχήσω σῶν λόγων πεισθεὶς ὕπο. 
μαίνηι γὰρ ὡς ἄλγιστα, κοὔτε φαρμάκοις  
ἄκη λάβοις ἂν οὔτ' ἄνευ τούτων νόσου.  
Teiresias:  Do you see? You rejoice, when a throng stands at the gates, 
and the polis magnifies the name of Pentheus. He too, I think, 
takes pleasure in being honoured. I then, and Kadmos, whom 
you mock, will cover our heads with ivy and will dance, and I 
will not be persuaded by your words to fight against the god. 
For you are behaving madly in the most painful way, and 
would get a cure for your illness neither with drugs nor 
without them. 
                                               
1100 Czerwińska (1999) 208 explains this as a sign of Pentheus’ extreme rationality.  
1101 Translation in Kirk (1979) 51. 
1102 Halliwell (2008) 134. 
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After Teiresias, also Cadmus tries to convince his grandson in recognizing the 
god in Dionysus and giving him praise (‘Join us and give honour to the god’ 
μεθ' ἡμῶν τῶι θεῶι τιμὴν δίδου, Ba. 342). The young man, however, 
vehemently rejects the offer, referring to the old men’s piety as stupidity 
(μωρίαν τὴν σὴν, Ba. 344) and folly (τῆς σῆς <δ'> ἀνοίας, Ba. 345).  
From the discussion above it becomes apparent that the scene in which 
Pentheus meets the two old men exposes the young king’s antagonism towards 
the new god. Noticeably, his derision of Cadmus and contempt at Teiresias 
origins from the men’s association with Dionysus. Hence, by expressing his 
disdain at the senile Bacchic revelers, Pentheus simultaneously manifests his 
antipathy for the god they worship.1103 In this respect, the four references to 
laughter in this scene (Ba. 250; 272; 286; 322) designate primarily Pentheus’ 
hostility. 
Dionysus, as I have mentioned above, is fully aware of the king’s 
arrogance towards him, yet, does not set himself as Pentheus’ enemy at once. In 
fact, this only happens when the young ruler becomes determined in carrying 
out a military expedition against the Bacchants, despite the warnings from the 
god himself (Ba. 809-11):  
Πε.  ἐκφέρετέ μοι δεῦρ' ὅπλα, σὺ δὲ παῦσαι λέγων. 
Δι.   ἆ·  
βούληι σφ' ἐν ὄρεσι συγκαθημένας ἰδεῖν;  
Pentheus: Servants, my armor from the palace! And you, shut your 
mouth! 
Dionysus: (with imperious authority, countermanding Pentheus’ orders) Stop! 
Do you want to see them sitting together on the 
mountains?1104 
According to Burnett, the ἆ spoken by Dionysus in line 810 marks a turning 
point in his treatment of Pentheus; with this exclamation the god ceases 
completely from his previous attempts at convincing the human to himself and 
                                               
1103 Segal (1982) 199; also Donzelli (2006) 4. 
1104 Translation in Kovacs (2002b) 89. 
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focuses on punishing the man for his immutable hostility.1105 Dionysus, then, 
uses his supernatural powers to exercise his vengeance. In particular, he casts a 
spell on Pentheus, with which he alters the king’s plans towards the Bacchants 
by persuading him to spy on the women on Mount Citaeron. In order to do so 
and not get caught, the god convinces the man to adorn the guise of a female 
Bacchic worshiper. However, as Dionysus explains to the Chorus, the king’s 
disguise is to serve another purpose, as well (Ba. 854-6): 
Δι. χρῄζω δέ νιν γέλωτα Θηβαίοις ὀφλεῖν  
γυναικόμορφον ἀγόμενον δι᾽ ἄστεως 
ἐκ τῶν ἀπειλῶν τῶν πρίν, αἷσι δεινὸς ἦν. 
Dionysus:  I desire him to incur laughter from the Thebans as he is led 
through the town in the form of a woman after the earlier 
threat with which he was so frightening. 
In this passage, we may notice that an important part of the god’s revenge is 
having his enemy suffer from the mockery of the citizens of Thebes (γέλωτα 
Θηβαίοις ὀφλεῖν, Ba. 854). Dionysus, aware of the destructive power of 
ridicule, intends to publically humiliate Pentheus, by having his subjects see 
him in female garments.1106 Such act, as the king mentions earlier himself, is 
considered to be shameful and may inflict harm on his honour (Ba. 828, 840-
2).1107 Although Dionysus plans to use derisive laughter in retaliation, however, 
we do not hear more about this.1108 Nevertheless, we may see that laughter may 
accept a punitive role, whilst hostility is concerned. 
                                               
1105 Burnett (1970) 23: ‘At this point, and only at this point, Pentheus becomes an object not of 
beneficence but of justice and Dionysus begins to function as an agent of punishment’. 
Nordgren (2012) 107 suggests that the interjection ἆ ‘could be an expression of him [i.e. 
Dionysus] coming to think of something, and using this to turn Pentheus’ attention to 
something other than he had planned’; cf. also Dodds (1960) 175 n. 810-12. 
1106 Cf. Pentheus initial shame at the thought of dressing up as a woman in Ba. 821-42. See also 
the discussion on his fear of incurring the ridicule of the Bacchants in such clothing ( Ba. 842) in 
section 5.2.5.4 below. 
1107 I discuss this matter in more detail in section 5.2.5.4. below. 
1108 Cf. Seaford (1996) 216 n. 854-5. 
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Pentheus’ fate is sealed when the god leads him dressed up in Bacchic 
attire to Mount Citaeron. As we hear from the Messenger’s report, Dionysus 
himself exposed the spy to the Bacchants (Ba. 1079-81): 
Αγ.     Ὦ νεάνιδες,  
ἄγω τὸν ὑμᾶς κἀμὲ τἀμά τ' ὄργια  
γέλων τιθέμενον· ἀλλὰ τιμωρεῖσθέ νιν. 
Messenger: “Young women, I bring you the man who is mocking you, 
me, and my rites: punish him!”1109 
Noticeably, the reason for punishing Pentheus is him being the one who dared 
to dispense mockery (γέλων τιθέμενον, Ba. 1081) at the god, his worshipers 
and his cult. What is more, we may recognize that with this reference to 
laughter Dionysus regards all the hostile words and actions he and his 
followers received from the king, including denial, rejection and constant 
aggression, which almost ended with physical violence, had the god not 
interfered. In this respect, we may recognize that γέλως in 1081 evokes the idea 
of hostility, which to the god of wine is considered to be a religious offence, or, 
in other words an insolence. In short, Dionysus perceives Pentheus’ laughter as 
ὕβρις.1110  
From the very beginning of the play, it is apparent that the relationship 
between Pentheus and Dionysus is at odds. As said before, the king of Thebes 
opposes the introduction of the new cult, and for this, he is regarded as ‘one 
who fights against the god’.1111 Only when his resistance almost leads to the 
bloodshed of the Bacchic followers, does the new god decide to interfere. From 
this moment, we may observe that once Dionysus acts in response to Pentheus’ 
antagonism, he defines himself as the king’s opponent. Euripides, hence, 
employs the language of laughter, in order to emphasize the hostility between 
                                               
1109 Translation in Kovacs (2002) 119. 
1110 On hybris in the Bacchae, see Fisher (1992) 443-51. 
1111 Denoted by the verb θεομαχέω ‘fight against the god’ used only in relation to Pentheus by 
three different characters: Dionysus (Ba. 45), Teiresias (Ba. 325) and Agave (Ba. 1255). Cf. also 
the god’s remark in Ba. 635-6: ‘though a man he dared to fight against the god’, πρὸς θεὸν γὰρ 
ὢν ἀνὴρ / ἐς μάχην ἐλθεῖν ἐτόλμησ'. Translation in Kovacs (2002b) 71. 
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the two characters, of which one imposes his power onto the other to the 
latter’s dismay.1112 However, the Bacchae contains also some references to hostile 
laughter connected with the feeling of glee over a vanquished foe. Let us, 
hence, turn our attention to those examples which refer to triumphant laughter. 
5.2.11. Triumph 
A laugh of triumph may manifest one’s exultation resulting from 
victory. In the Bacchae, I have found two references to laughter in connection 
with the idea of triumph over the defeat of an enemy; these are the instances in 
Ba. 842 and Ba. 1012. Before I proceed with the examination of these two 
examples, it is necessary to first elucidate the rapport between Pentheus and 
the Bacchants. 
From the very beginning of the play, the hostility of the king of Thebes 
towards the female worshipers of Dionysus is evident. In particular, the 
opening lines of his first speech (Ba. 215ff.) express his anger with the Theban 
women taking part in the Bacchic rites (Ba. 217-25), his attepmts to hunt them 
down (Ba. 226-7) as well as his intentions of imprisoning all free Bacchants (Ba. 
229-32). Pentheus, hence, has used force before and plans to use it again on the 
women raving in on Mount Citaeron. Upon hearing the news about two 
failures in pacifying the Bacchae (Ba. 443-8; 677-774), his fury and aggression 
towards them increases. In his view, the women’s behaviour is an outrage 
(ὕβρισμα βακχῶν, Ba. 779) and a great blemish to the Greeks (ψόγος ἐς 
Ἕλληνας μέγας, Ba. 779), hence should be put to a definite end, even if it 
requires bloodshed (‘I will sacrifice, indeed, stirring up much female slaughter, 
as they are worthy of it, in the folds of Kithairon’, θύσω, φόνον γε θῆλυν, 
ὥσπερ ἄξιαι, / πολὺν ταράξας ἐν Κιθαιρῶνος πτυχαῖς, Ba. 796-7). Before 
Dionysus finally interfers with his divine powers, the ruler of Thebes orders 
                                               
1112 Kott (1999) 192 refers to this as the clash of mystical arrogance (‘arogancja mistycyzmu)  
with that of rationality (‘arogancja racjonalności’). Similarly, Czerwińska (1999) 252. 
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military action against the Bacchants (‘Order all the shieldbearers and the riders 
of swift-footed horses to muster, and those who brandish light shields and 
pluck with hand the strings of bows, as we shall make war on the maenads’, 
κέλευε πάντας ἀσπιδηφόρους / ἵππων τ' ἀπαντᾶν ταχυπόδων ἐπεμβάτας / 
πέλτας θ' ὅσοι πάλλουσι καὶ τόξων χερὶ / ψάλλουσι νευράς, ὡς 
ἐπιστρατεύσομεν / βάκχαισιν·, Ba. 781-5). In light of his outward contempt, 
aggression and determination to use physical violence, it is obvious that the 
Theban king not only considers himself an enemy of the Bacchae, but also as 
being at war with them.1113 
The first example of triumphant laughter in this tragedy may be traced 
in Ba. 842 only if we accept the idea of an open conflict between Pentheus and 
the Bacchae. Dionysus has just begun to use his powers in order to take 
vengeance on the impious man (Ba. 810ff.). Falling under the god’s spell, the 
Theban king expresses a sudden desire to see the Bacchic revels on Mount 
Citaeron (Ba. 812). Once he decides to spy on the women, Dionysus points to 
the fact of him needing to sneak in the guise of a Bacchant (Ba. 821-23). At first, 
Pentheus is reluctant to the idea, considering it shameful for a man to dress up 
in female clothing (Ba. 828), however, gradually, he is persuaded by the god to 
do so (Ba. 838). Before entering the house so to adorn the Bacchic attire, 
Pentheus expresses his concern about being seen in such clothing by the 
citizens of Thebes (Ba. 840-2): 
Πε.   καὶ πῶς δι' ἄστεως εἶμι Καδμείους λαθών;  
Δι.   ὁδοὺς ἐρήμους ἴμεν· ἐγὼ δ' ἡγήσομαι.  
Πε.  πᾶν κρεῖσσον ὥστε μὴ 'γγελᾶν βάκχας ἐμοί. 
Pentheus: And how can I go through the town without being noticed by 
the Kadmeians? 
Dionysus: We shall go through deserted streets; and I will lead you. 
Pentheus: Anything is better than that the bacchants laugh (in triumph) 
over me.  
                                               
1113 Pentheus emphasizes this with the words ἐπιστρατεύσομεν βάκχαισιν, ‘we will make war 
with the Bacchants’ in Ba. 784-5. 
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As we can see, in line 842, the king transfers, from one moment to another, his 
fear of incurring laughter at his appearance from the Thebans onto the 
Bacchants. Here, he uses the term ἐγγελάω, ‘laugh at’, which primary sense 
regards mockery.1114 However, this sudden switch of the feared subject of 
laughter has had scholars dispute over the meaning of line 842, since it appears 
as an illogical response in the dialogue.1115 In his 1987 article, entitled ‘Whose 
laughter does Pentheus fear? (Eur. Ba. 842)’, Neuburg argues against the 
interpretation of the king’s anxiety of being seen in female garments by the 
Bacchants and, hence, attract their mockery. In his view, such understanding 
lacks sense, for, as Dionysus mentioned in Ba. 823, should the disguise fail and 
have Pentheus’ identity be discovered, then the maenads would kill him.1116 
Neuburg, thus, proposes the emendated πᾶν κρεῖσσον ὥστε μὴ γελᾶν 
βάκχην ἐμέ, which alters the meaning of the line into ‘anything but that 
[someone] should laugh at me for being a Bacchant’.1117 In effect of these 
changes, the sense of line 842 would follow, albeit indirectly, the idea of line 
840, since Pentheus is refering to himself in female appearance, which could 
attract public ridicule (with the Thebans implied). Neuburg’s proposition, 
however, has been criticized by Stevens in his 1988 article under the same title, 
in which the scholar proves no need for an emendation in the disputed line. 
Accordingly, Stevens also objects to the interpretation of Pentheus fearing the 
Bacchants’ mockery at his female appearance, therefore suggests the meaning 
‘triumph over’ for ἐγγελάω instead of ‘laugh at’.1118 To support his argument, 
the scholar adduces two passages indicating the king’s fury at the maenads (Ba. 
785-6; 803), whose wild conduct regarded as an ‘outrage’ (ὕβρισμα, Ba. 779) 
                                               
1114 Cf. chapter II, section 2.1.1.6. 
1115 Dodds (1960) 179 n. 842. This obscurity is visible in the translations of Way (1912b) 73: 
‘Better were anything than Bacchants’ mock!’; Kirk (1979) 50: ‘Anything is preferable to the 
bacchants mocking at me’; Kovacs (2002b) 93: ‘Well, any course is better than having the 
bacchants treat me with contempt’.  
1116 Neuburg (1987) 228. 
1117 Ibid. 229. 
1118 Stevens (1988) 246. 
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provokes his open hostilities.1119 As a result, Stevens proposes such 
understanding of Pentheus’ thinking in line 842: ‘I still find repugnant the idea 
of dressing as a woman, but anything would be better than allowing the 
Bacchants to triumph over me, and a reconnaissance in disguise could be the 
first move against them’.1120 As we can see, this interpretation corresponds to 
my discussion on the king’s notion of being at war with the female worshippers 
of Dionysus. We may, therefore, agree with Stevens on the matter that the term 
ἐγγελάω appears in relation to this conflict. Nevertheless, his suggestion of the 
meaning ‘triumph over’ for the verb excludes from its semantics the original 
idea of laughter.1121 While the feeling of triumph may be expressed by laughter, 
nevertheless, it need not always be. In Ba. 842, however, Pentheus evokes, 
primarily, the image of the Bacchants laughing, and it is this laughter he 
recognizes to be directed against him. In the context of his open conflict with 
the maenads, we may notice that he fears not his defeat, but the possibility of 
his enemies laughing with glee at him. In this respect, his anxiety of the 
Bacchae in 842 corresponds to that of the Thebans in 840, for both lines reveal 
the king’s fear of becoming the object of others’ laughter. As we can see, 
Pentheus shares the characteristics of the ‘shame-culture’, which considers the 
act of being ‘laughed at’ to be the most intolerable of insults.1122 Therefore, we 
may agree that the instance of ἐγγελάω in Ba. 840 denotes not triumph, but 
triumphant laughter the king imagines to incur from the Bacchants.1123 
Regarding the Bacchae’s disposition towards Pentheus, it is not, at first, 
distinctly outlined. In the first part of the play (Ba. 1-862), we may observe that 
the Chorus recognizes Pentheus’ animosity towards it but does not seem to 
reflect it. Firstly, the Bacchants are appalled with the king’s verbal attack at 
                                               
1119 Stevens (1988) 246. 
1120 Ibid. 247. 
1121 Cf. Halliwell (2008) 138 n. 89. 
1122 Segal (1982) 199. Similarly Seaford (1996) 215 n. 842. 
1123 Same meaning reflected in the translation of Gibbons quoted in Gibbons and Segal (2001) 75: 
‘Anything’s better than the Bakkhai laughing that they’ve won’. 
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their god and them, considering it to be an act of ‘impiety’ (τῆς δυσσεβείας, Ba. 
263) and ‘impure insolence’ (οὐχ ὁσίαν / ὕβριν, Ba. 374-5), however, do not 
reciprocate it. Next, they invoke Dionysus to shorten Pentheus’ aggressive 
plans towards them (Ba. 537-55), yet do not ask for retaliation. Nonetheless, we 
may notice a significant alteration of tone in the Chorus’ speech after Dionysus 
changes his strategy towards the Theban king in line 810. In the choral ode of 
the third stasimon, the Bacchae speak of divine punishment awaiting those who 
insult the gods (Ba. 882-96): 
Χο.   ὁρμᾶται μόλις, ἀλλ' ὅμως  
πιστόν <τι> τὸ θεῖον  
σθένος· ἀπευθύνει δὲ βροτῶν  
τούς τ' ἀγνωμοσύναν τιμῶν- 
τας καὶ μὴ τὰ θεῶν αὔξον- 
τας σὺν μαινομέναι δόξαι.  
κρυπτεύουσι δὲ ποικίλως  
δαρὸν χρόνου πόδα καὶ  
θηρῶσιν τὸν ἄσεπτον· οὐ  
γὰρ κρεῖσσόν ποτε τῶν νόμων  
γιγνώσκειν χρὴ καὶ μελετᾶν.  
κούφα γὰρ δαπάνα νομί- 
ζειν ἰσχὺν τόδ' ἔχειν,  
ὅτι ποτ' ἄρα τὸ δαιμόνιον,  
τό τ' ἐν χρόνωι μακρῶι νόμιμον  
ἀεὶ φύσει τε πεφυκός. 
Chorus: Slowly does heaven move, but still 
  its strength is <something> sure: 
  it brings to desctruction those mortals 
  who honor folly 
  and in the mad imagination of their hearts 
  do not reverence the gods. 
  The gods craftily conceal 
  the unhastening tread of time, 
  and they hunt down the impious man. 
  Never should a man’s thought and practice 
  rise above the laws. 
  For it costs but little to believe 
  that these have sovereign power: 
  the might of heaven, whatever it be, 
  and what through long ages has ever been lawful 
  and upheld by nature.1124  
                                               
1124 Translation in Kovacs (2002b) 99. 
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The Chorus continues the theme of hunting down impious men in their next 
choral ode in the fourth stasimon. Here, however, they directly express their 
desire for vengeance on Pentheus (Ba. 992-96, repeated verbatim in 1011-16): 
Χο.  ἴτω δίκα φανερός, ἴτω  
ξιφηφόρος φονεύου- 
σα λαιμῶν διαμπὰξ  
τὸν ἄθεον ἄνομον ἄδικον Ἐχίονος  
γόνον γηγενῆ·  
Chorus:  Let justice go manifest, let her carrying a sword slaughtering 
right through the throat the godless, lawless, unjust earth-
born offspring of Echion. 
As we can see, only with their god’s direct interference in Pentheus’ military 
actions do the Bacchants dare to express their outward hostility towards their 
oppressor.  
It is in the fourth choral ode that we find the second instance of 
triumphant laughter in the Bacchae, which is, in my opinion, discernable in the 
reference to Dionysus’ ‘laughing face’ (Ba. 1021). At one point in their ode of 
vengeance sung in the fourth stasimon, the Chorus of Bacchants summons 
Dionysus to hunt down their oppressor Pentheus (Ba. 1017-23): 
Χο. φάνηθι ταῦρος ἢ πολύκρανος ἰδεῖν  
δράκων ἢ πυριφλέγων  
ὁρᾶσθαι λέων. 
ἴθ᾽, ὦ Βάκχε, θὴρ ἀγρευτᾶι βακχᾶν 
γελῶντι προσώπῳ περίβαλε βρόχον  
θανάσιμον ὑπ᾽ ἀγέλαν πεσόν- 
τι τὰν μαινάδων. 
Chorus:  Appear as a bull or a many-headed snake (for us) to see or a 
fire-blazing lion to behold. Go, o Bacchus, beast, with 
laughing face throw around the hunter of bacchants the 
deadly noose as he falls under the herd of maenads. 
As discussed in section 5.2.2. above, the reference to laughter in line 1021 may 
denote not only how the face of the beast-Dionysus looks, but what it expresses. 
Since the Bacchants expect their god to punish Pentheus for his aggression 
towards them, they may evoke the image of the god coming ‘with a laughing 
face’ in order to denote their feeling of anticipated triumph over the previously 
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aggressive ‘hunter of bacchants’ (ἀγρευτᾶι βακχᾶν, Ba. 1020). In chapter IV, 
we have seen a similar example in the Sophoclean Electra, in which the title 
character promises her brother to conceal ‘her laughter on the face’ (Soph. El. 
1310). As I have argued, Electra’s γέλως expresses her anticipated joy in 
vanquishing her detested mother.1125 Similarly in the case of the Bacchae, for the 
Chorus imagines its god as also sharing their anticipated joy at the forthcoming 
destruction of the ruler of Thebes. With this interpretation, the expression 
γελῶντι προσώπῳ refers simultaneously to Dionysus’, but also the Chorus’ 
anticipation of the forthcoming punishment of the Theban king, who was 
previously aggressive towards them. As we see further in the play, the Bacchae 
rejoice at the news of Pentheus’ death (‘I cry in ecstasy, a stranger, with 
barbarian songs. For no longer do I cower under fear of chains’, εὐάζω ξένα 
μέλεσι βαρβάροις· / οὐκέτι γὰρ δεσμῶν ὑπὸ φόβωι πτήσσω, Ba. 1034-5). 
Therefore, it is apparent that the image of the god’s laughing face in 1021 
anticipates the Bacchants’ triumph over their enemy. 
5.2.12. The concept of shining  
A single reference to laughter associated with the concept of brightness 
is found in the fourth episode of the Trojan Women. The Greeks have murdered 
Astyanax, Hector’s son, by hurling him from the city walls of Troy to his death. 
After the execution, the child’s body is brought to the Trojan Women for burial 
(Tr. 1118). His grandmother, then, laments over the little corpse placed on his 
father’s bronze shield. In a set of fifty lines (Tr. 1156-1206), Hecuba delivers a 
speech, personal in tone, in which she intermingles memories about the child’s 
past with her observations on his present lifeless body (Tr. 1173-77):  
Εκ.   δύστηνε, κρατὸς ὥς σ’ ἔκειρεν ἀθλίως 
τείχη πατρῶια, Λοξίου πυργώματα, 
ὃν πόλλ’ ἐκήπευσ’ ἡ τεκοῦσα βόστρυχον 
                                               
1125 Cf. chapter IV, section 4.2.2.3. 
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φιλήμασιν τ’ ἔδωκεν ἔνθεν ἐκγελᾷ  
ὀστέων ῥαγέντων φόνος, ἵν’ αἰσχρὰ μὴ στέγω. 
Hecuba:  How brutally, poor boy, your father’s walls, the towers built 
by Apollo, hale shorn those curls on your head which your 
mother so often tended and kissed, and where the blood now 
laughs out between the broken bones. I will not hide the 
brutality of it. 
The queen’s reminiscence about Astyanax’s features whilst alive clashes with 
her description of his disfigured corpse. In the cited passage, Hecuba 
juxtaposes two images of the boy regarding the past and present conditions of 
his head (literally ‘curl’, βόστρυχος); before, it was the tender object of 
maternal affection (ἐκήπευσ’ ἡ τεκοῦσα βόστρυχον / φιλήμασιν τ’ ἔδωκεν, Tr. 
1175-6), but now it lies on his father’s shield as evidence of shameless murder 
(‘I will not hide the brutality of it’, ἵν’ αἰσχρὰ μὴ στέγω, Tr. 1177). It is at this 
point that Hecuba applies the language of laughter to describe the poor state of 
her grandson’s crushed head ‘where the blood now laughs out between broken 
bones’ (ἔνθεν ἐκγελᾷ / ὀστέων ῥαγέντων φόνος, Tr. 1176-7). Here, the verb of 
this sentence is ἐκγελάω ‘burst out laughing’, a rare compound that usually 
implies the vocalization of laughter.1126 Also, without any doubt, the subject to 
this verb is the noun φόνος which can mean ‘murder’, ‘slaughter’, ‘gore’ or 
‘blood’.1127 Since the subject of a typically human action is a non-animated 
object, we may already recognize that the lexeme ἐκγελάω is used in 
metaphorical manner.  
Scholars, generally, accept one of the two possible figurative meanings of 
ἐκγελάω in Tr. 1176 either 1) pertaining to the aural aspect of laughter, or 2) to 
the visual element of the phenomenon. In particular, the former interpretation 
of the term is found in modern lexica, which, in their entries to ἐκγελάω, 
adduce the example of Tr. 1176-7 in the meaning of ‘a liquid that rushes out 
                                               
1126 Cf. chapter II, section 2.1.1.6. See also, Halliwell (2008) 522 n. 12.  
1127 LSJ s.v. φόνος. 
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with a gurgling sound’.1128 According to the lexicographers of the LSJ or DGE, 
ἐκγελᾷ signifies the bubbling noise the blood makes coming out of Astyanax’s 
crushed skull. However, Lee argues that the speed of blood pouring out of a 
head-wound is too slow to make a sound resembling that of laughter.1129 In 
effect, most scholars prefer the visual interpretation of ἐκγελᾷ in Tr. 1176, 
although they allude to this meaning in different manner. For instance, some 
translators, e.g. Way and Kovacs, render ἐκγελᾷ with ‘smile’ or ‘grin’, in which 
the visual aspect of laughter is identified with the facial expression.1130 Others, 
like Barlow (cited above), Shapiro and Lattimore, allude to the brightness of the 
blood coming out of the wound.1131 In light of the possible etymological 
connection of the γελ- root with the concept of shining, this last interpretation 
especially seems plausible.1132 In this case, the verb ἐκγελᾷ ‘laughs out’ is used 
to signify the shinning quality of its subject described by the term φόνος. 
 The noun φόνος, however, as mentioned above, may accept different 
meanings: on the one hand it may designate 1) ‘murder’ or ‘slaughter’, which is 
a specific action, i.e. the act of killing a living being in barbarous fashion; on the 
other, it may signify 2) ‘blood’, thus, regard a physical object, in this case, a 
bodily liquid in living creatures. In effect of the semantic ambiguity of the term, 
two interpretations of the sentence ἔνθεν ἐκγελᾷ ὀστέων ῥαγέντων φόνος in 
                                               
1128 LSJ s.v. ἐκγελάω; also DGE s.v. ἐκγελάω 2: ‘de un líquido salir a borbotones’. (original 
emphases). 
1129 Lee (1976) 262. Similarly Clarke (2005) 50 n. 22: ‘Hekabe is imagining the child lying dead at 
the present moment of her speech, some time after the murder itself; any gurgling of blood 
would have lasted only a few seconds after the child hit the ground’. 
1130 Way (1916) 445: ‘through shattered bones forth grins murder – a ghastliness I cannot speak’; 
Kovacs (1999) 125: ‘‘the blood now appears in a smiling gash, to speak the ugly truth plainly’. 
Cf. the macabre comparison of strips of blood to that of a smile in Denniston (1936) 116: ‘the 
white strip of bone between two strips of blood is compared to a set of teeth smiling between 
two red lips’. The idea of grinning in Tr. 1176 is common amongst Polish scholars, cf. 
Abramowiczówna (1958-65) s.v. ἐκγελάω: ‘E. Tr. 1176 skąd wyszczerza się mord’; Łanowski 
(2006) 195: ‘teraz tam szczerzy kość roztrzaskana’.  
1131 Shapiro (2009) 71: ‘The skull now broken, bright blood gushing out / Like wicked laughter 
between the bones’; with the noticeable omission of any reference to laughter in Lattimore 
(2013b) 125: ‘where the brightness now is blood shining through torn bones’. 
1132 Cf. chapter II, section 2.1.1.1. and 2.1.1.2.6. 
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Tr. 1176-7 are permissible: either the expression signifies the child’s blood 
visible between the shattered bones,1133 or it becomes a metaphor for the 
Greeks’ brutal murder of the boy, which evidence is seen on his crushed 
skull.1134 It becomes, then, apparent that the interpretation of lines 1176-7 in the 
Trojan Women depends not only on the accepted meaning of the verb ἐκγελάω 
but also on the reading of its subject φόνος as well. 
Worth mentioning is the interesting interpretation of Tr. 1176-7 proposed 
by Arnould who is of the opinion that Euripides employs the double 
connotations of both ἐκγελάω and φόνος. According to the French scholar, the 
verb appears to evoke the concept of laughter in both of its aspects, aural and 
visual, whereas the noun seems to indicate the object of blood, but as a result of 
the act of murder. In this view, the sentence ἔνθεν ἐκγελᾷ ὀστέων ῥαγέντων 
φόνος reflects two ideas simultaneously: although it primarily refers to the 
brightness of the visible blood (and brain) in the head-wound, however, at the 
same time, it is a metaphor for the hostile laughter of the Greeks satisfied with 
committing such a brutal crime on an innocent child.1135 Here, the reference to 
the sound of laughter is noticeably metonymic. Arnould, hence, proposes a 
double reading of Tr. 1176-7, combining the different possible meanings of both 
ἐκγελάω and φόνος. 
In the Trojan Women, we find an example of the language of laughter 
applied in relation to the descriptive image of a murdered child. By evoking the 
image of laughter with the word ἐκγελάω, Hecuba creates a striking metaphor 
to express the horror of the sight that lies before her: bright blood, crushed 
white bones, the inside of a skull, blood-stained curls, the dead body of a litlle 
boy. Without any doubt, the power of this metaphor resides in the grotesque 
                                               
1133 As in the translation of Way (1916) ad loc. 
1134 Cf. the translations of Barlow (1986); Kovacs (1999); Shapiro (2009); all ad loc. 
1135 Arnould (1990) 139: ‘ἔνθεν ἐκγελᾷ ὀστέων ῥαγέντων φόνος — <<d’où jaillit l’éclat 
meurtrier des os brisés>>: à la fois éclat lumineaux du sang et de la cervelle, et éclats de rire des 
ennemis, satisfaits de leur crime’. For the meaning of ‘brain’ for φόνος, cf. Sch. Eur. Tr. 1176: 
φόνον δὲ λέγει τὸν ἐγκέφαλον, ‘he terms brain with φόνος’, (my translation). 
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combination of laughter with gore. Although we can recognize that the visual 
element in the semantics of ἐκγελάω corresponds more aptly with Hecuba’s 
verbal description of what she sees, nevertheless we cannot fully exclude the 
possible evocation of the concept of sound. In fact, the dramatic effect of this 
disturbing metaphor noticeably increases if we accept Arnould’s suggestion on 
the simultaneous reference to both aural and visual aspects of the concept of 
laughter in Tr. 1176-7. 
Having said this, I would like to turn my attention to the discernable 
functions Hecuba’s description of Astyanax serves in this tragedy. Firstly, the 
queen’s verbal depiction of her grandson’s body is necessary in maintaining the 
illusion of the play, due to the fact that in ancient performances props were 
used to imitate corpses.1136 Therefore, only her words may draw the audience’s 
attention to the lifeless body. Secondly, by focusing on the smallest physical 
detail in the depiction of Astyanax, Euripides gives Hecuba’s speech extra 
dramatic significance; apart from conveying her distress, the verbal description 
of her grandson’s body plays a role in heightening the emotional tension of the 
whole scene (Tr. 1156-1206).1137 As part of the queen’s pictorial language, the 
grotesque reference to laughter may only contribute to this dramatic effect.1138 It 
is, therefore, for tragic purposes that Euripides exploits the ambiguous 
semantics of ἐκγελάω in the Trojan Women. 
                                               
1136 Cf. Roisman (2014b) s.v. ‘props’. 
1137 Barlow (1971) 80-1. 
1138 Interestingly, in her paper ‘Laughter and Blood: A Homeric Echo in Euripides’ Trojan 
Women’, presented at the 145th Annual Meeting of the American Philological Association in 
Chicago, January 2-5 2014, Emily Allen Hornblower proposes a connection between Eur. Tr. 
1176-7 and Hom. Il. 6. 471-75, on the basis of the occurrence of ἐκγελάω ‘laugh out loud’ in 
both passages. In her view, Euripides employs the rare laughter-word in the Trojan Women, in 
order to recall the Homeric scene, in which the boy’s parents, Hector and Andromache, ‘laugh 
out loud’ at the sight of their son being afraid of his father’s helmet (ἐκ δ' ἐγέλασσε πατήρ τε 
φίλος καὶ πότνια μήτηρ, Il. 6. 471). With the evocation of the Iliadic familial scene, Euripides 
creates a sharp contrast between Astyanax’s happy past and the present horror of his death, 
which, according to Hornblower, increases the dramatic effect of Hecuba’s speech upon the 
body of her grandchild.  
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In this part of the chapter, I have discussed the interpretations of 
laughter-words employed by Euripides in his surviving dramas. In general, I 
have distinguished six main categories of the phenomenon the applied Greek 
terminology refers to: 1) the physiology of laughter (sound and facial 
expression, 2) its connection with humour, 3) the psychological aspect of 
laughter (delight, joy, state of madness, 4) the communicative function of 
laughter, 5) laughter as the manifestation of one’s disposition towards another 
(playfulness, mockery, hostility, triumph), and 6) the Greek association of 
laughter with the concept of shinning. It is, thus, evident, that the poet 
recognizes laughter to be a multi-facted phenomenon. 
5.3. Laughter-words in the fragments 
Euripides is believed to have staged 88 plays.1139 Today, we possess a 
very large number of fragments which complement our understanding of 
Euripidean drama. Nonetheless, these fragments consist only of eight instances 
of laughter-words; these are listed in table 12 below:1140 
Fragment Lexeme Form in text Grammar 
fr. 327 γελάω γελᾶν Inf. pr. act. 
fr. 492. 3 γελοῖος (μισῶ) γελοίους Acc. pl. 
fr. 460 γέλως γέλως (γίγνεται) Nom. sg. 
fr. 492. 1 γέλως τοῦ γέλωτος Gen. sg. 
fr. 492. 5 γέλως (ἐν) γέλωτι Dat. sg. 
fr. 1063 γέλως (μέγας) γέλως Nom. sg. 
fr. 991 ἐγγελάω ἐγγελᾷ Ind. pr. act. 3rd sg. 
fr. 362 συγγελάω συγγελᾶν Inf. pr. act. 
Table 15. List of Greek words on laughter present in the fragments of Euripides. 
                                               
1139 Czerwińska (2005b) 774. However, the number varies among ancient sources, e.g. Vita 
Euripidis and the Suda list 92 works composed in general, but the former states 75 dramas as 
surviving to the Byzantine period, whereas the latter declares 77; for a discussion on the 
number of works and the history of the transmission of the texts, see Lesky (2006) 319-28.  
1140 Fragments of Euripides are numbered according to the edition of Kannicht in TrGF V. 
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In this section I will be dealing with such lexemes: three verbs γελάω, 
ἐγγελάω, συγγελάω, one noun γέλως and one adjective γελοῖος. 
Furthermore, we will see that six of these references are found in fragments 
attributed to specific plays (fr. 327; fr. 362; fr. 460; fr. 492), whereas the sources 
of the other two references remain unknown (fr. 991; fr. 1063). I will discuss 
these fragments in the same manner as I have done in the previous two 
chapters, firstly focusing on the attributed fragments, then turning to those of 
unknown plays. 
5.3.1. Fragments of identified plays 
Six laughter-words are found in fragments attributed to specific plays. 
These are the Danae (fr. 327), Cretan Women (fr. 460), Erechtheus (fr. 362), and 
Melanippe Captive (fr. 492). It is worth noting that the passages I will discuss 
below come from tragedies. 
5.3.1.1. Derision 
The first reference to laughter in a Euripidean fragment comes from the 
lost play Danae. This tragedy presented the story of the Argive princess baring 
the child of Zeus and being cast with it in a chest by her father, Acrisius.1141 In 
fr. 327, an unknown character speaks of the social impact of wealthy people: 
φιλοῦσι γάρ τοι τῶν μὲν ὀλβίων βροτοὶ  
σοφοὺς †ἡγεῖσθαι† τοὺς λόγους, ὅταν δέ τις  
λειτῶν ἀπ' οἴκων εὖ λέγῃ πένης ἀνήρ,  
γελᾶν· ἐγὼ δὲ πολλάκις σοφωτέρους  
πένητας ἄνδρας εἰσορῶ τῶν πλουσίων  
καὶ <τοὺς> θεοῖσι μικρὰ θύοντας τέλη  
τῶν βουθυτούντων ὄντας εὐσεβεστέρους. 
The truth is, men usually †regard† the words of the prosperous as wise, but 
when some poor man from a modest house speaks well, they laugh. I often 
observe that poor men are wiser than the rich, however, and that those who 
                                               
1141 For a reconstruction of the tragedy’s plot, see Karamanou (2006) 22-9.  
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offer small sacrifices to the gods are more reverent that those who sacrifice 
oxen.1142 
We may recognize the fact that this fragment has been preserved for its 
sententious tone,1143 in which the character makes a general observation of men 
(βροτοὶ, v. 1) tending to (φιλοῦσι, literally ‘they love’, v. 1) give credence to the 
words of the rich (τῶν μὲν ὀλβίων, v. 1), but also being fond of laughing 
(φιλοῦσι… βροτοὶ… γελᾶν) at those with less money (λειτῶν ἀπ' οἴκων… 
πένης ἀνήρ, v. 3). Accordingly, people treat with respect the opinions of those 
who are rich, whereas reject similar views expressed by those of lesser wealth. 
Apparently, the speaker reproaches this human tendency to ridicule others on 
socially biased grounds. Here, the word γελᾶν in line 4 clearly evokes the idea 
of derision in regard of dismissing those public speakers only on the basis of 
their low material status.1144  
5.3.1.2. Schadenfreude 
Malicious delight connected with laughter is discernable in a fragment of 
the lost tragedy Cretan Women. In general, the play unfolded the consequences 
of the improper liason of the Cretan princess Aerope with a manservant. Her 
father, king Cathreus, decided to have her killed for such a disgraceful act and 
handed her to Nauplius, an Argive commander, who, instead of executing the 
girl, had her marry Pleisthenes.1145 It is commonly presumed that fr. 460 deals 
with the discovery of Aerope’s disgraceful affair, since the unknown character 
speaks of the necessity of concealing the fact of committing shameful deeds. 
λύπη μὲν ἄτῃ περιπεσεῖν αἰσχρᾷ τινι·  
                                               
1142 Translation in Collard and Cropp (2008a) 335. Hereon, I quote the English translations of 
other Euripidean fragments from this edition, unless stated otherwise. 
1143 Transmitted in Stob. 4.33.14. 
1144 Cf. Karamanou (2006) 98 n. 4. 
1145 Sch. Soph. Ai. 1297a: ἡ ἱστορία ἐν ταῖς “Κρήσσαις” Εὐριπίδου, ὅτι διαφθαρεῖσαν αὐτὴν 
λάθρᾳ ὑπὸ τοῦ θεράποντος ὁ πατὴρ Ναυπλίῳ παρέδωκεν ἐντειλάμενος καταποντῶσαι· ὁ 
δὲ οὐκ ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ' ἠγγύησε Πλεισθένει. Difficulties, however, remain in reconstructing 
the plot of the play, cf. Collard and Cropp (2008a) 517-18. 
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εἰ δ' οὖν γένοιτο, χρὴ περιστεῖλαι καλῶς  
κρύπτοντα καὶ μὴ πᾶσι κηρύσσειν τάδε·  
γέλως γὰρ ἐχθροῖς γίγνεται τὰ τοιάδε.  
It is painful to have a shaming disaster befall one; but if it should happen, 
one must conceal and cover it well, and not proclaim to it at all. Such things 
become a mockery for one’s enemies. 
Noticeably, this fragment contains the motive of dreading the laughter of 
enemies. We may clearly recognize the speaker’s fear of making those people 
who are hostile towards him/her, laugh maliciously at him/her should they find 
out about the ‘shaming disaster’ (ἄτῃ… αἰσχρᾷ, v. 1) Here, it is evident that the 
word γέλως in line 4 pertains to the idea of Schadenfreude, since the dreaded 
subject of laughter are explicit enemies (ἐχθροῖς, v. 4) taking delight at one’s 
misfortunes. Again, the language of laughter is used to evoke the image of 
people laughing at the misfortunes of their antagonists. 
5.3.1.3. Humour 
Greek laughter-words used in relation to humour appear in a fragment 
of the lost Melanippe Captive.1146 In fr. 492, an unknown character expresses 
his/her detest towards people who make others laugh as well as the humorous 
devices they employ:  
ἀνδρῶν δὲ πολλοὶ τοῦ γέλωτος εἵνεκα  
ἀσκοῦσι χάριτας κερτόμους· ἐγὼ δέ πως  
μισῶ γελοίους, οἵτινες τήτει σοφῶν  
ἀχάλιν' ἔχουσι στόματα, κεἰς ἀνδρῶν μὲν οὐ  
τελοῦσιν ἀριθμόν, ἐν γέλωτι δ' εὐπρεπεῖς.  
Many men practise ingratiating mockery for a joke, but I am inclined to 
despise those jokers who keep their mouths unbridled for want of wise 
things to say; they may be conspicuous for joking, but they do not count as 
men. 
Interestingly, this fragment alone contains of three laughter-words: two 
instances of the noun γέλως, of which one refers to the elicition of laughter in 
others (τοῦ γέλωτος εἵνεκα, lit. ‘for a laugh’, v. 1) whereas the second regards 
                                               
1146 On the plot of the play, see Lesky (2006) 507. 
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the skill of joking (ἐν γέλωτι εὐπρεπεῖς, lit. ‘conspicuous for joking’, v. 5); and 
a single occurance of the adjective γελοῖος, which is used in the plural as a 
substantive to denote ‘jokers’ (γελοίους, v. 3). As we can seen, the cumulation 
of these terms depict a social image of laughter consisting of witty people 
telling jokes and having others laugh with amusement. Mockery, therefore, 
mentioned in line 2 (χάριτας κερτόμους), is used for humorous purposes.1147 In 
this regard, we may recognize the fact that the speaker expresses his hatred for 
humorous laughter, in particular. 
5.3.1.4. A negative evaluation of laughter 
In the Euripidean fragments, we may find references to laughter, which 
refer to the phenomenon in non-favourable terms. Such example is found in the 
previously discussed fr. 492, in which the unknown character dismisses 
mockery, but also jokes and those who make them for fun. Clearly, the speaker 
expresses a strong dislike (μισῶ, v. 3) in those people who perform ridicule 
(ἀσκοῦσι κερτόμους, v. 2) in order to raise a laugh (τοῦ γέλωτος εἵνεκα, v. 1) 
as to gain other’s favour (χάριτας, 2).1148 Accordingly, such humorists 
(γελοίους, v. 3), noted for their art of joking (ἐν γέλωτι δ' εὐπρεπεῖς, v. 5), 
incur laughter only to make the impression of being wise (οἵτινες τήτει σοφῶν, 
v. 3). However, such behaviour is considered to be highly immoderate. This is 
especially noticeable by the speaker’s use of the expression ‘unbridled mouths’ 
(ἀχάλινα στόματα). In effect, the unknown character does not regard such 
people, who speak in an excessive manner, as real men (κεἰς ἀνδρῶν μὲν οὐ / 
τελοῦσιν ἀριθμόν, v. 4-5). Without any doubt, the speaker’s objections to 
                                               
1147 For a discussion on the verb κερτομέω ‘sneer’, ‘taunt at’ in connection with laugther, see 
Arnould (1990) 115-16. 
1148 Cf. Halliwell (2008) 19 n. 42. 
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derision but also humour are of moral nature.1149 In short, fr. 492 preserves the 
views of a discernible laughter-hater.1150 
A similar non-favourable view of laughter is found fr. 362 of the tragedy 
Erechtheus. In this fragment, the title character gives a farewell speech to his 
young son, listing many pieces of good advice on life.1151 At one point, the king 
of Athens speaks of what sort of people his child should avoid in the future (fr. 
362 21-23): 
ὁμιλίας δὲ τὰς γεραιτέρων φίλει,  
ἀκόλαστ<α δ>' ἤθη λαμπρὰ συγγελᾶν μόνον  
μίσει· βραχεῖα τέρψις ἡδονῆς κακῆς. 
Welcome the company of older men, and scorn unbridled behaviour which 
wins acclaim only by raising laughs: there’s brief enjoyment in 
dishonourable pleasure.  
In these lines, we may notice that Erechtheus advocates temperance in his son’s 
life. Accordingly, this virtue requires a moderation in certain behaviours, 
which, performed in excess may dispense disgrace, in spite of their pleasant 
character. As the Athenian king stresses in line 2, such dishonour is brought 
upon by ἀκόλαστα ἤθη, ‘undisciplined manners’, which gain the approval of 
others only by making them laugh (λαμπρὰ συγγελᾶν μόνον). Such 
disapproval is emphasized by the king’s juxtaposition of the two groups of his 
son’s possible companions: the one of older men (γεραιτέρων), whose 
company the father recommends (indicated by the imperative φίλει, ‘love’), in 
opposition to that of, as we may deduce, young men, whose company he 
condemns (indicated by the imperative μίσει, ‘hate’).1152 In reference to the 
                                               
1149 Similar notion expresses the Better Argument who in Ar. Nu. 992 promises to teach the 
young Phidippides ‘to feel shame at what is shameful and flare at anyone who mocks you’ (καὶ 
τοῖς αἰσχροῖς αἰσχύνεσθαι κἂν σκώπτῃ τίς σε φλέγεσθαι). Translation in Henderson (1998b) 
145. 
1150 Curiously, Euripides is considered to be a μισογέλως ‘laughter-hater’ in Alex. Aet. fr. 7. 1-2 
CA , cf. chapter II, n. 288. See also Halliwell (2008) 271 n. 18. 
1151 For the reconstruction of the plot of the play, see Collard and Cropp (2008a) 363-7. For a 
general discussion on the play, see Lesky (2006) 423-4, and esp. 423 n. 165 for further references. 
1152 On the fondness of laughter amongst the young, cf. Arist. Rh. 1389b 11, who calls the young 
φιλογέλωτες, ‘laughter-lovers’ (cf. chapter II, n. 284). In Ar. Nu. 983, Better Argument 
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latter group, Euripides employs the very rare compound συγγελάω, meaning 
‘laugh together with’, with which he indicates the social aspect of laughter. 
However, this sociality is, too, condemned by the king. The reason for this is 
the indecency of the ‘unbridled behaviour’, which cause laughter and, thus, 
make it also improper itself. Although Erechtheus recognizes the pleasant 
nature of such shared experience, nevertheless it is a short-lasting and a 
dishonourable sort of pleasure (ἡδονῆς κακῆς). As we can see, this fragment 
reflects a negative image of laughter in terms of morality, should it be incurred 
by indecent conduct and shared in the wrong company. 
 
In the fragments attributed to specific Euripidean tragedies, we may 
recognize that, generally, four main concepts of laughter are evoked in 
connection with: 1) derision, 2) hostility, 3) humour, and 4) the negative 
evaluation of the phenomenon. 
5.3.2. Fragments of unidentified plays 
The last two Euripidean uses of laughter-words are traceable in 
fragments of unknown dramas. Neither the title, nor the genre of the plays are 
known to us. However, we may distinguish one common feature in both 
fragments, namely, the evocation of the idea of laughter in connection with 
derision. 
As discussed before, incredulous views about the gods may attract 
mockery.1153 A similar notion is reflected in the two-versed passage of fr. 991: 
ἀλλ' <ἔστιν> ἔστι, κεἴ τις ἐγγελᾷ λόγῳ,  
Ζεὺς καὶ θεοὶ βρότεια λεύσσοντες πάθη. 
But there really are, there really are, even if one laughs at the saying, Zeus 
and the gods noticing mankind’s suffering.1154 
                                                                                                                                         
disapproves of a young man giggling (οὐδὲ κιχλίζειν); for the semantics of this verb, see 
chapter II, section 2.1.4.1. 
1153 Cf. section 5.2.5.2. 
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This sententious fragment refers to the disdain one may express at the thought 
of divine activity. Here, the lexeme ἐγγελᾷ indicates the scornful stance one 
may reveal towards the saying about the gods taking notice of human 
sufferings. Again, we find an example of ridicule occasioned by one’s disbelief 
in the supernatural. 
In the next fr. 1063, a character considers a certain circumstance as 
ridiculous. From the grammatical forms, we may recognize that the speaker is 
female who talks about the behaviour of a despotic husband towards his wife. 
δεῖ πυνθάνεσθαι γάρ σε νῷν χἡμᾶς σέθεν.  
τὸ μὲν μέγιστον, οὔποτ' ἄνδρα χρὴ σοφὸν  
λίαν φυλάσσειν ἄλοχον ἐν μυχοῖς δόμων·  
ἐρᾷ γὰρ ὄψις τῆς θύραθεν ἡδονῆς·  
ἐν δ' ἀφθόνοισι τοῖσδ' ἀναστρωφωμένη  
βλέπουσά τ' εἰς πᾶν καὶ παροῦσα πανταχοῦ  
τὴν ὄψιν ἐμπλήσασ' ἀπήλλακται κακῶν·  
{τό τ' ἄρσεν ἀεὶ τοῦ κεκρυμμένου λίχνον.}  
ὅστις δὲ μοχλοῖς καὶ διὰ σφραγισμάτων  
σῴζει δάμαρτα, δρᾶν τι δὴ δοκῶν σοφὸν  
μάταιός ἐστι καὶ φρονῶν οὐδὲν φρονεῖ·  
ἥτις γὰρ ἡμῶν καρδίαν θύραζ' ἔχει,  
θᾶσσον μὲν οἰστοῦ καὶ πτεροῦ χωρίζεται,  
λάθοι δ' ἂν Ἄργου τὰς πυκνοφθάλμους κόρας·  
καὶ πρὸς κακοῖσι τοῦτο δὴ μέγας γέλως,  
ἁνήρ τ' ἀχρεῖος χἡ γυνὴ διοίχεται.  
You must learn from us two, therefore, and we from you. The biggest thing 
is, a wise husband should never keep his wife too much under guard in his 
inner house; for her eyes long for the pleasure that is out of doors. If she 
wanders freely and ungrudged among those things, however, and looks at 
everything and is present everywhere, her eyes are sated and she is kept 
from trouble. {A male too is always prurient about what is hidden.} The 
husband who keeps his wife safe by means of bars and seals, imagining that 
he is doing something wise, is a fool and his thinking makes no sense; for 
any of us who has her heart abroad is off faster than an arrow or a bird on 
the wing, and would evade the clustered eyes of Argus – and there’s much 
to laugh at here, as well as trouble: the husband is helpless, and his wife is 
gone.1155 
In this monologue, it becomes evident that the woman is trying to convince the 
interlocutor about the need for a man to give his wife some freedom. In fact, the 
                                                                                                                                         
1154 Translation in Collard and Cropp (2008b) 567. 
1155 Translation in Collard and Cropp (2008b) 599. 
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female character considers a husband’s repressive actions towards his spouse to 
be a sign of his foolishness (μάταιός ἐστι, v. 11) and mistaken thinking 
(φρονῶν οὐδὲν φρονεῖ, v. 11). She, then, points to the vanity of guarding one’s 
wife, if her heart is already beating for someone else (literally ‘has her heart 
outside’, καρδίαν θύραζ' ἔχει, v. 12). In such a situation, as the speaker notices, 
there can only be ‘much to laugh at’ (μέγας γέλως, v. 15), for the cuckold 
husband cannot do anything (‘helpless man’, ἁνήρ ἀχρεῖος, v. 16) to prevent 
his wife from leaving him (διοίχεται, v. 16). Since the female character speaks 
of a husband’s useless efforts with disdain, it is clear that the idea of laughter 
she evokes in line 15 is derision.1156 Therefore, with the expression μέγας 
γέλως, ‘great laughter’, the woman considers the possible consequences of a 
man’s worthless represiveness as worthy only of ridicule. 
5.3.3. A fragment in the Amherst Papyrus? 
The concordance to Euripides of Allen and Italie (1954) includes one 
more instance of the term γέλως, which is traceable in the second Amherst 
papyrus. According to Grefhell and Hunt, the editors of the papyrus, it contains 
a fragment of an argument to the lost Euripidean satyr drama Sciron, in which 
few lines of the play were quoted (P. Amh. II 17).1157 Due to the poor state of the 
papyrus, only few phrases are discernable, among others the words γέλωτα 
κινεῖν (P. Amh. II 17. 9). This expression, in its basic sense, means ‘to arouse a 
laugh’, hence refers to the production of laughter.1158 Yet, the lack of a context 
makes any further study of this example impossible.  
In the last decades, however, scholars have questioned the attribution of 
P. Amh. 17 II to the drama Sciron, which has resulted in a tendency to omit this 
                                               
1156 Halliwell (2008) 80 n. 68. 
1157 Grenhell and Hunt (1901) 8. 
1158 Cf. chapter II, section 2.1.1.3. with n. 119. 
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fragment in recent studies on this play.1159 For this reason, the reference to 
laughter in the Amherst papyrus is of no relevance to my discussion. 
 
This part of the chapter presented a lexical-interpretative analysis of the 
Greek terminology related to laughter found in the fragments of Euripides. As 
it has emerged, the discussed passages have been basically preserved for their 
sententious tone. In particular, they reflect three main understandings of the 
phenomenon in connection with 1) its unfavourable evaluation in terms of 
morality (fr. 362; fr. 492), 2) the signalization of hostility (fr. 460), 3) the idea of 
derision (fr. 327; fr. 991; fr. 1003), and 4) humour (fr. 492). In general, the 
Euripidean fragments reflect the same connotations of laughter as 
distinguished in the surviving dramas, but, additionally, present a negative 
view of the phenomenon. 
5.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have examined the Greek laughter-words traceable in 
fifteen surviving plays and six fragments of Euripides. My analysis 
encompassed a total of 51 references to laughter, from which 43 instances 
appear in the extant dramas, whereas 8 are found in the fragments. As it has 
emerged from my discussion concerning Euripides’ use of the Greek terms 
listed at the beginning of this chapter, it is apparent that the poet evokes the 
idea of laughter in a variety of connotations.  
First of all, laughter is obviously connected with sound. Interestingly, the 
poet presents both mortals and immortals as capable of laughing, as shown on 
the examples of gods (Zeus in IT 1274, Demeter in Hl. 1349, Dionysus in Ba. 
439), men (Bacchic followers in Ba. 380, banqueters in Ion 1172) and heroes 
(Heracles in HF 946). However, the texts of dramas do not provide supportive 
                                               
1159 Zuntz (1955) 134; Steffen (1971) 25-33. 
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material for the poet presenting any of his characters as laughing onstage. As I 
have pointed out, even the single possible exhortation to laugh aloud (Tr. 332) 
remains without a response. In Euripidean drama, therefore, we hear (or read) 
about laughter, but do not hear laughter itself.  
Euripides gives but a single example of the phenomenon evoked in 
relation to facial expression (Ba. 1021). Yet, also in this case, the image of 
Dionysus’ laughing face is conjured up in an invocation delivered by the 
Chorus. Hence, it does not explicitly refer to events onstage, although scholars 
debate whether the mention of the god’s face, who appears as a character in the 
play, is not a reference to the actor’s mask.  
Euripidean drama also provides instances of laughter evoked in 
connection with humour. Here, it is apparent that the perception of an 
incongruity elicits amusement in the observer (Zeus’ in reaction to Apollo’s 
behaviour in IT 1274; the baqueters to a man’s excentric behaviour in Ion 1172; 
the Servants’ in response to Heracles’ actions in HF 950). In one case, this 
pleasant feeling leads to a loud outburst (IT 1274; Ion 1172), whereas in the 
other, it remains unexpressed (HF 950). However, these examples of humorous 
laughter in the extant dramas regard past events (recent in Ion 1172 and HF 950 
but unidentified in IT 1274) and are only mentioned by others. As for fr. 492, it 
presents a negative view on humorous laughter elicited by people performing 
jokes.  
Next, we have seen that the poet conjures up laughter in relation to 
different psychological states, such as the experience of various emotions: 
delight (the princess in Md. 1162; Demeter in Hl. 1349), joy (the Bacchants in Ba. 
380), Schadenfreude (unidentified enemies in fr. 460), but also mental states like 
madness (Heracles in HF 935). Here, it is clear that laughter is taken to be an 
outward manifestation of internal processes.  
Furthermore, the poet employs the language of laughter in relation to 
nonverbal communication between two characters. This is clearly the case of 
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Clytaemestra, who evokes the image of laughter to denote her not receiving 
support from the Greek army (IA 912). Interesting is the example in Md. 1041, in 
which the children’s innocent laughter reflects to Medea the horror of her 
plans. As we can see, Euripides exploits the communicative aspect of laughter 
in order to enable another character’s self-reflection.  
Moreover, the poet is aware of the semantic connection of γελ- rooted 
words with the concept of brightness, as we have seen in the gruesome 
example of ‘laughing blood’ in Tr. 1176. Here, the metaphor of laughter 
enriches the rich imagery of Euripidean drama. 
Finally, the largest amount of references to laughter associate the 
phenomenon with revealing one’s disposition towards another. As it has 
emerged from the discussion, these attitudes may be playful (Alc. 804), derisive 
(13 examples), hostile (19 examples), or even antagonistic (Ba. 842, 1021). Theses 
instances reflect the understanding of laughter as an interpersonal 
phenomenon. 
In view of such large collection of meanings of laughter evoked in the 
plays and fragments of Euripides, it is obvious that the poet is fully aware of 
the complexity of the discussed phenomenon.  
Noticeably, the general attitude towards laughter in Euripidean drama 
appears to be quite unfavourable. Firstly, it seems that only immortals and 
those who receive their benevolence are allowed to experience laughter without 
any consequences. Amongst the gods presented as laughing, it is noticeable 
that Zeus (IT 1274) and Demeter (Hl. 1349) laugh pleasantly, the first with 
amusement, the latter with delight. As for the laughter of Dionysus in Ba. 439, it 
is too enigmatic for its nature to be defined. Next, in regard of mortals, we have 
seen that Bacchic worshippers are expected to honour their god with joyful 
bouts of laughs (Ba. 380). Thus, the protection of Dionysus grants his followers 
a pleasant experience. Similarly the banqueters in Ion 1172, who feast under a 
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god’s care (in this case it is Apollo) and share laughter together.1160 Piety, 
therefore, as it appears, grants humans the possibility to enjoy the pleasure of 
laughter. 
In contrast stand the other Euripidean examples of mortal men laughing. 
Although we have seen that some characters may laugh in a seemingly positive 
way (Jason’s bride with Md. 1162; possibly Medea’s children Md. 1041) or feel 
an urge to laugh (the servants in HF 950), nevertheless their laughter is 
shortwhile and appears just before disaster happens in their surrounding (HF 
950), or worse, falls upon them (Md. 1162; Md. 1041). As we can see, even such 
laughter defined as ‘innocent’ does not end well.1161 Euripides, however, uses 
these instances of seemingly pleasant laughter for dramatic purposes, in order 
to increase the tension of the scenes or narratives. 
It seems that Euripides leaves no room for his characters to experience 
pleasant laughter. We have seen that Cassandra’s exhortation to laugh just after 
the defeat of her city (Tr. 332) as well as Heracles’ urge for the manservant to 
accept a more playful mood, despite his obvious mourning (Alc. 804), occur as 
highly improper under the circumstances. Also, the views expressed in some 
fragments discernibly disapprove of the experiences of group laughter (fr. 362) 
or shared fun (fr. 492). In general, then, we can see that despite some instances 
that evoke laughter in the positive sense, Euripides seldom alludes to laughter 
as a pleasant experience. In other words, there is little pleasure in Euripidean 
laughter. 
Having said this, I would like to refer to the second important 
observation on laughter in the drama of Euripides, which is the fact of its 
distinct social nature. This comes as no surprise, since a majority of Euripidean 
references (35 examples) evoke the idea of laughter in connection with 
                                               
1160 While laughing, the banqueters are ignorant of the fact that their laughter has been 
provoked by a man with criminal intentions, hence, their pleasure remains undisturbed and has 
no extra consequences. 
1161 Cf. Dillon (1991) 351. 
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revealing one’s disposition towards another. Therefore, laughter is used to 
denote the quality of interpersonal relations between the characters of the 
plays. Interestingly, Euripides favours using the language of laughter to define 
non-amicable rapports, which, often, have been disrupted by one of the sides of 
a relationship. This has become evident from the four main circumstances I 
have distinguished as leading to hostile rapports: 1) betrayal of φιλία, for 
instance, between fathers and sons (Theseus and Hippolytus in Hipp. 1000; 
Pheres and Admetus in Alc. 724), but also husbands and wives (Jason and 
Medea in Md. 383, 404, 797, 1049, 1355, 1362); 2) open conflict between two 
nations (the Greeks and the Trojans in IA 372 and Rh. 815), or between invaders 
and local rulers (Lycus with his army and Heracles’ family in HF 285); 3) 
enslavement of strangers (Orestes by the Taurians in IT 504; the satyrs by the 
Cyclops in Cyc. 687); and last, 4) the struggle for power between two opponents 
(Pentheus and Dionysus in Ba. 250, 272, 286, 322, 854, 1081). Euripides seems to 
be especially interested in the matters of interpersonal relationships between 
his characters. It is noteworthy to point to the fact that the two dramas with the 
highest numbers of references to laughter are the Bacchae (10) and Medea (8), 
whose plots revolve around the difficult or disrupted rapport between the two 
main protagonists (between a god and man, as well as between former φίλοι). 
We may, therefore, recognize that like Aeschylus and Sophocles, Euripides also 
evokes the idea of laughter in regard to human relationships; however, his chief 
focus is on the negative state of these rapports, dysfunctional, disrupted or 
even militant. In other words, for the most part Euripidean laughter denotes 
broken relationships between people as well as between people and gods. 
It is, thus, possible to paraphrase the saying of Victor Borge, quoted at 
the beginning of this chapter, that laughter is the shortest distance between two 
Euripidean characters. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
Laughter has no foreign accent. 
 Paul Lowney, Toads1162 
 
 
This study was set out to explore and identify the understandings of 
laughter in the works and fragments of the three major Greek playwrights of 
the classical period: Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides. My thesis has also 
sought to know whether the dramatists reflect a similar recognition of laughter 
to modern explanations of the phenomenon. Despite the increasing interest on 
laughter in antiquity in the last years, the theoretical literature on the subject 
considering Greek tragedy and satyr play has been scant and usually dealt with 
the matter in generalities. Such approach, consequently, omitted the 
characteristics of style of the three playwrights. Hence, in my opinion, there has 
been a need for a broader discussion on the subject, which this thesis has 
attempted to provide.  
In order to give answers to the five research questions posed in the 
Introduction, I have examined the references to laughter discernible in the 
surviving works and fragments of the three classical Greek playwrights. My 
investigation has been divided into two parts: in the first, I have established the 
conceptual framework for the study of laughter in fifth-century Greek drama; 
in the second, I have applied this theoretical framework in my lexical-
interpretative analysis of the particular references to laughter found in the 
defined corpus of texts.  
In chapter one, devoted to the discussion on laughter itself, I have 
studied the traditional theories and modern explanations for the phenomenon. 
At this stage it has emerged that there was and still is no single theory which 
                                               
1162 Lowney (1997) 11. 
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would define laughter in all of its aspects. As it has been shown, laughter 
appears to be a complex phenomenon occurring on different levels of human 
activity: physiological, intellectual, psychological and social. Finally, the 
analysis in this introductory chapter allowed me to distinguish twenty-four 
universal understandings of the phenomenon, which I have used as a backdrop 
in my investigation on the meanings of the Greek terminology related to 
laughter in the following chapter of the study. Thus, this chapter answers the 
first research question of the thesis, for it presents laughter to be a complex 
physical, psychological and social human phenomenon. 
In chapter two, the general classification of the various aspects of 
laughter proved applicable to the examination of the Greek terms for laughter, 
which I have analyzed according to five main word-groups. Special attention 
has been paid to the semantics of the Greek terminology of laughter. The 
lexical-semantic analysis in this part of my study has shown that the ancient 
modern English shares a similar understanding of the complexity of the 
discussed phenomenon as in Greek language, for all twenty-four categories of 
laughter distinguished in chapter one have been already recognized by the 
ancient Greeks, as the study of the semantics of the Greek terminology for 
laughter has shown. Also, I have also identified an additional and distinctly 
Greek connotation for the phenomenon of laughter, since the Greek language 
reflects, in certain terms for laughter, the concept of brightness. On the basis of 
the discussion in chapter two, I have discerned twenty-five general 
understandings of the phenomenon of laughter reflected in the ancient Greek 
language, which constituted the conceptual framework applied in my 
investigation in the second part of the study. Hence, this chapter provides the 
answers to the second and third research questions regarding the Greek 
terminology for laughter: firstly, I have shown that the Greek language possess 
a rich (consisting of 133 terms) vocabulary for laughter and laughter-related 
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phenomena; secondly, it has become apparent that already the Greek language 
reflected the understanding of laughter about the complex nature of laughter.  
In the second part of my thesis, consisting of three chapters, I have 
examined the Greek terminology for laughter appearing in the extant plays and 
fragments of the three dramatists. The particular findings on the meanings of 
laughter and the distinct use of its references by individual authors are chapter 
specific and I have summarized them in detail within the respective chapters: 
Aeschylean laughter in chapter three, Sophoclean laughter in chapter four and 
Euripidean laughter in chapter five. In general, the results from my analysis of 
the defined corpus of Greek texts have provided such answers to the last two 
research questions posed at the beginning of this study, regarding the general 
perception of laughter in Greek drama as well as the similarities and 
differences in its treatment by the three poets. 
Firstly, it is evident that Greek drama also reflects the understanding of 
the complexity of laughter, since the analyzed references evoked laughter in 
connection with such concepts: bodily actions (sound, facial expression), 
emotional experiences (joy, delight, amusement, Schadenfreude), states of mind 
(madness), manifestation of dispositions (friendliness, hostility, derision, 
triumph), communication, and the idea of brightness. Therefore, the authors of 
the Greek dramas and fragments of plays discussed in this study share the 
same general perception of laughter as a multi-faceted phenomenon. 
Secondly, the three poets share a common interest in the expressive and 
social aspects of laughter, since they all tend to evoke most often those images 
of laughter in connection with the manifestation of different emotions as well as 
dispositions. It has become clear that Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides apply 
the language of laughter in order to denote the quality of the relationships 
between the dramatic characters in their plays. 
Thirdly, despite the similarities between the three playwrights in 
perceiving as well as referring to the same aspects of laughter, every dramatist 
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uses the motif of laughter in his own manner and for his own purposes. In 
particular, the references to Aeschylean laughter correspond with world 
depicted by him in his drama governed by divine laws the characters have to 
abide; the instances of Sophoclean laughter reflect the traditional moral code 
that governs the social relationships of the characters in the world presented by 
Sophocles; and finally, the examples of Euripidean laughter show the poet’s 
interest in the emotional interactions between his characters. Hence, it has 
become apparent that the three poets use the motif of laughter in accordance to 
the general themes presented in their dramas. 
This study continues the discussion on laughter in the works of 
Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides and, hopefully, contributes to the fuller 
understanding of the phenomenon itself and its representation in Greek drama. 
I hope to have presented a clear framework of the understandings of laughter 
for its examination in Greek texts. In my opinion, it is important to keep in 
mind the fact of that references to laughter do not imply humour or the comic, 
as some scholars tend to associate or even identify in their research on Greek 
classical drama. In accordance to the view of Halliwell (1991), (2008), it is 
evident that the dramatists make references to laughter as a socially potent 
mean of communication. Sociality, therefore, is a crucial aspect of laughter in 
Greek drama. In this respect, although hostile laughter is rather dominant, 
especially in the tragedies, however, it is not exclusive, as it may seem in 
Arnould (1990) and in the Introduction to Halliwell (2008). In regard of the 
generally negative impression of laughter in the tragedies, which Dillon (1991) 
calls ‘tragic laughter’, it has become apparent that the references to laughter in 
the dramas correspond to the general themes presented by the individual 
playwrights in their works. And finally, although the main ideas on laughter in 
Greek drama distinguished in this study are consistent with those presented by 
Arnould (1990), Dillon (1991) and Halliwell (2008), nevertheless I attempted to 
broaden their general discourse with my detailed examination of the Greek 
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terminology for laughter and interpretations of the phenomenon in the 
analyzed texts. 
This thesis has encountered a number of limitations, which I have 
considered in the Introduction, and, as a consequence, leave room for further 
research. First and foremost, to complete the discussion on laughter in Greek 
drama of the classical period, the next study on this subject should take into 
account the 91 references to the phenomenon found in the surviving plays and 
fragments of Aristophanes. I am currently investigating the matter, for, in my 
opinion, the inclusion of fifth century comedy will allow to expound the 
perception of laughter in all three dramatic genres and distinguish whether the 
genre influences the discernible meanings of laughter. With such a 
comparatistic approach I would also continue Dillon’s 1991 discussion and see 
whether the new findings would confirm or not his distinction of a separate 
type of ‘tragic laughter’. Another possible study could include all references to 
laughter in the many fragments of other playwrights of the fifth and fourth 
century. Also, it would be interesting to study the references to laughter 
distinguishable in the preserved works and fragments of Menander. Such 
broad material would extend the discussion to the drama of the Hellenistic 
period, hence would allow a full understanding of the dramatic presentations 
of the phenomenon of laughter. 
This study has had the phenomenon of laughter, ‘the most familiar yet 
elusive of human behaviours’1163, as its focus of interest. The ancient Greeks 
recognized this elusiveness of the phenomenon and therefore never attempted 
to give it a definition or a theory. However, as shown on the example of the 
preserved texts of the three major dramatists, the Greeks were fully aware of 
the complexity of laughter, which exceeds the single connection with the sphere 
of the comic. Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides clearly share this 
                                               
1163 Halliwell (2008) viii. 
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understanding about laughter being mostly a human phenomenon and 
concerning basically interpersonal relations. In this respect, it is clear that the 
discourse on laughter did not begin with Plato nor Aristotle, as it is usually 
assumed, but was already undertaken by the classical dramatists of the fifth-
century. 
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